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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 70/71 **Winter/Spring 1969**

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IDEOLOGIES, PAST AND PRESENT

Maurice Cranston

IS ideology dead? 1968 was certainly a bad year for the best-established ideologies. The Soviet intervention in the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia was a body-blow against international communism. The Nigerian war against Biafra was a cruel affront to nationalism. In England Mr Wilson's policy of economic retrenchment at the expense of the wage-earning classes was a smack in the face of democratic socialism. Even anarchism seemed threatened with corruption as a result of the encroachments of ex-Stalinists, seeking a new revolutionary synthesis of Bakunin and Marx.

On the other hand, 1968 was a vintage year for action. Movements of dissent had a field-day, most notably in France, but also in the United States and elsewhere. To some observers these movements appeared to be without any coherent ideological direction: inarticulate movements, springing from a profound cultural dissatisfaction with the status quo but possessed of no clear conception of their situation and of no settled programme for future policy.

Even so I do not believe that the age of ideology is over, or even that the old-established ideologies are extinct. They are rather in a state of crisis, which is itself instructive, in that it tells something about the nature of these ideologies and about ideology itself. It has been said that ideology is a feature of the modern world, not much older than the word itself, which appeared as '*idéologie*' at the time of the French Revolution. Up to a point I think this is true. Nevertheless certain politico-religious movements and theories of earlier periods have distinctly ideological features, though it might well be argued that those features are the mark of their modernity. Two cases I have in mind here are Savonarola and Machiavelli in Renaissance Florence.

Savonarola gave his Christianity a new and distinctly ideological character when he attempted to set up in Florence a puritan utopia (later imitated both by Calvin and by Mao) which combined state control of private life (the banishment of finery, jewellery, musical instruments; the punishment of fornication, and so forth) with state control of the economy. The enterprise was presented by Savonarola as a struggle—an 'outward' struggle against papal corruption, the commercial ethos, and Renaissance humanism, and an 'inward' struggle against worldly and carnal desires. The programme was the establishment of a city of God on earth. Savonarola presented this as an essentially non-violent struggle. After some early success, his project failed totally. And one lesson which many later ideologists draw from the experiment was not that the enterprise had been ill-conceived, but that Savonarola's repudiation of violence had been mistaken. Since that time there has been a

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definite link between ideology and violence: not a necessary one, but a contingent one that is very important.

Machiavelli, who had witnessed Savonarola's experiment in Florence with his own eyes, was perhaps the first to say that Savonarola had failed because he had been an 'unarmed prophet'. Nor is this Machiavelli's only contribution to the emergence of the ideological style of politics. People who think of Machiavelli as an immoralist fail to see how much he was a man with an ideal—a republican ideal. Rousseau recognized this when he described *The Prince* as a 'handbook for republicans'. Machiavelli's dream was to revive in modern Italy a republic as glorious as that of ancient Rome, and he suggested that it could be achieved only by means of a revolution which had the nerve to liquidate its enemies ('kill the sons of Brutus'). There are, however, certain qualities in Machiavelli's writings which make them unsuitable for ideological use; they are indeed too good for such purposes, transparent where effective ideological writing has to be opaque, and ambiguous where such writing needs to be cut and dried. Machiavelli is too much of a philosopher to be an ideologist, and the same must be said of Rousseau. But in a vulgarized form—Rousseau reduced to Robespierre and Machiavelli reduced to Lenin—their philosophy becomes ideology.

Seventeenth-century England occupies an interesting place in the history of ideology. On the one hand, there were vigorous revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements. For a time England actually became a republic. But on the other hand, there was no republican ideology. The people who fought against Charles I and cut off his head were not republicans. What they wanted was a reformed, or constitutional, monarchy. Charles I stubbornly refused to be reformed. And when his enemies failed in their efforts to reform him by force, and decided to execute him, they found they had to become republicans. For a kingdom that eliminates the monarchy becomes, in a certain sense, *ipso facto* a republic; and he who wills a kingless kingdom, wills a republic, even though he never consciously aimed at one. The institution of the Commonwealth in England created a kind of ideological void. There was even a theoretical void, which the philosophers of the period sought to fill—Hobbes setting out the case for passive obedience to any *de facto* ruler; Filmer the case for the divine right of true kings, and Locke the case for the natural rights of property owning subjects, including the right to revolution.

It is one of the characteristics of that century that the theory was published after the action, and satisfied a need to explain and justify what had already happened, rather than serving to prompt action by means of expounding beforehand a set of ideas and ideals. For an ideology, in the full sense of the word, is a significant fusion of various elements. It is, first of all, an explanatory theory, whether about the nature of reality as a whole, or, more modestly, about the general social predicament of living men. It is, secondly, a programme of social

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and political change, which may be either reformative or revolutionary or even reactionary. It is, thirdly, a call to action; and this is characteristically a call addressed to a large audience, though it may confer on an élite of 'intellectuals' some special role of leadership. The action envisaged is usually conceived of as a struggle. This militant and often violent spirit of ideology distinguishes it most conspicuously from philosophy, which seeks to understand the world, whereas ideology is chiefly concerned to change it.

THE nineteenth century has been called the Age of Ideology. It was then that the word came into general use in West European languages, and then that the leading ideologies of the modern world—nationalism, socialism, communism, anarchism, and the rest—were born, or, if not born, at any rate assumed the form of ideologies. The inventor of the word '*idéologie*' was Destutt de Tracy, who intended it to be a short name for the 'science of ideas' which he had taken over from Condillac and other philosophers of the enlightenment and adapted to the new situation of Revolutionary France. Behind Destutt de Tracy's *idéologie* was the belief that secular re-education should take the place of religion in preparing Frenchmen generally for the new and rational society that the Revolution had initiated.

All subsequent ideologies have had something of this same character. They have been substitutes for religion: they have sought to provide for the general public an intellectual preparation for the new world, or the new order, they envisage. They have sought either to persuade or indoctrinate the people with their ideas. In having this aim, ideology differs from the reforming schemes of the Enlightenment, which were designed for the attention of rulers and élites. This is one reason why no one would call this eighteenth century the Age of Ideology. The *despotisme éclairé* of Voltaire and Diderot, the *despotisme légal* of François Quesnay, even the constitutional projects of Rousseau were not addressed to the multitude; these were addressed to the influential few.

Socialism itself in its early days had something of this same aristocratic *dix-huitième* character. Robert Owen, the father of English socialism, detested the proposal for universal suffrage because he feared it would enthrone ignorance; he objected to giving the vote to the working classes before they had been educated for socialism. For like Destutt de Tracy, Robert Owen felt that re-education held the key to a better world; and he looked to sympathizers in the educated classes to help him instruct the workers. Fabianism, especially as expounded by anti-democratic theorists like Bernard Shaw and Beatrice Webb, belongs to this Owenite tradition. It is, so to speak, ideologically weak. It does not flatter a mass audience; it is faintly esoteric and dry with the dust of Blue Books and economic science.

Nationalism and Marxist socialism are better examples of the full-fledged ideology, although Marx himself sometimes used the German

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word '*Ideologie*' as a pejorative one, meaning 'false-consciousness'. An ideology, in this view, was the set of ideas with which men deceived themselves and others. But Marx occasionally used the word as Destutt de Tracy used it, and as Marxists since then have fairly consistently used it, namely, to mean a valid theory which guides action. Indeed, Marxists have not only been content to hear Marxism called an ideology: but have even set up Ideological Institutes in those states where they have come to power.

Nationalism is an ideology with a longer history than Marxism, though not so very much longer. For nationalism was another thing which emerged with the French Revolution. Napoleon both asserted and denied it (a paradox I shall presently explore). The Congress of Vienna firmly and loftily refused to recognize the various 'nations' of Europe as having any right to political autonomy. For Metternich the thought of 'balkanization' was as distasteful as it is today to Mr Harold Wilson when he looks at Africa, and hears pleas for Biafran independence. The victors of 1815 wanted peace, and by peace they meant the tranquillity of order, which depended on a settled equilibrium in Europe. This 'balance of power' could not easily be reconciled with the recognition of the right of national self-determination.

So Metternich, at all events, thought; and he may well have been correct in thinking it: for when the assertion of nationalist claims in 1848 upset the European equilibrium, the way was opened for the wars of 1870 and 1914 and 1939. And then, after 1939, the statesmen of Europe went back to Metternich's way of thinking. The accords of Yalta and Potsdam were based on the doctrine of 1815. In 1945, the principle of self-determination was abandoned for the principle of the balance of power. Nationalism had won a great victory in 1918, when Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that liberty meant self-determination; and 'balkanization' was thought of only as a means of doing justice in Europe. In 1945, nationalism suffered an equally conspicuous defeat. Whole nations, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were removed from the map and the Eastern half of Europe was consigned to the mercy of Russia, on the feeble pretence that the inhabitants of those states had 'chosen communism'.

Nationalism, it seemed, was no longer for Europeans. But it took on a new lease of life as a doctrine for non-Europeans. Nationalism as we have known it for the past quarter of a century has been for the most part simply anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism. That is to say the chief driving-force of nationalism in recent years has been negative—anti-English, anti-French, anti-Dutch, and even anti-American. The curious thing is that those who have invoked the principles of 'self-determination' against the white men, have seldom been willing to concede it to their fellow coloured-men. The Nigerians' attitude to the Biafrans is an extreme case of a general attitude of all nationalists—they want self-determination for themselves, but they will not grant it to

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others. This has always been the way. I mentioned earlier Napoleon's position on this point: he asserted France's claim to national integrity, but denied the same right to other nations.

This is the ruinous defect of nationalism as an ideology. It cannot be universalized. For a nationalist is always a particular kind of nationalist—a German nationalist or an Irish nationalist or a Spanish nationalist, and it is part of such nationalism to resist other 'smaller' nationalisms: such as Bavarian nationalism, or Breton nationalism or Catalan nationalism. And because nationalism cannot be universalized it lacks the moral dimension which all ideologies purport to possess.

In this respect socialism has the advantage over nationalism. For even in its Marxist form, where it preaches class war against the bourgeoisie, socialism claims to consider the true interests of the whole of mankind, including those men it proposes to dispossess. For the Marxist sees the bourgeois as being as much a slave of the capitalist system as is the worker, and promises liberation to them both.

Marxism has to a marked degree all the characteristics by which (I have suggested) an ideology can be recognized. It has its explanatory theory of science and history—a theory which lends itself either to a positivistic or to a Hegelian interpretation. It has its programme of action—a programme about which, within certain limits, there can be disputes among adherents. And it provides a summons to a quasi-military struggle.

Marxism is perhaps the most 'therapeutic' of all ideologies, in that it provides, first, a cure for intellectual doubt, second, a purpose for living, and third, an outlet for aggression. This may help to explain why its appeal to restless and disturbed members of the educated classes is often greater than its appeal to the working classes: in South America, for example, most Marxists today are of middle-class origin. It is arguable, however, that these 'therapeutic' properties of Marxism are deceptive: and that what Marxism provides is not a cure, but a form of relief which is analogous to drug-dependence. Evidence of this may be found in the reaction of Western communists to the Ribbentrop-Stalin Pact of 1939. For then all the rational grounds that Western communists had for supporting the communist parties were suddenly swept from under their feet. Yet many, indeed most, of them continued to believe. The only explanation seemed to be that they were psychologically 'dependent' on their belief in communism, and could not bring themselves to face the 'withdrawal symptoms' that would follow their departure from the Party.

The Party itself is no longer so important. This is partly because the Party itself has cracked. The defection of Tito, the Party's own repudiation of Stalinism, the split between the Soviet Union and China, the emergence of glamorous non-Russian leaders such as Castro and Ho Chi Minh—all these events have destroyed the monolithic structure of communism: and competing forms of communism and neo-communism have replaced the old uniform ideology. It is safer nowadays

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to talk of Marxism. There was only one communism: there are several sorts of Marxism, though not, I think, so many as to preclude us making some safe generalizations about them all; nor so many as to prevent the present adherents of Marxism acting together as a movement.

Indeed, Marxists of all shades of opinion doubtless feel the need to recover the cohesion that existed in Stalin's time, and accordingly put a great deal of emphasis on the feelings they all share—their common hatred of America, for example, and their common impatience to see the 'neo-colonialist' regime in South Vietnam destroyed by the Viet-cong. Events that divide them—such as the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia—they visibly try to forget.

THE fairly widely-held opinion that ideology is dead, or dying, on the left is, I believe, a half truth. So far as left-wing regimes are concerned, it is clear that ideology means little to them. Communists and socialists alike are pragmatists in office: considerations of *Realpolitik* are far more decisive than considerations of ideology. The Russian government's decision to invade Czechoslovakia was one abundant proof that Soviet policy is dictated, not by Marxist theory, but by very self-regarding considerations of Russia's interests in the world strategy of power. The British Labour government's attitude to Kenya Asian immigrants, to Biafran independence, to workers' wage claims and children's school-meals shows how little it considers social-democratic ideology, in a situation where the defence of sterling is its overwhelming concern.

But if ideology means little to communist and socialist governments, it is still of the utmost importance to communist and socialist movements, and perhaps most important of all to the neo-communist movements which have sprung up in the world since the death of Stalin. One reason why ideology is so important to the neo-communists is precisely that they lack a formal and structured organization.

In a recent speech to the French National Assembly,[1] the Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Marcellin, said there was a link between the various revolutionary activists and militants in France and similar people in other countries: 'militant minorities', he called them, 'cultivating close contacts with each other across frontiers, and living in a state of permanent conspiracy against society'. Marcellin said he was not accusing any international organization of fomenting riots, but added: 'it is necessary to observe the solidarity, the mutual assistance between revolutionary movements in the service of the same ideology, of the same cult, of the same heroes, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, etc. The vocabulary is the same everywhere.'

This judgment seems to me to be manifestly true. These movements that I have called neo-communist function as a kind of international freemasonry, the adherents of which recognize one another by the very

[1] Reported in *The Times*, 15 November 1968.

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'vocabulary' that Marcellin mentions and who are held together, not by any institutional hierarchy, but by ideological kinship or fraternity. This produces occasional divergencies: such as occurred in London on 27 October, when one group of neo-communists marched in a united front with orthodox communists and pacifists in a non-violent protest to Downing Street, while a smaller group broke away to hold a violent protest in Grosvenor Square. But in the main, ideology serves very effectively to keep the neo-communist movement together as a movement and to suggest lines of concerted action.

Neo-communist ideology is eclectic, and draws not only on Marxism (its main inspiration) but on certain rival nineteenth-century ideologies, especially Michael Bakunin's anarchism. Its Marxism tends to be of the Hegelian type, which stresses the quasi-religious concept of alienation, and which satisfies the thirst of neo-communism for metaphysics. It draws from Bakunin a belief in 'propaganda by deed', and a relish for violence less veiled than that of Marx. It also draws from Bakunin (as opposed to Marx) the thought that working through the political parties and processes of parliamentary democracy is a waste of time. The orthodox communist parties—especially the strong French and Italian Communist Parties—appear to neo-communists to be part of the Establishment. Neo-communism is committed to the doctrine of revolution; and the means it favours is that of overthrowing institutions. At the moment its energies are directed especially to universities, which are particularly vulnerable institutions. Among contemporary theorists who have made an important contribution to the ideology of neo-communism are Herbert Marcuse, J.-P. Sartre, R. D. Laing, Frantz Fanon, Régis Debray. One should not underestimate the importance of the mouthpieces of Student Power such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and of Black Power such as Stokely Carmichael, who interpret the ideology for their followers. But equally one should not overestimate their significance. The most influential leaders of the Student Power movement are undoubtedly professors and other dons who operate more or less discreetly behind the scenes.

THE twentieth century, it seems to me, is as much an 'age of ideology' as was the nineteenth century. It cannot claim to have produced any new ideologies, except perhaps fascism and nazism, and even those were derived from a synthesis of nineteenth-century ideologies, from nationalism and socialism, among others. What the twentieth century has produced with its vastly increased literate population and its mass communications, is a far greater public for ideology than the nineteenth century had; and the decline of religion has at the same time made that public the more responsive to the appeal of ideology.

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I have written elsewhere [2] about the distinction between ideology and religion and between ideology and philosophy. In so far as ideology offers an explanation of reality and a purpose for living it resembles religion. But religion is always other-worldly; it teaches man to respect the mysteries of the universe and to find satisfaction in obedience to God's will. Ideology believes there are no mysteries but only problems that science can solve; and it offers men the promise of satisfaction in the visible world if they will only struggle to reorder it. Ideology breeds a more expectant, a more hopeful, a less imaginative outlook than religion: though it is correspondingly more liable to disappoint its adherents when such expectations are unfulfilled. Ideologies are easily adopted and easily dropped, which is one of the reasons why ideologists when they come to power take such great pains to censor criticism. Fidel Castro, who leans much more on ideology than do the Soviets, because he has got nothing of their sheer might, maintains the most elaborate machinery of censorship in the world outside China.

Ideology, I have said, shares with religion a prophetic posture. It shares with philosophy a passion for theory. Of course, there are two senses of the word 'philosophy'. The one is the subject that is taught in universities—logic, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics. The other is philosophy in the more popular sense of a *Weltanschauung*, or an ordered and reflective view of life.

Ideology has not often been confused with the more purely academic kind of philosophy, but it is often treated as if it were the same thing as *Weltanschauung*. Indeed it is one of the more impudent claims of modern ideologists to assert that a man without an ideology is a man without a *Weltanschauung*, an uncommitted, irresponsible and morally inferior man.

To have a *Weltanschauung* is to have a reflective view of life which distinguishes a man, to some extent, from those who live and act unreflectively, although one would not deny that unreflective men may nevertheless lead excellent and even noble lives. A man with a *Weltanschauung* is someone who subscribes to a particular view of life, and he bears witness to his belief in it by deeds as well as words. Conduct as well as talk is entailed in having a *Weltanschauung*. This is the connexion between *Weltanschauung* and commitment. The connexion between ideology and commitment is quite otherwise. Ideology is a 'package deal'. It is made up of a system and a programme, and the adherent must take the lot. Ideology does not allow people to accept one part and leave the rest. Discrimination is forbidden. Instead of that reflectiveness, which is essential to a *Weltanschauung*, ideology calls for the willing submission of the mind to an external system.

Nor is this all. Ideology provides a great release of energy. A *Weltanschauung* requires an effort: an effort to think it out and an effort to live according to the light of it. It is not economical. But ideology is

[2] *Encounter*, October 1968.

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wonderfully economical. It eliminates problems: it saves thought. It directs energy away from thinking into the channels of enthusiasm and aggression.

Ideology forestalls thought, by cultivating a jargon or conceptual language which is almost impossible to analyse. The adherents of the various current ideologies of the left, for example, communicate both among themselves and with the outside world with the aid of words such as 'confrontation', 'escalation', 'imperialism', 'alienation', 'fascist', to which it is virtually impossible to assign any one agreed meaning. Such language is not only employed to describe the war in Vietnam, for example, but equally to describe wholly different types of events, such as student sit-ins at Guildford and demonstrations in Grosvenor Square. When Daniel Cohn-Bendit and his supporters rioted in Frankfurt to protest against the award of a prize to the African poet and statesman Leopold Senghor, they explained their objections to him in one word—Senghor was a 'neo-colonialist'. What is a neo-colonialist? A coloured man who is not anti-European: a man who, though black in his skin, upholds European culture in Africa by writing poetry—and very good poetry—in French. But there is no need for the adherent of the relevant ideology to think even such simple thoughts as those. 'Neo-colonialist' is a word that signals red. The effect of hearing it is like the ringing of bells for Pavlov's dogs. 'Senghor is a neo-colonialist', shouts Daniel Cohn-Bendit: and a score of German students who have probably not read a word of Senghor's writings pull up the paving stones and weigh into the fight.

One October day last year I had the melancholy experience of seeing various placards posted over the London School of Economics, which a militant minority of students had just seized in defiance of the director's orders. The largest of these posters bore the inscription 'Victory to the Vietnamese Revolution'. One might well wonder what was the Vietnamese revolution? Was the invasion of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese, with the support of the Southern Communists, to be called a revolution? One might, I say, wonder about such things. But it would be no good asking: for the response from those who put up the posters would be more of the same ideological jargon—a jargon which is intelligible only within the context of the ideology itself. If you do not sympathize with the ideology, you simply cannot understand the language.

'Victory to the Vietnamese revolution': ideological utterances are typically of this military style. The literature of ideology is full of words like 'fight', 'march', 'resist', 'overcome', 'defeat', 'vanquish' and 'triumph'. Indeed the commitment of an adherent to any ideology can usually be measured by his militancy. To commit yourself to an ideology is to join a fight, to enlist; to become an adherent of an ideology is to become a partisan. And this, I suspect, is one of the reasons why an Age of Ideology is such a dangerous age to live in.

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STUDENTS: COMMITMENT OR BARBARISM?

Donald G. MacRae

IN contemporary student dissidence we encounter a revival of ideological, theoretical and practical themes of action almost forgotten since the October revolution. Proudhon, Stirner and Blanqui replace Marx as clues to behaviour. Now, no history is more mysterious than the history of modes of thought and action. No constituents of history are at once more permanent and more protean than these modes. There is no paradox intended here, but the statement of a fact which involves a dilemma: how can we doubt the recurrences and re-emergences of ideologies and ideologically motivated deeds over long tracts of time and in diverse social contexts; how can we recognize with certainty unities in these matters where appearance so often belies reality?

The various varieties of historical and sociological determinism have their answers. For example: class-struggles are constant, ubiquitous and ideology and political style are their epiphenomena; the human personality is framed everywhere and always in the same tangle of frustration and aggression, guilt and desire, and must manifest itself in the same ways; the analysis of social structure takes advantage of the fact that only a very limited number of variables and patterns are available to men, and inevitably they return again and again to similar forms of action, just as only a limited number of throws is possible with two dice; and so on and on. The trouble with these answers is not so much that they cannot all be true at once, or that they are all (as is indeed the case) demonstrably false except for certain specific cases and circumstances, as that they do an intolerable violence to reality as we experience it in our own living out of events and as we strive, if we try hard, to grasp its fabric either in alien places or other times.

We are, I think, in the wave of student dissidence which began, it is usually claimed, at the University of California's Berkeley campus in 1964, but which could be discerned in style and even concrete events elsewhere, particularly in Europe, certainly five or six years earlier, concerned with a recurrence and even a continuity in thought and action. In saying this I am not trying to assert either of two often asserted things: neither that these transactions should be taken as a part of that series of conspiracies to overthrow an institution or a society the study of which begins at Corcyra with Thucydides, nor as asserting that these things are part of some jolly ragging student tradition going back to medieval Bologna, Paris or Oxford. (And how jolly was, or is, that tradition? How amusing was it in 1192 for the serfs of Saint-Germain-des-Prés to be involved in that fray with students which is almost our first clear intimation that the University of Paris existed—or for the citizens involved in that second battle of 1200 which resulted

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in the first recorded faculty strike?) The point rather is that we are seeing the restoration of a particular tradition of thought and behaviour which has been in the more advanced countries—whatever that means—suppressed or overlaid by other events, forces and ideas.

No doubt the events of the spring and early summer of 1968 at Columbia and, far more important, Paris will soon be reduced to order by research and assertion, and agreed versions will be arrived at. Already, only six weeks after the Parisian outbreak, I have heard an eye-witness put down and corrected in his account of his experiences by a scholar who, like myself, had the advantage of not being present. An established fable will reign. Meanwhile the student revolt and the general strike seem to me extraordinarily reminiscent of an almost forgotten episode in modern history, the period which followed the generals' rising and opening of the civil war in Spain. Paris in 1968 sounds very like Barcelona in the days of the FAI—and it is not just that the black and red banners of anarchy appeared again in a significant context for the first time in a generation. It seems clear that the animating spirits of these days in Barcelona and Paris were alike. There was a faith in voluntarism, participatory democracy, the moral imperative of instant virtue, the creative élan of the workers, in populism and primitivism, and the conviction that continuing revolution was itself a good—which is also presumably the Maoist view. And there was apparently in both contexts a hatred or contempt for the unspontaneous work of the mind, of scholars, teachers and intellectuals. Once again the revolution was declared to have no need of savants—nor in West Berlin, to have need of liberals.

NOW this is very different from the authoritarian era which began in 1917. The essentially Blanquist idea of the mastering of an institution or a state by a disciplined cadre exercising dictatorial power after its seizure of power was modified by Leninism and routinized by Stalinism. The lamentable fate of German communism before 1933 was one result. The enormous ineffectiveness for its declared purposes of French communism was another. (Of course French communism *was* effective but in other ways. It was an obedient instrument of Russian foreign policy. It played a serious part in French local political patronage and intrigue. It organized major sectors of the French wage workers and peasantry in a manner that gave them ideological satisfaction, a connexion with the Jacobins, and a feeling that in the end they would triumph, so now they did not need to bother too much with transitory things.) This tradition dominated the left until recently, No one can say with certainty how much influence it retains—it certainly has power in the straightforward sense that the USSR has power—but an older tradition has reappeared and is challenging both the established universities and the public authority as well as the authoritarian left.

This is not to say that this New Left (by which I mean very little to do with the learned and disillusioned Stalinists who were so central

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to the 'New Left' after the Hungarian revolt of 1956) is without totalitarian aspects. Nothing is more manifest than its readiness to impose its standards and its will (if they are known) on dissenters if only by the processes of endless debate and confrontation. One straw in this wind, by the way, is the contempt of students from Berlin to Berkeley for that great instrument of democracy, that enemy of enforced consensus, the secret ballot. But it is an authoritarianism of an older sort, one which, however deviously, derives from Rousseau and from the young Marx.

Men in positions of power, both in the universities and in public office, are to be found who approve at least some of this. Mr Short, Secretary of State for Education and Science, hedged his bets in Britain, but his basic position seems quite clear. He told a meeting of educators (*The Times*, 29 June 1968) that authoritarian regimes 'persist' in too many universities. There should be 'new methods of discipline that are more appropriate to the democratic context in which students will live their adult lives'. According to the reporter he criticized much of education as 'intellectual junk', and said it was 'more important to know all the facts about Vietnam than to know the details of the Wars of the Roses. . . . The apparent chaos and violence of student protest, rightly understood and used, could raise the whole quality of our democracy.' And so on: one could cite many examples of this, for such voices are to be heard in every level of the educational apparatus, and at many levels of government!

In all this we may be confronted by a recurrent symptom of genuinely pre-revolutionary times. I refer to what Crane Brinton long ago called 'the transfer of allegiance'—the movement away from the accepted positions in ideological alignment of the intellectuals [1] by way of a period of disorientation and estrangement to one of new radically intransigent postures. But at least Western society has been here before. There are some new ingredients in the ideological cauldron, but most of them have been familiar since at least 1848, and as I suggested above many have been current fare since the time of Rousseau or can be found among the Christian heresies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were the leading themes of rebellion, 'propaganda by deed', syndicalism, and the aspiration of the non-social-democratic left until the triumph of Bolshevism, and they continued to be of importance in the Catalonia of Durutti, at least until the very end of the civil war in Spain. In some ways they seem peculiarly congruent with opposition to a regime such as that of Napoleon III—and it may be no coincidence that they re-emerge so strongly in the Fifth Republic. After all, in many ways General de Gaulle resembles Napoleon III—the former Prince President—in his rule more closely than he does any of 'the forty kings

[1] I am not claiming Mr Short as an intellectual, and for all I know he might be made angry by such an attribution. What is certainly the case is that on 29 January 1969 he came, when forced by student violence in the London School of Economics and Political Science, to the opinion that the student left was led by 'the thugs of the academic world'.

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who have made France'. Plebiscitary affirmations and a 'liberal empire' are also *revenants*.

But whatever we may think of 'the transfer of allegiance', yet more revolutions are attempted than succeed. The *émeute*, too, a ritual act of propaganda as much as a serious enterprise, has a history even older than the Fronde. Recent events certainly contain in their animating ideas elements of primitivism and exoticism—Che Guevara and Mao, not to mention the Freudian discovery of a primordial childhood for each of us, an 'exemplary infancy' as Eliade somewhere describes it—which are novel. And the emphases are often new. Yet to me it all seems genuinely like a restoration and a return—even if we never *quite* return to the places we once knew—to the traditions of an earlier rebellion with which earlier generations were quite familiar.

THE novelty lies, I believe, not so much in concepts as in the situation; the new and central role of the universities,[2] a novelty of claim by students to which we will return, and a genuine cultural gap between generations which is accentuated by the sheer proportional numerousness of the student-aged population—a factor which, demographically speaking, will reach its height for most advanced countries in the 1970s. I have tried to deal with the third of these elsewhere.[3] That analysis turned on five factors: changes in affluence, socio-economic status and aspirations; the experience of 'contingency' in a world of rapid change and nuclear wars where absolutely anything is possible; the politics of destalinization in relation to youth movements; the energies released by decreased tensions and guilts in the sexual sphere of life; and the devaluation of a tradition of learning, logic and rhetoric essentially classical and verbal. On these matters I shall try not to repeat myself more than is necessary for my purposes here.

The new claim made by students is itself an interesting one, and is perhaps connected with the sense of the contingency of the world which I mentioned above. That contingency can result in feelings of an urgency towards immediate enjoyment—including our enjoyment of power—which goes beyond any of the usual reactions to the fact that youth's a stuff will not endure. Such an explanation may be too charitable. The case is that a special indulgence, gratification and authority should be given to students *because on them the future depends*. This claim is a little like asking dividends first, capital later. Of course the future depends on people, for the future is a human category. Of course it will largely depend on the skills and attainments of these people. But to blackmail the present in the interests of the future is a dubious practice, and not just for the good reason that too many crimes and errors have been committed by the future-minded in our century for one to have much confidence in this kind of arrangement, but also for the

[2] Other 'middle-range' institutions, although regarded as equally potential fulcra for the levers of revolution, are neither so acceptable nor vulnerable in the universities.

[3] D. G. MacRae, 'The Culture of a Generation: Students and Others', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 2, no. 3, July 1967.

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rather obvious point that skills and attainments likely to have a major social pay-off are not going to be furthered by the disruption of the universities in which, however badly, these skills are acquired. Another argument for this claim is that only the young are truly contemporary, therefore only they can know what today and tomorrow both hold and need, therefore they have a right to a particularly powerful political influence and to, in the small world of the universities, a decisive say in the conduct of instruction.

This is really part of the same syndrome. It has been grossly overblown by those publicists, older than the students who constantly hold up their hands in wonder at the rate of change and who find a new industrial revolution twice a decade. It is so largely untrue that one is inclined to dismiss it, but it has some truth—enough, I would say, for an explanation and discussion of curricula to become a normal, if not too time-consuming, part of university procedures in so far as courses are not self-explanatory, as they often are. This part of the claim seems particularly important given the new centrality of the universities in society (which can reasonably be deplored but must be admitted) to the affairs of the state at three levels, finance, faculty expertise, and the drive for economic growth by the massive deployment of higher education as an aid to technological and other efficiencies.

This restoration of an old tradition of strong dissent must affect different university systems differently. Certain points about the British system, points which are in many ways strengths, render it vulnerable to damage of a kind to which other forms of university may be less subject. I am not sure that discussions of the present situation have concentrated sufficiently on these characteristics of British universities. One reason for this failure has been that new modesty, that mini-Englandism, which is one of the more depressing features of these 60s. There is an unwillingness to accept that in any sphere of life our ways and organizations can possess unique merits of efficiency and economy. In fact the intense British three- (and in some cases at Keele, Oxford and in Scotland four-) year first degrees is very remarkable as compared with other countries. Its intensity and the impartial rigour—widely deplored—of the accompanying examination system mean quite simply that we attain in three years what it takes a four-year degree *and* a master's degree to produce in the United States. And, although examinations are arduous, the mixed methods of instruction we use are on the whole among the most flexible, least bureaucratized in any part of the world. (To all I say, of course there are exceptions, but the general picture is true.)

Now for a country overburdened by the demands of the age this is all to the good. Whether students are numerous enough and in the right subjects are other questions, not for discussion here. The system also has a record measured in terms of its resources of producing much and good scholarship and research and an unmatched quantum of public service. But it is also a delicate and a nervous exercise. To achieve

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these things it asks more of students and dons than do its foreign alternatives. The dons, however badly, are also administrators. Increasingly they are the direct servants of the state—including the Mr Shorts—and their autonomy is bought at a price and defended with difficulty. If one cares for learning and freedom then the price is not too high and the defence is not to be abandoned in the interests of either a vision of the omnipotent state or of student communes.

In our time we have seen the re-emergence of an old and central theme of our civilization—a theme which derives from Christianity itself. Christianity simultaneously makes men both guilty, that is of uneasy conscience, and responsible. It also places the primary guilt out of time, in the primordial fall, but it constantly challenges men with the vision of the good and peaceable kingdom, unattained. With what relief then have we welcomed the idea—an inspiration of much sociology—that as individuals we are not responsible for our condition, but that the ordering of society is the decisive element in our lot. Both guilt and inevitable fate can then be shrugged aside, and society transformed or reformed. This idea has so much to its credit that one hesitates to question it—and hence comes that pervasive idea that one must have no enemies on the left.

But the attack on our relatively economic, just, efficient ordering of the universities which would transform them into perpetually smoking cauldrons of permanent revolution is possibly useful in pointing to genuine failures and grievances (which of course exist, and should be remedied) but is more likely to be merely destructive of a fragile set of institutions and devices. The restoration of the pre-Bolshevik revolutionary tradition is polycentric, various, generous in intent, humane in many of its aspirations (although essentially inhumane in its tacit promise of human perfectability, here, now) but it is fundamentally unrealistic in its neglect of opportunity costs in actual social situations. It is morally better than a decadent Stalinism, and much more attractive. It reveals certain forgotten continuities in our societies. It is attracted by sociology—and profoundly ignorant of the results of that disillusioning subject. Its rhetoric in word and deed should not be allowed to destroy what with difficulty has been achieved and maintained in higher learning either directly or through the use that can be made of it by men who are essentially anti-intellectual and believe only in the power of the state. For, here is a paradox, it is such men who, outside the universities in administration or politics, are most likely to be the beneficiaries of this dissidence which is at once old and new. It gives them cause for complaint and intervention, and it gives them a vocabulary. Of course it also threatens them as Paris showed, but the measure of that threat cannot be assessed without a metric which can give us a total accounting of the political and social potentialities of our specific societies and their inter-relations. It would not be any great novelty if a revivified tradition of revolt advantaged only the barbarians of our time.

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EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY SINCE THE WAR

Neil McInnes

THE impact of the social democratic parties on European events since the war is generally held to have been limited. Droz [1] states quite baldly, 'West Europe between 1945 and 1960 owes fairly little to democratic socialism'. From the other side of the House, Perry Anderson [2] is no less trenchant: 'The balance sheet . . . is arrestingly poor. Not merely has [social democracy] not brought about socialism anywhere: it has not itself effected any major structural change in the societies in which it has acted.' We might agree readily enough that since 1945 it has been overshadowed, as a force of political and social change, by such powerful influences as the great American corporations, communism, the anti-imperialist movements, and the war machine. Yet critics like Droz and Anderson will seem to some, to British Labour militants for instance, to underestimate socialist achievements. This is perhaps because these critics are struck by the contrast between the results of socialist activity and the almost unlimited hopes and expectations of the immediate post-war period.

As the war ended, social democracy provided the governing party in Britain, Norway, and Sweden, while it was in the ruling coalition and playing a role in constitution-making in France and Italy. Socialist parties were in ruling coalitions in smaller West European countries too. More important than the parliamentary situation was the climate of optimism about socialism's future. The conservatives and parties to their right had been discredited by the war and, in some cases, decimated at the liberation, whereas the socialists had recovered some of the prestige they lost in the 1930s by their contributions to victory and their role in the resistance. For example the SFIO, which had collapsed ignominiously in 1940, and not because of Vichy but because of its own internal dissensions, emerged from the war with 60,000 militants and seven newspapers with hundreds of thousands of readers.

It was then that Léon Blum said 'Socialism is at the point of convergence of all the great currents that today traverse not only France but Europe and all the world'. France certainly was held ripe for socialism. So was Germany. The SPD, which had gone down in 1933 crying, 'Nach Hitler, wir!' surfaced again in 1945 saying, 'Nach Hitler, wir!' more sure than ever it was true. Schumacher was convinced that socialism was inevitable.[3] The SPD leadership was astounded, says

1 Jacques Droz, *Le Socialisme démocratique 1864–1960* (Paris, 1966), p. 301.
2 Perry Anderson, 'Problems of Socialist Strategy', in Anderson *et al.*, *Towards Socialism* (London, 1965), p. 233.
3 Theo Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler* (Munich, 1965), pp. 15–16.

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Herbert Wehner,[4] when it did not sweep to victory in the first post-war elections.

However, the best example of this confidence (and part of the cause of the Continental socialists' optimism) was the situation in Britain. Here Labour had just won the most extensive political victory of any West European social democratic party in history. What is more, it took office not as a newcomer but as an experienced administration that had conquered, during the wartime coalition, solid positions in Whitehall. It would have been consistent with the history of earlier great political victories, such as those of the French and Russian revolutionaries, if Labour had sought to spread the movement abroad. Indeed, many socialists on the Continent expected it to; and after all, its rivals, Russian communism and American capitalism, were at that time interfering extensively in Continental political life, and specifically in the affairs of the socialist parties. The British Labour Party preferred 'socialism in one country'. Although the Continental socialists were almost unanimously anglophil, and looked to a socialist Britain with fervent expectations that one might compare with the communists' attitude to Russia (and indeed Fenner Brockway reported from Germany at that time that this comparison was commonly made [5]), and although Britain had sectors of Germany and Austria served up to her on a platter, London decided that labourism was not for export. Or should we put it this way: London overlooked the international conditions of the socialist experiment in one country, an oversight that later had to be paid for and which is now, belatedly, to be repaired in the 'flight into Europe'? When one recalls the intervention of the Russians in the Western labour movement, and not only in their zones of conquest, and of the CIA under cover of US trade unions, in the affairs of, for instance, the Italian Socialist Party, one sees that victorious Labour missed opportunities, notably in the abortive attempts to form labour parties in France and West Germany. Instead, it collaborated in a task that was already being effectively performed by Allied occupation authorities, the US secret services and the Vatican, that is, in preventing socialist co-operation with communists; it sent delegates across Europe for this purpose in 1946.

Still, despite this lack of international socialist co-operation (the Second International was not revived until 1951, and then mainly as an anti-communist agency), the European social democrats after the war were pugnacious, optimistic and well to the left in their ideological formulas. British Labour was committed to a 'peaceful revolution' and, on paper, it was still bound by its 1933 congress vote in favour of workers' control of industry and by the procedure laid down in the same year for TUC supervision of the party through the National Council of Labour; that is to say, it was supposedly dedicated to a

[4] Günter Gaus, *Staatserhaltende Opposition: Gespräche mit Herbert Wehner* (Hamburg, 1966), p. 11.
[5] Pirker, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

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proletarian form of socialism. In Italy, the PSIUP, as it was still called, chose to collaborate with the communists, because Sig. Nenni believed that proletarian divisions had been responsible for the victory of fascism. In West Germany there was—after Grotewohl's failure in Berlin—no question of collaborating with communists, but in 1946 Schumacher was calling for the nationalization of mines, power, transport, insurance, and banking. The French socialists had a similar programme and actually assisted in its partial implementation, in the 1944–45 nationalizations; and when Blum in 1946 sought to water down party doctrine, he was defeated by a Guy Mollet breathing the fire of Marxism and 'scientific socialism'.

Nor were these leftist stances electorally disadvantageous at first. Labour in 1945 got 11·99 million votes and 393 seats. The Italian socialists in June 1946, that is, while still united, got 20·7 per cent of the votes or more than the communists (18·9 per cent). In the elections to the first Bundestag the SPD got 29·2 per cent of the votes, only a hairsbreadth behind the CD's 31 per cent. The SFIO in October 1945 got 24 per cent of the votes, and was thus of comparable stature with the communist and Catholic parties. Figures for party membership, number of militants and party newspaper circulations all point to the same thing, that at the end of the war European socialism was at a high water mark.

Since then much of the water has ebbed away. Although one is tempted to generalize in order to abbreviate and simplify, one must resist that temptation, because it is in fact hard to find safe, sound generalizations about the various socialist parties in this period. But on the whole and with the partial exception of Britain and Sweden, the trend has been downward for social democracy since the war. The socialist parties either have lost members and voters and suffered repeated political defeat, or else they have fought against electoral failure by abandoning their socialist doctrines of just after the war, often at the cost of splits and internal revolts, confusion and compromise. Some have even suffered both fates: they have ceased to be socialist in all but name and have still lost electoral support.

These ideological retreats and quests for new sources of electoral support form part of a process that had in some cases begun before the war and which, in other cases, is not yet complete: the transition from a socialist party conceived as a movement to a cadre party. From being a mass or class movement, claiming to represent a group that is oppressed, and armed with revolutionary intent or at least with *ideas*, social democracy has evolved into a party-like-the-other-parties, an alternative administrator of an unchanged system. Naturally, then, social democracy, which never had much unity, now covers parties of very different sorts, because the local electoral circumstances to which a non-ideological vote-getting machine must adjust vary so widely. Meanwhile the socialist ideology has taken refuge in ineffectual *groupuscules*, 'guardians of cemeteries', such as the PSU and

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PSIUP. Incidentally, this evolution of social democracy was foreseen and described in advance by such different people as Léon Blum and Georges Sorel.

THE first development of importance after the war was the failure to form labour parties on the Continent, after the model of the British party. This is all the more remarkable because the war and resistance had produced alliances, e.g. between socialists, Catholics and radicals, that only needed to be maintained and formalized to create labour parties. That was impossible in Italy, where efforts toward such unity either at the party level or in the trade union confederations were scotched by the firm intervention of the Americans and the Vatican. In West Germany there was a move for a 'federal workers' party' (in the eastern, Russian, zone, of course, unity was enforced by the SED), but this was wrecked by the communists and the SPD, both of whom wanted to reopen the shop under the old sign. Schumacher wanted to restore the old, highly centralized party bureaucracy at once, and party patriotism made impossible collaboration with Left Christians or any such heretics. So the SPD reappeared in the hands of a bureaucracy surprisingly little changed since 1933, still mouthing revolutionism, Marxism, pacifism, anti-statism, still absorbed by parliamentary work and largely blind to what had changed in the world meantime.

In France, the chances of a 'great popular leftist movement' seemed better, because of the resistance, but the Old Firm came back into business. Blum and Daniel Mayer wanted a broader party but Guy Mollet condemned this as 'neo-revisionism'. Right from its 1944 congress the SFIO showed its suspicion of its wartime allies (the MRP, the *Mouvement de Libération nationale,* the group around *Combat,* etc.). It refused to admit groups and insisted members be admitted individually. In the 1945 elections the party co-operated very little with the resistance movements. Exclusiveness, jealousy, party patriotism, and the determination of the leadership to keep the party a creature over which they could exercise undisputed control showed at once in the SFIO. Gaston Defferre and François Mitterrand were to find these characteristics pretty much unchanged 20 years later. The particular issue that made a labour party impossible just after the war was clericalism: the socialists demanded suspension of Vichy state aid to confessional schools. This at once estranged the Catholics, just as the same attitude made Defferre's presidential candidacy impossible. Blum from the beginning denounced this revival of SFIO *laicité* as 'fit to delight a radical freemason', but it has gone on determining the party's fortunes: the Catholics planned revenge for the abolition of state aid, and got it in 1951 with the *loi Barangé*, which in turn forced the socialists into opposition.

So we find the social democrats occupying fairly leftist positions at the end of the war. It is not often noticed that one of the main functions of extremist formulas in politics is not to foreshadow their

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implementation, not to impress enemies nor even to attract supporters, but to scare away lukewarm allies. They serve as a touchstone to separate sheep from goats, to prevent collaboration from sympathizers: in the present case to prevent the formation of labour parties. Once that job is done, the extremist formula is discarded, quietly forgotten. We were to see this later in regard to clause four of the British Labour Party's constitution.

The transition from the leftist positions of just after the war toward milder doctrines (or no doctrine at all) began fairly soon. It did not take place in Britain, however, before substantial socialist legislation had been enacted. Of course, the party simply ignored or forgot its commitment to proletarian socialism and to subservience to the unions. That was natural: such proletarianism affects the party when it is defeated as in the 1930s, i.e. reduced to its safe seats which are working-class seats, but it is diluted when the party is electorally successful, which means winning marginal seats in middle-class areas with middle-class candidates. This oscillation between the domination of the industrial wing, the unions, and that of the middle-class voters, represented by a big parliamentary Labour Party when it exists, explains much of the history of the party. As it happened, the first Labour government after the war found, in Bevin and Attlee, a duo that could run in harness remarkably well. No such harmony was achieved by later Labour leaders and there was a period of acute struggle, in which at first the unions, then the parliamentary party (and more specifically its leader) were dominant. It seems this latter situation is the one that will endure, if only because modern electoral technology makes the party leader so hard to unseat, and because the unions at present do not want to get control of the party. All this could be changed, of course, by a severe electoral setback.

THE achievements of the post-war Labour government are well enough known. As time passes, we can more easily set them in context: we can see to what extent they were a consolidation of the social revolution that took place during the war under a national administration. I do not want to be Alexis de Tocqueville writing an *Old Regime and the Revolution* to prove that what you thought happened in 1945–47 really started happening in the 1930s, but one is bound to recall that the Tories had doubled expenditure on the social services between the wars, that the coalition government introduced family allowances, that a Conservative minister got the 1944 Education Act through, that many of Labour's acts of nationalization were a continuation of earlier governmental policy (gas, electricity, cable, and wireless) or were scarcely opposed by Tories (Bank of England, railways, coal, canals; though road haulage was, and steel too, later). Labour inherited rather than introduced the other two things (apart from nationalization) that people came to associate with socialism: full employment and wartime controls. On both, supporters have to

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speculate gratuitously that without Labour there would have been a return to pre-war circumstances. (Tawney says so,[6] as does Richard Crossman.[7]) But no such relapse occurred elsewhere, at least for years, even in the absence of socialist administration. (They still have wartime rent control in New York City.) Moreover, it is clear that Labour's ideological sources at this time were not socialist but liberal: Keynes and Beveridge were the guiding lights. So it is not absurd for friendly critics, like J. K. Galbraith, to say that Labour's historical achievement was to prepare the managed capitalism of the 1950s by giving the economy the built-in stabilizers and the control of aggregate demand that the great corporations now require. Even from that standpoint, however, the National Health Service would have to be seen as a characteristically socialist innovation, differing quantitatively from precedent so far as to mark a qualitative revolution.

By 1947, within two years of its great victory, the Labour government was running out of steam, out of ideas, and behaved as though it did not know how next to be socialist. It had lost coherence and purpose by 1947, said Hugh Dalton. It certainly had abandoned any velleity of social revolution, and it survived itself, as the French say, in the role of caretaker and one of growing incompetence. From 1951 on, Labour suffered a series of electoral defeats, by increasing margins, followed by internal divisions. The view arose, in Pelling's words,[8] that 'the Labour Party, with its class bias and its close ties with the unions [was] obsolete in the new Britain'. Gaitskell apparently thought so and undertook to convert the party into a 'modern' vote-getting machine of the SPD variety. He failed, but this did not prevent his policy being adopted and implemented later by his enemies. Meantime, the party got lost in the absurd disarmament campaign. This was so obviously a nine-day wonder that was going to blow itself out, like other acute attacks of virtue, that it is hard to understand why the party leadership bothered to make an issue of it, instead of taking the line of the SPD on the *Atom Tod Bewegung* of 1958. Though they knew there were communists behind it, and though under merciless attack from such as F.-J. Strauss ('*Lieber rot als tot*', was their motto, he charged), the SPD leaders half-heartedly endorsed it, they did not panic when they saw it attract bigger crowds than ever the party or the unions had managed to mobilize, and they then calmly watched it die out. In contrast, the Labour Party was racked by the dispute. By the end of 1960, to quote Pelling[9] again, it was 'in a weaker state than at any time for a generation: its leadership in dispute, its policy equally indeterminate on major issues, its constitution under heavy strain and its prestige humbled'.

Since then, of course, its electoral fortunes have changed considerably. Apart from noting, however, that short-run electoral vagaries, in the

[6] R. H. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition* (London, 1966), p. 179.
[7] Richard Crossman, in *Towards Socialism*, p. 158.
[8] Henry Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour Party* (London, 2nd ed., 1965), p. 120.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

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British system especially, are irrational and unpredictable, I will raise only the question whether what came back under Wilson's leadership was what went out under Attlee's 13 years before. We are too close to these events, and many developments are still incomplete, so we must hasten back to safer because more distant ground.

IN France, we have seen, the party emerged from the war strong and dogmatically leftist. It assisted in the implementation of some socialist policies in the progressive period of the republic, 1944–47, with nationalization and the introduction of the *securité sociale*. Notice, though, that these were all-party actions; some took place under de Gaulle. Besides, the wartime programme of the CNR was more socialist than that of the Popular Front, calling for planning and for nationalization of credit and of basic industries. This was accepted by all factions of the CNR, including conservatives and liberals, even by Joseph Laniel. It was under the Gouin government, which was socialist directed, that the first French plan was set in motion and that electricity, gas, mineral fuels, and some insurance were nationalized. It was under another socialist cabinet, the *monocolore* Blum government of early 1947, that the first Indo-Chinese war began, and it worsened under another socialist-led cabinet, that of Ramadier.

The SFIO began to lose support right from the start. I suggest this was because it disappointed the wartime hopes of acting as a rallying point for a wider, less doctrinaire, leftist or *travailliste* movement. Its reaction to electoral setback was curious. Blum, like Gaitskell or Herbert Wehner or Nenni in similar circumstances of electoral discomfiture, urged less sectarian policies, even at the cost of diluting their socialism. Guy Mollet denounced this as 'false humanism, revisionism', etc. Mollet may be all that André Philip has said, a demagogue, a fixer, a schemer, a petty boss; in short a politician in the worst sense. But the point is that he could appeal to, and get a response from, an old party tradition, the threadbare Guesdism that combines talk of barricades with bargaining over municipal spoils. For all the Marxist rhetoric, the party moved steadily to the right, with Ramadier's disastrously inflationary economic policies and the stubborn colonialism of such as Guy Mollet, Max Lejeune and Robert Lacoste. Despite all those concessions to everything non-socialist (or was it because of them?) the SFIO's share of the electorate fell in 20 years from 24 per cent to 12 per cent, with the temporary upturn of 1956 due to its alliance with Mendès-France—an alliance it immediately betrayed once the elections were over. In parallel, its membership fell from 354,000 in 1946 to well under 100,000 today. That support and that membership, moreover, moved southwards, away from industrialized France towards small towns. The SFIO since the war has been a failure as a vote-getter, as a bearer of an ideal, as an administrator, and as a pressure group.

In West Germany the transition we are studying may not have gone

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any further than in other social democrat parties, but it has been more explicit. At the end of the war there was considerable socialist fervour in West Germany, yet within a decade socialism was being frankly abandoned. Not that the SPD had taken a leftist line in the constitutional debate, but it clung sentimentally to Marxism, and a first attempt to get it to renounce that doctrine, in 1947–48, was defeated. A succession of electoral setbacks, which disheartened the party all the more because it concentrated on electioneering to the exclusion of all the social causes that used to preoccupy the old SPD, forced the party to revise its doctrine. This could not occur until the powerful, strange, and anachronistic personality of Kurt Schumacher was removed from the scene, by death, in 1952. Then the trauma of the 1953 electoral beating, which occurred in the shadow of the Russian repression of the East Berlin uprising, hastened the process. In a series of party congresses, that culminated at Bad Godesberg in 1959, the SPD disowned socialism. This divesting of its own tradition took in all six years, and was masterminded by a man who was actually once a communist, Herbert Wehner. That it went to such lengths and was so open was due to various things. First, there was the proximity of the communist threat, on German soil, which made it urgent to dissociate the SPD from anything that the bad faith of Konrad Adenauer (and in domestic polemics, Adenauer's bad faith was monumental) could link with socialism. Ulbricht collaborated with Adenauer in this, by backing the SPD at election times. Then, there was the success of Ludwig Erhard's economic policy, which, although aided by specially favourable circumstances, made a change in the economic system seem unthinkable.

The Bad Godesberg programme is not one, but a statement of 'values', and the values are those of Christian ethics, humanism, and classic philosophy; Marxism is not mentioned as one of the sources of socialism. On social policy, the document surrenders the collectivist, solidarist doctrine for individualism; it approves free enterprise and competition, it opposes concentration of economic power not only in private hands but in those of the state. Herbert Wehner says the main points in it are the denial that democracy must be socialist (a cardinal idea of Schumacher's), the disavowal of the class struggle and of the notion that socialism is a historical necessity, and, finally, renunciation of nationalization as either the end or means of economic policy. Incidentally, the programme threw overboard Schumacher's foreign policy: NATO and rearmament were accepted. The Prussian nationalism that Schumacher had already embraced after the war (arguing that the socialists' unpatriotic stand after 1918 had let the right monopolize nationalism) was exacerbated; the SPD had to answer the unscrupulous CDU innuendoes about the émigré past of its leaders (Willy Brandt, Ollenhauer, Wehner), and the programme was heavily patriotic.

Despite these concessions, the SPD remained in opposition. Soon

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it was consumed by 'ministerialism', by hunger for office, which it sought to achieve by way of the Grand Coalition since it could not get it alone. From 1960 it urged a bipartisan foreign policy and in general it began to act as though it were already in this coalition. It declined to exploit the CDU's difficulties during Adenauer's fourth cabinet (1963), renouncing its oppositional function. It hailed Erhard as a *Volkskanzler*, approved the Erhard coalition cabinet of 1963, chose not to put up a candidate against Lübke in 1964 and refrained from attacking Erhard even when he was an obvious failure in 1966. Having proven by all these amenities that it was *salonfähig*, the SPD was admitted to shared office in Bonn in December 1966. One is entitled to speculate whether, had it chosen to oppose Adenauer and Erhard consistently, it would not have been able to force elections when the slump came in 1966 and win them, so that it would be in office alone today. Herbert Wehner does not, however, believe in opposition, in dispute, in conflict, arguing that divided, occupied Germany cannot safely afford them.

In Italy, the transition from the Popular Front mood of the liberation to the present collaboration with the right began quite early, and must in fact be dated from the split of the Saragat social democrats in 1947 and the formation somewhat later of the PSDI. The split occurred in January 1947, in the Palazzo Barbarini in Rome, when Saragat had just returned from the USA. Nenni's PSI fought the April 1948 elections with the CPI. At that time the USA wanted both parties outlawed but de Gasperi refused. In fact, Nenni began to take his distance from the CPI very early and in the 1953 elections the PSI ran their own slate, separate from the communists. It was in 1953 also that Nenni first proposed the Left-Centre coalition; it was shelved as premature by de Gasperi. Nenni again urged it, more forcefully, in Turin in 1955 and declared at the Venice congress in 1957 that it was indispensable. This divorce from the CPI was a long, complex affair, involving splits and confusion; at one moment, Nenni was actually put in a minority by the *carristi*.

In August 1956, Nenni had had a secret meeting in a town in the French Alps with Saragat, initiating the equally long, complex process of socialist reunification. The Hungarian uprising a little later strengthened the autonomists in the PSI, and in terms of electoral arithmetic the *apertura alla sinistra* would have been possible from 1958. Hesitations on both sides delayed it till 1961, though it was still not until October 1963 that the socialists joined the government. Reunification would have been possible earlier, but a question of persons had to be settled: Saragat lost to Segni in the 1962 presidential election, and it was not until, Segni incapacitated, Saragat had gained that high office that the reunited party was free to be headed by Sig. Nenni alone. This dual reconciliation cost the PSI many supporters; up to one third of its membership quit. The PSI claims that all other social democrat parties in Western Europe have given up the struggle for socialism, but not it. In reality it governs in coalition with the right,

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just as the socialist parties of West Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland do or have done.

RATHER than trace the political fortunes of the smaller parties in Europe, it would be more rewarding to look at the internal life of the parties so far mentioned. They would claim that whatever ideological concessions they have made, they are still mass parties and democratically organized, more so in both respects than their opponents. This is certainly not true in France. The SFIO is marked by an indifference, indeed hostility, to ideas, and has not tolerated in its ranks a Nenni, a Bevan. It adopted new statutes after the war that reinforced its unity and strengthened the established leadership; this has been called its 'Stalinization'. Inside the party cohabit federations from industrial areas, where French capitalism is at its most progressive, and federations from backward peasant regions. Members are above average voter age; they are salaried folk, officials, notably school-teachers and policemen, and workers in nationalized industries. One third of functionaries vote socialist. Yet there is a move, in this narrow base, away from national civil servants to municipal officials in small towns, especially where there is a socialist mayor. This reveals the party's strength: it is the party of clerks, who use its card to get on. The decline in its support in recent years would be due, then, less to the hiving off of the ideological dissenters who formed the congeries of splinter groups around the PSU than to desertion to Gaullism, currently a safer card to hold for functionaries. Though it is the party of teachers (its parliamentary group once consisted of three workers, 20 school-teachers, and 17 professors), one of the latter has said that French socialism is a compromise between a dogmatism worthy of a museum and the expedients of empirical politics, fundamentally unrealistic, unable to get rid of its revolutionary ideology, attached to a distributive demagogy, unwilling to envisage any structural reform of society, inclined to make citizens permanent solicitors of state favours, in short, a parasite on capitalism, an economic and ideological anachronism.[10]

Much less ill can be said of the SPD, yet there too the inner life of the party was for a long time after the war dominated by older men dedicated to a phoney revolutionism. Now power has passed to electoral technologists mainly interested in getting a photogenic leader elected chancellor. The party is frequently alleged to be dominated by cliques and, especially in the *Länder* governed by the SPD, the party card is a passport or a protection. Patronage is rife at the municipal level too. No longer an idea party, the SPD can and should be described and analysed in the terms worked out in relation to the US parties.

It is not surprising that the Scandinavian parties should have been converted by long periods in office into channels of communication between the authorities and the masses. Critics say they have no inner

[10] Droz, *op. cit.*, pp. 310–13.

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democracy, that they wake up only at election time and then not to listen to the base but to get the activists out climbing stairs. These parties are appendages of the state, dominated by ministers, officials and notables; and like the state, even in Scandinavia, they are profoundly authoritarian.[11] Perhaps a period in opposition may change some of this, but it is not likely: the Scandinavian parties will continue to be, not class parties, but coalitions of clerks and peasants, divided from the conservatives by no serious ideological differences but engrossed with influencing the minimal—two per cent—electoral fluctuations that decide which side will administer the system.

The Italian parties for most of the period after the war have been considerably livelier, because they have lived in an atmosphere of division, fragmentation, confusion, and instability. It is nevertheless said [12] that the PSI gets no more popular participation than these other so-called 'mass' parties and that the delegates to its conferences are chosen by self-appointed cliques. Certainly there have been periods when a small, pro-communist minority, the *carristi*, held the key posts in the party, in the co-operatives and in the trade union federation.

With the British party we encounter a different sort of organization, because of the system of union affiliation—which exists abroad also in Australasia and Canada. This leads to a quite different kind of party life: apparently not a more democratic one, for the contracting out system of collecting the political levy, and the domination of party congresses by the union block vote could scarcely promote mass participation. Union members are Labour members only in the most shadowy sense, but constituency members do not seem to be more effective; indeed they are said to be often, literally, shadows, phantoms. But then the falsification of party membership figures is common to many European socialist parties. It has even been claimed by Perry Anderson that 'the Conservative Party now has a greater mass character than the Labour Party', in that it has more activists and specifically more active working-class members.[13] That goes further than I wish to here. None of what I have said is intended to suggest that the social democrat parties are less democratic than their principal opponents, but rather that there is so great a gap between the facts of their inner life and their claim to be peculiarly mass movements, to transmit in a privileged sense the voice of the people, that one is bound to treat them as electoral machines rather than morality movements.

ONE aspect of the end of ideology on the left deserves passing notice, the retreat of anti-clericalism, once a passion with the socialists. It was abandoned early on in Scandinavia; H. Branting, one of the founders of the Swedish movement, made a point of this. The Lutheran Church indeed remains established in Scandinavian countries after many

[11] Michel Bosquet, in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), no. 81, 1966.
[12] Norman Kogan, *A Political History of Postwar Italy* (London, 1966), p. 104.
[13] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 250–54.

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years of socialist rule. I suggest this peace with religion was a reason for the earlier electoral successes of the social democrats there. The Austrians, in contrast, were strongly anti-clerical and it was only in 1958 that their programme admitted the possibility of co-operation with the churches. The Swiss in 1959, after a long period when social democracy was assumed to be anti-religious, also made their first appeal to religious faith. The SPD was traditionally hostile to the churches, and Schumacher after the war was still openly anti-clerical, calling the Catholic Church the 'fifth occupying power'. The change came in Germany after severe electoral defeats (made inevitable by the new religious balance in West Germany, now more Catholic because of the loss of the eastern, Protestant, regions). The SPD in Lower Saxony got a treaty with the Evangelical Church in 1956, and a questionable concordat with the Catholic Church later. Meanwhile the Bad Godesberg programme declared a peace with religion. In Italy, inevitably, the socialist parties are plagued by the clerical issue and this governs their immediate electoral future. It has been, less explicably, a major factor in France and, of course, it has riven the Australian Labour movement. British Labour has never had to face this problem, since the British nation failed to maintain its unity, losing its Catholics to Eire.

A similar surrender or attenuation of ideology is seen in the fading of any characteristically socialist economic policy since the war. By policy I do not mean the declarations that lie unimplemented in some party constitutions (other parties have been franker and got rid of them), but the policies actually pursued in office. 'Butskellism' became familiar in the 1950s to express the lack of difference between socialist policy and its supposed opposite; if a combination of Selwyn-Lloyd, Callaghan and Jenkins has not been invented it is perhaps less for reasons of euphony than because it would be unfair to Mr Selwyn-Lloyd. In the same way, at the present moment Michel Debré would be seen as more of a socialist by the fathers of the movement than would Karl Schiller, despite party labels. If anything marks off socialist economic stewardship since the war outside Norway and Sweden it is its technical financial incompetence, its ability to be surprised by the performance of the neo-capitalist economic machine.

Guy Mollet once resigned from a government declaring, 'It is impossible for me to share the responsibility for the economic and financial policy decided yesterday'. This was not after his Finance Minister, the socialist Ramadier, had plunged France further into inflation and nearer bankruptcy. It was on 8 January 1959, the day after the adoption of the Pinay-Rueff policy that restored France to her present economic stature. Here is a similarly cruel quotation. It is from the SPD's first post-war *Parteitag*, just after the Erhard reforms that began the German miracle: 'Germany today is no longer in a state to bear a private-capitalist, profit economy or to pay exploitation-gains, capital-dividends or ground-rent. The ruling property relations no

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longer correspond to social conditions and needs. They have become the gravest obstruction to reconstruction and progress.' One could find a dozen other socialist prophecies of the failure of the Erhard reforms. The Italian left also was deep in Byzantine discussions about whether Italian capitalism had fought free of feudalism while the Italian economic miracle was breaking out before their eyes. (Exactly the same thing occurred in Japan.) The years since the war have been the era of the greatest economic advance in human history over much of the Western world, but in most places where this advance occurred one finds social democrats proving that it is impossible. While in some places where it has not occurred, the policies pursued by social democrats in office are directly involved. Yet this magnificent machine, that is even terrifying in its efficiency, is one the socialists helped to create and that would not work without some of the social dispensations they pressed for.

IN sum, West European socialism had something of a Saint Martin's summer immediately after the war, but it would be possible to date fairly precisely the moment in the 1950s when, in one country after another, socialism came to an end. Naturally, this does not prevent successor forces continuing on under the same name; this is a recurrent theme in human history. At present, the label is used to cover such various commodities as J. K. Galbraith's ' responsible society ', the moral criticism of consumer affluence, the movement for consumer protection and, latterly, the will to apply Keynesianism to the larger economy of European unity. (This latter passes for socialism among the Eurocrats.)

Going deeper than the vicissitudes of parties and their labels, the evolution of socialism as a workers' movement must be connected with changes in the nature of work, including changes in the relation between a man as worker and the same man as consumer and citizen. In the first phase of industrial capitalism—here I follow the analysis of André Philip [14]—workers were artisans who had only lately lost the ownership of their equipment but still had a technical expertness that gave them the pride and independence of the craftsman. Such men suffered from the low pay and long hours of factory work, and above all perhaps from subordination to capitalist and overseer. They dreamed of once again becoming owners of the means of production (which had got too big to be individually owned), either through producer co-operatives or via the transformation of all society into a producer co-op. Such men had the producer mentality, they improved themselves and imagined a proletarian culture to set against the bourgeois world, they distrusted parties and the state, and were to varying extents anarchist, federalist, later revolutionary syndicalist. They were dedicated to workers' control and to the administration of things. It is among them that socialism arose in the nineteenth century and acquired its leading characteristics

[14] André Philip, *La Gauche: Mythes et Réalités* (Paris, 1964), pp. 62–80.

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That period had ended by 1914 in France, earlier in Britain and Germany.

Later—at a later stage of capitalism, we might say—those craftsmen-workers were replaced by men and women required only to perform simple repetitive tasks. Chaplin's *Modern Times* refers to this era. These workers got no satisfaction, security or independence from their jobs. Their personality was crushed. Such men were poor unionists, and they transferred their allegiance to political parties which required of them not participation but the dependence and blind obedience they learned on the job. The class consciousness of such men was not the independent producer mentality of original socialism but 'oriented resentment'. The socialist parties that correspond to that state of mind are those of between the wars and, even better (hence their greater success among workers at that time), the communist and fascist parties of the day.

Later still, and here we reach post-war neo-capitalism, the worker becomes increasingly a salaried employee, if not a clerk. It is not that the standard of living rises so notably at first but that the nature of his work changes completely, and the way of life it supports is no longer proletarian in either of the two preceding senses. On the job, the worker deals less with machines and more with other men, in teams and in a hierarchical scale that becomes easier to climb. Here, paradoxically, unions regain importance, but simply as mechanisms for negotiating work organization and better pay; they do not regain political or social importance. The worker, as he becomes qualified and gains admission to the cadres of technicians, wins pride, a sense of responsibility and participation. Socialism, if it attracts him at all, no longer means revolt against the system but at most an effort to 'control' it better, smoothe out its ups and downs. In fact, by now the worker is less interested in that general problem than in the extension of his own power to consume; he is less a worker or citizen than a consumer. In so far as socialism seeks to interfere with the structure of the system, and thereby threatens even a temporary interruption of its capacity to satisfy consumer demand, it will be rejected by him. And even when he says he favours 'control' of the economy, planning or democratization of the industrial system, it is always understood: 'as long as that can be done without upsetting the churning out of more and more goods'. At that point, the worker is no longer socialist in either of the preceding senses, and the socialist parties undergo the transition we have seen since the war.

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World Communism Before the Moscow Meeting

A COMPARATIVE SURVEY

Roger Salloch

THE Sino-Soviet rift determined perspectives within the international communist movement from 1960 to Khrushchev's fall. Later on other cracks appeared. However, new tensions among communist parties come from less easily labelled sources. One contributing factor, however, is easily discerned. The policies of both ruling and non-ruling communist parties are increasingly shaped by perceptions of their national interest. Conflict between them has naturally sharpened. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia capped a development which has been in progress for some time. There is now a fresh differentiation among communist parties, between 'progressive' and 'orthodox' factions. New variations combining these elements with a nationalist focus have begun to emerge.

To illustrate the development and effects of such conflict, a 'continental' survey follows. But while convenient, it must be remembered that there are limits to such a regional approach. Ties of reform stretch from Australia to Italy, while conservatism binds East Germany with Mongolia. The currents of today's communism know no geographical bounds.

Latin America

THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES have always provided Moscow with some of its sturdiest support on international issues. But the image of solidarity they suggest is of marginal importance in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle within the region. They are strong in their pro-Soviet convictions only because their own environment does not nurture their *raison d'être*.

Ernst Halperin has explained their failure to establish national roots [1] in terms of the delayed industrialization process of their continent. In comparison with Europe, an identifiable Latin American working class 'emerged at a time when the attitude of governments, and to some extent of the employers, was no longer hostile to labor organizations and their demands. As a result the working-class élite did not turn into a counter-élite, and the bulk of the industrial working class did not become alienated.' [2]

Proletarian internationalism was not a marketable theory. Chile remaining an important exception, Latin American communist parties have had no base from which to capitalize on occasional electoral

[1] Except in Chile. See his book, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1965).

[2] Ernst Halperin, *Proletarian Class Parties in Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Center for International Studies, 1967).

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success.[3] The peaceful road to socialism, as advocated by the Soviet Union, is hard to follow without mass support behind parliamentary representatives. Frequently they are forced to operate clandestinely—as in Paraguay—and have been the object of repression by conservative regimes—as in Brazil; after the 1964 coup by Castello Branco the Communist Party was thrown into complete disarray, with many of its members going into hiding or exile. The Sino-Soviet rift added problems by dividing many of the parties, sometimes, as in Peru, leaving a larger pro-Chinese than pro-Soviet faction.

But the relative impotence of the Latin American communist parties does not mean there is no room for militant left-wing political forces. Military regimes, as in Brazil and Argentina, create a natural focus for such opposition. American capitalist influence is pervasive. The population increase of the continent is more rapid than anywhere else in the world; demands for radical social reform are vocal.

Sooner or later it was only natural that inchoate radical forces would turn to Castro for support. He, after all, had initiated a successful revolution. Moreover, while Castro proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, the practical effects of 'Fidelism'—notably the guerrilla warfare it encourages—have so far been fairly unsuccessful; yet this hardly affects the impact which Cuba's 'national communism' has had on the world communist movement.

A long-time neutral on Sino-Soviet issues, Castro began to assert a 'Cuban' alternative shortly after the March 1965 consultative conference in Moscow. Cuba had gone to that meeting only because the Italians had made it clear that no anti-Chinese ultimatums would derive from its deliberations. Three days after the conference adjourned, in a speech on 13 March, Castro asserted, 'We are not and never will be anybody's satellite'. In pointed fashion he added: 'And we want everyone to know that here our party makes the propaganda, that here our party shows the way. . . .'

By his own admission the primary target of Castro's speech was the Chinese Communist Party, accused of spreading its gospel inside Cuba.[4] But it is equally plain that the criticism had another dimension. In his mind's eye Castro's 'here' did not mean just Cuba. The speech marked a new surge in his drive to assert Cuba's own ideology as the political inspiration of revolution in Latin America. The Chinese Communist Party which sought to institutionalize the Sino-Soviet split within the continent was undermining the real purpose of communism in Latin America, the fight against 'Yankee imperialism'.

The Chinese threat was a small stumbling-block, however. What loomed larger on the horizon was the prospect of a collision with the CPSU—almost inevitable now that Castro's policies had assumed an active regional focus.

At the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966 Castro assured

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See *Granma*, 6 February 1966.

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a clash by establishing the Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (OLAS). From Moscow's point of view communist opposition to Latin American governments had to be low-keyed. Virulent obstructionism would have endangered the Soviet goals of promoting economic ties with Latin America and of providing a counterbalance to United States' influence in the area. Nevertheless, Castro pursued his course; as one observer commented, 'Many are the Latin Americans who see [in OLAS] the foundation of a Revolutionary Continental International having as its programmatic base the seizing of power by revolutionary violence'.[5]

In a speech of 13 March 1967, in which he made public his rift with the Venezuelan Communist Party, Castro presented a direct challenge to the CPSU. The speech was a frank statement that the formally constituted parties of the world communist movement had failed to serve the revolutionary interests of Latin American left-wing forces. Castro said: 'what defines a communist is his action against oligarchies, action against exploitation, action against imperialism, and in this continent, action in the armed revolutionary movement.'[6]

The OLAS confrontation served to reinforce such criticism. Not only did the body—dominated by Castro's supporters—condemn the 'right-wing' leadership of the Venezuelan Communist Party, it also recorded a conference denunciation of the policy of 'certain socialist countries' which had given economic and technical assistance to Latin American conservative regimes.[7]

Latin American communist reaction to Castro indicates why the theme of 'national communism' on that continent has been treated entirely in a Cuban context. When the other parties answered Cuban charges, they did so strictly under Soviet auspices. In an article in *Pravda* on 30 July, Luis Corvalan, General Secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, wrote: 'The revolutionary current which emerges on a petty bourgeois basis usually underestimates the proletariat and the communist parties, is more disposed towards nationalism, adventurism and terrorism, and sometimes permits anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes.' Nor were Castro's main enemies, the Chilean and Venezuelan Parties, ambivalent in their support of Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia.[8]

Castro, for his part, maintained a neutral attitude on the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis before the invasion. He seemed unable to accept

[5] David Alexander, 'Cuba: Un Nouvel Internationalisme Révolutionnaire', *Les Temps Modernes*, March 1967.

[6] Supplement to *Granma* (English weekly edition), 19 March 1967. Cited by Kevin Devlin in 'The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro', *Problems of Communism*, January—February 1968.

[7] Havana Radio, 11 August 1967.

[8] It should be noted, however, that only 12 out of 21 Latin American communist parties openly supported the Warsaw Pact intervention. Moreover, some, like the Venezuelan Party, suffered leadership division over the issue. Pedro Duno, a Venezuelan communist leader, denounced the Soviet action in a six-point memorandum issued by *La Verdad* on 23 August, but the Party's tenth plenum was subsequently to state its approval of the occupation on 2 September.

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either the implications of the Prague decentralization and liberalization, or the political intervention by the CPSU into the affairs of another party. Castro interpreted the intervention itself in Machiavellian fashion as illegal but justified. Typically, he saw in the conflict further proof of the wisdom of the Cuban revolutionary road.[9]

There was no doubt as to 'the necessity for such a dramatic, drastic and painful measure. . . .'. But there was also no doubt 'that the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was violated' without 'the slightest trace of legality'. The problem arose, in the first place, he states, because 'an internationalist and communist conscience is not being developed' throughout most of Eastern Europe. He cites as proof the 'inconsistencies' which lead the Warsaw Five to pursue their dealings with the 'oligarchic governments of Latin America' and to continue their support of 'those rightist groups that are betraying the revolutionary movement in Latin America'. The reference to the orthodox communist parties is obvious. They remain Castro's prime target, for he insists that they recognize the Cuban national experience as 'the true revolution'.

Outside pressures have certainly not halted Castro in the pursuit of his convictions. The Chilean Communist Party has recently developed a Popular Front alliance with considerable success, but Castro seems unperturbed by what he considers an isolated example.[10] Moreover, while Che Guevara's death put a brake on the development of other revolutionary models, it did not prevent Castro from rubbing more salt into the wounds of the old Latin American communists. In 1968, for the first time, the Cuban revolution fathered secessionist factions within other communist parties. Castroism has now been institutionalized in Guatemala, Colombia and Brazil; in the latter the splinter group became an official pro-Cuban Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party in April 1968.

Asia

SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION Peking has put more active pressure on Asia's communist parties. It has encouraged radical factionalism even within nominally pro-Chinese groups. And it has attacked the slender ties which the neutralism of some parties still required them to maintain with the CPSU in spite of their sympathy for China. The first method is exemplified by the split which has occurred in the pro-Chinese 'Marxist Communist Party' of India. Accused by China of being 'revisionists in communist garb', for such activities as their

[9] In a speech of 23 August 1968 (*Granma Weekly*, 25 August).

[10] In the 1967 national municipal elections the Communist Party and the socialists, aligned in a popular action front, captured 29 per cent of the vote, an increase of seven per cent over their combined 1965 figures. Still, 'Fidelists' have captured a segment of the Socialist Party and now threaten the stability of the alliance from the left. This was demonstrated by the split in the left's campaign for the student federation elections in October 1967.

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participation in coalition governments in West Bengal and Kerala, this group is now threatened by Maoist ultras on its left. While rebuffing Chinese charges, the CPI (M) has not stopped its criticism of the CPSU.[11] Interestingly, in spite of such criticism, the (usually) pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party (CPI) has encouraged the CPI (M) to co-operate in establishing a national front against the ruling Congress Party. If the new Maoists succeed in founding their own ultra-left Indian CP, co-operation between the other two factions along national lines will be facilitated.

The second method is best illustrated by Peking's attitude towards Hanoi. Earlier respect for the Vietnamese middle road was cast aside as exacerbated relations with the CPSU increased polemics. The Chinese now came to look upon their own differences with the Soviet Union as the touchstone of true Marxism-Leninism, and inevitably North Vietnam became the object of pointed remarks in Chinese articles. As a piece in *People's Daily* commented: 'To oppose imperialism it is imperative resolutely to oppose the counter-revolutionary line of the Soviet revisionist clique. There is no middle road in the struggle between the two lines.'[12] The Chinese have also not been above embarrassing Vietnamese delegations by making anti-Soviet speeches in front of them.

It is, of course, unlikely that the North Vietnamese would be swayed by Chinese arguments. Bernard Fall has pointed out that while the North Vietnamese do not have high regard for the role which Moscow has played historically in Indochina, the Vietnamese also, 'no matter what their political color, do not trust the Chinese no matter what *their* political color . . .'.[13] As the war has escalated, the importance to North Vietnam of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute has increased. This is true partly for tactical reasons: major arms supplies must come from the Soviet Union, while food shipments and the guarantee of the delivery of those arms must come from China. And it is also true because the Hanoi regime wants to keep factional disputes from erupting within its own ranks. Balanced praise rather that balanced criticism (as in the case of North Korea) has therefore been the usual mark of North Vietnam's independence.

Under Chinese pressure, however, the Vietnamese have found it necessary to assert their autonomy in more forceful fashion. An editorial appearing in the September 1967 issue of the North Vietnamese theoretical journal *Hoc Tap* stated:

> It is necessary to make everyone understand the developmental trend of our theory-formulating task, which is to stick firmly to

[11] A Politbureau statement said: 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has violated proletarian internationalist principles governing relations between parties. . . . The Comunist Party of China . . . is also sometimes found to disregard this principle. Our Party should guard itself against outside interference and jealously defend its independence' (UPI, 18 August 1967).

[12] *People's Daily*, 21 July 1967.

[13] Bernard Fall, *Last Reflections on a War* (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 116.

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> our country's reality and develop the spirit of independent thinking and research to a high degree, according to our viewpoint and methods of Marxism-Leninism. Only on this basis will the study of fraternal parties' experiences be useful.

North Vietnam's strength, in other words, depends on her skill in avoiding involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This is not easy. Recently, to Moscow's displeasure, Hanoi sent greetings to the CCP's Congress.

After the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, China sought to undermine North Vietnam's independent position by suggesting that the Soviet Union might bargain off South-East Asia to the United States for full acceptance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.[14] After the Ussuri clashes and the Ninth CCP Congress, Maoist propaganda intensified its accusations that the 'Kremlin's New Tsars' are 'ganging up with U.S. imperialism', trying to 'rig up anti-China encirclement'.

The North Vietnamese are not blind to this kind of manoeuvring. If North Vietnam feels that the Soviet Union might be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China in inter-party polemics, then it is in her own interests to move slightly towards Moscow. After the invasion, North Vietnamese communications media commented for the first time on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While remarks were favourable they were never directly linked to the Party or government.[15] The contrast between Ho Chi Minh's and Castro's attitude towards Czechoslovakia highlights the importance which different perceptions of their national interests have acquired in shaping the policies of the two parties.

The Japanese and North Korean Parties moved some years ago from support of Peking to development of their own national Party lines. Kosygin's visit to North Korea in February 1965 was of pivotal importance in producing better Party relations between the two countries. The military and economic agreements reached allowed the North Koreans to move from under the unproductive yoke of their ties with China.[16] At the same time the Soviet Union stopped courting a pro-Moscow faction within the Japanese Communist Party and thereby enhanced possibilities of rapprochement with that Party too.

In a joint communiqué signed after a Japanese Party visit to North Korea in March 1966, both Parties subscribed to the importance of an anti-imperialist 'united front' in support of Vietnam.[17] This did not make them Moscow's vassals. But as China refused to support the principles of a united front, it is an indication of the extent to which the escalation in Vietnam caused them to reappraise their positions of neutrality on Sino-Soviet issues. The gap created has since widened. Both Parties held congresses in October 1966. At theirs the Japanese

[14] A speech by Chou En-lai on 2 September at a National Day reception given by the North Vietnamese Embassy in Peking (*New York Times*, 3 September 1968).
[15] See 'Les Mystères de Radio-Hanoï', *Le Monde*, 30 August 1968.
[16] J. C. Kun, 'North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking', *The China Quarterly*, July–September 1967.
[17] KCNA, 22 March 1966.

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stressed 'the autonomous and independent' line which they would henceforth pursue, while Kim Il-sung reiterated his Party's belief that a joint struggle against imperialism would determine who was a true Marxist-Leninist and who a revisionist.

The Japanese Party moved closer to the CPSU in 1968, a meeting in early February taking the first steps to a 'normalization of relations'. However, as Asia's most important non-ruling communist party (200,000 members and more than six per cent of the electoral vote in the July 1968 national elections), and one which has suffered grievously as the result of Soviet interference in past years, it remains understandably concerned about preserving its autonomy. A mark of this came when the JCP unequivocally supported the Czechoslovaks during the pre-intervention weeks of the crisis in Eastern Europe. Takeshi Hama, editor of *Akahata*, the JCP press organ, told the Czechoslovak news agency in an interview that the Japanese Party rejected on principle 'any interference in the internal affairs of another fraternal party'.[18] After the occupation, the Japanese Party suggested that it might have to reconsider its policy of rapprochement with the CPSU. It demanded 'the immediate termination of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia by the governments and the communist parties of the five countries'.[19] In contrast, North Korea was concerned with its newly re-established Soviet ties. Like North Vietnam, it endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The revisionist Czechoslovak regime was bitterly denounced.[20]

Europe

IN EUROPE, MORE OBVIOUSLY THAN in Asia, the development of 'national communism' was directly related to change within the Soviet Union.

[18] Ceteka, 22 July 1968. The Japanese CP was planning an international 'anti-imperialist' conference to be attended by other parties (such as those of North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Rumania), who are similarly unwilling to attend a Soviet-sponsored meeting. It also had talks with the French and Italian Parties, but no other parties seem to have voiced their support for the proposed conference. In its 'neutralist' stand, it decided to boycott the Moscow conference. After the Ussuri border clashes, it appealed to China and the Soviet Union for peaceful negotiations.

[19] Kyodo News Agency, 24 August 1968, and *l'Unità*, 25 August 1968. Before the intervention the generally pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party had also praised Czechoslovak efforts to develop 'multi-party socialism' (*New Age*, 2 June 1968). This was in keeping with its own attempts to convince other parties in India of the importance of a coalition against the Congress Party. Now, however, it must compromise between the strong anti-invasion sentiment within its own ranks and the challenge posed by seeking a domestic bargain with an anti-revisionist communist party. See Peter Hazelhurst, 'Indian Communists Avoid Open Split', *The Times*, 9 September 1968. The victory of the Communist Party of India (M) in the West Bengal elections in February highlighted the confused situation in the Indian communist movement. As the Polish *Trybuna Ludu* (26 January 1969) noted with satisfaction, this party supported the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia after it had split with the more radical (and pro-Chinese) Naxalbari communists. In contrast, among the pro-Moscow communists, it was the more moderate wing which condemned the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. They were not satisfied with the compromise hammered out after the invasion, and 10 of them published a collection of essays, 'Whither Czechoslovakia?', strongly attacking the Soviet position.

[20] *Nodong Sinmun*, 23 August 1968.

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The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU had an obvious liberating effect, in particular on the Italian Communist Party. But it was more recently, after the fall of Khrushchev, that 'in view of the manifest weakness of the movement's "center" . . . the other communist parties found themselves thrown back upon their own resources. They now had to depend on their popular bases, that is [on] the national conditions of their origin and growth.'[21]

Virtually all the West European parties supported the 'Czechoslovak revolution' and condemned the intervention. To have done otherwise would have undermined their programme of appeal to the non-communist left in their own countries. Even the Finnish CP, in spite of its psychological and geographical proximity to the CPSU, opposed the intervention. Nevertheless, while some of these parties have stressed their view of the occupation as a violation of Czechoslovak sovereignty, others have gone much further and imply that it is smothering a renaissance of the socialist spirit. It is therefore not accurate to picture the West European parties as an *identically minded*, non-ruling reform group. For the East European states within the Warsaw Pact the intervention generally emphasized their dependence on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, a description of the nationalist elements of these parties' policies remains valuable as an indicator of where future strains will appear.

1. *Western Europe*

IN THE PAST, SOME WEST EUROPEAN communist parties have manifested party autonomy by refusing to attend international communist conferences. The Dutch and Norwegian Parties, for example, have both been consistent absentees. But this manifestation of 'nationalism'—read neutrality on Sino-Soviet issues—is a virtue they find dictated by the necessity of making peace between pro- and anti-Soviet leadership factions. Thus the Norwegian Communist Party's decision to send an observer to the Budapest February 1968 consultative conference was only a compromise offered by neutralist chairman Reidar Larsen to potential supporters of a faction (led by Joergen Vogt, editor of the Party daily, *Friheten*) which had left the Party at the end of 1967 for its failure to condemn the Chinese Cultural Revolution as an 'aberration'.

The Swedish Communist Party's absenteeism at international conferences has been a more conscious attempt to assert a nationalist orientation, unfettered by tight connexions with the CPSU. Proof is offered by its Twenty-first Party Congress decision in May 1967 to change the Party's name to 'Left-Party—Communists' in an effort to broaden its appeal to the Swedish electorate. Added national impetus was provided when the Soviet invasion provoked even the conservative

[21] François Fejto, *The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967), p. 194.

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northern faction of the Party into 'deploring' the event.[22] The subsequent election defeat on 15 September—three weeks after the intervention—when the Party's share of the national vote fell 3.4 per cent, will only enhance further retrenchment along national lines.

The Swedish Communist Party's plight is one example of the kind of problem faced by the West European communist parties; avoidance of international commitment and concentration on a domestic line does not guarantee a Party's national appeal. In any case, in the post-intervention era the semblance of a reform wing of West European 'Marxist' communist parties acquires substance.

Soon after the intervention Franz Marek of the Austrian Communist Party Politbureau wrote that

> The KPO . . . tends rather to favour a conference of the communist parties of Western Europe. . . . Such a conference would include parties which face essentially the same or similar conditions of struggle. . . . The Czechoslovak communists' conceptions of socialism come nearest to those models of socialism which the West European communists have worked out themselves in recent years.[23]

At the Twentieth Congress of the Austrian Communist Party (held in Vienna in January), the 'progressive' tendency suffered a setback. The Congress reaffirmed, however, the condemnation of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. Soon afterwards, the 'progressives' headed by Franz Marek were reinstated, regaining their majority in the Politbureau.

Even agreement on the conference issue, however, would not disguise the differences which exist between Western parties. The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) did condemn the Soviet intervention, thereby keeping to an earlier policy of support for Czechoslovak socialist democratization.[24] This certainly distinguishes it from the West German Communist Party, the Luxemburg CP and the exiled Greek KKE, smaller parties without national bases which supported the invasion. But the SKP split at its Fifteenth Congress in April: the Stalinists headed by Aimo Aaltonen and Taisto Sinisalo decided to form their own party.[25] For the most developed examples of how consciousness of their national image affects Western parties in different ways, we must turn to the two largest communist parties in Western Europe, those of Italy and France.

ALTHOUGH TOGLIATTI COINED THE WORD 'polycentrism', he and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) were to drop it from their vocabulary. Picked up by Moscow's opponents to the left and to the right, the problem with the new term was that 'it failed to satisfy the PCI's own

[22] *Worrskens Flamman*, 22 August 1968.
[23] *Volkstimme*, 27 August 1968.
[24] *Kansan Uutiset*, 19 March 1968.
[25] Before and during its Fifteenth Congress, *Pravda* (11 February and 5 April 1969) and *Izvestia* (9 February and 5 April 1969) did not mention the possibility of the split.

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desire for a formula acknowledging the virtues of unity as well as of regional and national autonomy'.[26] By the end of 1965 such a formula had been found. The Eleventh Party Congress in January 1966 gave it official sanction. Ascendant within the PCI were the views of the Secretariat member Giorgio Amendola, calling for a domestic strategy which placed heavy stress on collaboration with Italy's non-communist parties of the left.[27]

The stability of policy which the Eleventh Congress seemed to ensure did not, however, last long. As with other communist parties, the belligerency of the Chinese Communist Party and the Vietnam war were factors which called for a cautious reappraisal of Party policy throughout 1966.[28] More critically, the unification of the Italian socialist parties in October 1966 put Amendola's ideas in question.

At this point (although the evidence is limited) Pietro Ingrao seems to have begun to express his views more forcefully in Party circles. During the summer of 1967 the militant posture of the PCI was hardened; PCI articles began to stress the importance of 'the *struggle* for peaceful coexistence.'[29]

During 1968 the PCI was to go through several critical stages. At the February Budapest meeting the Party failed to present a convincing set of 'Italian' arguments to the delegates. The PCI (and Yugoslav) request that non-communist revolutionary forces be invited to Moscow was swept aside in the orchestrated agenda of the CPSU. But the May national elections were to reinvigorate the Party domestically and increase its stature internationally.

Electorally united with the far-left PSIUP, the PCI took advantage of public disenchantment with the socialists' coalition role, moving its own percentage of the vote up nearly two per cent to 26·9 per cent, while the PCI-PSIUP combined ticket acquired nearly one third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Domestically, Amendola seemed to emerge the victor in his dispute with Ingrao. The socialist coalition had lost votes and the non-communist left was weakened in relation to the PCI. But externally, in the face of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia, Ingrao's chary refusal to support the Soviets on international questions was beginning to prove his political wisdom. Before the intervention the Italian Communist Party gave extraordinary coverage to Czechoslovak affairs in its journals and supported Dubcek from the sidelines with Politbureau communiqués. But more important, acting in unison with the French Communist Party (the first time such a joint initiative of

[26] Donald Blackmer, *Italian Communism and the International Communist Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1968), p. 376.

[27] Amendola's opponent at the Congress was Secretariat member Pietro Ingrao. Ingrao argued that Italy's Centre-Left government was not as destined to failure as the PCI majority thought. He felt the PCI should forget its special alliance with the socialist parties and seek instead to create a 'New Left' in Italy composed of radical elements from all levels of Italian political society—including 'progressive' Catholics.

[28] A pro-Chinese movement gathered strength and formally constituted itself a party on 15 October 1966.

[29] 'Guerre locali e strategia della coesistenza', *Rinascita*, 7 July 1967.

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these parties had been taken vis-à-vis the Soviet Union), on 14 July the PCI sent two high-ranking members of the Party leadership, Carlo Galluzzi and Gian Carlo Pajetta, together with Waldeck-Rochet to Moscow to reason with the Soviet leaders. According to some reports this was followed by a later letter (along with ones sent by Tito and Waldeck-Rochet) also strongly critical of Soviet policy, a letter sent directly to Brezhnev at the Cierna meeting.[30]

As has since become obvious, the Soviet Union did not pay much attention to the demands of the PCI and the PCF. But for the Italians at least, while the military action came as a shock, Party unity was strong enough to absorb the repercussions. The Party had consistently extolled the purpose of the Dubcek regime, and the Central Committee meeting held after the invasion reaffirmed this early conviction. As Longo stated:

> We are particularly prepared to understand and comprehend [the Czechoslovak] direction because it corresponds comletely with our Leninist and Gramscian conception and elaboration, and it corresponds to the teachings left by Togliatti and [his] Yalta Memorandum.[31]

PCI theoreticians have since given substance to these remarks by beginning a series of studies which examine the relationship between socialism and democracy, promoting concepts which frankly derive from the nine-month revolution in Czechoslovakia. Critical remarks are directed at the other regimes in Eastern Europe for sapping the strength of a socialist rebirth. Achille Ochetto, writing in *Rinascita*, observed critically that

> Today the entire movement of the anti-imperialist struggle is characterized in a new way. We see the attenuation of every mechanical tie between the socialist struggle and communist parties, while the obsolescence of the alternative between social-democratic opportunism and Stalinist dogmatism appears as a process of political renewal involving many communist parties.[32]

A week later Pietro Ingrao added his own views:

> Inner party democracy, debate and criticism are necessary to the party to establish proper relations with the working class. . . . Without this dialectic between the party and the masses, the party remains 'lost in the clouds', to paraphrase a remark by Gramsci. . . . We all know that a bureaucrat is a conservative and always ends up to the right because he gives up the idea of building anew and he entrusts himself to the repetition of outlined formulas. Czechoslovakia has also lived through events of this kind. . . . The only way to mobilize the party fully . . . is to come to a correct understanding and interpretation of this relationship between democracy and socialism, thereby defeating positions based on illusions about what strong leadership can accomplish.[33]

[30] David Holden, *Sunday Times*, 4 August 1968.
[31] *l'Unità*, 28 August 1968.
[32] *Rinascita*, 6 September 1968.
[33] *Ibid.*, 13 September 1968.

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Ingrao and Ochetto both represent radical voices within the PCI, contending with the more conservative group of leaders around Amendola; and in the interests of Party unity, on practical political issues differences are still subsumed in the haze of Togliatti's formula of unity in diversity. As the draft thesis for the Party's Twelfth Congress stated:

> Our conception of unity in diversity does not signify an agnosticism, is not concerned solely with the affirmation of the legitimacy of diverse paths to socialism so that we can enclose ourselves within our national field; rather it means a party commitment to seek . . . the requisite strategic and political unification. To this end it is necessary to lead the ideological and political battle against the positions we hold to be erroneous and inspired by a one-sided view of the class struggle.[34]

While the Party initially opposed the holding of the Moscow world conference in the light of the invasion, once its postponement to spring 1969 had been secured it reverted to its old position, that it was in its interest to attend the meeting. The PCI has not abandoned, however, its opposition to Soviet 'hegemonical' tendencies. It later reaffirmed its condemnation of the idea of 'excommunicating' the Chinese Communist Party and its continued support for the Czechoslovak 'reformists', but proposed to implement its stand through what Longo called a 'policy of presence'. This new resoluteness emerged at the Twelfth Party Congress held in Bologna from 8–12 February 1969. On this occasion opposition to the Soviet expressed line was frequent by the delegates. The stand taken on the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had only a marginal relation to internal differences. These had already been openly aired in the July–October 1968 issue of the PCI's bi-monthly theoretical *Critica Marxista*. In an article entitled 'Twenty-five Years After the Communist International', Amendola, after a brief criticism of the Soviet justification for the invasion, noted parenthetically that 'naturally, there is a distinction which cannot be ignored between the defence of socialism, and the maintenance of imperialist oppression'. It is a parenthesis which said as much as the rest of his article. Ingrao, on the other hand, implied that the intervention could be considered a defence of socialism, for the 'model' being defended is not valid. He defined the model as one in which the leading role of the Party becomes unified with the repressive and military force of the state machinery. He pointedly asserted that the grave import of the military intervention lay not only in the use of arms between socialist states, but also 'in the theoretical and "practical" affirmation that only such a "model" is a guarantee of socialism and a force against imperialism'.

The publication in *Pravda* (13 January 1969) of an article by Luigi Longo marked the resumption of a dialogue with the PCI. In contrast to the East German press, Soviet journals never engaged in open

[34] *l'Unità* (supplement), 27 October 1968.

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polemics with the Italian communists; they passed over in silence their critical attitude towards the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. They condemned however 'some' West European communist parties for their tendency to 'reformism' and 'right-wing opportunism'. The resumption of a 'dialogue' was no doubt intended to influence the PCI in the direction of 'solidarity' before the PCI Congress in February and the March meeting in Budapest.

However, this effort could hardly be considered successful. The Italian communists did agree to participate in the Moscow June meeting of the world communist parties, but only as a part of their flexible tactics of trying to put pressure on the Russians 'from inside'. At the Bologna Congress only two members of the Central Committee (out of 151), D'Onofrio and Donini, came out for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, all the other speakers—and the Party leadership—condemned it. The delegates from the five invading Warsaw Pact countries found themselves in a difficult position and only one of them, Zhivko Zhivkov, from Bulgaria, strongly defended the action. Others used all forms of evasion and understatement. On the other hand, reports on the Congress in the Soviet and satellite press were so slanted as not to give any hint of the difficulties which Moscow-supporting communist parties were facing in Bologna. Longo's speech was published in full in Czechoslovakia, but in *Pravda*, *Trybuna Ludu*, *Neues Deutschland*, *Nepszabadsag*, and *Rabotnichesko Delo* it was heavily censored (or even rewritten). The offensive passages dealt with the role of the communist party in a modernized society and with the Czechoslovak problem. The speeches of the Yugoslav delegate, Edward Kardelj, and the Rumanian representative, Paul Niculescu Mizil, were simply not reported, and *Neues Deutschland* even managed to ignore the concluding speech at the Congress by Enrico Berlinguer, Longo's heir-apparent.

Internally, the Bologna Congress was characterized by the emergence of new trends within the Party. The Amendolas and Ingraos were out-distanced on the 'right' and 'left' respectively. This New Right and New Left of the PCI clashed over the issue of the 'parliamentary road to socialism' versus 'revolutionary change'. Like their predecessors of old they charged each other with 'reformism' and 'adventurism' respectively. The representatives of the New Left were in a small minority. They had six delegates out of 817, but politically their strength was incomparably greater than these figures suggest. Luigi Pinder, Rossana Rossanda, Aldo Natoli, and Achille Ochetto—all of them followers of Ingrao—went out of their way to support the younger militant revolutionaries. In the present situation, when the Party has for a considerable time been making a determined bid to win over the student militants, this consideration gives the New Left in the Party not inconsiderable political weight. This was certainly reflected in the concluding speech of Berlinguer, who as a successor to Longo is trying to find a new political formula for reconciling the Party's Right and its

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'New Left' (in the best traditions of the Italian political *combinazione*). He assured the delegates that 'we are not in a hurry to come to power in Italy', but he also spoke favourably of the 'new force' of militant students, thus wooing the right and left wings at one and the same time. Like Longo, Berlinguer evidently believes that he can ride the two horses—*riformismo* and *massimalismo*—simultaneously.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Italian Communists are no less adroit. They deplored the Ussuri clashes in a proper ecumenical spirit, but they are not neutral ideologically and are against the Chinese frontier claims. They also pointed out (*l'Unita*, 16 April 1969) that Soviet arguments about the inviolability of their frontiers also apply to the Czechoslovakian ones.

TOGLIATTI LEFT THE PCI A GUIDE to the 'national road to communism'. He thus ensured that his Party's image was engraved on the Italian consciousness. The French Communist Party was not so fortunate. As one observer has commented, the patrimony of their long-term leader, Maurice Thorez, incorporated the historical fact that 'for the French communists the unity of the international communist movement is not a question of interest, but of faith. The more they advance on a road of practical revisionism, the more they need to integrate their daily action, their "electoralism", to a general line. . . .'[35] It was only in January 1967, after the PCF's Eighteenth Congress, that the Party emerged from the backwaters of the French political scene.

The programme announced then for seeking co-operation with the non-communist left was audacious in scope and placed the Party squarely in the mainstream of French political life. The Party's success in the March 1967 elections anchored them there.[36] Nevertheless, the PCF did not basically alter its firm allegiance to Soviet international policy. Its strong support of the Karlovy Vary meeting of European communist parties demonstrated that it still identified the objectives of Soviet foreign policy with the goals of international communist unity. The umbrella of Gaullist foreign policy was a great help to the PCF in promoting Soviet interests without damaging its reputation at home.

The concatenation of crises which befell the PCF in the spring of 1968 was, however, to affect Party attitudes considerably, both internally and internationally. The May crisis, the June elections, and the tension in Eastern Europe telescoped an evolutionary process within the PCF which might otherwise have taken several years.

[35] François Fejto, 'Le Parti Communist Français, a-t-il Change?', *Preuves*, March 1967.

[36] The PCF gained 32 seats in the National Assembly; more significant, however, was the fact that the electorate obeyed the rules of the tactical alliance which France's parties of the left had established, and where a communist was left running against a Gaullist in the second round of the election, anywhere from 60 to nearly 100 per cent of the non-communist left cast their vote for the communist. This election and the problem which the definition of a common programme is posing is discussed in detail by Raymond Barillon, *La Gauche Française en Mouvement* (Paris, Plon, 1968).

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The story of the French 'revolution' and the role which the PCF played in it cannot be detailed here.[37] The important point in hindsight is, as the June elections made plain, that the electorate was convinced by Gaullist tactics that behind a vote for the left—in particular for the PCF—there lay further chaos and revolution. The French Communist Party therefore suffered the worst electoral defeat in its history, dropping from 73 to 34 Assembly seats.

In fact the Party was not responsible for the politicization of the university unrest. Furthermore, only at one point did it try to use the political disorder to undermine the regime (from 27 to 29 May when it called on the strikers to demand more than mere social and economic reforms). For the rest, the PCF insisted on its role as 'the Party of order and political wisdom',[38] and counteracted Gaullist charges of subversion by asserting that 'we are the great French Communist Party in which millions of Frenchmen place their confidence and hope. . . . In these difficult moments our Party's attitude allowed [the nation] to avoid the conflict which [the Gaullist regime] sought in order to arrive finally at a military dictatorship.'[39]

This same emphasis on the Party's role as upholder of French democracy was repeated at the PCF's 8–9 July Central Committee meeting in Nanterre at which Waldeck-Rochet assessed the Party's performance during the preceding two months. He affirmed: 'We maintained and will continue to maintain the idea that it is necessary to replace Gaullist power by a government born of *a democratic union, not by subversion* but by the popular will clearly and democratically expressed.'[40]

But right after its defeat the PCF found itself faced with the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis. To reinforce the decisions made in July, maintaining the Party's national image, it was clear that the PCF would have to counter even the CPSU's early political intervention in Czechoslovak affairs by an intiative of its own. Waldeck-Rochet's trip to Moscow and his subsequent call for a European conference[41] on the Czechoslovak question must be viewed in this light.

Similarly, once the military occupation had taken place, the PCF determinedly pronounced its 'reprobation' of the invasion. It ignored Soviet suggestions that it had taken place at the behest of unnamed Czechoslovak Party and government leaders.[42] Four days later the editor of *L'Humanité*, Yves Moreau, wrote that 'the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was a break with the principles which we as communists consider fundamental; the respect of the sovereignty and the independence of each country, the respect of the free determination of each communist party'.[43]

[37] See Stanley Hoffmann, 'The French Psychodrama', *The New Republic*, 31 August, 1968.
[38] *L'Humanité*, 12 June 1968.
[39] *Le Monde*, 12 June 1968.
[40] *L'Humanité*, 10 July 1968.
[41] *Ibid.*, 18 July 1968.
[42] *Ibid.*, 21 August 1968.
[43] *Ibid.*, 25 August 1968.

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While the PCF has thus indicated that it regrets the misapplication of Leninist principles by the Soviet Union, unlike the PCI it seems to have less regret that the creative development of those principles by Czechoslovakia was not permitted to continue. Roger Garaudy, philosopher and spokesman for the PCF's small but articulate liberal wing, was criticized by *L'Humanité* on 5 October for his preface to a published collection of Czechoslovak documents. The charge focused specifically on his assumption that the Czechoslovak experiment could prove an excellent model for application by the PCF in France.[44] The strictures of democratic centralism, however, also meant that the leadership had to fend off charges by keepers of the old-guard pro-Soviet line. At a Central Committee meeting in Ivry on 20 October, the resignation from the Politbureau of Mme. Jeanette Vermeersch was accepted. She is the widow of Maurice Thorez and was the leader of the 'Moscow' group within the Party. Garaudy was given a public reprimand but he retained his Politbureau seat. The nature of the compromise the PCF thereby sought to establish was revealed in a separate communiqué announcing a meeting between the PCF and the CPSU. The Party declared:

> The French Communist Party believes that a divergence between fraternal parties should not undermine their common battle for the grand objectives which they hold. . . . The French Communist Party is determined to continue to work towards the reinforcement of the unity of the international communist movement and its relations of friendship and solidarity with all brotherly parties, notably the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[45]

If the French Communist Party has thus discarded the principle of a general line—a considerable step in itself—it, nevertheless, maintains a 'faith' in a transcendent fraternal solidarity of communist parties which prevents it from absorbing the lesson of Czechoslovakia. Having been forced to assume a more independent stance as a result of the invasion, the PCF still runs the danger of ossifying at home. It was clearly more inclined than some other West European parties to soft-pedal its initial stand on Czechoslovakia, and to support the CPSU initiatives on the world conference of communist parties. As a result of the visit of the French Party leaders to Moscow in November 1968, relations between the two parties have improved, and the Soviet press has begun to reproduce French communist declarations. However, the internal cohesion of the Party remained under severe strain. A visible sign of this continuous tension was the affair of the new journal, *Politique aujourd'hui*, published in collaboration with some of the more liberally-minded Party intellectuals, which was immediately and severely condemned by the Party leadership.

Another example of the orthodox caution of the French Party leadership was the way the Italian Party Congress in Bologna was reported

[44] See Raymond Barrillon, *Le Monde*, 6 and 7 October 1968.
[45] *Le Monde*, 23 October 1968.

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in *L'Humanité*. All criticisms of the Soviet Union expressed at this Congress were carefully omitted, and the only reference to Czechoslovakia was a brief quotation from Longo's speech. The general tendency was clearly to play down the differences of opinion between communist parties and to stress the need for their unity.

II. *Eastern Europe*

THE WARSAW PACT ALWAYS PROVIDED a cover of agreement for some of the parties in Eastern Europe, but also served to highlight the distaste of others for what is now the reinforced Soviet-East European system. East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary constitute the loyal band of supporters. Czechoslovakia, in the aftermath of her confrontation with the Soviet Union, must be seen as a hostage of the rigid alliance structure. The outsiders are Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania—all three of which should be seen as separate phenomena on the periphery of the real East European core.

On issues pertaining to world communist unity, the Hungarians had generally managed to preserve a slightly heterodox position. Before the first Budapest consultative conference in 1968, Zoltan Komoscin, the Hungarian delegate, said that decisions jointly arrived at 'cannot be mandatory and must be considered as directives which will be implemented by the appropriate leading organ of each party according to the peculiarities of its situation'.[46]

The Hungarians also reacted favourably when the West German *Ostpolitik* was announced at the end of 1966. Diplomatic activity in the weeks after the policy was made public suggested that the two countries might have even moved towards establishing diplomatic relations. The Rumanians did sign such a diplomatic agreement with Bonn in January. But the East German and Polish reaction to the Rumanian move was so negative that it killed any further discussion along these lines among the faithful members of the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party made an attempt to formulate objectives in areas where Hungary could play an active role. The most important of these were Kadar's efforts to promote Danubian co-operation. Relations with Austria improved considerably as a result. Hungary even assumed a noticeably less hostile attitude than the CPSU towards Austrian attempts to gain association with the EEC.[47]

Not surprisingly Kadar was also the one East European leader of the faithful four to favour a greater tolerance vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia throughout the tense weeks of early summer.[48] In the foreign policy area there were, after the invasion, some manifestations of a special Hungarian twist in the application of the Warsaw Pact policy. These

[46] *Nepszabadsag*, 24 December 1967.
[47] J. F. Brown, 'Die ungarische Aussenpolitik im Schatten des Bundisse mit der Sowjetunion', *Europa Archiv*, no. 15, 1967.
[48] See, for example, David Binder, *New York Times*, 4 August 1968.

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appeared at first to be contradictory. Hungary has been notably less harsh in its attacks on Dubcek than have its allies, yet has virtually set the pace of criticism directed at Rumanian opposition to the intervention,[49] obviously trying to take advantage of the situation to make political hay out of their traditional hostility to Rumania, a hostility which continues because of the nationality problems posed by Transylvania.

Bulgaria, for her part, has shown strong interest in promoting Balkan co-operation. But she would not let such a programme conflict with her close attachment to the Soviet Union. Her policies remain an accurate reflection of Soviet wishes. Still, Bulgaria was less hostile towards Rumania than her allies in the aftermath of the occupation. Apparently she would preserve some shreds of Balkan co-operation and, in the light of the open enmity between Sofia and Belgrade at the moment, Rumania offered the only hope. However, this was a minor development. Basically Bulgaria's strong support for Soviet goals indicated there was little possibility that Bulgarian Party policies would acquire a more effective national focus in the near future.

Unlike Kadar, Ulbricht and Gomulka have not tried in the past to deflect attention from their countries' dependence on the Soviet Union. Their conception of 'national interest' moved them in an opposite direction. Under a panoply of appeals to international unity, the primary object of East Germany and Poland has been to tighten the cohesion of the East European-Soviet alliance. In Gomulka's case this has not always been true, but a signal manifestation of the change in Polish perspectives was the increased importance which the Poles placed on a Pankow-Warsaw axis.

As early as 1964–65 Gomulka had begun to strengthen his ties with East Germany. When the West German coalition government gave official sanction to its new *Ostpolitik* in December 1966 the Poles and East Germans began to seek formal means of strengthening East European unity. In the spring, with the GDR taking the lead, they both began to sign or renew treaties of friendship and co-operation with their fraternal neighbours. While these were considered a defence against Bonn's new policy, Rumania's effective exclusion from the group could not be missed.

As noted earlier with reference to Hungary, there is no doubt that Polish and East German militancy was successful in sounding the alarm about the immediate threat of a West German 'breakthrough' into Eastern Europe. They had, in the first place, arranged to convince the CPSU that West Germany did pose a corrosive danger to their alliance. In the second place, their protests only reinforced the impression of a disturbed political atmosphere and consequently produced a chorus of support for Soviet objectives from the loyal Warsaw Pact

[49] *Nepszbadsag*, 27 August 1968.

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allies. In the 'Warsaw letter' it was made clear that they were the parties with the most at stake in telling the Prague leadership that

> We cannot reconcile ourselves, however, with the fact of hostile forces pushing your country off the road of socialism and creating a threat of tearing Czechoslovakia away from the socialist community. This is no longer only your concern. This is a common concern of all communist and workers' parties and of states united by alliance, co-operation, and friendship.[50]

The liberalization inherent in the Czechoslovak experiment certainly did represent a major threat to Ulbricht's Stalinist regime, and provided a stark contrast to the increasingly repressive methods being employed by Gomulka, notably against students and intellectuals. From Ulbricht's point of view, moreover, there was undoubted benefit to be gained from the immediate strictures imposed on Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, specifically vis-à-vis West Germany.

The intervention did not resolve the problems created for Ulbricht by the Soviet Union's failure to act on behalf of Novotny in January. Compounded with the Soviet Union's post-intervention efforts to collaborate with the hostaged Czechoslovak leadership, this must make it clear to him that the Soviet Union might easily countenance his own demise. With 20 divisions on East German soil, the Soviet Union is unlikely to be worried about the socialist structure of his country. By continuing to attack the presence of counter-revolutionary elements among Czechoslovak intellectuals, Ulbricht was trying to muzzle East German opposition to his rule. The fall of Dubcek may have made this task easier. Ulbricht, like other leaders of the five Warsaw Pact countries, promptly congratulated Husak on his nomination. The reintroduction of censorship in Czechoslovakia and the more repressive line taken against intellectuals and reformers there cannot but please Ulbricht. But even a Kadar-like solution in Czechoslovakia carries no guarantees for him in the long run.

Poland and East Germany had not, in fact, been entirely happy with Czechoslovak policy even under Novotny. Usually, while he was head of the Czechoslovak Party, if there was ever a suggestion of conflict between Czechoslovak national priorities and the demands of international unity, it was always the former which gave way. But Czechoslovakia had shown a definite interest in improving relations with West Germany even before the new *Ostpolitik* was announced. In the aftermath of Rumania's diplomatic agreement with Bonn, Czechoslovakia cautiously suggested that it might be useful in promoting a full 'normalization' of relations between states. Later, in August, an agreement to exchange trade missions with the Federal Republic was signed.

The possibility of further developments along these lines was, however, cut off in the summer of 1967. Faced as he was with serious

[50] *Pravda*, 18 July 1968.

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domestic difficulties, there was no chance that Novotny would seek to counter the pressure of his allies.

AFTER ALEXANDER DUBCEK BECAME First Secretary, Czechoslovakia managed to destalinize its domestic affairs, but it had to be very cautious on its foreign affairs, so as not to give its die-hard allies additional pretexts for intervention. When it occurred, prospects of developing co-operative efforts along the lines of a Little Entente, suggested by Tito's and Ceausescu's visit to Prague immediately before the invasion, vanished. The only important diplomatic venture in which the Czechoslovak Party has engaged since September was bargaining with the Soviet Union on the extent of Czechoslovak sovereignty which should be permitted. The replacement of Dubcek by Husak, the dismissal of Smrkovsky and the rehabilitation of the quisling diehards destroyed Czechoslovak hopes. But Rumania continued its defiance.

East European communist parties have had to live with Rumanian Party autonomy since the Rumanians' famous April 1964 'Declaration of Independence'. The policy was a key factor in making Rumania one of the more successful communist countries in identifying itself with the issues of popular nationalist appeal. Once their autonomy was firmly rooted, the Rumanians felt little compunction about exacerbating their relations with Hungary by assimilating the Hungarian Transylvanian minority or even in raising questions about the legality of Soviet claims to Bessarabia which Rumania had been forced to give to the Soviet Union in 1940.

The more important aspect of the policy, however, was that it laid the foundation for Rumanian neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rift and for her independence from the strictures of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.

This was indicated in March 1965 by Rumania's refusal to attend the March consultative conference in Moscow and in the Rumanians' failure to respond at the end of 1966 when the Soviet Union relaunched its conference crusade at the Bulgarian and Hungarian Party Congresses. Increased inter-Party pressure only made the Rumanians more intransigent. Rumanian Party neutrality on international communist issues was now used to enhance a neutral position on questions of world politics. Nineteen sixty-seven was to see her establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, refuse to break her relations with Israel during the Middle East crisis, and offer increasing opposition to the Soviet-American sponsored version of the non-proliferation treaty.[51] The Rumanians saw no reason why a communist party should feel bound by the abstract appeal of a common front.

For conservative parties, of course, such an attitude was tantamount to a weakening of their position on Czechoslovakia, and the loyal five did not invite Rumania to any of the multilateral meetings in which

[51] See J. R. Brown, 'Rumänien—der unbotmassige Verbundete', *Europa Archiv*, no. 24, 1967, for a full discussion of Rumanian foreign policy in 1967.

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the situation in Eastern Europe since the January change in Prague was discussed. Rumania was not present at Dresden, Moscow, Warsaw or Bratislava. Immediately following the intervention, Ceausescu called it a 'shameful moment in the history of the revolutionary movement' and a 'flagrant transgression of the national independence and sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic'.[52] Making it clear that Rumania was directly involved in the issues at stake, Ceausescu warned his audience, 'perhaps tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counter-revolutionary tendencies'. He exhorted the population to 'be ready to defend our socialist homeland at any moment'.

Nor was the defensive posture ill-considered. On 24 August, when Tito and Ceausescu met in Vrsac to discuss 'problems of interest to both countries', *Izvestia* and TASS were issuing their first condemnation of 'the leadership of Yugoslavia and Rumania, who are actively helping the Czechoslovak anti-socialist forces'.[53]

After the Moscow agreement, however, the pattern of the Rumanian response has somewhat changed. Rumanian officials still referred to the importance of building Rumanian socialism and maintaining the nation's support of foreign and domestic Party policy. But polemics with her nominal allies became cautious. The desire not to jeopardize the fragile bargaining position the Czechoslovaks had established was probably one factor in this. A more important one may have been Ceausescu's assessment as to why the Soviets had intervened in Czechoslovakia. Neither the Rumanian Party model nor Rumanian autonomy—not strategically critical in either military or economic terms—threatened Soviet interests in the way Czechoslovakia did. But although the danger of Soviet intervention in Rumania was therefore less, the Rumanians felt impelled to soft-pedal their polemics. Yet they rejected the Soviet proposals about the Warsaw military exercises in Rumania.

Rumania's main goal must remain protection of her autonomy, and to secure it she has to play a delicate game with the Soviet Union. She is showing the CPSU that, in Premier Maurer's words, 'We are building socialism in such a way that it can never be said that we have deviated from it'.[54] Secondly, she is guarding her common interest with current ostensible enemies of the Soviet Union, in particular Yugoslavia. And finally, she is still playing the Chinese card: Ceausescu sent greetings to the Ninth CCP Congress.

Obviously, after a period of extreme caution, the Rumanians resumed bolder tactics in their resistance to Soviet pressures, both in respect of the closer military links demanded by the Soviet Union and in respect of Party relations (as distinct from state relations). The Rumanian delegate took a strong stand against the idea of the integration of

[52] Bucharest Radio, 21 and 22 August 1968.
[53] TASS communiqué, printed in *Pravda*, 25 August 1968.
[54] Bucharest Radio, 31 August 1968.

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Comecon at the Berlin meeting of that organization. Another Rumanian delegate strongly attacked the USSR at the Italian Communist Party Congress. Soviet military demands were stone-walled, and rapprochement with Yugoslavia continued. A direct challenge to the Soviet thesis of 'limited sovereignty' was made by Ceausescu on 7 February 1969. He dismissed it as 'contrary to Marxist-Leninist principles'. This was shortly after Tito's visit to Rumania on 1–2 February, when the two leaders 'noted the identity or similarity of views of the two Parties'.

Ironically, only 18 months ago, the Soviet Union's aggravation of its relations with Rumania had been at least partly compensated during the Middle East crisis by its rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The co-operation achieved between Moscow and Belgrade in the aftermath of the June 1967 war was a high point in a series of efforts towards better Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

This was achieved in time for the February 1968 Budapest meeting. But the Soviet performance there disenchanted the Yugoslavs and the choking of the Czechoslovak liberal model has once again pushed Moscow and Belgrade to open enmity. Tito has been accused by Soviet media of having promoted counter-revolution in Hungary in 1956 and of doing the same in Czechoslovakia in 1968.[55] A Zagreb daily commented in retort that

> it is important that the leaders in Moscow have come to the conclusion that Tito, as the promoter of a humanistic socialism which puts men in the centre of all things and which is being implemented in Yugoslavia, has become the chief obstacle to all attempts to preserve outdated social relationships in socialist societies. Such a Tito is now to be disclaimed.[56]

The Soviet-Yugoslav polemics have continued ever since. The patriotic belligerence, however, cannot cloak the fact that Tito's policies have been damaged as a result of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The non-aligned countries he courts will need convincing of the importance of maintaining bridges between the socialist countries and the Third World, or of its role in it. Soviet-Yugoslav relations have in any case deteriorated to such an extent that Tito is hardly in a position to do any bridge-building. After Czechoslovakia, Soviet-Yugoslav polemics reached a new asperity and the Ninth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, held in March in Belgrade, has been boycotted by the Parties of the Warsaw Pact (minus Rumania).

* * *

IN a recent essay Theodore Draper has suggested that focus should come to be placed on the 'polymorphic' nature of communist parties.[57] The occupation of Czechoslovakia has not changed the

[55] Moscow television on 19 September 1968. See *Politika*, Belgrade, 21 September 1968.
[56] *Vjesnik*, 21 September 1968.
[57] 'World Politics: A New Era?', *Encounter*, August 1968.

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validity of that observation. Only analysis based on this kind of appreciation can reflect the impact which the 'national experience' has had on the world's communist parties and formulate typologies which will make comparison fruitful. Along the internationalist 'hard line' one can draw from Pankow through Warsaw to Moscow, irregularities produced by nationalist pressures have occurred. In Western Europe, differences between communist parties remain acute, in spite of the common hostility to Soviet intervention and may even intensify as a result of the new Czechoslovak crisis. And the differences in outlook of Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea and Rumania which the invasion produced raises the question whether their characterization as a 'neutralist bloc' among parties still carries weight.

It is therefore difficult to talk of the future of 'the world's communist parties'. International cross-currents are still produced by the Sino-Soviet problem; patterns of factionalism will appear as a result of the Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation, particularly among the West European and Latin American parties. But the more relevant criteria in discussing the policies and future of a party are its ability to operate effectively within the context of domestic issues. The Chilean Communist Party's support of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, to pick one example, is less important than its reaction to the appeals of Castroism within the Chilean body politic. The same kind of consideration applies to the activities of the Italian Communist Party, though here the relation between its domestic interest and its concern with inter-party relations, after Czechoslovakia even more than before, is quite intimate. The fact that the PCI is increasingly inclined to put its own interests before those of the Soviet Union is primarily determined by domestic considerations, yet, as communist differences have to be expressed in ideological terms, local developments acquire wider significance and clash with the ideological positions of other communist parties.

The Italian Communist Party promised (in its Congress Theses) that it will work against 'every conception that would make the whole force of proletarian political power consist only in the coercive apparatus of the state'. This inevitably becomes not only a local, but a universal issue for the communist movement, particularly for those parties whose power is based 'on the coercive apparatus of the state'.

If the June meeting actually takes place, and it is not impossible that it will be postponed once again, the Italian communists may find themselves, despite all their tactical skill, in a situation where they become the focus of a new dispute. They have indicated that they want an open public discussion during the conference (Carlo Galluzzi, *Rinascita,* 4 April 1969) and voting on all issues and resolutions. They have no illusions that 'the divergences in the communist movement are serious and are not going to be overcome within a short period' (*ibid.*). They complain about the retreat from the political line of the Twentieth Congress (*l'Unità,* 16 April 1969) and sarcastically point out to the

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Russians that they should forget 'the monolithic conception' of the communist movement (*ibid.*). Their relations with the Russians on the eve of the Conference have deteriorated considerably. They may again soft-pedal their position, but after the replacement of Dubcek by Husak the Politbureau of the Italian CP published a statement demanding 'the total restoration of Czechoslovak sovereignty'. This can hardly be a good omen for a smooth passage of the final resolution of the Conference. For the CPSU the Sino-Soviet conflict and Czechoslovakia are the Scylla and Charybdis between which it will have to sail at the communist summit conference.

The June meeting in Moscow is still faced with all the thorny questions which the Soviet leaders have been trying for so long to sweep under the carpet (when *Pravda* reported the PCI's agreement to attend the Moscow conference, it concealed the fact that the Italians stipulated that there should be no resolutions, only an exchange of opinions). The 'new internationalism' of the PCI reinforces the position of all those parties which are unwilling to submit to the attempted reassertion of Soviet leadership at the new communist 'summit'. The long-term effects of the process of polycentrism have not been obliterated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. There is now a clear clash between positions which find their ideological expression in the formula of 'different roads to socialism' on the one hand, and of the 'doctrine of limited sovereignty' on the other. They cannot be reconciled by the Soviets claiming that there may be different roads to socialism, but 'there is only one socialism'.

In trying to rebuild the unity of the communist movement under its own domination, Moscow is still chasing a chimera. It can hardly be achieved by the explicit rejection of the sovereignty of states and of the equality of the communist parties. No verbal patchwork can cover up this central issue at the June meeting in Moscow. If there is only one socialism, Moscow still has to discover that Soviet interests are no longer accepted as the one and only determinant of its definition. Internationally, an appropriate metaphor is suggested by the historical experience of the Catholic Church. The Soviet Union must sooner or later recognize that stop-gap measures to maintain Latin for the Mass of the world's communist parties are futile. There has already been one critical schism over dogma; basic tenets are increasingly being interpreted according to local political conditions; the vernacular is coming into its own.

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NATIONALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh

THE recent revival of interest in nationalism in Western Europe is due to the fact that 'nationalism' could be used as an explanatory category for what are to many people very disturbing tendencies: the drifting apart of Western Europe and the United States; the permanent crisis in the European Communities leading to the question whether European integration can still make any progress. It seems to me, however, that this use of the concept 'nationalism' does not explain much and can even be misleading.

The first reason is that nationalism after the Second World War, through its association with the aggressive ideologies and behaviour of the fascist Powers, acquired a thoroughly pejorative meaning. Putting the blame for the halting of European and Atlantic integration on the 'nationalism' of certain political actors has therefore made political debate more acrimonious than necessary and has hampered the analysis of what are in fact the very complex causes of these tendencies.

Secondly, nationalism had a fairly specific meaning in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century West European history. It denoted a set of ideas about the world and norms for political behaviour that, because of its emphasis on exclusivity, superiority, and national mission, greatly contributed to international conflict. To use the term nationalism now without further clarification to denote what might in fact be very different ideas and norms is to run the danger of reasoning by analogy, a procedure as perilous in politics (e.g. the use of the Munich and Rapallo analogies) as it is in social science. It might lead to predictions about the conduct of political actors deemed nationalists which are based on what nationalism was in the past and not on what it now is or may become.

Few terms have so many meanings, both in ordinary and scientific usage, as nationalism, and the study of nationalism can therefore have different objects: the history of political (nationalist) movements; of a set of ideas or ideology (nationalism) impelling people to action; of the foreign policies (nationalism) of certain governments, spurred on by the feelings of loyalty (nationalism) of the people. And not only that: practically all writers about nationalism have felt the need to come forward with their own definitions and classifications of nationalism.

In view of this it can be asked if the concept of nationalism, with its multifarious meanings and its links with specific historical periods, can still be used for analytical purposes (its value for political purposes remains, of course, obvious). I think it can, but only if we clearly separate the analytical and the normative components of its meaning.

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We can define nationalism in a non-pejorative, normatively neutral manner as a *frame of reference*, the set of ideas and norms an individual (or group of individuals) holds about the terminal political community (state or group aspiring to statehood) to which he feels he belongs. This way of looking at nationalism enables us to distinguish between *types* of nationalism and to escape from the misleading dichotomy nationalism-internationalism.

CONTEMPORARY nationalism is different from the types of nationalism which manifested themselves in the period from the French Revolution—the event that made the nation emerge as a political community—to the Second World War. The history of nationalism begins with the French Revolution because it marked the end of the unquestioned acceptance of the dynastic principle as the source of political power. Authority could henceforth not be legitimated if it could not in one way or another be said to emanate from the people.[1] The idea of the nation could replace dynastic property as the criterion on which to base the delimitation of political communities from one another. But which units could in fact be called nations?

Before Karl Deutsch the debate between advocates of an objective definition and proponents of a subjective definition of the nation remained unresolved. The objectivists tried to define the nation on the basis of objective characteristics like race, language, territory, culture, whereas the subjectivists stressed the will or consciousness of the members of a group: 'a group of people constitute a nation when they feel they do', as Inis Claude has written. But Deutsch has been able to transcend this debate in his pioneering study, *Nationalism and Social Communication.* He has been able to demonstrate that nationhood is related to communication patterns: 'the essential aspect of the unity of a people . . . is the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals.' This helps to explain the important role that a common language, a common literature, common historical experiences have played in the nationalist ideologies that have created nations out of certain human groups. It also makes clear why a common form of political organization or administration is so important, why nations could grow out of the centralizing activities of dynastic states or colonial administrations. Centralizing administrations opened up to new patterns of communication closed, traditional communities that previously might not even have had a common framework to communicate with one another. The creation of new patterns of communication also explains why the formation of nations coincided with the transition from agricultural to industrial economies, in short with social mobilization. (Conversely, it makes clear that colonialism carried the seed of its own destruction: bringing colonies into the market economy required social mobilization and the spread of communications

[1] This is the reason why all political systems want to be called democracies.

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technology. This created the conditions for successful nationalist movements.)

Social mobilization is also a euphemism for the uprooting of the peasant population and for changes in the power, wealth, and status distribution in a society. The 'nation' offered to the uprooted a new sense of personal identity and social belonging. The nation became, as Ernst Haas has written, 'a synthetic *Gemeinschaft*', a new kind of community to replace the warmth of the traditional village communities. It also offered an opportunity for compensation to the victims of social change, to the personally insecure or the socially frustrated individuals who could overcome their handicaps by claiming to speak for their particular nation and endowing it with special traits which made it vastly superior to its environment and defined its role or 'national mission'. In this relationship the socio-psychological basis for the success of the integral nationalism of nazism and fascism can be found.

In this perspective the more vicious kinds of nationalism—those resulting in military aggression and the extermination or persecution of national minorities—can be seen as linked to social change, to the great transformation of territorially organized agricultural societies into functionally organized industrial societies.

What kind of nationalism (liberal, jacobin, traditional, integral) won out in a particular society depended on particular historical and cultural factors. That, for example, integral nationalism was successful in Germany and Italy may partly be explained by the fact that as a result of the struggle to unite these countries *explicitly* nationalist ideas and symbols were disseminated far more widely among their populations than in France or Britain. In France nationalism also remained strongly linked to the ideas of the French Revolution. This constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the integral nationalism of Charles Maurras and the *Action Française*.

This brief analysis of the historical development of nationalism is meant to show that the past of nationalism in Western Europe can be viewed as the consolidation of a new type of political community linked to the process of social change resulting from the development of science and technology. The type of social mobilization which industrialization required has now been achieved and a new equilibrium—i.e. the extension of the middle class over nearly the whole of the population—has been reached. The West European nations are also involved in various processes of regional integration. This means that both the social basis and the international setting for nationalism have fundamentally changed. Only where the terminal political communities are still in question—the division of Germany, Belgium, South Tyrol, North Ireland, and to some extent the Scottish and Welsh movements—might historical comparison be useful.

But if we want to analyse the meaning of nationalism and its effects in stable nation-states involved in the different processes of

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regional and international integration, the traditional distinctions between types of nationalism and the types of foreign policy to which they are presumed to lead are of no avail. The prevalent type of nationalism in Western Europe is of the liberal variety, which 'regards the nation as a fraternal community whose purpose is the realization of the rights and liberties of individuals, thus contributing to the happiness of all' (Ernst Haas). This conception of the nation can be said to underlie the idea of the welfare or service state, to which all the major West European political parties, trade unions, and even employers' organizations subscribe, even though they may differ with respect to the question of how far the state should extend its services and in what manner it should perform them.

To the extent to which the welfare state fulfils expectations and aspirations, it results in a growing identification with the nation-state. This has weakened the cohesion of the cross-national political movement that communism wants to be, as can be clearly seen in the evolution of the West European communist parties. But the welfare conception of the states does not prevent the growth of supranational decision-making, in so far as it can be demonstrated that supranationalism delivers the goods. In this way supranational institutions can be seen as an extension of the welfare state, not as the locus of a new political community. But precisely because supranationalism now is essentially a vast bureaucratic bargaining process it may cause difficulties, because of the present attempts at a redefinition of democracy (which includes a strong critique of unresponsible bureaucracy) that we see all over the Western world.

But whatever the evolution of the welfare state, it is clear that the traditional distinctions between types of nationalism do not offer us any analytical tool to study the relations between nationalism and integration in Western Europe. We will have to develop a new typology of nationalist frames of reference, study their structure, determine their distribution in the nation-states we study, and analyse how this distribution is related to social and political change and to changes in the international setting (e.g. to American foreign policy). In other words, a forecast of the future of nationalism in Western Europe in specific terms is impossible. It is in any case a task that cannot be attempted in this essay, which is confined to the exposition of a typology of nationalist frames of reference (which can also be regarded as an attempt to define nationalism as a dependent variable), and to some speculative remarks about present and future trends in their distribution over politically relevant élite groups.

The typology is based on two criteria: the *geographical unit* to the interests of which political priority should be attached, and the *character of the political relationships* which should prevail within or between those units.[2]

[2] I am assuming that none of the types of nationalism is inexorably linked to any of

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WITH respect to the geographical units, only the distinction that would make between the European Communities and Europe requires comment. Neither can yet be clearly delimited territorially, but they stand for two different geographical-political conceptions of Europe: the one for the unity of the democratic West European nations, the other for the reconciliation or the uniting of Eastern and Western Europe into a greater Europe, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

With respect to the character of political relationships between the units, I distinguish between co-operation, selective supranationalism and nation-building. By co-operation I mean that only those relationships among states are tolerated that do not involve giving slices of sovereignty to supranational institutions, as selective supranationalism advocates. Nation-building, in turn, means that the creation of a new (federative) unit is advocated through the use of a new nationalism or the disappearance of all nationalisms.

Before describing the structure of the different types of nationalist frames of reference in greater detail, it should be noted that as described they can only be demonstrated to be held by élite groups (politicians, civil servants, military leaders, representatives of interest groups and opinion makers). Their frames of reference can be presumed to be the most relevant for foreign policy, though the type and intensity of the nationalisms operative at the mass level obviously will be one of the factors determining which type of nationalism will determine foreign policy in a particular nation.

The first type is the one that has given the term nationalism its pejorative connotation, as it is the one most likely to lead to a nationalist foreign policy. It assumes the nation to be the most basic social reality and the highest value. The nation is held to have a specific identity, based on certain inherent qualities forged by history (for example, French culture and rationality, German *Geist*, Dutch tolerance, British democratic stability and pragmatism, etc.). These qualities should be contributed by the nation to the world at large or protected against foreign contamination. The nation should fulfil a certain role in the world, usually an independent one (not necessarily: the Dutch role was held to be to promote the creation of an international legal order). It follows that a nation has specific interests which can only in some situations and in some areas be coterminous with the interests of other nations. The nation should therefore remain master of its own destiny and the state—the instrument which translates the will of the nation into action—should remain fully sovereign. This implies that only temporary co-operation between sovereign states can be permitted, if feasible and in the interests of

the prevailing political ideologies (socialist, liberal, Christian-democratic). I also assume that we can heuristically separate nationalist frames of reference from the total belief-systems of individuals.

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the nation. All forms of supranationalism or integration should be opposed because they imply that either a hegemonial power or a supranational institution may impose its will on the nation. Because this type of nationalism implies that the interests of the nation come before the interests of the people, it can be translated into foreign policy only by a strong leader who claims to interpret and represent the real will and interests of the nation (de Gaulle).[3] It also makes a difference whether this type of nationalism is made explicit or whether it remains an implicit guide to behaviour. In the first case we can speak of explicit nationalism, in the second case of statism. Selective supranationalism might then still win consent because a small country will have more influence and guarantees for its interest in a supranational than in an intergovernmental decision-making framework (as for example has always been held even by those members of the Dutch élite who were far from enthusiastic about the Europe of the Six and wanted no more than free trade). But statists will be hesitant about attempts at new breakthroughs in supranationalism.

The third type, supranationalism, does not attach the highest value to the identity or role of a specific unit. It regards the state as an organization that performs certain indispensable functions, but it assumes that in the present interdependent world the nation-state cannot adequately provide welfare or security any longer. But it is highly pragmatic with respect to the units that should supplement the nation-state in these functions. Because the European Communities are a going concern from which concrete benefits are derived, judgment on the ultimate ends of integration should be suspended, notably on the question whether they should be developed into a West European federation. The highest priority should be to work out an optimal division of labour between national and supranational institutions, so that welfare can be maximized. There are two subtypes: the first, to be found within the Six, holds that membership should be extended to all democratic West European countries, but that this should not endanger what has already been achieved among the Six. The second places higher priority on the extension of membership and might be willing to break up existing arrangements to start afresh, if that could be done. After the threat to present supranational arrangements is removed, they will both support new breakthroughs in integration.

The fourth type starts from the same assumptions, but it would not be willing to carry integration within the European Communities further if that would result in the consolidation of the post-war division of Europe. It gives priority to the reconciliation of the two parts of Europe and hopes for the creation of a European system of cross-cutting communities and relations in which the German question would

[3] For a more extensive analysis of General de Gaulle's nationalism see my 'Contemporary Nationalism in the Western World', *Daedalus*, Summer 1966, esp. pp. 833–39.

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gradually come to lose its meaning and its dangers. This type can be called European reconciliationist.

The fifth type also starts from the assumption that the separate nation-states can no longer provide adequate welfare and security, but it places the highest priority not on welfare, as supranationalism does, but on security. It holds that the democratic West is still threatened by the totalitarian East. Because Western Europe cannot effectively defend itself against the political pressure, supported by overwhelming military superiority, that the Soviet Union is able to exert, Western Europe still needs American protection. The highest priority should, therefore, be given to the maintenance of close relations between Europe and the United States, and West European integration should contribute to this goal, not endanger it. The creation of an Atlantic partnership should have the highest priority.

The sixth type takes mankind as a whole as its point of reference. It regards the attachment of priority to a specific unit, whether this be one's own nation-state, Europe, or the West, as the wrong answer, given the interdependence of the modern world. It does not consider European integration as good *per se*, but looks at the functions which should be performed by supranational organizations. It tends to view the European Communities as pioneering efforts, as demonstrations of the effectiveness of the supranational method, but it regards development of the Third World as the central problem of our age. It will, therefore, put any organization to the test of whether or not it contributes to development. It will tend to attach higher priority to the support of universal organizations than to regional organizations of the developed countries. This type can be called world functionalist.

The seventh and eighth types are two varieties of what might be called European nationalism. Both hold that the days of the traditional European nation-states are over, because of the post-war shift in the balance of power. Only a united Europe will be able to play a world role. However, they define Europe differently. The European nationalists want to unite Europe on the basis of the integration already achieved by the European Communities, while the Greater European nationalists want to unite Eastern and Western Europe into a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. But they share some basic assumptions and categories of thought. Europe has a great past and should therefore have a great future. It should fulfil a world role worthy of its accomplishments. It has a cultural mission, both with respect to 'humanizing' the materialist and technological culture of the United States and to teaching its own achievements to the developing nations. Europe should, therefore, become independent of other centres of power so that it can be free to define its new role in the world and to build an exemplary society uncorrupted by foreign influence (Americanization). Europe is also in danger of becoming economically dependent upon the United States; to be able to resist

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'*le défi américain*' it should merge its efforts. The European nationalists therefore advocate the development of the European Communities into a federative structure. Only a European federation can acquire the full measure of independence, because it will be able to maintain and control a European nuclear force.

The Greater European nationalists, though they use the symbols and categories of thought of nation-building, tend to be much vaguer in defining political priorities. Their Greater Europe in fact turns out to be not much more than a classic organization of independent nation-states which have agreed on some kind of a common European security system. It is, therefore, compatible with explicit nationalism or statism, which then in fact will determine political priorities.

The ninth type can be called Atlanticist. It is based on the presumed division of the world between the open democratic societies and the closed totalitarian societies of the East. It wants to achieve an Atlantic Union in order to protect 'the basic values of the Atlantic Community'. However, it cannot use a name which has connotations comparable to the name of a nation, as the European nationalists can use Europe. Atlanticists are handicapped by being able to refer only to common values and interests.

The final type, that of the world federalists, the advocates of world government, requires no further comment.

A FEW examples can be given of which élite groups will tend to hold the respective types of nationalist frames of reference, and it may be possible to indicate whether their number and influence are declining or growing.

Explicit nationalists are to be found mainly in France among the Gaullists. French foreign policy is the only foreign policy of a West European country that is determined by explicit nationalism. In other West European countries explicit nationalism is found only in small right-wing parties, in von Thadden's NPD, and in the various 'Poujadist' parties such as the Farmers Party in the Netherlands. Contrary to what is often said, I think that explicit nationalism is declining in importance, even in France. Only in Germany, where the terminal political community 'Germany' is still in question, might there be an increase of explicit nationalism. But for explicit nationalism to determine foreign policy a strong political leader like de Gaulle is needed, and it is not very likely that the West European political systems will produce such leaders in the foreseeable future.

Statists have their strongholds in the ministries of foreign affairs. In general, civil servants in national bureaucracies who feel their position threatened by the growing importance of 'Brussels' will tend to become statists. French explicit nationalism has also made some supranationalists in the other EEC countries shift to statism, particularly in the Netherlands. Since de Gaulle's veto of Britain in 1963 statism has been growing, but it may decline quickly again after explicit

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nationalism no longer determines French foreign policy and new breakthroughs in the European system have been achieved (for example, the extension of membership of EEC or the creation of a new technological community).

Particularly in the EEC countries supranationalism is very strong, especially among the interest groups that benefit from integration and among civil servants in the specialized ministries (agriculture, economic affairs, transport) who are closely involved in the integration process, and are therefore also able to improve their own position vis-à-vis the ministry of foreign affairs. Its influence is still growing and will become even stronger if new breakthroughs are made. The experience of the European Communities has been that integration creates its own support.

The emergence of European reconciliationists is a consequence of the détente and also of a growing disillusionment with the United States because of the war in Vietnam. Reconciliationists are to be found mainly among intellectuals and left-wing socialists, but their influence is growing with the younger generation of all the mainstream political parties.

Supporters of an Atlantic partnership are declining in importance. They are to be found mainly in the military and among the older generation of anti-communist socialists, whose frame of reference was formed by the thirties and the war. Again, the détente and the war in Vietnam have contributed to its decline, nor is it likely that a change in American policy away from Asia would reverse this tendency. The same is true for the Atlanticists, who have always been few in number. Few also are the world functionalists. They are mainly economists and intellectuals preoccupied with development and peace (Gunnar Myrdal is a prominent example). The European nationalists are to be found mainly in the European movement. They are most strongly represented in the Christian-Democratic parties, but they too give the impression of being an old guard whose importance is declining. The younger generation of 'Europeans' tends to combine supranationalism and European reconciliationism, i.e. it has not made up its mind to what extent the two are incompatible and where they should place priority.[4] The Greater European nationalists are more a possible than a real type. A few representatives can be found in France, but for the most part they talk the language of a Greater Europe because they think that France will be able to play a more important world role in such a system than in the present Euro-Atlantic system.

IF we look at the history of European integration in the light of the types of nationalism prevalent in different periods, we can first say that the European Communities remained confined to the Six,

[4] It should be noted that the types are mutually exclusive only when a priority will indeed have to be assigned, that is, when an individual is confronted with the necessity to choose. An empirical investigation of real frames of reference cannot therefore always tell us what choices an individual will in fact make.

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mainly because in Britain statism won out. The idea of the welfare state, with its emphasis on national planning, at first provoked resistance to giving independent powers to supranational institutions, a resistance perhaps reinforced because in the fifties supranationalism was still regarded as a means of building a European federation. Britain at that time still aspired to an independent role in world politics as the leader of the Commonwealth and a mediator in the Cold War.

The European Economic Community was until 1962 very successful, because statists, supranationalists, European nationalists, and supporters of an Atlantic partnership could all view the Community as a means to achieve their particular ends. Even the explicit nationalist de Gaulle could see the EEC as the basis for a political union of the Six led by France (because of its nuclear force) which could establish equilibrium with the Soviet Union, eliminate American hegemony, and create a greater Europe. But when in 1961 the statist British Conservatives began to see their interests in terms of selective supranationalism (some were even converted into supranationalists and European nationalists), and applied for British membership of the EEC, it became increasingly clear that the different types of nationalism had conflicting political priorities. This led to the re-emergence of 'high politics', as Stanley Hoffmann has called it, in the relations between the member countries of the EEC. After the French veto of 1963 the disputes over questions related to the different types of nationalism—the future role of Europe in the world, relations with the United States and the Soviet Union—caused a temporary halt in the progress of the EEC. But the supranationalists were already so strong that the Community could rather quickly go back to business as usual. Similarly, only the strength of supranationalism can explain the successful resolution of the protracted crisis of 1965.

It seems that new breakthroughs in integration depend on a similar convergence of the immediate goals that the different types of nationalism dictate as occurred in the late fifties. This kind of convergence is most likely to take place if no major European country is dominated by explicit nationalism or by any of the nation-building types of nationalism.

At this moment the decisive question is, of course, whether or not the European Communities will be able to survive for the next five years the stresses created by the second British application. They probably will, even if Britain does not enter the Communities during that period. But if they do survive they will almost certainly be able to pick up momentum again, because it seems that explicit nationalism and European nationalism are gradually declining, as are the Atlantic types of nationalism, and these are the types of nationalism that have injected 'high politics' into the integration process. It may seem paradoxical to assert that European nationalism is now an obstacle to further European integration. To achieve the first breakthrough in

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European integration, European nationalism was clearly indispensable. But now there is a clear incompatibility between the goals of the European reconciliationists and the European nationalists which might prevent new breakthroughs even after Britain will have joined the Communities. The extension of selective supranationalism, the future progress of European integration, may be dependent on the decline of its original motivating ideology as propagated by the European movement. In particular, the aim of creating a European nuclear force, when espoused by one of the major European powers, is likely to prevent the necessary convergence of immediate goals because these will probably continue to be regarded in the light of high politics. It is also much more likely that integration will proceed in an incremental fashion than by drastic all-or-nothing decisions.

One forecast that can in any case be made is that it seems much more likely that supranational communities will tend to become, as Ernst Haas has said, 'a stable form of government' than that a new federative unit will be created. But the further extension of selective supranationalism faces one serious difficulty; it is not yet certain how far it can go without the establishment of a great measure of democratic control over the decision-making process. Democratic control, however, makes progress more difficult. There is an inherent tension between the two because decision-making in the Communities is a continuous bargaining process which makes it practically impossible to locate responsibility for a particular decision.

This forecast implies that although nationalism on the élite level has drastically changed and continues to change, the nation-state will remain for a long time to come the terminal political community in the one area of the world where it was for a long time thought that it would disappear. On the mass level, however, the nation-state will continue to command the loyalty of its citizens. The nation-state is still identified with the fatherland, with 'home' in a larger sense. When asked 'what are you?' people do not say 'I am a European' but 'I am an Italian' or 'I am Dutch'. But now that the traumatic experiences involving the nation (it was decolonization that brought de Gaulle to power) have been overcome, this identification with the nation-state ceases to be a potential obstacle to the extension of selective supranationalism. Only in Germany can nationalism at the mass level still come to play an important part in the determination of foreign policy. In the other West European nations (and at present in Germany too) nationalism at the mass level neither prevents nor stimulates integration, and now that de Gaulle's nationalism has healed the wounds of the past, this will become more and more true of French nationalism as well.

It may legitimately be asked whether recent events, in particular the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, have not changed or reversed some of the trends in the distribution of types of nationalism

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that I have described. I am inclined to answer that question in the negative. On the contrary, the different reactions to the Czechoslovak tragedy seem to me to illustrate the strength and durability of the different types of nationalist frames of reference. Both Atlanticists and European nationalists, for example, used Czechoslovakia to demonstrate that they rightly assigned priority either to strengthening NATO or to the creation of a West European political entity. President de Gaulle did not change his opinion on the question of Britain's membership of the European Communities nor on the general direction of his foreign policy. Obviously, those most in trouble are the reconciliationists. But they have interpreted Czechoslovakia as a temporary setback in a process that will prove irresistible. They see the Soviet Union weakened rather than strengthened by the invasion, and they think that to continue to stress East-West reconciliation is the best way to reinforce the position of the doves in Moscow.

Therefore, if catastrophes are avoided—if the war in Vietnam will not spill over into the relations between Eastern and Western Europe (a new Berlin crisis or worse) and the European Communities survive the next five years—new breakthroughs in selective supranationalism will be possible. The nation-states will not be replaced by larger units; if anything, they will fade away.

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AFRICA: A DECADE BACK, A DECADE HENCE

Russell Warren Howe

IT is 10 years since Sylvanus Olympio, with UN help, unrigged a French colonial election enough to guarantee independence for his little country. This forced de Gaulle to hold a referendum in French Africa which brought the vast area to nationhood two years later. This in turn ensured that *uhuru* would reach the continent's remotest corners—Bissau, Swaziland, the Seychelles, Fernando Pôo.

Africa's first decade has brought disappointments but few surprises. We were, it seems in retrospect, right about the vicissitudes but often wrong about the people. The correspondents have done better than the academics. As a consequence, in the still undeveloped negative of 1978, a few features seem already dimly discernible.

Where those who tried to map the forest of modern history from within the woods were particularly right, 10 years ago, was in the speed and completeness of the rising African revolution. True, the London *Daily Telegraph* published a map in 1958 with an inset of 'Africa in the Year 2000' in which Northern and Southern Rhodesia and even Kenya and Sierra Leone were still to be dependent. True, Frenchmen of even the most progressive hue then viewed Africans opposed to French rule as demented illiterates. But to the handful of us involved in the transcontinental scene itself, the unmistakable roar of a bandwagon getting under way was deafening.

We did not, of course, anticipate the road block in Zimbabwe—although one diffident and friendly British minister did. In 1959, Lord Home (then Commonwealth Relations Secretary) asked me in Accra if greater time could not be given to East and Central Africa for adaptation to race equality. My view was: with a timetable, yes; but with white propaganda left unchecked to breed black frustration, history's tail would wag the dog off. Home nodded noncommittally: he said the colonial service would do what it was told (i.e. decolonize) from Berbera to Blantyre, but that Salisbury, over which no Colonial Office official ruled, was wild country, heedless of history.

I think most of us anticipated widespread violence, earlier than this, in South and South-West Africa. Conversely, we saw Portuguese Africa, which 'assimilated' its literates and which lived behind a language curtain, as destined to be the last bastion of all to fall. Now, thanks to the quality of such pioneering leaders as Roberto, Mondlane and Cabral, it is leading a hesitant Africa into battle against the settler zone.

Ten years ago we were optimistic about development. In some ways our hopes have proved to be too cautious. Businessmen—still mostly foreigners from the Western world—make a great deal more

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money than they did in the days when colonial rule purposely inhibited infrastructural development. Perhaps, infrastructurally, many things have gone faster than the economies can justify or than recurrent budgets can afford—thanks often to an unholy alliance between construction companies (with home-government investment guarantees) and ministerial ten-percenters. But Africa's inability to keep living standards rising faster than population has largely negatived development's effects, and stressed the gap between *nouveaux-riches* and always-poor.

We certainly never guessed that Africa would fail so miserably in its principal economic activity, agriculture, although this might have been suspected from the dangerous overemphasis on industry—seen not just as a hard-currency saver, but as reducing Africa's dependence on the major powers.

The role which the black military were to play was sensed before independence came. Even Nkrumah held on to a British general for as long as he dared. In 1960 almost every African army of relative importance was brought into the Congo under the UN flag to witness one of Africa's largest countries turned upside down by enlisted men. In Leopoldville one day I saw hundreds of demonstrators stopped in their tracks by a police officer's shot in the air which sounded oddly unconvincing: then I realized I had seen power coming out of the barrel of a starter's pistol. Military lessons like this were not lost on those soldiers who witnessed the vast, tragi-comic opera of the Congo from 1960 to 1964. What perhaps was less evident to us in 1958—before Congolese independence—was the speed with which the military would act to destroy regimes built on personalities, not institutions.

If Africans have been less responsive to pattern and prediction than Africa, this has been most true in their relations with non-Africans. The interracial sun whose dawn we acclaimed never rose at all. Today, interracial prejudice is certainly more acute than 10 years ago. There are many reasons: the image of a flabby Britain, waving a rubber dagger at the white Rhodesian micro-nationalists; the way in which underdeveloped immigration into Europe has helped 'solve' class grievances there by adding on a caste system, making the white serf a Brahmin; and the role of the mass media (and the demagogue) in putting us all in everyone else's slit trenches. The racial climate in, say, Freetown can be coarsened by snippets of televised film from South Africa, the United States or the Arab ghettoes of northern Paris. Incalculable harm was done by the unjustified front-paging of the non-stories about the 'mercenaries' (foreign officers feature in every African army, from Algeria to Zambia; nearly half the 'Frenchmen' fighting in Indo-China were German foreign legionnaires). This in turn sprang from the loaded myth of a Tshombe 'under white control' and 'unpopular' with the Congolese, contrasted with the equally absurd claims of his admirers, who saw him as a man of peace, administrative efficiency and interracial amity.

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We were wrong, too, about Africa's ability to rise above the excitement of getting on the gravy-train. The next generation of African historians will teach that the standards of leadership in *this* generation were appalling. Africa's statesmen are very few—the late Tafawa Balewa and Sylvanus Olympio, the patriarchal figures of Kenyatta, Bourguiba, Houphouet-Boigny, and Senghor, the tragic figure of Kaunda, the blemished but noteworthy figures of Nasser, Nyerere, and Tubman.

As in Latin America, the mandarins are immeasurably better than the politicos. Perhaps the greatest African of the generation is Gardiner. There is certainly more of Latin America than Asia in Africa, running from a cantankerous exuberance of character to an easy addiction to fascism. Senghor has wisely pushed for closer African co-operation with Latin America, conscious as he is of the substantial Berber, Negro and Arab traditions of Spain and Portugal, and of Africa's own western-hemisphere presence dating from slavery. But the nearly-white peoples of this world are often the most complexion-conscious: for the moment, Latin America itself resists association with Africa, although such an association must seem probable in the long run.

THE lessons of the recent past are mainly there to guide us into the near future. But the new human material evades easy analysis even more than its fathers' did. Last year, as a visiting professor at Dakar University, I had some students who had been 10 years old at independence. Colonial rule is for them an exotic subject. What does the average American or European know or care about Iwo Jima or Dieppe? How many *young* Israelis read about the Eichmann trial in the press? But in Africa as in Israel, intellectual youth (a privileged class in Africa, a *jeunesse dorée*) are concerned about their membership in an economic, demographic minority in a hostile world.

Ironically, Africans still turn to European panaceas for the aches and pains of nationhood. Marx's theories for nineteenth-century, industrial, urban Europe are seen as having a pertinence for twentieth-century, agricultural, rural Africa. But the results bear little resemblance to the model. 'In Moscow', a Soviet ambassador said to me recently, 'we call inefficiency "African socialism"'. Marcus Garvey claimed that Mussolini borrowed his ideology from the Black Star Movement. Africa's version of the left has tended to be a mish-mash of Peronist national-socialism, exalting both nationalism and socialism. It has triggered the current saw about 'one man, one vote, once'. Africa has produced in many countries (a minority of English-speaking, a majority of French-speaking ones) one-party systems which inevitably generate instability and violence, junta interventions being the only way of going from one government to another.

Africa will probably retain its similarity to different faces of South and Central America—Mexico in the twenties, Bolivia in the sixties. Asia's experience seems to have little relevance, burdened as Asia is by a cultured past which Africa does not possess and which European

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countries like those of Latin America are prepared to rewrite dynamically.

In 10 years' time most of the great figures of this era will presumably be dead names on avenues. We have to envisage a landscape without the ailing, ageing Bourguiba, without Haile Selassie and Kenyatta (both now 76), shorn of Houphouet (who is far from fit at 65) and Nasser (diabetically declining at 61). Senghor has talked of retiring at 70—in three years' time. Many lesser figures will have posed ardent succession wars: Banda, Mahgoub, Idris, Tsiranana. Among leading Africans, who—assassins permitting—has a chance of 10 more years of power? There are Nyerere and Kaunda, and perhaps Obote; Somalia's Egal has made a running start, but Africa's most multiparty democracy seems unlikely to keep a premier for a whole decade. Younger men of significance who seem unlikely to last the course include Mobutu, Touré, Boumedienne, Hassan II. (Modibo Keita has already been overthrown.) West Africa, 1978, is an open book, as of course is a southern Africa shorn of Vorster and Salazar.

The evolution of English-speaking Africa depends in part on Commonwealth evolution. At present, English-speaking Africa seems more self-assertive and independent-minded than French Africa—to both groups. English Africans and English-language publications on Africa refer to the ex-French colonies as 'franco-phonie' (bitingly using the French word for Francophonia, the French-language world); French Africans refer, equally scornfully, to 'saxophone Africa', where politicians are seen as full of noise but lacking in pragmatism. The two attitudes are the result of British 'indirect rule', encouraging the different parts of the empire to retain their exotic flavours, and France's unkept promise of 'assimilation' which made Frenchness desirable. If one assumes a reaction to both these present attitudes, English-speaking Africa in 10 years' time may be ripe for a more global role and for militant participation in a new English-speaking transglobal union—whether led by Canada, the USA or Britain.

If the EEC survives, or is succeeded by NAFTA, or if there are two or more economic unions of continental capacity, Africa's involvement with them can only grow. Eurafrica is already an economic fact, even if it is not yet a politically accepted dogma. Economically, Eurafrica is something which the colour of African politics can do little to diminish or enhance. It will grow, like the EEC, its replacement or its rivals, at the speed which financiers, not political orators, decide. Africa's economic ties with Western Europe and the Americas will be influenced by the competitive pace of developments in Eastern Europe.

The African map seems sure to undergo a few changes in the next 10 years; but major cataclysms on a national scale should be mostly limited to countries artificially expanded by the pan-Africanizing influence of imperialism to sizes too great to resist the twentieth-century dogma of self-determination—of which decolonization itself is only an important facet. This is the virtue of our age which enables the weak to

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defy the strong—in Biafra, in Gibraltar, in Czechoslovakia. (Just possibly, Vietnam is relevant here as well.)

Ethiopia, as threatened now as in the days of Teodros II, might possibly hold together, if one military leader, ruling through Emperor (now Crown Prince) Asfa Wossen, can dominate the others. But most factors point to civil war: competing claims by the country's remarkable armed élite, ancient linguistic feuds, and the fact that Muslims now outnumber Christians in the oldest realm of Christendom.

Nigeria seemed likely, two years ago, to break neatly into four—the former federated states, with possibly frontier adjustments. The Soyinka Plan, keeping the south together, would have kept Nigeria as two. Since then, with the government replaced by the officers' mess in Lagos, a sense of widespread purposelessness seems to herald further splits in the former federation. The brutal and unimaginative handling by the Lagos junta of the post-pogrom situation has made Ibos—a tribe larger than any nation in West Africa, except Nigeria itself—virtual non-members of any future non-Ibo system. A commonwealth of sovereign ex-Nigerian states remains the last best hope.

Keeping Ethiopia one is just possible and desirable. Keeping Nigeria one is neither. The Congo's position is less fortunate. Here, fissiparousness poses grave problems; but, unlike Ethiopia, probably no unitary solution is possible. Mobutu's rule by intimidation cannot be a long-term answer. Kasavubu believed in some sort of confederal 'unity at the top': a commonwealth might be possible here, permitting sovereign states to share a common currency and services, a common market and free-trade zone. Just possibly, the fractionalization of Nigeria and the Congo may set the pattern for wider African economic units, perhaps finally expanding to great economic commonwealths of sterling states or franc-zone powers (the latter will presumably include the Congo, if present French ambitions in Kinshasa are realized). Such commonwealths could flatter the pan-African articles of faith of this generation by having supranational flags, and rotating, ceremonial presidencies.

The twilight of the monarchies in Libya and Morocco, and the Czech-type youth reaction to the present Algerian system—in Algiers, as in Prague, there is a recollection of relative prosperity *before* Marxism—should all help to homogenize the Maghreb and inspire greater economic co-operation. The Maghreb is a natural extension of Europe's Mezzogiorno, one which could reasonably expect to follow Spain, southern Italy and Provence into an era of development. The Mediterranean is a less daunting barrier than the Sahara, in commerce and in culture: if this is the last century of organized religion, we must presumably begin to think of 'Africa' as ending, not in the Syrtes, but in the Aïr, and of 'Europe' as beginning in the Fezzan.

IN 10 years' time the most predictable African headlines will be about the jackboot south. Long before the next decade is up northern Mozambique should be sufficiently secure in nationalist hands for an

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African government to have been established, and Zambia and Malawi given access to the sea through Ncala or Mozambique City. When Salazar dies, Angola's 300,000 Europeans may establish a Rhodesian-style republic, independent of Portugal, but with less of Salisbury's tendency to flatter South Africa's idiosyncrasies about racial separation. Angola will have black Portuguese ministers under white leadership. Mozambique may follow Angola into 'white' independence: if it does, it may also appeal for black quislings, temporarily weakening the the nationalist movement there.

In 10 years most white Rhodesians will have withdrawn to the safety of South Africa, probably after a rearguard offer, Blundell-style, of racial parity in power. In Salisbury, as in Mozambique, the initial stages of representative government are likely to be quarrelsome and negative: South Africa will continue to exercise a cancerous influence.

There will be popular risings in South Africa, but few observers expect them to be decisive. But conflict on a major scale will slowly become inevitable, especially when Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa are in African hands. The ultimate solution in South Africa will probably be partition, with separate independence for South-West Africa (to be called Namibia).

Broederbond thinkers are already prepared to envisage a partition which gives the whites the Cape and the mines and draws a frontier line along the Drakensbergs. The majority of the population would acquire less than half the country, but including Durban and East London. This of course presupposes that white South Africa would negotiate from a position of strength, as obviously it would today. What seems more likely ultimately is a white South Africa restricted to the diamond and agricultural territory of the Orange Free State, perhaps with a corridor to the sea. Such an outcome will probably take more than 10 years to achieve; but in a decade's time, this or a similar solution will be under active discussion in the chanceries.

By the time of the showdown South Africa's economic advance on the rest of the sub-Saharan continent will no longer be so absolute. The Inga Dam will have begun to give the Congolese federation or commonwealth an industrial weapon with which to assail markets from Douala to Bujumbura, from Fort Lamy to Lubumbashi. North Africa will have begun to share the Mediterranean pond more equally with Europe. Parts of present Nigeria, plus Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya and perhaps Madagascar, Cameroun and Senegal will have become industrial satellites of the technological revolution.

Already Africa seems on the slow road back from unipartite government. In 10 years' time, it will still be with us in some countries, as will military rule; but when the major convulsions in the outsize states have run their course, and the number of African countries has grown to about 55, there should be some grounds for cautious optimism about politics in Africa.

Will Africans, apart from a lucky few millions, live any better? This

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largely depends on crop and livestock agriculture, including fishing. In the long run, today's Formosans who produce five times the former rice crop in the Gambia River Valley, or the Kasaian peasant who has just discovered how to grow cassava roots five feet long (assuming they are still edible at four or five times their normal length) may be creating revolutions which will touch more bellies and brains among Africans than the sagas of Kenyatta, Bourguiba, Houphouet-Boigny and Chief Luthuli.

A COMMENT

Stanislav Andreski

IF by progress we mean a trend towards humanitarian and libertarian ideals, demanding an elimination of poverty, ignorance and oppression, then an unprejudiced survey of mankind's vicissitudes provides no grounds for regarding it as inevitable. Nonetheless, while intellectuals no longer have the confidence of their forerunners in this once avant-garde belief, some of them retain it as an official creed, both East and West.

Indeed, the similarity between Mr Howe's way of thinking and Marxism strikes one forcibly: for like the Marxists Mr Howe knows the position of history's tail, as well as the direction of the trunk. Optimism is *de rigueur*: Mr Howe believes that the African dictatorships must give way to something better, although Liberia has existed as a corrupt and narrow oligarchy for nearly a century; and in no other part of the world can we discern at the moment any rush towards democracy. No rational arguments, only wishful thinking, can underlie expectations such as that 'English-speaking Africa in 10 years' time may be ready for a more global role and for militant participation in a new transglobal union . . .'. The same can be said about the conviction that 'the next generation of African historians will teach that the standards of leadership in this generation were appalling'. After all, there is no evidence from any part of the world that statesmanship improves with the passage of time; and that this craft has attained greater perfection in the hands of the rulers of today's great powers than it did with Bismarck or Metternich or Jefferson or even Solon.

The expectation of the imminent fall of the Rhodesian and especially the South African regimes derives solely from the widely shared displeasure at their existence, coupled with a naïve underestimation of what a ruthlessly and shrewdly used power can achieve. Personally, I rule out the possibility that the South African order might be overthrown from inside within the foreseeable future; and even in Rhodesia I do not regard such a turn of events as imminent, owing to the dissensions within the subject race and the greatly superior efficiency and cohesion

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of the ruling caste. On the other hand, an invasion from outside, strong enough to overwhelm South Africa, would require either a profound alteration in the balance of power which would enable a Soviet or Chinese expeditionary corps to land in southern Africa, or a level of efficiency, cohesion and technology on the part of the neighbouring African states which they cannot attain in less than several decades . . . and certainly not in 10 years. For the same reason I do not see why the Portuguese should not be able to hang on to their colonies for a long time to come if they are obstinate enough, particularly as they have a plentiful supply of superfluous peasants inured to hardship and obedience and are less concerned than the pampered American boys about getting back home. The Angolan and Mozambique settlers are not so foolish as to try to cut themselves off from this source of protection, and the eventuality which Mr Howe adumbrates could materialize only if a civil war broke out in Portugal. To come back to the South African system, I rate its chances of survival as higher than Israel's because the Arabs are much nearer unity than the Africans, and the Middle East could much more easily become an arena of war between the external powers.

Nor are there any grounds for expecting that since no sense of nationhood can develop in ethnically disparate and strife-torn countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Congo or the Sudan, these entities must therefore disintegrate, because many long-lived empires were held together by sheer force; and neither the events in Czechoslovakia nor in Biafra nor even in Vietnam give us reason to believe that this can no longer be done.

A rather unsophisticated version of the materialist interpretation of history also underlies Mr Howe's last paragraph, where the importance of the development of the forces of production is emphasized while 'the sagas' of the African leaders are dismissed as of no consequence, as if economic progress did not depend on good government and as if the beneficial effects of improvements in agricultural methods could not be nullified by an excessive growth in population, which only a deliberate and skilfully planned and energetically carried out collective action can remedy.

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REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

David Kimche

VIOLENCE is on the increase in Latin America. The second half of 1968 witnessed a dramatic increase both in the number and in the scope of incidents leading to bloodshed. The student upheaval in Mexico was the most spectacular of all these incidents, but there have been others of varying gravity in most of the other countries of the subcontinent, to say nothing of two successful coups d'état. Student unrest has by no means been confined to Mexico; the forces of order in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Jamaica, Panama, Uruguay and a number of other countries have been coping with it with increasing difficulty. Organized strikes, leading to clashes between workers and police, have also become more numerous. The strike at La Plata of workers of the Argentine National Petroleum Company, and that of the plantation workers at Puerto Limon in Costa Rica, are two cases in point, for both led to violence and bloodshed. And, after a period of relative calm, there has also been a recrudescence of acts of terror, notably in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela and Peru, countries which have long been ravaged by guerrilla activity, but also in Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay.

In Uruguay the extreme left-wing clandestine organization '*Tupamaros*', which rose to fame by kidnapping the personal adviser of the President of Uruguay, has become more active, though a number of its members were captured by the police in October. In Brazil left-wing activity was highlighted by the assassination, on 12 October, of an American officer by self-styled 'implementors of revolutionary justice', while in the Dominican Republic an attempt was made to assassinate the President. And in Argentina a spate of bomb attacks wrecked an American-supported library, government offices in Buenos Aires and in Cordoba, and offices of the petroleum company at La Plata.

Of all these incidents, the most important have undoubtedly been those created by the student unrest, and this if only for reasons of demography. Latin America, more than any other region in the world, is dominated, demographically at least, by the youth. It has the highest rate of population growth in the world and by the end of the century the population is expected to reach 600 million. This population explosion has led to a marked preponderance of young people; in Venezuela, for example, over 50 per cent of the population are under 19. A similar situation exists in Mexico, where, if the present birthrate is maintained, the population will double itself within the next 15 years.

This overwhelming accent on the young has social, economic and also political connotations. It hinders social development. It creates

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a vast and growing problem of unemployment and underemployment; in Mexico industry is creating 180,000 new jobs a year, but the working population is growing by a yearly 400,000. It increases the number of dependants on those who have employment, creating additional hardships for the poor. And above all it swells the ranks of the discontented, provides new recruits for the militant organizations, and adds a greater urgency to the demand for changes in the present situation, in which the inequality of income distribution is greater than in all other developing countries and in which a large majority of the agricultural population still live at barely subsistence level.

There are, indeed, numerous factors which make Latin America an ideal arena for violence, of which the great social inequality, the growing unemployment and the wretched poverty of a large proportion of the rural population are but a few of the more notable ones. Discontent is alive, dynamic, and is not the result of the machinations of the communist parties or even of the extreme militant organizations of the far left or right.

Yet in such conditions the existence of extremist organizations assumes added significance, especially if they make violence their hallmark and embrace the tenets of armed struggle as their ideology. Such movements and organizations abound in Latin America. They are to be found in every country, some assuming the standing of a well-organized guerrilla organization, others comprising no more than a few dozen members emanating from the fringe of society. But since 1966 these various movements have been institutionalized in one supra-organization, the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), whose overall aim, according to the communiqué issued at its establishment, is to 'use all means within its reach to support the liberation movements'. In view of the increase in violence noted above, it is well worth examining this organization more closely.

OLAS was established in January 1966, as a result of a decision taken by the Latin American delegates at the first conference of the Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), held that month in Havana. The attempt to line up the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) with the militant movements of Latin America had sprung from different causes: Castro saw in his association with AAPSO a means to counteract Cuba's isolation and a way to promote his own prestige on the world scene; the Soviet Union considered such an association—provided that Latin America would be represented by its communist parties—an opportunity to overcome the influence of China in AAPSO. The Chinese saw in it a possible springboard for increasing their own influence in the hemisphere, and tried to get the better of the Soviets by demanding that the more militant, extremist organizations of Latin America, and not the Moscow-oriented communist parties, should represent their countries. Similarly, the Egyptians,

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who held a dominant position in AAPSO,[1] believed that by including Latin America in its activities this dominant position would automatically extend to that hemisphere as well. Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, urged the inclusion of Latin America on the grounds that this would 'destroy any manifestation of racialism that can upset our anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle'.[2]

The call for a tricontinental conference was first made in March 1961, in Mexico, at the first 'Latin American conference for national sovereignty, economic emancipation, and peace'. The conference had been sponsored by the World Council of Peace (WCP), and was presided over by Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, one of the vice-presidents of the WCP. He, and the WCP, were to become prime movers in the events which led to the Havana Tricontinental Conference and to the establishment of OLAS. A month after the Mexican conference, the proposal to hold a tricontinental conference was put forward, by a delegate from Ceylon, at a council meeting of AAPSO, held at Bandung. This had been the first AAPSO event at which an observer from a Latin American country was present.[3] As a result of the Bandung proposal, the question of Latin American participation was brought up at the next meeting of the AAPSO Executive Committee, held at Gaza on 7 December 1961, when it was decided to consult the WCP on the matter. Subsequently, a delegation of 12 members of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat left for the WCP meeting which was being held that month in Stockholm, in order, in their own words, to have a preliminary exchange of views on the idea of AALAPSO with the Latin American delegates there. Shortly after their arrival they met delegates from Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Argentina, in what was to be the first direct contact of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement with the Latin Americans to discuss the possibility of holding a tricontinental conference. The WCP leaders, however, thought that the role of the WCP should be much more active in these preparations, and they organized a special plenary session devoted to discussing the proposed conference. But the AAPSO delegation felt this was going too far. It was beyond the brief they had been given in Gaza. The African members of the Secretariat objected to the way these 'outsiders' were taking over the direction of a subject vitally affecting the future of the solidarity movement. The Chinese, supported by the Japanese and the Guinean members of the Secretariat, formally

[1] The Secretary General of AAPSO has been, since the establishment of the organization, an Egyptian, Yusuf al-Sibai, and the Secretariat has been housed in Cairo. The Egyptians, together with the Russians and the Chinese, have provided the bulk of AAPSO's funds.

[2] Part of a private message from Nkrumah, delivered by the Ghanaian delegate to the African participants of the AAPSO Executive Committee which met in Nicosia in September 1963. See D. Kimche, 'Africa and the Afro-Asian Movement', in *Asian and African Studies*, Jerusalem, vol. 4, 1968, p. 128.

[3] S. Giraldo Mazola, of Cuba, who arrived at the end of the Council meeting and subsequently made what was probably the longest speech at an Afro-Asian meeting when he addressed the Executive Committee which met immediately after the Council.

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opposed the participation of the WCP in organizing AALAPSO. In the end, all the delegates, with the exception of the Russian and the Indian, left the meeting and returned to Cairo. This rift with the WCP represented a severe setback for the Russians, and a victory for the Chinese.

This question of the role of the WCP continued to bedevil preparations for the conference. It brought to naught efforts made at the AAPSO convention at Moshi in February 1963 and later at Algiers in March 1964 to decide on the venue, date and composition of the conference. In April 1964 a meeting was held in Cairo under the chairmanship of Muhammad Yazid of Algeria, and with the participation of several AAPSO leaders and of Jorge Seguerra, the Cuban Ambassador to Algeria. At that meeting it was agreed to set up a preparatory committee of six Africans and six Asians, who would be joined later by six Latin Americans, and that this committee should visit Cuba and other Latin American countries to solve the problem of Latin American participation. But before this committee reached Cuba, an important event occurred there. In November 1964 a meeting of Latin American communist parties was held in Havana, and a decision was taken committing the Cubans to co-operate with the parties in Latin America that favour Moscow. This decision annulled the Soviet Union's fears regarding the proposed tricontinental conference, and it thereafter supported the idea wholeheartedly. It supported the resolution put forward by President Nkrumah at the Fourth AAPSO Conference held in Winneba, Ghana, in May 1965, which called for a tricontinental conference to be held in Havana in January 1966.

THAT nearly five years should have elapsed before these first moves bore fruit at Havana is, in itself, indicative of the sharp differences of opinion existing within AAPSO on this subject, which were polarized between the Soviet and Chinese camps within the organization. These differences were centred on two basic issues: which Latin American organizations should be represented at the proposed conference, and what form of organization should be set up after the conference. The Soviets wanted the Latin American representatives of the WCP to decide on Latin American representation. The Chinese were adamantly opposed to this, demanding that the subcontinent be represented by the liberation movements. This point was finally settled during a meeting of the preparatory committee [4] which was held in Cairo on 1 September 1965. It was agreed to let the six Latin American members on the committee decide about the invitations to Latin American participants to the Havana conference. This decision was taken despite the objections

[4] The countries represented on the preparatory committee were: Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, South Africa, UAR, Tanzania, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Vietnam (Liberation Front), Soviet Union, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. A Moroccan (Mehdi Ben Barqa) was chairman.

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of the Chinese and their friends, who wished the entire 18-member committee to approve the nominations.

The second issue was not so easily settled. It was known that the Soviet Union, confident that the majority of the Latin American delegations would prove to be pro-Soviet, were in favour of the creation of a single tricontinental organization which would supersede and absorb the existing AAPSO. The Chinese, on the other hand, were adamantly opposed to any change in the structure of AAPSO. They envisaged the establishment of a Latin American Solidarity Organization which would work parallel to, and in co-ordination with, the Afro-Asian movement, but not as an integral part of it. The Chinese were to prove victorious on this point.

The Latin American members of the preparatory committee, after consulting with Fidel Castro, contacted or sent out invitations to 106 organizations from 22 Latin American countries; of these, 76 organizations from 21 countries accepted the invitation and were represented at the conference within the framework of national solidarity committees.[5] The only country invited which did not send a delegate was Surinam. Notable among the guerrilla movements of Latin America which sent delegates were the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional* (FALN) of Venezuela, the *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN) of Colombia, the *Movimento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) of Peru and the *Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes* (FAR) of Guatemala.

It is not my intention here to enter into the intricacies of the divergent views expressed at that conference. I wish to examine the role of the Latin American delegations only, in particular with regard to the establishment of OLAS.

The key to this role was the posture taken by the Cuban delegation, which, at the opening of the conference, supported the Soviet aims in toto, including the disbanding of AAPSO and the establishment of a new tricontinental organization with headquarters in Cairo. In the course of the conference, however, there occurred a significant switch in the attitude of the Cubans. The more nationalist in the Cuban Establishment wished to see Havana as the organization's centre. They failed to understand why the Egyptians should gain all the prestige of having the Secretariat in Cairo after they, the Cubans, had devoted so much time, energy and expense to preparing the conference. This attitude on the part of some of the Cubans coincided with a growing feeling among the Latin American delegations, and especially among the members of the liberation movements, that the centre of the new organization should be in the American continent. Particularly vocal in this demand were the Venezuelans, the Dominicans and the Bolivians. The members of the

[5] These figures are based on a study made by the Council of the Organization of American States (see Document OEA/Ser.G/IV.c–i–769–A Rev (English), 28 November 1966, p. 107 ff). To these must be added the six Latin American countries of the preparatory committee itself, and the 22 organizations, including five trade unions from Mexico, which were invited from them.

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communist parties still tended to support the Soviet-UAR line, but when these were sharply rebuked by Fidel Castro for not thinking in terms of their regional interests, the Latin American bloc came down solidly in favour of Havana.

Thus the die was cast. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement was given a new lease of life, and beside it was formed the new, cumbersome Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization, with headquarters in Havana.

WITH the Afro-Asian organization still in existence, it was only natural that the Latin Americans should demand a regional organization of their own. At the very opening of the conference Pedro Medina Silva of the Venezuelan FALN had called for the 'formation of an organ to co-ordinate the struggle in Latin America', while Jesus Maza Paredes, the Peruvian guerrilla leader, had declared in a press conference that his delegation 'was interested in the establishment of a permanent Latin American committee that would take responsibility for all work involving support, co-ordination and exchange of information . . .'. At the close of the conference the Latin American delegates met on 16 January and decided on the establishment of the Latin American Solidarity Organization. An organizing committee, with representatives from Brazil, Cuba, Colombia, British Guiana (now Guyana), Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela was elected to assure the fullest representation of 'the revolutionary forces in each country' and to prepare the first conference of the organization.[6]

In the light of later events in Latin America it is interesting to note that, several months after this organizing committee was established, a conference of Latin American students was held in Havana,[7] and resolutions identifying the aims of the Latin American students with those of AALAPSO and OLAS were adopted. One of the resolutions declared that 'in this revolutionary struggle . . . armed struggle constitutes the most effective and consequential form of combat against imperialism'. Prominent at the conference were a number of members of the organizing committee of OLAS.

This emphasis on 'armed struggle' also provided the major theme of the first conference of OLAS which opened in Havana on 31 July 1967. The divergences between the OLAS militants, with Castro at their head, and orthodox communist thinking were put in sharp relief at that conference. Of these divergences, perhaps the most important from the communist point of view is that the guerrilla band, and not the party

[6] The participants in the organizing committee were: Haydee Santamaria Cuadrado, Secretary General of OLAS and member of the Central Committee of the Cuban CP; Aluizio Palhano Pedreira Ferreira of Brazil; Manuel Cepeda Vargas of Colombia; Fransisco Marroquin of Guatemala; Lall Bahadur of Guyana; Daniel Molina Alvarez, a student leader from Mexico; Jesus Paredes from Peru; and Silvia Moreno who represented Uruguay and Venezuela.

[7] It was attended by some 150 participants from 23 Latin American countries.

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organization, must stand in the vanguard of the revolution. The revolution must be one based on the peasantry and not on the industrial workers. It must, therefore, be directed from the countryside, and not from the cities. As Fidel Castro pointed out in his speech at the closing session of the OLAS conference, 'guerrilla experiences in this continent have taught us many things—among them the terrible mistake, the absurd concept that the guerrilla movement could be directed from the cities'.[8] That is the reason, according to Castro, why the political and military direction of revolutionary activity must emanate from the same source, from the headquarters of the guerrillas. Che Guevara also stressed this point. The guerilla band, he wrote, and not the 'civilian organization', is the vanguard of the people.[9] In other words, the communist parties of Latin America, which are overwhelmingly based on the large cities and whose supporters are mainly urban workers and not peasants, are thus relegated to second place in leading the revolution.

Another traditional communist concept which has been thrown overboard by the New Left of OLAS is the belief, spelt out so forcefully by Lenin, that conditions must be ripe for a successful revolution. On the contrary, declares Guevara, it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for revolution exist: 'the insurrectionary nucleus can create them'![10] This line of thought is expanded upon in Castro's OLAS speech:

> There are those who believe that it is necessary for ideas to triumph among the masses before initiating action, and there are others who understand that action is one of the most efficient instruments for bringing about the triumph of ideas among the masses. . . . It was enough for the ideas to take root in a sufficient number of men for revolutionary action to be initiated, and, through this action, the masses started to acquire these ideas; the masses acquired that consciousness. . . . And what distinguished the true revolutionary from the false revolutionary is precisely this: one acts to move the masses, the other waits for the masses to have a conscience already before starting to act.

This line of thought is closely interconnected with the third basic premise on which the militants of OLAS and the communists have parted ways: the need to wage armed struggle in order to achieve the revolution. Castro and his followers have vehemently rejected the gradualist approach of the Latin American communists who maintain that if the transition from neutralism to socialism is gradual enough the USA and world capitalism will be powerless to intervene and there will be no risk of war. They mock the idea that power can be gained by peaceful means. 'To those who believe that peaceful transition is possible in some

[8] The full text of the speech was produced in pamphlet form by the Instituto del Libro, Havana, n.d., see p. 24.

[9] Che Guevara, *La Guerra de Guerillas* (Havana, 1960), p. 11. Régis Debray goes into this question at length in his book *Revolution dans la revolution?* (Paris, 1967), pp. 68 ff.

[10] Guevara, *ibid.*

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countries of this continent, we say to them that we cannot understand what kind of peaceful transition they refer to, unless it is to a peaceful transition in agreement with imperialism', Castro declared in his OLAS speech. The General Declaration of that conference proclaims that 'revolutionary armed struggle constitutes the fundamental line of the revolution in Latin America and all other forms of struggle must promote rather than delay the development of the fundamental line: that of armed struggle'.[11]

The rejection of the tenets of peaceful coexistence and of the possibility of gaining power by means of the ballot box is not, of course, a feature exclusive to the Latin American left. The Chinese have for years preached the inevitability of the armed struggle, and their rejection of peaceful coexistence forms one of the cornerstones of their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. Numerous members of AAPSO have emphasized the need for armed struggle; indeed, a resolution of the last large AAPSO Convention, held in Ghana in 1965, specifically endorsed the need for 'revolutionary violence', and issued a clarion call for armed struggle, mentioning specifically Congo (Kinshasa), Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, South Vietnam, Thailand and Venezuela, as well as the colonial territories, as countries ripe for revolution and armed struggle.

A FULL analysis of the dispute for and against the ideas of peaceful coexistence, especially as it was reflected within AAPSO, falls outside the scope of this article. But the ambivalent attitude of the Soviet Union, and of the communist movement as a whole, to the question of armed struggle had a direct bearing on the ideological development of the New Left in Latin America, and must, therefore, be considered.

The stand of the Soviet Union on this question has varied from downright opposition to none-too-enthusiastic support. This negative approach has resulted from a number of factors: 'armed struggle' has been exploited by the Chinese as an antithesis to 'peaceful coexistence'; armed struggle implies a struggle waged independently of the world socialist movement; local liberation wars, moreover, can easily grow into something much larger, and the Russians have no wish to set off the sparks which could lead to a thermonuclear confrontation, or even to more 'Vietnams'. Typical of Soviet thinking on this subject was a speech by M. A. Suslov at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which he declared that if the communist parties were going to put all their hopes on armed struggle alone, to the exclusion of all else, regardless of whether the masses were ready to support such a struggle, 'this would inevitably lead only to bitter defeat'. And he continued:

Now that the winning of economic independence and the forward

[11] *Tricontinental Bulletin*, Havana, no. 18, September 1967, p. 17.

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> movement on the path of social progress have become the chief direction of the anti-imperialist struggle of the liberated countries, particular importance attaches to the expansion of economic co-operation between them and the socialist states and the extension of economic assistance to them.[12]

Economic aid was, in Suslov's mind, far more important than the 'stereotyped demand' of the Chinese for armed struggle. Similarly, another Soviet theoretician, K. Brutents, wrote that

> the application of the call to armed struggle to countries with national progressive governments is tantamount to an order for the violent overthrow of these governments which have the respect of the masses and which adhere to an anti-imperialist line. This would be political adventurism, very profitable to the imperialists, and fatal for the prospects of *progressive development* in those countries.

And Brutents adds that 'social progress coincides with the process of national liberation'.[13]

Such reasoning might be applicable to certain of the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, whose governments might be considered by the communists as being 'national progressive governments'. But it certainly is not applicable to the situation in Latin America, or to *all* the countries of Africa and Asia. The militants of these countries categorically refused to accept the Soviet viewpoint, and the Russians were forced to tack their sails accordingly.

Support for armed struggle was now expressed, but not in place of the basic belief in peaceful coexistence. Typical of this new line was an article in *Pravda* on 13 February 1963, which stated that 'peaceful coexistence creates all the conditions for the victorious development of the national liberation movement', and, at the same time, 'the USSR and other socialist states with all their forces support liberation wars and armed struggle against the colonialists'. It was a question of priorities: from the Soviet point of view, peaceful coexistence 'created the conditions' in which the national liberation movement could best succeed. Therefore peaceful coexistence should be a prime objective for all those fighting against imperialism. This dogma had, however, been increasingly attacked by the Chinese as being a betrayal of the fighting liberation movements. The Russians, therefore, added their corollary which they insisted was not incompatible with their demand for peaceful coexistence.

This became the formula which was repeated at all conferences of AAPSO and, later, at the Tricontinental. On the one hand, the idea of peaceful coexistence was supported, and on the other, the call was made for armed struggle. An open break between the communist movement

[12] Report by M. A. Suslov on 14 February 1964 at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, 3 April 1964).

[13] *Pravda*, 17 September 1963.

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and the militants of AAPSO and of Latin America was thus avoided, though the ideological gap between the two has proved to be too wide to bridge. The Soviet-sponsored conference of Latin American communist parties in Havana in November 1964 decided that the communist parties should actively support the struggle of 'persecuted patriots'. There were even cases of alliances between guerrilla bands and communist parties in which the communists joined in guerrilla activity. In return, Fidel Castro followed a generally pro-Soviet policy within the framework of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Despite the closeness in ideology between the Chinese and the Latin American New Left, above all in respect of their attitude to armed struggle, neither Castro nor any of the more important militant groups in Latin America allowed themselves to be drawn into the Chinese orbit. To a large extent the Chinese themselves were to blame for this lack of success. There were, initially, numerous admirers of communist China among the revolutionary leaders in Latin America.[14] Moreover, the Cuban missile crisis and, later, the failure of the Russians to retaliate against the bombing of North Vietnam caused a tremendous loss of prestige for the Soviet Union among the left wing in Latin America, which could easily have been exploited by the Chinese. But they failed to grasp these opportunities. They were more interested in splitting the communist parties than in supporting the guerrilla movements. The result of this policy was that the Chinese succeeded in creating a number of small pro-Chinese communist parties of no great importance, but the bulk of the militant revolutionaries banded together in OLAS remained implacably opposed to any orientation towards the Chinese.

Thus OLAS, with the Cubans at its head, follows a policy which neither favours the Soviet Union nor China. The Latin American militants, together with many of the African leftists, have become profoundly suspicious of the Great Powers of communism. They believe that only by their own struggle can they complete their own revolutions. OLAS, far more than either AAPSO or AALAPSO, both of which are dominated by the two communist giants, has become a body following an independent line, tempered to the realities of the Latin American scene. In a very real sense, it has become the International of Latin American revolutionaries. So far there has not been much to show for its efforts. The guerrilla movements in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and elsewhere have not succeeded in seriously challenging existing authority in their countries. Yet discontent in Latin America is rife. Unless the governments succeed in initiating much-needed reforms on a vast scale, this discontent may yet be harnessed by the organizations which together make up OLAS, with a resultant upsurge of violence on a scale hitherto unknown in that strife-torn subcontinent.

[14] Men like Francisco Juliao, former leader of the Peasants' League of Brazil, who fled to Cuba from Uruguay in 1967.

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THE WARSAW PACT: ENTANGLING ALLIANCE

Roman Kolkowicz

THE military invasion of Czechoslovakia has underlined the important roles of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet policy. The Warsaw Pact's primary purpose is to contain a turbulent and eruptive group of countries under Moscow's influence. Consequently, the central uses of the Warsaw Pact are internal; to contain, to police and to maintain stability.

In his 'secret speech' to the Twentieth Party Congress on 25 February 1956, Khrushchev told the assembled communist leaders from all over the world how Stalin had misunderstood the nature of political dissent in Eastern Europe. To Stalin, Khrushchev related, it all boiled down to frightening his small opponents: 'I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito. He will fall.' Khrushchev then told the assembly at the Kremlin that

> We have dearly paid for this 'shaking of the little finger'. . . . But no matter how much or how little Stalin shook, not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was that in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and people who had gone through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.[1]

Eight months later Khrushchev himself shook his 'little finger' at the Polish Communist Party leaders in Warsaw with minimal results. Several weeks later the Soviet leaders abandoned their past methods and suppressed the Hungarian uprising with the Red Army. In the intervening years the Soviet leaders, far from having stabilized the East European political situation, faced new sources of dissent and opposition. The Albanians left the Warsaw Pact; the Rumanians continued to oppose Soviet authority in Eastern Europe; the Czechs embarked upon a policy of radical internal reforms at home, and profound changes in their external relations.

These developments suggest that Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe has suffered since the death of Stalin from a form of dualism: on the one hand, the Soviets sought a policy of 'decompression' in Eastern Europe, or more properly, a policy of managed change in the Stalinoid political and social processes in the former satellites; on the other hand, they continued to insist that such change must be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, and that changes must take place within the framework of the unity of the socialist camp under Soviet

[1] In *Current Soviet Policies*, II (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 183.

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domination. Since 1960 the Warsaw Pact has become the main mechanism of such managed change in Eastern Europe.

The events culminating in the occupation of Czechoslovakia are indicative of this dualism in Soviet policy. The *leitmotif* in Soviet policy was a search for a peaceful solution to the mounting crisis, paralleled by a concerted effort to be prepared for a military solution in the event of the former policy failing.

There is little doubt that the speed and breadth of Czech liberalizing policies caught the Soviets by surprise. Having anticipated merely 'cosmetic' changes in Czechoslovakia, changes which would have satisfied the insurgent intellectual, managerial and governmental opponents of Novotny's regime without undermining basic Soviet interests in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe, the Soviets were now showing their shock and rage at what they considered Czech deception:[2]

> You are aware of the understanding with which fraternal parties treated the decisions of the January plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as they believed that your party, firmly controlling the levers of power, would direct the entire process in the interests of socialism, and not let anti-Communist reaction exploit it to grind their own axe.[3]

On 17 July the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU met in the Kremlin and discussed the Czech situation and 'unanimously adopted a decision on the question under discussion'.[4] It is assumed that the decision involved preparations for the eventual military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Simultaneously, Soviet armed forces launched several military exercises, the real objective of which was Czechoslovakia, while their publicly given rationale was that they were routine. A massive naval exercise, code name NORTH, involved naval forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland. While NORTH was widely publicized in the public media, three other exercises were barely mentioned in the Soviet press.[5] The reason is obvious: Operation NORTH, which was taking place far from Czech borders, and whose applicability to the Czech situation was minimal, was used to deflect attention from exercise SKY-SHIELD, from the massive manoeuvres of the logistically vital Rear Services units, and the joint exercises of the communications troops. Operation SKY-SHIELD, which started sometime around 20 July, was to serve as an 'intensive check on the country's anti-aircraft defence troops'.[6] The manoeuvres of the Rear Services began sometime in late July and continued into August. Sketchy Soviet reports on these exercises indicate their purpose and objectives. The chief of staff of the

[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Reference here is to Soviet agreement to the dismissal of Novotny from his Party positions.
[4] TASS, 17 July 1968.
[5] See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 13 July 1968; *Izvestia*, 13 July 1968; Moscow Radio, 16 July 1968, among others.
[6] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 13 August 1968.

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manoeuvres headquarters of the Rear Services, General Novikov, stated that 'this exercise is one of the largest manoeuvres that has ever taken place in the Soviet Army'.[7] He also stated that the objectives of the exercise were to test 'the supply of troops by various means of transport' and to 'ensure the material and billeting requirements of troops in peace and war'. He indicated that 'units of military districts and troops together with reservists are taking part in the manoeuvres'. General Novikov further stated that 'automobile transport from the national economy is also being used'. The commander of the exercises, General Maryakhin,[8] stressed that a major objective of the exercise was to solve 'the practical solution of the problem of supplying troops with all kinds of transport'.

The manoeuvres, which spread from western Ukraine through Poland and East Germany, were clearly designed to prepare for a blitz-type of invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was to overwhelm and paralyse the Czech armed forces and the Party leaders, and to present the world with a *fait accompli*.

While these preparations were under way, the Soviet leaders decided to attempt once more to arrive at a peaceful solution with the Dubcek regime, one which would accomplish the desired objectives without necessarily resorting to force. On 29 July, a number of Soviet Politbureau members met Czech leaders in Cierna, after having failed to persuade the latter to come to Moscow for such a meeting. The Cierna meeting was undoubtedly marked by violent exchanges, referred to in the official communiqués as an 'atmosphere of complete frankness'.[9] The meeting, which continued until 1 August, failed to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement. The Czechs, however, were persuaded to meet with leaders of the Soviet Union and of the other four Warsaw Pact countries in Bratislava. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped to intimidate the Czechs with a unified communist front.

The Bratislava meeting which took place on 4 August 1968, like the one at Cierna, ended badly, having failed to persuade the Czechs to submit to Soviet demands. While much of the Western press interpreted the results of these two meetings as a victory for Dubcek, it failed to recognize properly the implications of the military preparations around the borders of Czechoslovakia.

On 7 August *Pravda* reported that the Politbureau had met in Moscow to consider the results of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings and 'fully approved the activity of the CPSU delegation at the Bratislava conference'. This was presumably the meeting that finally approved the military solution for the Czech crisis, and in the following days the Soviet press increased its criticism of the Dubcek regime. Final preparations for the military blitz on Czechoslovakia were under way,

[7] Prague Radio, 30 July 1968. This exercise was eventually given the code name NEMAN.
[8] TASS, 29 July 1968.
[9] *Pravda*, 2 August 1968.

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with Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Defence Minister, conducting final briefings with military leaders of the countries that joined Soviet forces in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[10]

IN the weeks following their invasion of Czechoslovakia Soviet public media continued to stress a major reason for this action: 'Peace and security in Europe depend decisively on the unity and cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact countries.'[11] The Soviets argue that the Warsaw Pact 'serves as an insuperable barrier to all those who would revise the results of the second war'[12] and that 'the bedrock of the status quo (in Europe) is the unity of the Warsaw Pact countries'.[13] This central theme, the need for unity of the Warsaw Pact, has been described by Moscow Radio[14]:

> Let us look at the political map of Europe and the position Czechoslovakia holds in it. It is a kind of wedge which divides the Warsaw Pact countries in two. The GDR and Poland in the north; Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania in the south. If Czechoslovakia had been lost, these countries would have been left without direct contact between them.

In seeking to justify the Soviet invasion, Moscow Radio suggested that 'there was no other alternative in that situation' and that the move 'was dictated by the necessity to protect the vital interests of the whole socialist community'. A passive toleration of events in Czechoslovakia was rejected as dangerous: 'Is it not clear that such a change in the power balance in Europe would have led to an explosion, to war?'

This repeated Soviet stress on the vital role of the Warsaw Pact in maintaining peace and in serving Soviet policy objectives raises several questions: What is the Warsaw Pact? How is it constituted and what *is its internal structure and process? What purposes does it serve* Soviet policy?

The establishment of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 was a logical concomitant of Soviet perceptions of some important changes in Europe. In a sense, the creation of the communist regional defence alliance reflected the Soviet Union's conviction that its policy and strategy must adapt to new threats from the West and, secondly, that its past methods of ruling Eastern Europe had become inefficient. Subsequently the Warsaw Pact was to be a new mechanism for modernizing Soviet management of Eastern Europe, while at the same time serving as a response to an ascending NATO.

The major developments which established the *raison d'être* of the Warsaw Pact were: (a) the ratification of the Paris Agreements (of

[10] For details of Grechko's meeting with East German and Polish military leaders, see *Pravda*, 17 and 18 August.
[11] Moscow Radio, 9 September 1968.
[12] *Izvestia*, 22 August 1968.
[13] *New Times* (Moscow), editorial in no. 33, 21 August 1968, p. 6.
[14] Moscow Radio, 9 September 1968.

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23 October 1954) which became effective on 5 May 1955, and which stipulated the rearming of West Germany and its eventual entry into NATO; (b) the entry of West Germany into NATO on 9 May 1955; (c) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria, which was agreed upon one day after the Warsaw Pact had been signed; (d) the need to establish a legal new rationale for the maintenance of Soviet forces in Hungary and Rumania, now that the logistic and communication needs for the Soviet contingent in Austria had ceased; and (e) the need to create a new mechanism for the maintenance of Soviet influence and control in Eastern Europe which would be legally binding and respectable, while at the same time offer the restless East Europeans a participatory role in the affairs of the communist bloc.

From the very outset the Soviets asserted that the Warsaw Pact was a defensive alliance of equals and that its main purpose was to deal with a phoenix-like West Germany rising from the ashes of defeat to threaten once again the East Europeans. But despite these assertions the organization was to be a Soviet-dominated, primarily political, integrating mechanism useful to Soviet leaders.

1. **The Structure and Organization of the Warsaw Pact.** The Warsaw conference of May 1955 created two major bodies: the *Political Consultative Committee* and the *Unified Command of Pact Armed Forces.* The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) was to be the highest organ of the Warsaw Pact and was to co-ordinate all non-military matters of the Warsaw Pact. The Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact was entrusted with authority over forces assigned to it by the member states of the Pact. Its mandate was to 'strengthen the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in case of war and to decide on the deployment of troops'[15] assigned to the Warsaw Pact. In January 1956, at the Prague meeting of the PCC, the latter created a Permanent Commission and a Joint Secretariat, both to be located in Moscow. These two new organizations were to deal, respectively, with the development of foreign policy recommendations and with the administration of those technical fields serving the realization of treaty goals. Both of these organizations were to be headed by Soviet representatives.

The Supreme Commander of the Unified Command, as was stipulated from the very beginning, was to be a Soviet military leader. He is supported by a General Staff, which contains permanent representatives of the general staffs of the participating member states. He is also assisted by eight deputies, usually the ministers of defence of the participating member states. The status of the integrated staffs is supranational.

2. **Problems of Integration.** Although in principle a highly integrated

[15] See text of the 'Establishment of a Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance'.

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organism with extensive co-ordination between the various members and their political and military organizations, the Warsaw Pact functioned in its early stages as a limited organization, with minimal integration and co-ordination. Until 1960–61, when the Soviets decided to upgrade and revitalize the role and mission of the alliance system, there were no war games or any inter-Pact military exercises. The Political Consultative Committee, which was to meet twice a year, had only held three such meetings before 1961. The supranational staff of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow consisted of a skeleton crew whose functions were ill-defined.

At the same time, however, there were some processes of integration taking place during this earlier period: partial standardization of weapons and indigenous arms production along Soviet lines; adoption of organizational forms and doctrine of Soviet models; and a definition of roles and missions of the member armies had taken place.

It would seem apparent that the Soviet leaders viewed the military utility of the Pact in continental rather than in broader strategic terms. During the Middle East crises in 1956 and in 1958 the Soviets did not place the Warsaw Pact forces at any high levels of readiness or alarm. And during the Cuban missile crisis the Soviets refrained from a build-up or mobilization of the Pact forces and generally tried to maintain a non-provocative stance of the Warsaw Pact.

Under the broadly defined Soviet strategic doctrine the Warsaw Pact and the East European states were assigned a theatre-operations role, under the central umbrella of Soviet nuclear power.[16] Although the East European forces had been given tactical missiles (150 miles range) which could, in theory, be mated to nuclear warheads, the one million strong forces of the Warsaw Pact and of the indigenous forces in Eastern Europe retained a conventional posture.

Some time in 1959 Khrushchev and the Party Presidium decided to shift Soviet strategic doctrine and policy from its previous rather ambiguous posture to one firmly grounded in a policy of nuclear deterrence. In January 1960 Khrushchev formally and publicly announced the 'new look' in Soviet strategy.[17] The new policy reflected profound changes in Soviet military policy, but even more important it indicated significant departures in Soviet foreign policy. The new policy might be described as Khrushchev's 'grand design', since it encompassed military, political, economic and ideological problems of major scale.

The reasoning behind the new strategic doctrine and the policies resulting from it were based on the belief of Khrushchev and other Party leaders that a war with the United States was highly unlikely and stemmed from a concern with the rising needs and demands from

[16] See Marshal A. A. Grechko, 'Reliable Guarantee of Peace and Security of the Nations', in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, no. 9, May 1965.

[17] *Pravda*, 14 January 1960; for a detailed analysis see R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 150–56.

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the domestic Soviet sector and the decreasing utility and burdensome costs of large standing conventional forces. The new strategic policy provided for a sharp reduction of Soviet conventional 'theatre' capabilities[18]; for a significant upgrading of the role, mission and allocations of the strategic missile forces; and for a new vital role of the Warsaw Pact and the indigenous East European forces, which were now to fill the gap left by the reduction in Soviet conventional forces.

It seems paradoxical that the Soviets should decide to give a larger, more active role to the indigenous East European military establishments at a time when the East Europeans were becoming more independent and more difficult to control. In retrospect, however, it appears that Khrushchev saw the revitalized Warsaw Pact as an asset to Soviet policy for a variety of reasons: In view of the eroding unity and cohesiveness of the bloc, with many East European countries demanding greater freedom from Moscow, Khrushchev chose the political structure of the Pact, the PCC, as a useful instrument for rallying the dissenting satellites around this Moscow-dominated organization; a revitalized Warsaw Pact would presumably satisfy some of the demands of the alliance members for a more coequal role in the military and political affairs and decisions in the bloc; in dominating the Warsaw Pact in general, and the PCC in particular, the Soviets sought to force through 'unanimity' in various policy decisions, thereby indicating the continued cohesiveness of the bloc, and denying Chinese propaganda of a collapsing Soviet hold over the East Europeans; the new re-emergent Warsaw Pact would serve the Russians as a useful legal means for moving Soviet forces through Eastern Europe, for a deeper penetration into the internal affairs of the several countries, for the establishment of closer ties with the distrusted indigenous military establishments in Eastern Europe; and finally, in endowing the Warsaw Pact with a newly active and important role, Khrushchev could maintain that in view of his proposed deep cuts in Soviet conventional forces the Warsaw Pact would be an asset which would offset these cuts.

Khrushchev's policy, however, encountered stiffening opposition from two diverse sources: from his own military planners and from leaders in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev's new strategic policy had a shock effect on the Soviet military. Not only was this establishment to be truncated and a quarter of a million officers summarily dismissed, but more important, the new strategic policy, as the Soviet military saw it, put all Soviet strategic eggs into one basket: it was geared solely to the demands of a world nuclear war, an all-or-nothing proposition which provided limited and inadequate capabilities for dealing with lesser conflicts. It also deprived the Soviets of graduated and controlled responses to potential Western initiatives. Moreover, while Soviet strategic policy and its capabilities were rigidifying along the

[18] The reduction provided for the release of 1·2 million officers and soldiers mostly from the conventional theatre forces, leaving the strength of the Soviet armed forces at 2·4 million.

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lines of a 'massive retaliation' principle, the United States was developing a whole range of forces, weapons systems and doctrines capable of dealing with various levels of hostilities. And finally, the Soviet military planners viewed their East European allies with great distrust, having little faith in their capabilities and intentions. To the Soviet military, therefore, Khrushchev's policy was both dangerously simple-minded and single-minded.

In Eastern Europe the new military division of labour in the communist bloc was generally greeted with less than wholehearted enthusiasm. Most East Europeans viewed it as a new attempt by Moscow to reassert its influence and control over their countries.

The resistance to the 'new look' in Soviet strategy started in 1960 and has largely continued into the present. The Soviet military, mainly in the most affected conventional theatre forces, openly argued that: (a) an overriding reliance on nuclear deterrence only is dangerous, it gives a false feeling of security; (b) the Party must shift social priorities and subordinate domestic needs to acute requirements of the defence establishments; and (c) mass armies are still vitally necessary, even in nuclear war, meaning *indigenous mass Soviet armies* and not the unreliable forces of the East Europeans.

THE East European attitudes to Soviet attempts at greater integration and revitalization of the Warsaw Pact continue to be generally negative for several reasons:

(a) *The high expenses incurred by the East Europeans in maintaining their defence establishments* at a time when the détente eroded the sense of threat from the West and when their main policy objective is economic resurgence of their countries. A recent Czech comment underlines this dilemma. Referring to the Stalin-imposed policy of high defence budgets and emphasis on heavy and defence industries in Eastern Europe, the Czechs maintain the 'conflict in Korea led to the establishment of quite specific economic measures, the accomplishment of which became a heavy burden on the Czechoslovak economy, whose weight is felt to this day'. The spokesman further asserts that 'the current oppressive situation of the national economy' and 'the economic burdens resulting from our defence policy' are alarming and must be ameliorated.[19]

(b) *The Moscow-enforced division of labour*, which forced most East Europeans to maintain over-large conventional military forces, which drained badly needed resources, and which did not correspond to the real defence needs of these countries. An example of Soviet-enforced backwardness in the development of East European armies was cited by a Czech official[20]:

The existing size of our army necessarily results in a situation

[19] *A Revue* (Prague), 12 July 1968, pp. 28–30.
[20] *A Revue*, 17 May 1968, pp. 32–39.

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> whereby our army costs too much money in peace time, and reduces the possibility of modernization. I think it would be better to have less people in our armed forces and to use the money saved in this way for modernization. . . .

He then maintained that about 70 per cent of the defence budget usually went 'for general needs', while only 30 per cent was invested in new technology, facilities and reserves. When compared with some Western military allocations, Srovnal asserted that the Czech, and presumably other East European defence establishments, came out unfavourably, since the others usually allotted more than half of their resources for modernization and development. Moreover, in describing 'the international division of labour', he stated that 'hardware is supplied primarily by the Soviet Union' and he stressed the 'difficulties in negotiating deadlines' and the 'more permanent difficulties [which] exist and will continue in the deliveries of spare parts'.

(c) *The imposition of a unified strategic doctrine* on the East Europeans which interfered grossly with their defence needs, their state autonomy and their own attempts to define strategy in their own national terms. A recent discussion of Czech generals candidly revealed these sensitive issues and problems which until now were viewed as unmentionable.[21] Stating that 'since 1950 we have accepted the conclusions of Soviet military doctrine', one of the group, a Major General Knotek, asserted that 'it is not sufficient for us to take over the Soviet military doctrine . . . and fulfil our alliance obligations under our specific conditions'. Moreover, he emphasized that 'the fact of our common political goals of the coalition in which the USSR plays a leading role, cannot change this at all'. General Knotek then described why the Soviet doctrine is not always useful for Czechoslovakia because 'the USSR solves [its own and the coalition's] tasks through the state military doctrine of the USSR, which differs greatly from ours'. He concluded that 'thus, the USSR does not want, and cannot solve on our behalf, those tasks which stem from our own political, economic, geographic, technical and other conditions and possibilities'. Subsequently, 'we ourselves must decide how we want to fulfil our tasks within the framework of the coalition, and how we want to defend our country'.

Another participant in the debate essentially summarized the consensus of the meeting and, implicitly, of the attitudes of many other East Europeans towards the role and place of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact: 'Thus the relations of the two sovereign countries, one a big one and the other a small one, must be precisely defined in all respects. Otherwise the feeling of wrongdoing will persist. This problem is very sensitive in the military sector.'

(d) *The assertion of a Soviet monopoly over command-authority in the Warsaw Pact* which allowed only token participation by East European military representatives in the key affairs of the Pact. Until

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–18.

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the middle and late 1950s, the Soviets retained informational channels and large influence within the indigenous East European military establishments. The growing nationalism and independence of the East Europeans, however, has forced the Soviets to withdraw most of these national pretenders.[22] The revitalized Warsaw Pact, under firm Soviet controls, has enabled Moscow to maintain useful links with the East European armies and has given it assurance regarding the latter's activities, intentions and objectives.

This Soviet monopoly of authority, which contradicts several articles of the Warsaw Pact, has in recent years provoked resistance and demands for change. Rumania was among the first to demand greater equality among the Pact partners and recent authoritative Czech statements have left little doubt on the Soviet role within the Pact. In a widely noted press interview given by General Prchlik,[23] the then head of the important state-administrative section of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee stated the following:

> As far as the relations within the coalition are concerned, we hold the view that they should be improved particularly in such a way as to emphasize the real equality of the individual members of this coalition, to emphasize real equality so that every member of this coalition can really assert itself and have its share in the programmatic work of the whole coalition.

Prchlik went on to describe the inner workings of the Joint Command and the Soviet role in it:

> So far the situation is that this command is formed by marshals, generals, and officers of the Soviet Army and that the other members' armies have only their representatives in this joint command. These representatives, however, so far have held no responsibilities or functions to co-decide, but rather played the role of a liaison organ.

To be sure, the Soviets have in recent years taken great pains at symbolic and formal establishment of equality among the Pact members, while in reality retaining full authority over the affairs of the Pact. They initiated a number of joint military manoeuvres and war games, in which great show was made of the 'equal' and important roles of the other Warsaw Pact members.[24] The Political Consultative Committee was formally enhanced and given a larger role.[25] The Soviets have also undertaken a more ambitious modernizing and standardizing weapons programme, which included shipments of relatively modern weapons to the East European defence establishments.[26]

[22] See Raymond L. Garthoff, 'This Military Establishment', *East Europe*, September 1965, pp. 2–16.
[23] Prague Radio, 15 July 1968.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] See Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact* (Santa Monica, Calif., The RAND Corporation, RM-4835, December 1965).

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(e) *The internal political uses of the Warsaw Pact by the Soviets.* East European Party leaders have strongly resisted past and current Soviet attempts to use the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact for interfering in the internal affairs of the Pact members. The Rumanian Party Secretary Ceausescu has stated this principle of non-interference in the following way: 'The Warsaw Pact was conceived of, at its creation, as a tool for the collective defence of the member nations against imperialist attack and aggression. Not for a moment did we think of the Warsaw Pact as a reason to justify interference in the internal affairs of other nations.'[27] Ceausescu was referring to Article 8 of the Warsaw Pact which states that 'the Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship . . . each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and *non-interference in their internal affairs*'.

These legalistically and morally based pleas of the East Europeans for non-interference by the Soviets in their internal affairs are rather melancholy exercises, since the major Soviet interest in the Warsaw Pact is precisely to provide for the containment of the independent-minded East Europeans, and for manipulating their internal affairs toward this end. In order to facilitate 'legally' and formally this policy objective, the Soviets have announced a new principle for interfering in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact members: 'The defence of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia is not only the affair of the people of that country; it is the joint affair of all communist and worker parties.' Already before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets also stated that proletarian internationalism 'does not allow any socialist country to base its foreign policy exclusively on its own interests',[28] an idea later developed in the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'.

THE history of the Warsaw Pact reflects the major periods of Soviet policy interests, both internal and external, in the post-Stalinist era. While created as a hasty reaction to Germany's entry into NATO, and then left to languish as a forgotten paper tiger, its renascence in 1960 marks an important turn in Soviet foreign, military and economic policies. Its main purpose since has been to serve as a replacement mechanism for the past Stalinist control system, by means of which to provide a centre, a linch-pin, which was to hold together a rapidly eroding unity and community of the communist bloc.

The revival of the Warsaw Pact in 1960 and Soviet expectations of the Warsaw Pact's unifying and cohesive effects in Eastern Europe brought about both success and failure. The success may be seen in establishing a formal and now viable structure for dealing with the political and military problems in the bloc and in asserting a greater Soviet presence in this unstable region. The failure can be seen in the

[27] In *Scinteia*, 16 July 1968.
[28] Moscow Radio, 19 July 1968, and the 'Warsaw letter', *op. cit.*

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fact that, while the Moscow-imposed superstructure of the Warsaw Pact symbolically and 'legally' affirmed the Soviet presence and controlling influence in Eastern Europe, it nevertheless failed to act as a brake on the growing pressures of nationalism, towards independence and sovereignty.

Past Soviet policy may be described as a form of gradual decompression of the once hermetically closed Stalinist empire, which had accumulated over the years strong anti-Soviet animosities and repressed nationalist aspirations. However, while seeking 'managed change', the Soviets created a spiral of expectations in some of these countries, in which expected change was always more intense than what actually obtained. Therefore, far from 'decompressing' and stabilizing the communist camp, the Soviet leaders actually heightened the tensions and exacerbated relations with some of their allies, resulting in a situation in which each accommodation and concession by Moscow resulted in renewed and higher demands for further concessions.

The post-Khrushchev regime, having inherited this burdensome problem, faced some difficult choices. Having embarked on a moderate and pragmatic policy at home and abroad; remaining interested in the progressive erosion of the Western alliance system and the avoidance of any provocative acts which may reverse this erosive trend; showing mounting concern with the threat of nuclear proliferation and with the spectre of a nuclear missile armed communist China—the leaders in the Kremlin undoubtedly viewed a conspicuous crack-down by force on the troublesome East Europeans as a death blow to a carefully nurtured foreign policy of caution and moderation. On the other hand, a passive tolerance of the mounting pressures of East European nationalism, revisionism and independence might reach a point of no return, and might erode or destroy Soviet influence in the strategically and politically sensitive region of Eastern Europe.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime at first sought a conciliatory relationship with the East Europeans. Actively seeking closer political unity of the bloc, the Moscow regime tolerated conspicuous dissent from the Rumanians and apparent economic, technological and cultural initiatives from other East European countries. The Moscow regime was itself engaged in a policy of economic and technological activism, entering into trade agreements with various Western and non-communist countries. At the same time the Soviets were slowly and patiently seeking to put together a large anti-Maoist bloc within the communist world in preparation for some future showdown with the Chinese. This early period, roughly from 1964 to 1966, was one of détente abroad and stability at home.

By 1967, however, the rather balanced Soviet foreign policy became bifurcated, between a continued 'détentist' policy and one which may be called a 'hard-line' policy. There is good reason to believe that there were internal policy disagreements in Moscow and that as a result

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Soviet foreign policy became vacillating and uncertain. What were the underlying reasons for this shift in Soviet policy?

First, the Soviets began to catch up with the West in strategic offensive military capabilities. Second, they emplaced a modest ABM capability and thereby changed to some degree the strategic balance between the two super-powers. Third, they broke out from the Black Sea confinement and introduced a sizeable Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean. Fourth, their anti-German propaganda campaign became markedly intensified indicating their concern with the West German *Ostpolitik* and nuclear policy and a resolve to combat them.

At the same time the Soviets continued to show strong interest in the Non-Proliferation Agreement; they have indicated interest in future negotiations on arms control in strategic weapons; they also dampened the revolutionary zeal of Fidel Castro in Latin America and have shown restraint in their handling of the explosive Middle East situation.

These two policy lines, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, at times indicated the likelihood of some sharp disagreements between powerful factions in the Soviet Party and government. Among the most outspoken dissenters from a policy of pragmatism, self-restraint and moderation were members of the Soviet military establishment.

At the roots of Soviet policies towards Europe in general, and Eastern Europe in particular, was the desire to preserve the status quo. As a recent official Soviet statement maintained, 'the status quo . . . is an indispensable condition of peace and security in Europe'.[29] And indeed, the viability and unity of the Warsaw Pact has become the *sine qua non* for Soviet–East European relations. Although the external military utility of the Warsaw Pact is marginal, its legalistic and formal structure has become an indispensable element in Soviet attempts to retain its influence in Eastern Europe, and it also defines the outer limits of Soviet tolerance of East European dissent.

WE ought to ask, however, how the Soviets have managed to rally several East European countries in its effort to put down Czechoslovakia? Or more specifically, since it is widely assumed in the West that most of Eastern Europe is gripped by a nationalistic, anti-Soviet turmoil, seeking its own independence and freedom from Moscow, why did it join in intervening in Czechoslovakia? For answers to these questions we ought to examine Western misperceptions about East European politics and compare them with certain unhappy realities.

We ought to recall the peculiar euphoria of recent years when Western scholars, analysts and public figures were vying with each other in constructing models and schemes for various Pan-European, Europe-to-the-Urals, Europe-for-the-Europeans and other aggregations. Such schemes and proposals generally assumed that since their humiliation in Cuba the Soviets had become eagerly interested in détente and

[29] *New Times* (Moscow), no. 37, 18 September 1968, p. 2.

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real peaceful coexistence. They further assumed that the Soviets were on the defensive in their relations with China and in Eastern Europe; that the process of ideological and political erosion in Eastern Europe contained an irresistible momentum which accrued only to Western interests; and that there was little the Soviets could do to arrest or reverse the trend of emancipatory and nationalistic pressures. And finally, it was assumed that economic and technological penetration by the West into Eastern Europe would transform itself into political and even military gains.

It might be said now, with the benefit of hindsight, that this situation was one of 'a plethora of Grand Designs in search of reality'. The grand design planners failed to take into account some realities regarding the Soviet bloc: namely, the fact that many indigenous leaders in that region had established relations with the Soviet Union which they would not want radically to change. In other words, while these leaders sought greater independence from Moscow, they also enjoyed certain ties and inherent benefits deriving from them. Let us briefly describe them: (a) *The Uncertain Trumpet*: Many East Europeans have come to realize that they cannot rely on Western assistance in the event of a crisis with the Soviets. Consequently much of the Western encouragement for a distancing from Moscow fell on deaf ears. (b) *The German Problem*: Despite Western minimizations of this bogey-man spectre of a rearmed and 'revanchist' Germany, many East Europeans continue to fear a rearmed Germany. The Soviets have always managed skilfully to exploit this fear in their own interests. (c) *Security Considerations*: In a world of nuclear deterrence, with the two super-powers aiming potential nuclear salvoes at each other, the East Europeans viewed the security of the Soviet nuclear umbrella as a necessary evil, which assured their basic defence needs. (d) *Limited Political Mobility*: While the Soviet Union had continued to tolerate, and at times encourage, economic and technological intercourse between Eastern Europe and the West, it, however, showed great concern with the possibility of extending such exchanges into political or military arrangements. And it is a bald fact that the East Europeans have limited political mobility. In the unlikely event of pulling out of the Warsaw Pact, such dissenters had no place to go, i.e. they would exchange a tolerable, though by no means ideal, relationship with the Soviet Union for an uncertain, limbo-type existence in the dangerous proximity of a hostile super-power on its own borders.

In essence, the over-optimistic visions of the grand designers were out of touch with harsh realities, and they were rudely shocked out of their complacency by the mounting militancy of the Soviet Union and by the brutal Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia.

MAJOR alliance systems created for some specific military or political purpose are essentially unstable. The viability of such alliance systems is determined by two broad factors: how does the

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alliance survive an attack from, or against, the potential external adversary? And, even more important, how does the alliance survive when the initial threat from outside the alliance abates? It is the contemporary experience with such alliance systems, which were predicated on acute perceptions of imminent threats, that they eventually suffer from 'bloc-fatigue'. The lesser allies become weary of subordinating their own national interests to the more abstract goals of the alliance system. The obsolescence of the initial, acutely perceived objectives of the alliance leads to an erosion of the alliance, and much of the energy of the alliance supporters is spent in shoring up the disintegrating alliance structure.

The Warsaw Pact, however, is not symmetrical with NATO. The major asymmetry between these two alliances is that the former is a forced, 'entangling' alliance, whose major purpose is to serve internal, political Soviet objectives, while the latter continues to be essentially a defensive, externally-oriented system of regional defence.

The Warsaw Pact, moreover, is a guardian of a rigid status quo which is also the hallmark of Soviet policy in Europe. Many of its smaller members, however, seek greater mobility, both within Eastern Europe and across the boundaries to the West. The Soviet leaders, having seen the erosion of most of their traditional mechanisms for the containment and control of their allies, view the Warsaw Pact as the most efficient and 'proper' instrument for containing such outward pressures.

The events in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe seem to indicate that despite the inherent obsolescence of the Warsaw Pact as an effective externally-oriented military instrument, the Pact will continue to be kept alive and to serve Soviet policy interests. However, the utility and viability of the Pact has undergone a profound metamorphosis as a result of the Czech crisis. While at a first glance it would seem that the unity and internal cohesiveness of the Pact were strengthened as a result of recent events, it is more realistic to examine some of the fissures and cracks in the Pact structure. For, in reality, the latent divisions within the Pact have become even more polarized, with East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria showing their strong adherence to the Pact, and with Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary indicating, explicitly or implicitly, their strong misgivings about its utility. While the more backward, or internally insecure, loyal supporters of Moscow see the Pact as a protector of their own positions of power, the others see it as an impediment to modernization and in their external relations.

The key new Soviet objective underlying the Warsaw Pact was to create the symbol and, if possible, the reality of a new unity in the communist bloc. This unity, expressed in Soviet desires for a status quo in the region (which would, however, tolerate small steps in the adjustment of Moscow-East Europe relations), was threatened from several sources: (a) the *Ostpolitik* and *bridge-building* policy had a seductive appeal to some of the capital-starved economies in Eastern Europe

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and promised technological and economic assistance to them; (b) the intellectual ferment in Eastern Europe, and to some degree in Russia, which questioned the neo-totalitarian practices of their rulers; (c) the loss of appeal resulting from the replacement of a charismatic leadership in Moscow with pragmatic managerial bureaucrats; (d) the renascence of nationalism which rejected supranationalistic schemes and alliances; and (e) the clearly manifest ' bloc-fatigue ', a form of resistance to blocs based on divisions along ideological lines.

The crisis in Czechoslovakia has brought into the open the various tensions, frustrations and dangers underlying the forcible unity of the communist bloc. Soviet public reactions to the Czech liberalization trends have, in effect, contained a full list of these particular threats to the unity of the bloc, and have also indicated the deep Soviet concern with their likely consequences, if remained unchecked. The March 1969 summit meeting of the Pact countries in Budapest witnessed a Soviet failure to achieve full unanimity in Pact affairs. Once again Rumania proved to be a barrier to closer Pact integration. The Soviet pressure for the Warsaw Pact countries' support in its conflict with China met with Rumanian stone-walling. Even so the Pact is serving its purpose for the Russians, and the triumphant satisfaction of all its members (except Rumania) on the occasion of the fall of Dubcek and Smrkovsky has provided a fitting symbol of its present tendency.

The Warsaw Pact has come full circle, from a minor organization of limited role and utility to one which has become very vital to the Soviet Union. Its main uses are political, rather than purely military, and it serves as an iron corset to hold together the communist bloc. In a larger sense, the Warsaw Pact serves as an alliance system through which the Soviet leaders seek to entangle their unwilling allies in the web of Soviet national interests.

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SPHERES OF INFLUENCE: A REASSESSMENT

Bennett Kovrig

> Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism, or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace.
>
> Franklin D. Roosevelt.

HYPNOTIZED for four years by the Vietnamese war, the eyes of the world shifted with some difficulty back to Mackinder's heartland in the summer of 1968. The events in Czechoslovakia aroused in most observers a tragic sense of *déjà-vu*. Writers' conferences and heretical memoranda, the surfacing even within the Party apparatus of liberal-nationalistic elements, spiralling popular demands and temporizing conferences with the Soviets, the ultimate occupation, the resounding silence in the West's chancelries—Hungary in 1956 had followed a similar path from decompression to repression. There were, to be sure, stylistic differences: the Magyar temper is more quixotic than Schweikian and the Czechoslovak Party retained with remarkable success its position in the vanguard of the reform movement. Moreover, there was no Suez crisis to divide the West. General de Gaulle's and Dr Kiesinger's overtures to Eastern Europe gave reason to suppose that they were intent on achieving more independence for those countries, and, according to most prominent Sovietologists, the values and interests of the United States and of the Soviet Union were steadily converging.

Yet, in spite of these encouraging differences, Russian tanks appeared early one morning in Wenceslas Square, as they had appeared early one morning 12 years before in the streets of Budapest. What had gone wrong? In Washington's official circles there was apprehension that the Czechoslovak incident would induce anti-Soviet hostility in the public mind, and that this hostility would harm the policy of détente and in particular the preliminary negotiations on arms control. The Johnson administration's senior consultant on Soviet and East European affairs, Professor Brzezinski, urged that the West's outraged reaction ought not to detract from its long-term policy of building bridges: 'It was the success of this policy that forced the Soviet Union into this criminal act.'[1] Though one is tempted to ask whether the price of success was not too high, such moralizing would obscure the key issue arising out of this crisis which is, broadly speaking, whether the functions of American globalism are in fact serving the interests of the marginal members of either bloc. The doctrine of détente, with its constituent

[1] Quoted in the *New York Times*, 22 August 1968.

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credos of polycentrism, liberalization, and convergence has dominated official Western thinking for some time; and this doctrine seems to predicate the immutability of the status quo until the distant day when all men relinquish arms and ideologies. In an era when secular forces in both major spheres of influence are pressing for change, it may be appropriate to review the process whereby American foreign policy became mired into its present immobilism, and then to consider the implications for the future.

IF spheres of influence as a contemporary doctrine and reality arose out of the Second World War, it was through no conscious design of the American leadership. Roosevelt, Hopkins, Hull *et al.* were too imbued with Wilsonian ideals to join their allies in planning for the new political map of Europe; it was left to Churchill to negotiate a ludicrously quantitative repartition of influence in the Balkans with Stalin. On the other hand, along with vast confidence in the panacea of the United Nations, there was a general awareness in Washington that the Soviet Union would be the dominant force in Europe after the war, and that Eastern Europe would inevitably—for strategic as well as for ideological reasons—become Stalin's purlieu. Favouring a frank recognition of this prospect, George Kennan wrote to Ambassador Harriman in December 1944 that 'as far as border states are concerned the Soviet government has never ceased to think in terms of spheres of interest'.[2]

Wartime proclamations such as the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta Declaration made official American sanction of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe politically impossible; conventional wisdom has it that it was equally impossible politically for the United States to take advantage of its atomic power and, as Churchill suggested privately to James Farley in 1947, give an ultimatum to the Russians to retire from Europe.[3] The concern of the Truman administration became to prevent further expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. The Marshall Plan, by its stiff preconditions for membership, served to delineate better than any subsequent treaty the division of Europe; American officials assessed the Prague coup of 1948 as a riposte testifying to the success of the European Recovery Program.[4] On the military front, the Truman Doctrine's assorted mutual security pacts ensured that the new perimeters of the Western camp were well-manned.

Almost coincidentally, George Kennan's famous 'X' article came to provide a conceptual framework that, with the magic word 'containment', brought apparent order into the chaotic state of mind of a government and nation only half reconciled to the prospect of world leadership. As then understood, his prescription was essentially defensive: to hold the perimeter (although its extent was open to interpretation) and thereby to thwart the expansionist dynamic inherent in

[2] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, 1967), p. 222.
[3] *New York Herald Tribune* (European Edition), 29–30 May 1965.
[4] Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

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Soviet communist ideology. For those uneasy about the ultimate outcome, there was a teleological reassurance: the Soviet system carried within itself the seeds of its own decay. Kennan omitted any reference to Eastern Europe, which in view of his evolutionary philosophy seemed committed almost irrevocably to the Soviet sphere. Writing some 20 years later, he deplored such contemporary distortions:

> The purpose of 'containment' as then conceived was not to perpetuate the status quo to which the military operations and political arrangements of World War II had led; it was to tide us over a difficult time and to bring us to a point where we could discuss effectively with the Russians the drawbacks and dangers this status quo involved, and to arrange with them for its peaceful replacement by a better and sounder one.[5]

The policy of containment served notice on the world that the United States recognized the *fait accompli* of a divided Europe; at the same time its propaganda assured disaffected East Europeans of the West's enduring sympathy.

That a European settlement did not materialize has been ascribed to numerous, at times mutually exclusive, causes, and in his recent essay Arthur Schlesinger provided an eloquent analysis of the roots of this stalemate.[6] The creation of NATO's military apparatus hardened the line of division and, apart from a blockade of Berlin that initiated a series of recurring crises involving that unfortunate city, the political map of Europe acquired the consensual seal of permanence. American attention shifted to the failure of the China policy, then to the Korean impasse, and in the Acheson years the prospect of a European settlement, peaceful or otherwise, slowly receded.

To the extent, however, that 'containment' ran counter to a certain American predilection for quick solutions, it proved a tough political pill to administer, and the foreign policies of the Truman administration aroused criticism on grounds ranging from immorality to profligacy. In a 1951 amendment to the Mutual Security Act, Congress allocated $100 million in European military assistance funds for use at the President's discretion to aid refugees from Eastern Europe and possibly integrate them into NATO units. The author of the amendment, Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin, in almost the same breath deplored the excessive cost of the aid programme and urged that 'when the time is opportune we should actually assist the people behind the iron curtain to liberate themselves'.[7] Such Congressional distaste for the apparent immobilism of containment, though coincident with the decline of bipartisanship, was no isolated phenomenon; Paul Nitze, later director of the Policy Planning Staff, records that 'by the summer of

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 365.
[6] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 'Origins of the Cold War', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 1, October 1967, pp. 22–52.
[7] US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, *The Mutual Security Program, Hearings*, pp. 1108–1109.

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1952 the evolution of our policy had outrun public understanding and support'.[8] The temptation was great, in the election year of 1952, to offer easier and more popular solutions to the East-West deadlock.

TWO dominant influences determined the configuration of American foreign policy in the latter years of the Truman administration. One was a conviction of Soviet intractability, arising out of an elusive amalgam of ideological and strategic expansionism, which made it unlikely that negotiation could produce results acceptable to the West. The other factor was the unwillingness of the United States to test its relatively reduced power in a major confrontation with the Russians. Between the Scylla of futile negotiations and the Charybdis of atomic war lay the policy of containment; and containment could do nothing for Eastern Europe but offer vague reassurances of ultimate self-determination coupled with somewhat superfluous reminders of the virtues of Western liberalism. The only significant attempt of the post-war years to reverse the spheres of influence orthodoxy occurred in the infancy of Eisenhower's presidency, and that period is therefore worthy of more detailed consideration.

The rejection of containment crystallized by 1952 into the new doctrine of liberation. In a polemic described rather hyperbolically by *Le Monde* as the reference text of the new administration, James Burnham argued for an East European strategy involving a threefold commitment to liberation: 'all-sided political warfare; auxiliary military and paramilitary actions where called for; adequate preparation for whatever military action may be required in the future'.[9] The official version of 'liberation' was formulated of course by John Foster Dulles, who as early as 1949 had publicly urged Truman to take the offensive and assure the people of Eastern Europe that their self-determination was a goal of American foreign policy.[10] Dulles adopted the same position in his election-year article, 'A Policy of Boldness', in which he denounced the prevailing tactics as 'merely reactions to some of the many threats'.[11] He proposed instead a military establishment capable of instant retaliation and, with this in hand, a major political offensive.

Dulles's deep concern with moral precepts somewhat obscured the development of his policy: 'We should be *dynamic*, we should use *ideas* as weapons; and these ideas should conform to *moral* principles.' Claiming that secret work in progress to promote liberation was inadequate, he asserted that his goal could not be achieved 'unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur'.

[8] Paul H. Nitze, *U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945–1955*, Foreign Policy Association, March–April 1956, p. 48. See also W. H. Chamberlin, *Beyond Containment* (Chicago, 1953), *passim*.

[9] James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation* (New York, 1953), p. 223.

[10] *New York Times*, 14 December 1949; see also Dulles's *War or Peace* (New York, 1950).

[11] John Foster Dulles, 'A Policy of Boldness', *Life*, 19 May 1952, pp. 146–60.

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> The mere statement of that wish and expectation would change, in an electrifying way, the mood of the captive peoples. It would put heavy new burdens on the jailers and create new opportunities for liberation.

As means to this end, Dulles suggested a number of practical steps to be taken. These included a declaration of liberation as a peaceful goal of American policy; creation in the free world of political 'task forces' of reliable émigrés who would develop a 'freedom programme' for each satellite; assistance in the escape of such men; co-ordination of Radio Free Europe and of the Voice of America with this 'freedom programme'; co-ordination with the programme of America's cultural, economic, and commercial relations; the cutting-off of diplomatic relations with the satellites 'if and when that would promote the freedom programmes'; and the gaining of free world support for a 'great new Declaration of Independence' regarding the satellites. He ruled out the risk of touching off revolts:

> We do not want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals. There can be peaceful separation from Moscow, as Tito showed, and enslavement can be made so unprofitable that the master will let go his grip. [We] can be confident that within two, five or ten years substantial parts of the captive world can peacefully regain national independence.

Repelled by the isolationism of the Taft wing, Dulles sent a memorandum to Eisenhower in March 1952 outlining his views on foreign policy. Judging from his reply, the General was impressed by Dulles's advocacy of a credible American deterrent; he did not reflect, however, on the proposed programme for liberation.[12] In the eventual drafting of the Republican plank, the future Secretary of State's commitment to the principle of self-determination and his moral outrage at Soviet hegemony provided only part of the impetus. A more practical function of the liberation plank was to gain the support of voters who had fled communism or who were of East European stock. The Republican National Committee had set up an Ethnic Origins Division, and to head the 'Foreign Language Group Activities' it chose Arthur Bliss Lane, an ex-Ambassador to Poland noted for his anti-communism and his charges of a 'Yalta betrayal'; Lane later recorded that he 'had numerous talks with Foster Dulles in Chicago, urging him, not only because of the international importance but for political purposes also, to make this plank as strong as possible'.[13]

When the platform was adopted at Chicago on 10 July, the foreign policy plank, standing first and foremost, varied little from Dulles's earlier pronouncements. Inevitably, this calculated emphasis sounded the death-knell of bipartisanship. Admonishing the Democrats for their

[12] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change* (New York, 1963), p. 23.

[13] See Louis L. Gerson, *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy* (Lawrence, 1964), p. 183.

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abandonment of the satellites, the plank promised that an Eisenhower administration would 'repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements'.[14] The Democrats, sensitive to the appeal of this activist approach, strove to underline its perils. President Truman emphasized that uprisings in the satellites could scarcely succeed without Western support, and charged that the Republicans wanted neither war nor insurrection but only votes; Stevenson deplored that the satellites had become an election issue, while Secretary of State Acheson claimed that the liberation programme was a positive prescription for disaster. The Democratic position was bolstered by the Chief of Staff of SHAPE, General Gruenther, who stated in an interview that while it was necessary to keep alive the hopes of East Europeans, they could not be liberated without war, and there was no question of launching such a war.[15]

Indeed, the Republican contender appeared almost equally dubious, and he had to be prodded by the National Committee to reaffirm 'liberation' in his speeches.[16] Throughout the campaign Eisenhower was careful to refer to *peaceful* liberation, but his future Secretary proved to be less conscious of the pitfalls of bold words. When Mutual Security Director Averell Harriman expressed reservations regarding the peacefulness of 'liberation', Dulles retorted:

> It is nonsense for Mr. Harriman to say that General Eisenhower's liberation policy is a trap and would lead to premature uprisings and more Warsaw massacres. There was nothing premature about the Warsaw uprising. What was wrong was that the Russians doublecrossed the Poles. To suggest any analogy between this treachery and the General's idea is unthinkable. The only trap I see is that in the Democratic platform which says, they look forward to liberation of all these peoples but they aren't willing to do anything about it.[17]

Clarifications ensued, but the fact remains that if the originator of 'liberation' could be so equivocal about its meaning, it is not surprising that Europeans, Eastern and Western, came to adopt an interpretation far removed from the realities of American foreign policy.

Though committed to liberation as an abstract goal, Dulles appeared little concerned with the immediacy of such a development or with the means of its implementation. When towards the end of the campaign Eisenhower made his famous promise to go to Korea, the ambivalence of the Republicans' foreign policy became even more striking. Was not

[14] Council on Foreign Relations, *Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1952* (New York, 1953), p. 80.
[15] *New York Times*, 3 and 12 September 1952.
[16] Gerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–91.
[17] *New York Times*, 28 August 1952. A biographer of Dulles records that this occasion was one of the two on which Eisenhower had been vexed by him, the other being the Suez episode (Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles*, New York, 1967, p. 88).

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the credibility of liberation tainted by his determination to secure peace in Korea, and this foreseeably by an armistice that, far from rolling back communism, would reaffirm the line separating spheres of interest? The paradox of the Republican response to popular frustration with the East-West stalemate lay in the ease with which the newborn policy of moral dynamism was discarded in favour of more amoral pragmatism.

RETURNING a month after the election from his well-publicized trip to Korea, the new President met on the cruiser Helena with his principal advisers to review his administration's broad philosophy. There was agreement to liquidate the Korean war by accepting stalemate; the meeting also dealt with what they called 'the Great Equation —how to equate needed military strength with maximum economic strength'.[18] This became the overriding concern of Eisenhower and his entourage of businessmen: to re-establish economic conservatism by means of a balanced budget. Dulles's views on deterrence—subsequently referred to as 'massive retaliation'—were in harmony with this goal, and a close adviser recalls that 'the considerations that controlled the President's judgment were, first, the working up of a strategy for the "long haul" that would be within the nation's capacity to pay and, second, a defensive and retaliatory power of such overawing strength as to deter the possibility of attack upon this country'.[19] There is no evidence that the policy of liberation figured in these discussions.

Nonetheless, in the first year of the Eisenhower administration concern for the satellites was repeatedly proclaimed, and in his State of the Union message the President reiterated his rather ambiguous campaign promise to repudiate secret understandings that somehow permitted the enslavement of East Europeans. The Secretary of State, although probably aware that Eisenhower considered him over-optimistic about the impact of liberation, remained steadfast in his advocacy. Testifying before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Dulles asserted that liberation 'must be and can be a peaceful process, but those who do not believe that results can be accomplished by moral pressures, by the weight of propaganda, just do not know what they are talking about'.[20]

Conservative Republicans in Congress were not reassured by the first official manifestations of the liberation programme. By the end of January 1953, three House Joint Resolutions and two House Concurrent Resolutions had been introduced by Congressmen clamouring for 'repudiation'; and when the official draft omitted any denunciation of deals made at wartime conferences, disillusionment set in. The President's proposed Captive Peoples Resolution deplored Soviet

[18] Charles C. V. Murphy, 'The Eisenhower Shift—Part I', *Fortune*, January 1956, pp. 86–87.

[19] Robert Cutler, quoted in Murphy, 'The Eisenhower Shift—Part III', *Fortune*, March 1956, p. 112.

[20] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, *Nomination of John Foster Dulles* (Washington, 1953), p. 6.

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hegemony, expressed hope that the satellites would achieve self-determination, and rejected 'any interpretations or applications of any international agreements . . . which have been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples'.[21] As Dulles explained in a memorandum, 'Repudiation of the agreements would be repudiation of the basis of those very rights which we are struggling to achieve for our own and other peoples'.[22]

Opposition from Democrats and disappointed Republicans in Congress made the status of the Captive Peoples Resolution uncertain when, on 5 March, news of Stalin's death reached the West. This development, and the subsequent overtures of Malenkov, contributed to the curtailment of debate on the controversial measure, apparently to the 'immense relief' of Eisenhower and Dulles.[23] In a telephone conversation later that month with Congressman Walter Judd, who was interested in reviving the resolution, Dulles agreed that the US 'had missed the boat before the peace feelers began', but objected that 'it would be difficult now because it would look as though we were rejecting the peace bids'.[24]

The fate of the resolution did not presage much future action on the impassioned promises of the campaign. Nor was the revisionism implicit in the moral strictures of liberation strengthened by the new administration's determination to trim military expenditures, which brought with it a strategic inflexibility. When the change in the Kremlin prompted the President to override Dulles's apprehensions and make a major speech advocating disarmament and peaceful coexistence, allusions to liberation were specifically ruled out.[25] Two days after Eisenhower's speech Dulles felt the need to issue a statement reiterating America's concern for the captive peoples.

In spite of the seemingly firm declarations of the election platform, a wide-ranging review of foreign policy options was still under way. On 8 May, a meeting in the White House brought together the President, Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith, CIA director Allen Dulles, Robert Cutler, and the head of the recently created presidential committee on psychological warfare, C. D. Jackson. They considered three strategic alternatives: to carry on with containment, to extend the line of demarcation to threatened areas in the Middle and Far East, or to take the offensive and apply political and economic pressures on the Soviet Union. Task forces set up to study these alternatives reported in July; the strategy finally adopted, according to a close observer, was a compromise involving more containment with additional alliances in South-East Asia and the Middle East, coupled with a military posture

[21] *Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1953*, p. 188.
[22] Dulles MSS. (Princeton); cf. Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
[23] Sherman Adams, *Firsthand Report* (New York, 1961), p. 93.
[24] Dulles MSS.; account of telephone conversation, 28 March 1953.
[25] Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (New York, 1963), p. 109.

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based on atomic weapons.[26] Clearly, as aboard the *Helena*, liberation had played little part in this updating of American strategy.

The June uprising in East Germany afforded the first concrete test of liberation, the more so since the American-sponsored broadcasting station in West Berlin contributed to the spreading of revolt after the initial disturbances.[27] Although it was reported that C. D. Jackson joined Dulles in urging that encouragement be given to the rebels, the President remained more cautious and in the event the United States limited its reaction to protest and an offer of food supplies that was summarily rejected.[28] This revelation of Washington's impotence or unwillingness to act dealt a severe blow to American prestige and in particular to Dulles's credibility. At the Foreign Ministers' conference on 10 July, he tried to rescue the battered liberation policy by claiming that the revolts were proof of the Soviet system's inherent weaknesses.[29]

In September the National Security Council endorsed the New Look, a strategy making atomic retaliatory capacity the cornerstone of Western defence; cutbacks in American conventional forces followed. On the political front the problem of a divided Germany overshadowed the satellite issue, and pressure came from some Western allies, Churchill in particular, to resume high-level negotiations with the Russians. There was little indication, however, that either side was willing to take the first step in reducing its sphere of influence by dismantling its alliance network; talk of disengagement and a non-aggression pact prior to the Berlin conference in January 1954 proved to be trial balloons at best. Dulles warned later that year: 'The scope of conferences with the Soviet Government is necessarily limited by our attitude towards the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we will not make any deal which would condone and perpetuate the capitivity of men and nations.'[30]

The new emphasis on stability and peaceful coexistence, arising partially out of the incipient nuclear arms race, was of course contrary to any really dynamic concept of liberation, and opposition in Congress arose from elements similar to those that had denounced containment. In a report issued on 2 January 1955, the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggression recommended:

> The time was never more opportune, or the world situation more demanding for a bold, positive offensive by the United States and the entire free world; this is the only course which gives reasonable hope for avoiding all-out war.[31]

Almost simultaneously, the Committee on Foreign Relations released a study which concluded that while there was widespread popular antagonism to the communist regimes in the satellites, the power of the Red

[26] Murphy, 'The Eisenhower Shift—Part III', *loc. cit.*, p. 232.
[27] Edmond Taylor, 'RIAS: The Story of an American Psywar Outpost', in William E. Daugherty, ed., *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, 1958), p. 146.
[28] See the report by the Alsop brothers in the *New York Herald Tribune*, 28 June 1953.
[29] Department of State *Bulletin*, 13 July 1953, p. 40.
[30] *New York Times*, 30 November 1954.
[31] *Ibid.*, 3 January 1955.

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Army and the secret police made any talk of inner collapse unrealistic.[32] The precise extent to which the original 'freedom programme' came to be implemented is impossible to estimate accurately.

A SUCCESSION of events in the first half of 1955—the Austrian State Treaty, the Khrushchev visit to Tito, Soviet diplomatic recognition of Bonn in spite of Germany's impending participation in NATO—raised popular as well as official hopes that the new Soviet regime was at once weaker and more conciliatory. The President proved to be particularly sensitive to public expectations that a summit conference would somehow enshrine the détente; even the Secretary of State, whose aversion to summit conferences dated back to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, became more optimistic in his perception of Soviet weakness.[33] However, both of them persisted in their vocal advocacy of revision of the satellites' status. In spite of Soviet objections from the outset that no 'problem of the countries of Eastern Europe' existed, the latter were a priority subject in preparatory discussions in Washington, and Dulles told a Congressional committee that the neutralization of Austria had created a 'new frontier of freedom' for Hungary and Czechoslovakia and new pressures on Moscow to relax its grip.[34]

The conference planning of the administration was complicated by pressure from some conservative Republicans to activate the policy of liberation. Senator Joseph McCarthy, though well past the peak of his power, submitted a resolution in which he argued that failure to discuss the satellites at Geneva would imply *de jure* recognition of their status and would demoralize internal opposition; his recommendation that the satellites be put on the formal agenda was defeated, and instead a 'sense of Congress' resolution was adopted urging that the United States help achieve independence for countries under foreign rule.[35] Such pressures could not overcome the adamant opposition of the Russians to any consideration of the subject. Dulles warned Molotov during an informal meeting at the end of June that the status of Eastern Europe required discussion, but a sense of futility intruded into the American position. At a press conference prior to the summit, the President had asked rhetorically, 'if you believe [that liberation is desirable], how far are you going to go? You are certainly not going to declare war, are you? So there, instantly, you fix yourself limitations on how far we, as a people, will go in accomplishing this thing.'[36]

[32] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, *Tensions Within the Soviet Captive Countries, Part 7, Hungary* (Washington, 1954).

[33] See Paul C. Davis, 'The New Diplomacy: The 1955 Geneva Summit Meeting', in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good, eds., *Foreign Policy in the Sixties* (Baltimore, 1965), and Sherman Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[34] US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 84th Congress, 1st Session, *Mutual Security Appropriations for 1956, Hearings* (Washington, 1955), p. 1. Cf. Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 507.

[35] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, 1st Session, *Hearing on S. Res. 116 favoring discussion at the coming Geneva conference on the Status of Nations Under Communist Control*, 21 June 1955.

[36] *New York Times*, 30 June 1955.

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Clearly, the Soviet terms—broad discussion on the subject of relaxation of tensions, no agenda reference to Eastern Europe—were not to be rejected at this late date.

The drastic attenuation of the liberation policy and the concurrent drift towards recognition of the spheres of interest is well illustrated in a set of status papers, penned by Dulles, outlining the respective goals of the Americans and the Russians at the forthcoming conference.[37] The paper on US goals relegated to fourth place the satellite question, and Dulles expressed profound pessimism regarding constructive changes; he added somewhat pitifully that 'what we ask for is less than what the Soviets gave Tito'. The primary goal was progress towards German reunification without neutralization or demilitarization, and then an agreement on 'European security' involving some reduction of forces by both sides, but he expressed concern 'lest this arrangement operate in effect to accept and consolidate the Soviet control over the satellites'. Significantly, the Secretary expected the first and foremost Soviet objective would concern their sphere of influence:

> An appearance that the West concede the Soviet rulers a moral and social equality which will help the Soviets maintain their satellite rule by disheartening potential resistance. . . .

By implication, the American policy makers considered that their Soviet counterparts were unlikely to make concessions on major issues and were primarily interested in exploiting the propaganda advantages of a summit meeting. Dulles acknowledged that the latter would 'probably make considerable gains in this respect', with the proviso that 'the extent of Soviet gain could be limited by public knowledge that the occasion was being used by the United States to push for satellite liberation and liquidation of International Communism'.

In the light of the foregoing it is scarcely surprising that the summit produced no progress in solving the major issues and that the status of Eastern Europe received little attention. At a post-mortem meeting with Congressional leaders, Dulles claimed that American concern for the satellites had been voiced both at the conference table and in informal talks, but he noted that he had 'never expected that the Soviet Union would agree to establish international procedures to deal with these matters'.[38] At the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Paris in mid-December he reviewed the Geneva conferences and concluded that the only positive outcome was 'the repudiation of war as a present means of extending (Soviet) influence'; he noted that East-West relations were entering a new phase by the opening of a new cold-war front in the Middle East and in Asia.[39]

[37] Dulles MSS; *Papers on Geneva Conference Goals*, 7 July 1955.
[38] Dulles MSS; post-mortem paper on Geneva for White House Bipartisan Congressional Leaders' meeting, 25 July 1955.
[39] Dulles MSS; NATO meeting, Paris, 13–18 December 1955, *Estimate of Soviet Policy*, and *Statement by Secretary Dulles in Connection with Agenda Item II: Review of the International Situation.*

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Evidently the US had once again become reconciled to a lasting deadlock and the preservation of spheres of influence in Europe. While retaining his characteristic confidence in the ultimate victory of right over wrong, Dulles had come to perceive certain limitations of American power, limitations which apparently also precluded any determined efforts at disengagement. The 'spirit of Geneva' found its manifestation in a relaxation of American revisionism, and the package deal whereby the satellites were finally admitted to the United Nations was an indication of the road travelled since the original 'freedom programme'.

TO adopt pragmatically a new morality of peaceful coexistence based on mutual deterrence presented no great obstacle. To renoune publicly the old morality, which gave priority to national self-determination, seemed beyond the capacity of American leadership. The most striking aspect of the post-Geneva period was the lack of correlation between the various aspirations of US foreign policy and the poor co-ordination of the propaganda organs. Sympathetic Christmas messages to the satellites were promptly denounced by the Soviet Union as 'not in accord with the spirit of Geneva'; the note replying to this charge, as well as the President's State of the Union message, maintained that the policy of liberation remained a valid and enduring answer to the 'bondage of millions'.[40] Thus by the end of 1955 a substantial credibility gap between encouraging words and actual policy had materialized.

The final and painful test of Washington's ephemeral commitment to self-determination in Eastern Europe came in the autumn of 1956 with the Hungarian revolution. Eisenhower recalls in his memoirs how the fear of war made Hungary 'as inaccessible to us as Tibet', thereby neatly summarizing his administration's incapacity to exploit the opportunities presented by the Nagy regime's appeal to the United Nations and the 'four great powers' to protect Hungary's neutrality.[41] There has been endless *post facto* speculation regarding the practical options open to the US at the time, the most realistic perhaps being the prompt dispatch of UN observers or a token peace force; there is concrete evidence of hesitancy and disagreement within the Soviet Politbureau before the final reoccupation of Hungary. Others argued that the revolution had been a propitious moment for initiating negotiations on disengagement and a European settlement. The Suez affair was hardly calculated to provide a suitable background for such negotiations, and in the event Washington's overriding concern was to avoid the slightest provocation of the Soviet Union. This passive reaction was sustained initially by the hope that the Nagy regime would consolidate its position

[40] Department of State *Bulletin*, 16 January 1956, p. 85; cf. C. L. Sulzberger's comments in the *New York Times*, 14 May 1956.

[41] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace* (New York, 1956), p. 95.

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along Titoist lines, but there can arise occasions in diplomacy when keeping one's interlocutor guessing is the best policy, and the Hungarian revolution may well have been such an occasion. The hasty assurance of respect for the Soviet Union's sphere of influence must have been welcomed in Moscow as a *carte blanche* that made the subsequent UN deliberations incidental.

From 1956 onwards the United States unambiguously recognized the status of the satellites as one of close links with the Soviet Union, clearly within the Soviet sphere of influence. It can be said that the Hungarian revolution had been an unexpected and unwelcomed interruption in a Soviet-American détente that was already evident in 1955. In a sense, the revolution served to reconcile the American public to a policy devoid of pretensions of 'liberating' the East Europeans from the Russian version of colonialism; the impotence of Western policy makers to affect the fate of the satellites in the short run, and their inclination to preserve the European status quo factor in the East-West equilibrium, destroyed any popular illusions regarding American power and influence in the area.

This new realism in turn facilitated the clarification of official attitudes towards Eastern Europe. The new policy, referred to during the latter years of Eisenhower's presidency as 'gradualism', marked in effect a return to the old premises of containment, but with a greater emphasis on economic and cultural intercourse as a means of weaning away the satellites. In the event, by the end of the 1950s Eastern Europe as a bone of contention was rapidly fading out of the picture, and the word satellite came to refer exclusively to earth-orbiting devices. Although Berlin remained an irritant that performed as a barometer of Soviet aggressiveness, Western pressure for German reunification also lost much of its urgency; since this had been the pivotal issue in the Cold War, the fate of the minor members of the spheres was *ipso facto* sealed.

The decade after 1955 saw a change of venue for Soviet-American rivalry as the underdeveloped areas of Africa and Asia became the new battleground. Initially, the Dulles-inspired policy was adamant in requiring the ideological allegiance of these states, and the competition for their loyalties—with massive aid programmes for incumbent regimes as well as for assorted 'national liberation' movements—threatened to extend the two super-powers' sphere-of-influence doctrine to the global scale. Numerous factors conspired over the years to hinder this extension of the two spheres: political instability or intractability in the recipient states, ecological patterns that defied rapid modernization, and domestic demands that encroached on the aid programmes. Nonetheless, the contest was safely remote from divided Europe.

Another factor which incidentally slowed down the sphere-extending process but which had also far wider significance was the development of polycentrism in the early sixties. On the communist side, this phenomenon manifested itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in particularistic

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tendencies in Eastern Europe, notably by Rumania over its economic role within Comecon. On the Western side, General de Gaulle's voluntarist approach to foreign policy (tinged with a generalized antipathy towards the English-speaking world) culminated in his withdrawal in 1966 from the military structure of NATO. Thus both spheres suffered some erosion, although the only immediate net gain for either side was the reorientation towards Moscow of Castro's Cuba.

If the Kennedy and Johnson administrations carried over 'gradualism', under the new guise of 'building bridges' and 'peaceful engagement', it was in full awareness and partly because of the balance of terror that had been invoked during the Cuban missile crisis. In other words, the expectations were exceedingly modest and long-range. Kennedy's passive reaction to the building of the Berlin wall and his tacit renunciation of America's commitment to German reunification were indicative of the paramountcy of the 'easing of tensions' philosophy; the US refrained from recognizing the Ulbricht regime largely because of Adenauer's and de Gaulle's intransigence.[42] The three objectives of US policy towards the communist bloc as noted by Dean Rusk serve well to illustrate the scale of values that had emerged:

> (1) To prevent the Communists from extending their domain: and to make it increasingly costly, dangerous, and futile for them to try to do so:
> (2) To achieve agreements or understandings which reduce the danger of a devastating war;
> (3) To encourage evolution within the Communist world toward national independence, peaceful cooperation and open societies.[43]

As in the initial phase of containment, the relative immobilism of this approach with respect to the spheres of influence elicited a domestic reaction. Unlike the fire-and-brimstone outcry of the early fifties, however, the more contemporary reaction took the form of a theory of convergence that reinforced existing policy. The new orthodoxy derived its strength from the process of liberalization and decentralization that had surfaced sporadically within the Soviet bloc since the death of Stalin. Thus, in spite of Hungary and of the Berlin wall, policy makers could argue that a secular trend, steadily altering the fabric of the Soviet system, gave cause for optimism and warranted American efforts at rapprochement. This comforting teleology has allowed American foreign policy experts to extrapolate from whatever liberalizing tendencies they could detect, and to frown on more energetic attempts at self-assertion in the satellites; Professor Brzezinski asserted recently that encouragement of nationalism in the area may be 'counter-productive' and that Eastern Europe performs a more useful function as a progressive but not secessionist vanguard within the bloc.[44]

[42] See Chaps. 13 and 14 in J. E. Smith, *The Defence of Berlin* (Baltimore, 1963).
[43] Department of State *Bulletin*, 16 March 1964.
[44] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 'The United States and Eastern Europe', Address at the

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When in the spring of 1968 the Czechoslovaks set out to humanize their political system and to acquire a modicum of latitude in foreign policy, most Western observers felt vindicated in their predictions of convergence. Only after the invasion by Warsaw Pact forces did it become obvious that earlier assessments of liberalization within the Soviet Union had been inaccurate, that the post-Khrushchev generation of pragmatic technocrats were in the majority hard-liners, and that polycentrism had finally and unexpectedly hit a ceiling. The ensuing dismay in the White House was inspired less by sympathy for the Czechoslovaks than by a realization that the détente had suffered a setback; the President's hopes for compensating for the unpopularity of Vietnam by new disarmament negotiations and a summit meeting with Premier Kosygin were momentarily eclipsed. Some 12 hours after receiving notice of the invasion from Ambassador Dobrynin, Johnson announced that it was 'never too late for reason to prevail', and only when Rumania came under a similar threat did he speak out more forcefully about unleashing the dogs of war. The Soviet Union, in the classical ploy of consolidating a gain by further threats, alarmed the already cowed NATO members by claiming the right to intervene in West German affairs. At no point had American sanctions or retaliatory actions been considered, and Dean Rusk specifically denied that the Vietnam involvement had limited any available options.[45] When at the United Nations the Secretary of State wondered aloud when Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Andrei Gromyko warned the Assembly of the Soviet commonwealth's inviolability. The spheres remained intact.

TWENTY years separate the Grand Alliance from the Great Symbiosis—a new entente between the United States and the Soviet Union that, if not always cordial, has generally ensured respect for each other's sphere of influence. With Pavlovian regularity, the nuclear balance of terror is invoked on every occasion and by both sides in defence of a status quo. It is not surprising that this common strategy of immobilism is accompanied in both camps by a belief that time and history were on their side.

A corollary of the spheres-of-influence doctrine has been that change in the status quo cannot come about by voluntary withdrawal. The United States felt obliged to fill the vacuum left by the French in Vietnam, while the Soviet Union identified freedom of the press in Czechoslovakia with German revanchism and acted accordingly. The most striking common denominator of the super-powers' foreign policies has been the ceiling placed on neutralist or secessionist tendencies with-

Conference on Canada and Eastern Europe, Carleton University, Ottawa, 20 January 1967. See also John C. Campbell's discussion of alternatives for American policy in *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead* (Minneapolis, 1965).

[45] *New York Times*, 22 August 1968.

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in their spheres. For the Kremlin, polycentrist evolution hits a ceiling when nationalistic and/or particularistic elements threaten the exclusive position of the Party as sole arbiter and agent of change, and seek escape from the economic and military embrace of the Soviet Union; for the USA, the ceiling depends on a less ideological but equally ethnocentric estimate of the country's allegiance. Both powers seem to act on the assumption that when this ceiling goes the entire edifice collapses, and that therefore the limits of heresy may fluctuate slightly but must not be exceeded. Since the USA agrees that one of the ground rules of détente is implicit respect for the spheres of influence (all the while preaching that détente will ultimately lead to a hypothetical well-ordered pluralism), where does this leave those lesser nation-states which feel uncomfortable in either or both spheres? Cuba occasioned the outstanding transgression, and according to the unwritten rules of the game both players could be faulted: the United States for allowing the communist consolidation, and the Soviet Union for its missile gambit. The Americans have still not recovered from the psychological effect of Castro's defection. When China and France also withdrew from their respective spheres, their relative invulnerability allowed the apostasy to go unchallenged; Hungary and the Dominican Republic were less fortunate.

This lingering death-grip of the super-powers over their spheres is all the more paradoxical in view of certain concurrent phenomena that appear to affect them equally. Growing domestic demands—for social service expenditures or for consumer goods and services—have brought on budgetary dilemmas that both governments tried to resolve partially by cuts in their external aid programmes. Retrenchment does not yet extend significantly to military expenditures, although the preliminary talks so rudely interrupted by Czechoslovakia's fugue suggest possible congruence also in that field. This stabilization of the aid race and of the arms race, enhanced by a fully-ratified non-proliferation treaty, might lead one to think that the *raison d'être* of the spheres is receding; the inertia of empires and ideological universalism seem to decree otherwise.

Were the maintenance of the present system the consensual value of international politics, the efforts of the super-powers would deserve some polite applause. But the *Zeitgeist* is one of reaction against the prevalent polarization of power and influence, and it is manifesting itself in the ubiquitous phenomenon Raymond Aron termed 'national affirmation'. The new nationalism is due in equal parts to disillusionment with hegemonic politics and to awareness that the nuclear standoff may present new opportunities for marginal realignments. It is not altogether out of altruistic historical insight that both Moscow and Washington are increasingly intent on mitigating nationalistic pressures —particularly within their own spheres—and on stressing allegedly value-free functional processes, for nationalism threatens to erode the

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loyalty of their clientele. Symptomatic of this new posture is the fact that whereas a few years ago American propaganda strove to nurture the national aspirations of East Europeans, today Professor Brzezinski claims that the 'thrust of history clearly points to the emergence of larger units as an inevitable consequence of social and political development', and goes on to dismiss their nationalistic élites in favour of the 'new functional intelligentsia'.[46] The latter distinction is unconvincing; the evidence of Czechoslovakia suggests on the contrary that the young technocrats were in the forefront of the abortive national rebirth.

In the long run the nation-state system may well alter drastically and disappear, and many will welcome this repudiation of nineteenth-century ideology, even if the alternative of some functional global empire seems an Orwellian utopia; but in the foreseeable future nation-states will remain the basic actors in the international system, and nationalism the predominant seculiar religion. In this more modest projection, the drive for national affirmation represents a function in sharp conflict with the universalist dynamic inherent in super-power politics. The communications revolution has vastly increased the potential of the technologically advanced states for creating a 'global village' in their own image; nevertheless, the struggle promises to be more drawn out than some futurists suspect.

This concern with the spheres of influence is not intended to echo the ideological and ethical relativism that permeates current crypto-anarchistic movements. The invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were, at least from a legalistic perspective, qualitatively different from the American engagement in Vietnam; as many sins have been committed in the name of nationalism as against it. As a knowledgeable Canadian observer noted recently, the Americans 'are not as immaculate as their national tradition has led them to believe, but their record under unparalleled temptation is better than others under less temptation.'[47] Finding a viable middle course between nuclear crusade and ideological surrender is no mean dilemma for the super-powers; however, since their policy-making apparatus is necessarily tainted with ethno-centrism and human fallibility, the need for critical scrutiny outweighs sympathy for the vicissitudes of world leadership.

It is particularly when the middle course turns out to be in diametrical opposition to the interests and aspirations of the lesser nations that one must question the legitimacy and immutability of the status quo. In support of the preservation of current hegemonic spheres, some theorists and policy makers claim that world order and economic development are variables that depend on the super-powers' security networks. Others go farther, and maintain as George Liska does that an American empire is legitimately performing the civilizing and order-

[46] Brzezinski, 'The United States and Eastern Europe', *loc. cit.*

[47] John W. Holmes, 'Canada and the Pax Americana', Address at Victoria College, Toronto, 30 January 1968.

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ing function of a rejuvenated *pax romana*. Admitting that a multipolar global balance of power system is an intellectually appealing prospect, Liska argues that nonetheless a system of 'complementary imbalances', giving primacy to the Soviet Union in Europe and to the United States globally, is functionally more feasible:

> In a reordered European system, Eastern Europe would continue to evolve under lessened but legitimized Soviet paramountcy, exercised in more or less explicit agreement between the Soviet Union and France (and eventually Great Britain) over its terms and limits.[48]

With extravagant historical determinism, the protractors of this world order supervised by super-powers brandish the spectre of anarchy or of nuclear holocaust at any hint of dissidence. Admittedly, any attempt to change the status quo within such a system carries with it a risk of violence. But the super-powers' inclination to manage change is scarcely equivalent to peaceful or equitable conflict resolution; better still a viable international organization, or failing that a return to a more diffuse Ballhausplatz diplomacy.

To the extent that alteration of the spheres of influence implies diminution, the initiative is unlikely to come from Moscow or Washington. While it would be comforting to believe that the Russian or American man in the street is immune from dreams of empire, the modern Kiplings have at their disposal unprecedented powers of persuasion to ward off isolationism, and the former cannot but concur when their governments tell the world that the American/Soviet model must be its ultimate paradigm. The arrogance of power is evident in the words of a one-time National Security Council employee: 'If the United States is to have the option of introducing constructive changes into the existing world order it must ensure its own and the world's security during the process of change.'[49] It may seem ingrate to protest at this paternalism after 20 years of a nuclear peace owed to the self-control of the super-powers, but surely the time has come to look at the spheres-of-influence doctrine and ask, *cui bono?*

The process of national affirmation and the resultant pressures for desatellization are therefore a source both of current international tension and of hope for a more equitably balanced system. States below super-power status are slowly coming to realize that their long-term interests lie in the dismantlement of *both* hegemonic spheres. The answer is not some virginal non-alignment—alignments are the bread-and-butter of diplomacy—but rather self-imposed alignment, calculated to lead to an international system characterized by a diffuse distribution of power and sovereignty. 'Tripolarity' is no better than bipolarity in the present ideological context: Tocqueville's prophecy has been overfulfilled by Russia and America, but Nostradamus's yellow peril offers

[48] George Liska, *Imperial America* (Baltimore, 1967), pp. 65–68 and *passim*; cf. Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York, 1967).
[49] William R. Kintner, *Peace and the Strategy Conflict* (New York, 1967), p. 179.

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scant consolation. It is to be hoped that the present immobilism, dictated by the increasingly symbiotic deadlock of the super-powers, can in time give way to the non-ideological dynamic of national affirmation. The latter will by no means eradicate antagonisms (Liska warns against ' agitated futility '), but it will at least provide a counter-pressure to the deadly globalism of the two super-powers. If these sentiments favouring decentralization are scarcely novel, they have nevertheless seldom surfaced effectively in the foreign policies of the lesser powers [50]; it was disappointing in view of his dreams of a realigned and European Europe to note that General de Gaulle failed to follow up his earlier gestures toward the East with any attempt to take advantage of the Dubcek regime's momentary disengagement. In spite of the tanks in Prague, the era of loyal spheremanship is ending. Voluntarism in foreign policy may yet prove to be the salvation of the less than great.

[50] For a spirited defence of voluntarism see James Eayrs's *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy* (Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1967).

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DÉTENTE: THE SOVIET VIEW

Elliot R. Goodman

SOVIET détente policy has displayed a striking dichotomy. When dealing with the future of Europe, the role of the United States has been almost totally neglected; when dealing with global strategic problems with the United States, the role of Europe has been almost entirely neglected. Each approach, though divergent, still has a common thread, since the net effect of both would be to divorce the United States from its European allies.

In looking towards a European settlement, the Soviet leadership, particularly in the post-Krushchev period, has been adept at popularizing and manipulating a variety of Gaullist themes: The Soviet threat to Europe has disappeared; nationalism in the West is a positive good to be glorified, except, of course, in the case of West Germany where the opposite is true; movement towards greater cohesion in the West is bad and must be opposed, as in the case of supranationalism in the European Communities or integration in NATO; NATO is obsolete and an obstacle to détente and should therefore be disbanded; a European settlement is a matter for the Europeans, which means excluding 'the Anglo-Saxons' from any future political and security arrangements for the European continent. This coincidence of views does not, of course, make the Kremlin Gaullist, nor de Gaulle a communist, since each has sought to exploit these ideas for different ends. Yet the practical effect has often been for one to reinforce the appeal of the other.[1]

THE Kremlin has embraced with special vigour, and even refined, the Gaullist image of NATO that flowed from his détente policy: eliminate NATO and conditions for a peaceful settlement of Europe's problems will be created. As an inducement towards this end, the Soviet leaders proposed mutual 'pactocide'. The dissolution of NATO, they

[1] In domestic French politics, for example, the French Communist Party broke out of 20 years of isolation in the elections of March 1967 and made the formation of a coalition government including the communists a foreseeable possibility. This dramatic shift could be accounted for by numerous factors, such as the passing of the Stalinist-type leadership of Thorez in the French Communist Party, the polycentric tendencies in the communist world that provided the flexibility for communists to adapt to varying national conditions, and the persistent inability of the non-communist opposition to organize themselves as a viable alternative to de Gaulle. High on the list of such factors, however, was the newly found respectability with which de Gaulle had endowed the communists in French public life. This was an inevitable, though perhaps inadvertent, by-product of de Gaulle's pursuit of détente, which often cast him as an uncritical associate of the Kremlin. Then when confronted by the May 1968 riots and general strike, which the Communist Party did not begin and in the initial phases even severely condemned as adventurism, de Gaulle suddenly discovered that 'France is indeed threatened by dictatorship . . . of totalitarian communism' ('Text by General de Gaulle to the French People', *New York Times*, 31 May 1968).

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promised, would be accompanied by the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact.

This Soviet offer deserves careful scrutiny. The timing is significant: de Gaulle's assault against NATO, launched in February 1966, had by the summer led to a full and acrimonious dispute with the alliance. On 4 and 5 July the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Bucharest, and issued a lengthy declaration that systematically attempted to maximize the fissures in the West. 'The United States aggressive circles,' the declaration asserted, 'are, with the help of the North Atlantic military bloc and the military machine created by it, trying further to deepen the division of Europe, to keep up the arms race, to increase international tensions and to impede the establishment and development of normal ties between the West European and East European states.'[2] The reconciliation of European states, East and West, was allegedly obstructed by the continued existence of NATO. Therefore, 'the need has matured for steps to be taken towards the relaxation, above all, of military tension in Europe'. This could be achieved by 'the simultaneous dissolution of the existing military alliances'. Recognizing that this ambitious proposal might not be implemented in a single step, a less far-reaching alternative was also advanced: 'If, however, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty are still not ready to accept the complete dissolution of both alignments, the states that have signed this declaration consider that it is already now expedient to reach an understanding on the abolition of the military organizations, both of the North Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty.' Here the communists picked up precisely the distinction de Gaulle had earlier drawn between the military instrumentality of NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty, and indicated that they would be satisfied, as an initial measure, if the other NATO states imitated de Gaulle's behaviour by abandoning the NATO military organization. And in the absence of military alliances, how would security be provided for? 'Their place ought to be taken by a European security system.'[3]

'A European security system' turns out to be a communist reworking of de Gaulle's 'European Europe'. 'The problem of European security can be solved by the joint efforts of the *European states*.' The declaration left no doubt about the need for Europe to break all trans-Atlantic ties. 'The European states are capable of solving the questions of relations between them without outside interference.'[4] The irrelevance of America, and other NATO members beyond the European continent, to the construction of the security system was emphasized by a Soviet commentator who hailed 'the establishment of friendly contacts and extensive co-operation between the two largest powers

[2] 'Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe', issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty at Bucharest, 4 and 5 July 1966, Appendix III, Document 387, Assembly, Western European Union, *Proceedings*, December 1966, vol. III, p. 136.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 138 (italics added).

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on the continent—the Soviet Union and France—who bear special responsibility for European peace and security'.[5] This was, in part, meant to flatter de Gaulle and fed his animus against 'the Anglo-Saxons', but it also reflected the permanently subservient position intended for Germany. The Bucharest declaration called for recognition of all existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse, and of 'the fact of the existence of two German states'. Sanctifying the status quo would foreclose the presumably revanchist demands of West Germany, which, in addition, should be denied entry into any international scheme for nuclear sharing, such as the then proposed multilateral nuclear force. In the very distant future the German people were offered the prospect of reunification 'through a gradual rapprochement between the two sovereign German states'. Just how the future fusion of two sovereign German states could be accomplished was left vague, while the immediate aim of recognizing two separate Germanies was stressed repeatedly. Taken together, this programme would bring about 'the normalization of the situation in Europe' and foster détente.[6]

A conference of European communist parties at Karlovy Vary in April 1967 substantially reaffirmed these positions and added a few flourishes. West Germany must be precluded from any opportunity 'to gain access to nuclear arms in any form, either European, multilateral or Atlantic', while relations must be normalized between two sovereign German states and 'West Berlin as a separate entity'. In this document the distant prospect of German reunification was not even mentioned. The central proposal remained the demand for 'a simultaneous liquidation of both military alliances' for 'the purpose of achieving a détente and strengthening the security of the peoples of our continent'.[7]

WHAT, then, is the Soviet meaning of détente? What mutual concessions are offered, what accommodation of positions are called for, so as to lessen tensions and 'normalize' relations on the European continent?

The dismantling of NATO would eliminate forces in being under an integrated allied command structure. It would also certainly mean the end of an American military presence in Europe. The West Europeans have always wanted Americans on hand both to help deter or defend against conventional attack, as well as to keep hold of a friendly hostage, so that the instant involvement of American troops would insure American nuclear retaliation against a Soviet nuclear strike. The

[5] Y. Rakhmaninov, 'For European Security', *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1967, p. 85. See also Y. Shvedkov, 'West European Political Forces and European Security', *ibid.*, March 1968, pp. 8–13.

[6] Assembly, Western European Union, *Proceedings*, December 1966, vol. III, p. 141.

[7] The Karlovy Vary Statement of European Communist Parties, 26 April 1967, in *The Soviet View of NATO*, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 19–20.

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dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, would bring no such dramatic shifts in the power structure of the East. As NATO Secretary-General Brosio properly recalls, 'a veil is drawn over the fact that the Soviet Union has already concluded a network of bilateral pacts with its allies, such as to render the Warsaw Pact superfluous and make the dependence of the Eastern countries upon the Soviet Union even more entire'.[8] Soviet troops would doubtless remain in East Germany, since the GDR is supported by Soviet bayonets. But even if Soviet troops were thinned out in Eastern Europe, in exchange for a withdrawal of American and other forces from Western Europe, units of the Soviet Army could be easily and quickly reintroduced with little difficulty, while the re-entry of American and other allied troops into Western Europe would be a major undertaking, both in terms of reversing a political commitment and as a logistical military enterprise. Furthermore, the open way in which the recommitment of troops to Western Europe would have to be carried out would not serve to avoid a crisis, but rather to precipitate one. Foreknowledge that Western troop re-entry would stimulate a major crisis would further inhibit their reintroduction, thereby leaving the separate countries of Western Europe increasingly exposed to Soviet political influence, which would be backed by a disequilibrium of military power.

This imbalance would be especially marked in the case of nuclear weapons. The 700-odd medium-range ballistic missiles stationed along the western border of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe would still be aimed, as at present, at all the major targets of Western Europe. Meanwhile, American forces in Europe that had been an earnest of the American nuclear guarantee would have gone home, and taken with them the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe under the two-key system. The remaining French and British national nuclear forces, which in any event were not credible as deterrents if used alone (since the price of such use would be certain national suicide), would now be of even less value, with the installation of a Soviet ABM system that could ward off blows against a limited nuclear force. Despite the questionable worth of such a small national nuclear deterrent, the West Germans might feel compelled to strike out for one, given their exposed and defenceless position. This would involve breaking West German treaty commitments to abstain from creating a national nuclear force, and would certainly set off violent reactions with unforeseeable consequences. Thus the only certainty is that détente and peaceful accommodation would not ensue from the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

[8] Manlio Brosio, 'NATO and East-West Detente', *NATO Letter*, December 1967, p. 6. US Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, similarly remarks: 'The Soviets are testing Allied endurance with their proposal to abolish both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I can see why they would want to exercise their military command over other Communist forces directly without a structure that implies their allies should have something to say about how and when the forces are used, against whom and for what purpose' ('The Transformation of NATO', *ibid.*, November 1967, pp. 5–6).

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The West Germans, on the other hand, might well be persuaded of the dangers and futility of building a national deterrent, but this need not create stability in Europe. In these circumstances the Kremlin might find the temptation of nuclear blackmail too great to resist. With overwhelming Soviet force arrayed against them, the West Germans might succumb to Soviet threats, while hoping, in the bargain, to salvage the reunification of their nation, even if achieved on Soviet terms. The shock waves of this realignment would spread over the remainder of the European continent and, in one fashion or another, subordinate it to Soviet control. Mutual pactocide, it would seem, is a matter of form but not substance for the Warsaw Pact, while for NATO it involves both form and the essence of power.

The campaign to abolish military blocs was obviously not rendered more plausible by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yet even Czechoslovakia did not deter the Kremlin from repeating its demand for creating the Soviet version of collective security for Europe, as reflected for example in the declaration of the Warsaw Pact powers' meeting in Budapest on 17 March 1969. It would still behove us, therefore, to explore with care the implications of the Soviet proposal for a new European security system. The long-range prospect would be, as noted, for Soviet power to flow into the mainstream of Western Europe, as a result of the new, gross imbalance of forces. The immediate aim, however, may be identified as a Soviet attempt to secure and legitimate all the gains reaped in east Central Europe as a result of the Second World War. American influence could be foreclosed from the processes transforming Eastern Europe, which Moscow forlornly hopes might once again become its exclusive preserve. The influence of Western Europe on the Eastern bloc states would also certainly be minimized if, as Moscow would like, de Gaulle's pattern of development were followed. In this case the institutions of the European Communities would be progressively reduced to mere inter-governmental bodies, devoid of all supranational attributes and all source of strength and power of attraction upon Eastern Europe.[9]

LOCKED into the centre of such a Europe, in the Soviet plan, would be two sovereign German states. The Kremlin (like de Gaulle) would also keep the Germans in a permanently inferior military position by insisting upon their continued denuclearization. The Soviet leaders and de Gaulle have rigidly rejected even indirect West German access to a nuclear force within the context of controls offered by any multilateral nuclear sharing plan.

Is this prospect for a divided Germany, as Moscow insists, 'the normalization of the situation in Europe' that would dissipate tensions and achieve a stable détente? Or, sooner or later, is this precisely the

[9] See Jerzy Lukaszewski, 'Western Integration and the People's Democracies', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968, pp. 377–87.

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recipe for an explosion? At best, the road towards German reunification will be strewn with frustrations. Public opinion anywhere outside Germany displays little zeal for this cause. The ruling élite in East Germany will certainly not hasten its own demise by embracing free, all-German elections. And, most important, the Soviet Union has numerous incentives to keep its strategic stronghold in Central Europe. The GDR offers Moscow a potentially divisive issue and a lever of power that can be used to pry apart the members of the Atlantic Community, while serving as an outer bastion that might possibly contain the disintegration of its former empire in Eastern Europe. By constantly playing upon West German 'revanchism', Moscow can hope to alienate the Federal Republic from its allies in the West, while feeding the suspicions and fears of the smaller communist countries of Eastern Europe that must remain dependent upon the Soviet Union for protection. Beyond these considerations, of course, the Kremlin has a very considerable economic stake in perpetuating its control of the GDR, whose economy is of great importance to the Soviet Union and to the whole Soviet bloc.

The solution of the German problem, then, is not around the corner, and no one knows what the Germans themselves might ultimately become resigned to accept as a definition of reunification. One fact, however, is clear: reunification itself may be distant, but the issue of German reunification has become increasingly sensitive and important in German politics. In large measure this has been a function of de Gaulle. The West Germans had sought to find a respected place for themselves in the movements towards Western integration, both on an Atlantic and European scale. When these hopes were assaulted and frustrated by the French glorification of national egotism, the outlet for the creative energy and idealism, particularly among the youth, was increasingly turned from building supranational institutions in which West Germany would have found a place, to purely German national concerns. The prime national concern, namely reunification, is also unfortunately the most insoluble.

Both the Kremlin and de Gaulle approved of nationalism in Western Europe, except in the case of Germany. But can one bestir a selective awakening of nationalism? National intransigence and an unwillingness to accommodate narrow aims for the larger good cannot be confined to Gaullist France, which has by now provided all its neighbours with a nearly perfect model for chauvinistic behaviour. The extent to which Germans in pursuit of reunification will be caught up in this uncompromising spirit remains to be seen. This would, in any event, unleash dangerous forces, even if German reunification posited a goal that was within sight. But given the obstacles to reunification, the revival of German nationalism does not seem to have a tolerable outlet for its energies. Under these conditions it would be helpful to do anything that could soften the lines of demarcation between East

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and West Germany, or that could render both German societies more porous, so as to facilitate human contacts on a variety of levels. This, at least, would give a feeling of movement towards détente, and render a partitioned Germany more endurable, even though the basic issues of power remained unresolved.

The Soviet concept of détente, of course, would have precisely the opposite effect. Granting *de jure* recognition to two German states, plus West Berlin as a separate political entity, would only harden and intensify the present lines of division. Far from dissipating tension and encouraging a hopeful evolution toward détente in any real sense of the word, a Soviet 'détente' would legitimate the division of Germany and create a permanent condition of instability and strife in the heart of Europe. For Moscow this aspect of 'détente' is obviously a weapon of political warfare.

De Gaulle, too, has sought to manipulate the idea of détente for narrow political purposes. Similarly, on the key question of German reunification, it is likely that de Gaulle's view coincides in good measure with that of Moscow, despite the obvious differences in their public posture. Of necessity, de Gaulle must reject the Soviet demand for recognition of the GDR and display a continuing interest in German reunification, in order to gain the allegiance of Bonn as a junior client. He can afford this attitude so long as reunification is not a serious prospect. But should reunification somehow become possible, what would happen to the role de Gaulle has staked out for France, as the leading nation in Western Europe, and as one of the two great powers, along with the Soviet Union, in a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals? The Soviet Union, in this Gaullist scheme, would be cut down to size by being partitioned at the Urals. But how could France avoid being dwarfed by the combined skills and material resources of a united Germany, containing over half again as many people as France, and with an incomparably greater economic potential? It is certain that a united Germany would be the dominating economic giant of Western Europe, and it would be difficult to see how its political and military power could be restrained for long. The eventuality of German reunification could only puncture the Gaullist pretensions of French grandeur. Assurances to Bonn notwithstanding, de Gaulle cannot have much interest in German reunification.

The French and Soviet images of Europe with a divided Germany do, of course, differ in some fundamental ways. What the Soviet leaders would like to achieve is a reshaping of Europe in which the German problem would disappear. Ideally, the Germans would be held in a position from which they could never become a threat to anyone, by keeping them divided and putting both Germanies under some sort of demilitarized regime. And how would these discriminatory controls be policed? Who would be able to guarantee that this condition would persist? Obviously the role of policeman would fall upon Moscow, since the Soviet Union would be the only super-power left to exert

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influence upon a European security system. NATO, as we recall, would have been disbanded and American power would have been expelled from Europe. The very nature of such a Europe would inevitably extend Soviet influence far beyond Germany, The whole European continent would become part of a Soviet imperium.

What chance would this Soviet daydream of a European security system have of enduring, assuming that it somehow might be created? This plan would dispose of the fate of nearly 80 million Germans. If the lesson of Versailles teaches anything it is the utter futility of trying to impose a permanently discriminatory regime upon a numerous and resourceful people. The answer of those who have learned from Versailles, and were also disillusioned with nationalism, has been to incorporate German strength into the larger bodies of an integrated NATO and a supranational Europe on the basis of equal rights. Such broad and powerful Western institutions would not only furnish a safe haven for West German strength, but would also provide attractive bargaining agents, endowed with a united will that could conduct negotiations with the East, so as ultimately to bring East Germany into some more satisfactory arrangements with its West German countrymen. Both the Kremlin and de Gaulle have, of course, rejected this approach. Both have attacked NATO and the idea of a supranational Europe. We have already seen what effect West German discouragement with building a supranational Europe has had on German policy. But what effect would the dissolution of NATO have? The West German armed forces, the most powerful in existence among the European members of NATO, are completely integrated into the NATO command structure. The disbanding of NATO would necessarily cast these powerful forces in a purely national mould and require the creation of a German General Staff that would direct their use for nationally-conceived ends. With the accompanying evacuation of American troops from Europe, the West Germans would remain unchallenged as the dominant military power in Western Europe. Would not the Soviet leadership and de Gaulle, both of whom seek to control the development of German military power, find that the success of their attacks upon NATO would bring about precisely what they profess to abhor? Surely such thoughts must have crossed their minds, but there has been inadequate public recognition of the fact that either Moscow or Paris has seriously considered this consequence of dissolving NATO.

There has not, for that matter, been an excessive amount of critical analysis in the other European capitals of the proposal to disband military alliances in Europe and replace them with a 'European security system'. On the face of it this seems to be an alluring idea, and it has, in fact, aroused widespread interest and appeal. The Bucharest declaration of July 1966 held out the attractive prospect, for example, of calling 'a general European conference' on questions of European security that would lead to the creation 'of a system of collective

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security in Europe' by abolishing military blocs.[10] The difficulty with this general theoretical proposition lies not in the idea of collective security, but in how it should be implemented. Collective security, as an abstract principle, was incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter. It only became an effective force, however, when it was given embodiment in some specific alliance that was formed to counter a particular threat to peace. Nor, in the nuclear age, is it sufficient to say that everyone shares an interest in avoiding nuclear war, so that military alliances have become superfluous. 'The trouble', as one commentator has noted, 'is that this common interest in avoiding nuclear war can be made into a force for peace only by creating a situation in which any hostile act creates, or seems to create an unacceptable risk of escalation to nuclear war. This . . . is precisely the function of the Atlantic Alliance and its military dispositions, which the advocates of European collective security would dismantle. A collective security guarantee directed only against an unnamed "aggressor", and without the support of an American military presence, would not make peace in Europe more stable. Nor would it serve the cause of "world peace" or "reduction of tensions", which its advocates profess. On the contrary, it would weaken deterrence by weakening the seriousness of the guarantee and making the risk of nuclear escalation more doubtful.'[11]

MUTUAL nuclear deterrence has not only created a measure of stability, but following the terrifying experience of the Cuban missile crisis, it has given rise to an element of détente between the two nuclear super-powers. This aspect of Soviet détente policy has been conducted with little regard for Gaullist pretensions of grandeur, since it has been based on a realistic assessment of power. A global strategic relationship has therefore evolved on a largely bilateral basis between Moscow and Washington, leaving all of Europe, including Paris, on the sidelines. Here, it turns out, a bundle of misconceptions have attached themselves to the nature of the détente that the United States thought it had reached with the Soviet Union.

In the aftermath of the missile crisis President Kennedy called for a re-examination of the traditional attitudes of East-West hostility, which must be made subordinate to the common interest humanity shares in avoiding nuclear war. 'Both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race . . . Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved.'[12]

[10] Assembly, Western European Union, *Proceedings*, December 1966, vol. III, p. 141.
[11] Harold van B. Cleveland, *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals* (New York, 1966), p. 169.
[12] Address by President Kennedy at Washington D.C., 10 June 1963, *Bulletin*, Dept. of State, vol. XLIX, no. 1253, p. 4.

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To say that the United States and the Soviet Union 'have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace' implied that they shared common positive goals. This fed hopes for a far-reaching accommodation on the gamut of issues that divided East and West. Agreement on the test ban treaty, for example, touched off a wave of wishful thinking throughout the West, which in some places has since become permanent, about the presumed transformation in the Soviet regime and in Soviet aims.

The post-Stalinist leaders undeniably introduced significant changes in the style of life at home, while losing control of a once monolithic communist movement abroad. They have also explicitly recognized the dangers of nuclear war, and have therefore introduced a measure of caution into aspects of their foreign policy. Taken together these innovations have fostered the comfortable illusion that the Soviet Union has become just another nation-state manoeuvring amidst the anarchy of international politics, willing to accept political compromises as the price for a stable world order. The reality is somewhat harsher. The Stalinist tyranny has been modified, but Soviet political life remains conspiratorial in nature, with political power lodged in a self-perpetuating élite that continuously seeks to repress the expression of unapproved ideas and innovations bubbling up in Soviet society. The Soviet leaders are also convinced that they must remain true to the principles of communist internationalism, as they interpret those principles. At the root of these tenets is the belief in the irreconcilability of the communist and non-communist political systems and in the inevitable, though perhaps long-delayed demise of the non-communist world. For the West, the fact that there are now many communisms does not eliminate the communist challenge, but rather calls for a more differentiated and complicated response.

An accurate reading of experience with détente would reveal that two different processes have beeen going on simultaneously. There is mutual recognition of an interest in preventing nuclear war by seeking agreement upon measures of crisis management and arms control. This community of interest between the super-powers, however, is essentially negative; it has had little effect upon reaching agreement on common programmes of a positive nature for a political détente. Alongside the pursuit of overlapping negative interests in avoiding nuclear catastrophe, there has continued a very sharp and very real global power conflict between two adversaries that hold incompatible images of a desirable international order. Kennedy did, in fact, try to guard against undue conclusions being drawn from his détente efforts. 'A pause in the cold war', he warned, 'is not a lasting peace, and a détente does not equal disarmament. The United States must continue to seek a relaxation of tensions, but we have no cause to relax our vigilance.' As Kennedy properly pointed out, 'there are still major areas of tension and conflict, from Berlin to Cuba to Southeast Asia. The United States and the

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Soviet Union still have wholly different concepts of the world, its freedom, its future.' [13] These qualifications, however, tended to be drowned in the welling flood-tide of hopes that peace had finally broken out.

There was one illusion that the Kennedy administration itself apparently entertained about the nature of its détente with the Soviet Union. President Kennedy declared that both sides not only had a mutual interest in a just and genuine peace, but also that both sides were interested 'in halting the arms race'. The main point of the test ban treaty, in Kennedy's view, was that it represented a move towards his goal of stabilizing the international equilibrium of power. Kennedy looked upon the test ban, Schlesinger informs us, as an indication of 'a mutual willingness to halt the weapons race more or less where it was. In the Soviet case this meant acquiescence in American nuclear superiority. . . . The Russian willingness to accept such margins showed not only a post-Cuba confidence in American restraint, but a new understanding of the theories of stable nuclear deterrence.' [14] The United States doubtless wished to believe that détente meant stopping, or at least greatly slowing down, the arms race and reaching a stable deterrence based on American nuclear superiority. The only difficulty with this attractive prospect is that the Kremlin never accepted it.

THE Berlin crisis in the spring of 1961 had already dramatically raised the possibility of a nuclear conflict mushrooming from the confrontation of Soviet and American tanks at 'Checkpoint Charlie' on the sector border in Berlin. Here the Soviet advantage in ground troops was offset by the decisive superiority of American strategic weapons that could have been called upon if a local clash had escalated to nuclear proportions. Faced with this disparity of forces Professor Marshall Shulman speculated that 'in the forefront of the consciousness of the Soviet leaders . . . was the conviction that the strategic military superiority of the United States must be overcome as soon as possible.' In September 1961 the Kremlin began a series of nuclear weapons tests that continued through 1962, during which time efforts were apparently made to increase the meagre Soviet stockpile of ICBMs. 'The most daring effort to find a short-cut toward strategic parity was, of course, the abortive emplacement of medium and intermediate range missiles (of which the Soviet Union had an abundance) in Cuba. The targeting of the United States from Cuba would have enabled the Soviets to perform a strategic function, substituting for their deficiency in intercontinental missiles.' [15]

The withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba only reinforced the

[13] Address by President Kennedy at Orono, Maine, 19 October 1963, *ibid.*, vol. XLIX, no. 1271, p. 695.
[14] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (New York, 1967), p. 831.
[15] Marshall D. Shulman, 'Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect', *Journal of International Affairs*, no. 1, 1968, pp. 30–31.

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Kremlin's determination to attain strategic parity in ICBMs. As their production rate hit full stride, from October 1966 to October 1967, they more than doubled the operational Soviet ICBM force, turning out more than one new missile a day.[16] The concept of strategic parity is admittedly elusive, because of the variety of factors that must be weighed in the calculation. Both the Soviet and American land-based ICBM forces number more than 1,000 missiles, although the 700-plus medium-range nuclear missiles based in western Russia and Eastern Europe put all of Western Europe within range, and so serve in the capacity of strategic missiles. Conversely, many of the numerous tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe under the two-key system might be considered strategic missiles if they bring major Soviet military targets within range. The United States has held a considerable edge in sea-based ICBMs, although the vigorous Soviet submarine programme has been intended to narrow this margin.[17] American long-range nuclear bombers have also maintained a considerable superiority, which Moscow has sought to offset by other means.

The most significant aspect of American superiority lies in its head-start in developing multiple nuclear warheads that can be delivered by a single launcher. These are the so-called multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV). MIRV permits a single missile to carry a cluster of warheads that can separate in flight and then be guided individually to widely dispersed targets. American superiority in the number of its deliverable warheads is certain to be whittled down, since it is generally conceded that the Soviet Union has the capability to produce its own version of MIRV, given time. 'In terms of megatonnage, however', former Deputy Secretary of Defence Gilpatric reported in December 1967, 'the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal may already be on a par with or possibly ahead of that of the United States'.[18] The Soviet determination to keep pace with the strategic power of the United States has been reflected in different ways and with differently phased programmes, but the underlying deliberate and sustained challenge to the American position has been unmistakable.

The American development of MIRV was triggered by the need to penetrate Soviet missile defences, which, in turn, grew out of the Soviet initiative to start building an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). This represented a significant push upward in the spiralling nuclear arms race, which Washington had sought to slow down. A nuclear physicist, Dr Edward Teller, recounts the futility of attempting to dissuade the

[16] William Beecher, 'U.S. Sees Soviets Closing Gap on Strategic Missiles', *New York Times*, 19 February 1968. For further details and possible implications of the Soviet strategic missile build-up, see William R. Kintner, *Peace and The Strategy Conflict* (New York, 1967), Chapter V.

[17] John W. Finney, 'A Growing Threat from Russia's Submarines', *New York Times*, 21 April 1968, and the articles on rapid expansion of Soviet submarine capabilities by William Beecher, *ibid.*, 10 and 11 May 1968. See also, *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge*, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Special Report Series, no. 6 (Washington, 1967), pp. 46–49.

[18] Roswell L. Gilpatric, 'The Atomic Arms Race', *New York Times*, 3 December 1967.

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Russians from launching their ABM programme, so as to head off a costly new phase in nuclear arms, from which both sides would ultimately emerge with no more security than they had attained before. At an international scientific meeting in January 1966 a European colleague posed the question: 'An escalation by introducing missile defence will be disadvantageous to the Russians because America, with its greater potential, will necessarily win. Since this is so, why do the Russians develop these defences?' To this, an American who had been dealing with the ABM problem recalled: 'The question came up in the last three Pugwash meetings' (which are periodic high-level, private conferences between Western and Soviet scientists and other leading figures). 'Three meetings ago the question was posed to the Russians in this form, and the Russians said: We don't understand. Two meetings ago the question was repeated and the Russians said: We don't know anything about it. Last meeting the question was raised and the Russians said: Now it is too late.' [19] After it was apparent that a Soviet ABM system had been started, the United States reluctantly backed into a similar programme, claiming at first that a 'thin' American ABM system was designed to ward off threats of a Chinese communist nuclear strike, although obviously such a system would also be of some benefit in parrying a Soviet missile threat. In addition it could gradually be 'thickened' so as to become more credible as a defence against Soviet nuclear power.

Secretary of Defence McNamara's announcement on 18 September 1967 of the intention to build a 'thin' ABM system [20] was made with the hope of minimizing, if not abandoning, this project, if only agreement could be reached with the Kremlin about the futility of both sides constructing ballistic missile defences. McNamara's arguments had persuaded President Johnson to approach the Soviet leaders in December 1966 suggesting talks on limiting ABM systems. In March 1967 Moscow approved the idea in principle, adding that offensive missiles should also be included in these discussions—a provision that President Johnson promptly accepted. As time passed and the talks did not begin, McNamara seized upon the occasion of the Johnson-Kosygin summit conference at Glassboro in June 1967 to appeal directly to the

[19] Dr Edward Teller, 'Needed Now: Trans-Atlantic ABM Defense—and Union', *Freedom & Union*, November 1967, pp. 4–5. See also the testimony of Col. Thomas W. Wolfe, 7 November 1967, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.), pp. 66–67: 'During the period preceding Soviet decisions to embark on ABM deployment, the Soviet leadership was not visibly impressed by arguments widely raised in the West that "first deployment" of an ABM system was a step likely to destabilize the strategic environment and set off a new round in the arms race. Although Soviet delegates at various international meetings, including the Pugwash conferences, were frequently exposed to such arguments, no public discussion of the pros and cons of ABM deployment comparable to that in the West emerged in the Soviet Union.'

[20] Address by Robert S. McNamara at San Francisco, 18 September 1967, *Bulletin*, Dept. of State, vol. LVII, no. 1476, pp. 443–51.

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Soviet Premier to take action that could stop the dangerous and enormously costly missile race from getting out of hand.[21] The Soviet bureaucratic machine ground exceedingly slowly, but finally at the end of June 1968 Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly indicated that the Soviet government was prepared to enter into discussions with the United States on the limitation of offensive and defensive missile systems.[22] President Johnson responded on 1 July, at the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, by declaring a willingness to commence 'in the nearest future' Soviet-American discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive missiles.[23]

PRESIDENT Johnson hailed the agreement to talk about missile limitations as another significant contribution to a growing pattern of Soviet-American understanding that could have far-reaching political implications. Just before this announcement, he had returned to Glassboro to dramatize the importance he attached to his meeting with Kosygin of the previous year. He pointed with pride to various commitments recently undertaken or that were about to be concluded: the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in outer space, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, an astronaut rescue agreement, a Soviet-American consular convention, a Soviet-American civil air agreement, as well as a renewal of the Soviet-American cultural exchange agreement. 'We believe genuinely', the President said, 'that every one of those steps is a step toward peace'. He noted that areas of disagreement lingered on, 'but in the last year we have made some progress. We have proved that we can agree, can agree in part, on some occasions at least on some issues. We have proved that our two countries can behave as responsible members of the family of nations.' Still addressing his Glassboro audience, Johnson exuded optimism: 'I believe that the two great powers who met here . . . last year have begun—however haltingly—to bridge the gulf that has separated them for quarter of a century.'

This appraisal of the détente process went far beyond the negative community of interest that both states had recognized in their efforts to avoid nuclear war through crisis management and arms control measures. It staked out the hope for agreement on positive programmes that would result in a political rapprochement between the superpowers. 'There are many other fields in which we should begin to build new programmes of co-operation.' Johnson specifically suggested as points of departure: Joint ventures in an international biological programme on the human environment, joint participation in a global satellite communications system, co-operation in exploring natural resources on the ocean floor and in the great rain forests of the tropics,

[21] Information supplied by the late Assistant Secretary of Defence, John McNaughton, to Robert Kleiman, as reported by Kleiman, *New York Times' Book Review*, 8 September 1968, in his review of McNamara's book, *The Essence of Security*.

[22] Address by Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, *Pravda*, 28 June 1968.

[23] Remarks by President Johnson at the signing of the non-proliferation treaty, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1968, *Bulletin*, Dept. of State, vol. LIX, no. 1517, p. 86.

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as well as extending the existing Soviet-American co-operative efforts in the Antarctic to the Arctic.[24] In short, the super-powers should collaborate wherever possible for the benefit of all mankind. This vision of the future assumed that both powers would share a fund of common values and hold a common interest in promoting world order.

The plea for extensive East-West co-operation found an unexpected response from a highly unofficial source in Moscow. The prominent Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov, had privately circulated a bold essay on the urgent need for Soviet-American collaboration, and in July 1968 managed to have its text smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published in the United States. All issues, he insisted, must be judged from the perspective of how mankind can preserve its civilization, which is imperilled by nuclear war arising from nationalism, racism, militarism and intolerant ideologies. Man is also threatened by overpopulation and catastrophic hunger, as well as by environmental pollution that will have unforeseeable consequences for the conditions of life on our planet. Man's creative thought everywhere must be mobilized for the mastery of these immense common challenges, and every impediment to such thought must be eliminated. The world can no longer afford 'stupefaction from the narcotic of "mass culture" and bureaucratized dogmatism, nor a spreading of mass myths that put entire peoples and continents under the power of cruel and treacherous demagogues'. Therefore, 'any action increasing the division of mankind, and preaching the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness and a crime. Only universal co-operation under conditions of intellectual freedom . . . will preserve civilization.' Sakharov called for an 'ever increasing coexistence and collaboration between the two systems and the two super-powers' that would result in their convergence upon the principles of democratic socialism, and by the year 2000 lead to the creation of a world government. While this would require important modifications in American society, they would be minor compared to Sakharov's forthright demand for the total extirpation of the Stalinist legacy in the Soviet Union. Writing with an extraordinary display of personal courage, he pictured the demise of the dictatorship of the Party, and its replacement by a pluralistic democracy.[25]

[24] Address by President Johnson at Glassboro, New Jersey, 4 June 1968, *ibid.*, vol. LVIII, no. 1513, pp. 813–17. President Johnson made a number of statements at this time in which he read general political implications into limited agreements. For example, on the consular convention: 'We can hope that this treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States will be a sign for the future. It could help to establish a pattern of progress: in disarmament, in space, in science, in the arts, and—I hope—ultimately in a broadening area of politics' (White House Press Release on the Occasion of the Ratification of the Soviet-American Consular Convention, 13 June 1968, *ibid.*, vol. LIX, no. 1515, p. 40). On the non-proliferation treaty: 'I consider this treaty to be the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began. . . . There is hope that treaty will mark the beginning of a new phase in the quest for order and moderation in international affairs' (The President's Message to the Senate of the United States, 9 July 1968, *ibid.*, vol. LIX, no. 1518, pp. 126–27).

[25] A. D. Sakharov, 'Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom', *New York Times*, 22 July 1968.

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The Soviet leadership responded promptly to this threat to its existence. Though not mentioning Sakharov by name, his arguments were taken up and answered one by one. An *Izvestia* article on the issues facing the world during the remainder of the twentieth century attributed the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind exclusively to the forces of Western imperialism. Overpopulation and hunger could only be conquered when the people of the underdeveloped world followed the example of the Soviet Union and adopted its social and political system. Conservation and renewal of natural resources on a global scale would have to be based on 'a scientifically planned regulation of resource extraction and production throughout the world. All this requires changes in the social climate of the entire non-socialist part of the world.' As for the increasing convergence of the super-powers, *Izvestia* reaffirmed that 'socialism and capitalism, the two fundamentally different world systems, are developing in diametrically opposed directions. . . . The struggle between two basic tendencies, two opposing world forces—capitalism and socialism—permeates the course of history in the last third of the century.' Sakharov's vision of a world government by the year 2000 was therefore totally rejected. Instead, the 'revolutionary currents, whose guiding force is found in the socialist countries, led by Marxist-Leninist parties, comprise the mighty power that will bring all countries into the orbit of socialism and open the way for harmonious socialist action on a global scale'.[26] As if to dramatize the determination of the Kremlin to brook no challenge to the Party's monopoly of power, or to efforts to subvert or compromise its ideology, this pronouncement was followed 10 days later by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

SINCE the democratization programme in Czechoslovakia was seeking to lift the heavy hand of Party controls over broad areas of life, the invasion forced many people to reconsider their easy assumptions about the willingness of the Soviet regime to move in the direction of a pluralistic, liberal democracy. Such a move, as Sakharov rightly understood, was a necessary precondition for broadly-based Soviet-American collaboration on programmes of positive political content that might save mankind from disaster.

The shock of the Soviet invasion even placed in jeopardy the delicate arrangements that had so laboriously been pieced together on issues relating to the negative community of interest that the super-powers had evolved in trying to avoid nuclear war. The United States did not promptly ratify the non-proliferation treaty, since the Senate found agreements with the Soviet Union on matters involving forebearance in the use of force inappropriate at such a moment. Meanwhile, the major non-nuclear states that had in any case disliked the treaty, also

[26] Viktor A. Cheprakov, 'Problems of the Last Third of the Century', *Izvestia*, 11 August 1968.

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temporarily found an excuse to delay action. Remaining hesitation about building an American ABM system was gravely weakened, and there was little reluctance on the part of the United States to pursue testing of its MIRV missiles. The opening of Soviet-American talks on limiting offensive and defensive missiles was scheduled to be announced on 21 August, but the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia, begun the preceding night, caused its postponement. Along with this, plans for another Johnson-Kosygin summit conference fell through.

Soon thereafter Foreign Minister Gromyko defended Soviet action in Czechoslovakia before the United Nations, and at the same time renewed the Soviet offer to talk about the limitation of missiles. Secretary of State Rusk, however, struck a different note in his address to the United Nations General Assembly: 'Let us say very plainly to the Soviet Union: The road to détente is the road to the Charter', which had been so callously ignored by the massive Soviet armed intervention.[27] Thus the normal technical obstacles in the way of arms control arrangements were compounded by a renewed crisis of confidence, which demonstrated how far apart the super-powers remained on fundamental political issues. The reunification of Germany, for example, hardly seemed any closer.

Even given a favourable political climate, the technical obstacles to an effective regime of limiting missile systems would be formidable. Technological innovations, such as missiles with multiple warheads, makes on-site inspections imperative. Unless one is actually allowed to go around and open missile nose cones so as to count the number of warheads they contain, the count of missile sites by satellite reconnaissance becomes misleading and meaningless. Even the United States would probably resist this kind of inspection, yet it is perfectly apparent from all past Soviet behaviour that the Kremlin would never allow this type of intrusion into its closed society. Moreover, restrictions on research and development of all kinds of missiles would be even more difficult to monitor. The cruel fact, then, is that while missile talks may proceed, one should not raise false hopes about concrete, enforceable results.

Each side has inexorably continued to play out its part like actors caught in a Greek tragedy, despite mutual professions that both should strive for a détente that would place restraints upon their nuclear weaponry. Thus détente, even when reduced to its strictly negative aspect of trying to avoid nuclear catastrophe, has proved to be of an extremely fragile nature. Attempted arms control arrangements have always been in danger of being overturned by the dynamics of tech-

[27] Address by Dean Rusk to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 2 October 1968, *Bulletin*, Dept. of State, vol. LIX, no. 1530, p. 407. Gromyko addressed the same body on 3 October 1968 (*Pravda*, 4 October 1968). Rusk reportedly told the Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, on 25 November just before his departure for consultations in Moscow, that the United States was willing to reopen missile talks (Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*, 7 December 1968). However, the Kremlin by then preferred to wait for the incoming Nixon administration.

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nological breakthroughs in nuclear weapons development. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by efforts to ban nuclear weapons from outer space.

In October 1963, soon after the signing of the partial test ban treaty, American and Soviet representatives vigorously supported a United Nations resolution that called on all states to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. This principle was elaborated in a treaty regulating the use of outer space, signed in January 1967, again with Soviet and American sponsorship and adherence.

While the treaty represented an effort to control competition in arms between the super-powers, its restricted scope could not offer the basis for extravagant hopes. Article 4 did not prohibit deployment in space of weapons not capable of mass destruction, such as anti-satellite or anti-missile weapons that did not contain nuclear warheads, nor did it ban military support activities in space, such as command and control stations, manned orbiting laboratories, weather modifying devices and the like. Finally, it did not restrict the testing or use of nuclear missiles that would pass through space en route to their targets, so long as these missiles were not placed in full orbit.

At the moment the treaty was signed, American intelligence discovered that the Soviet Union was testing a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons with a trajectory that took it into outer space, from where it was targeted, before striking the earth. This fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) provided a shorter flight time for its nuclear missiles than an ICBM, and therefore made defence against it more difficult. At the end of 1967 the United States revealed the development of its counterpart weapon, which Defence Department director of research, Dr John S. Foster, Jr, called a ' space bus '. Like the Soviet FOBS it travelled a partial orbit in space. However, it could carry a number of individually manoeuvrable nuclear warheads that could be separated and dropped off, target by target as it re-entered the earth's atmosphere and passed over enemy territory. Again, technically this did not violate the space treaty, since it did not go into full orbit, yet the refreshing candour that prompted it to be called a space bus clearly indicated that this type of nuclear missile was considered a space weapon.

The last shred of credibility for an effective space treaty had been worn thin before the treaty was even written. As early as May 1965 the Russians had displayed a large three-stage rocket which they claimed would be a multiple orbital bombardment system (MOBS) that would permit a nuclear warhead to be placed in repeated, full orbit for prolonged periods, before being recalled to earth. In deference to the space treaty, the Soviet government has maintained that this global rocket has not been tested, although Washington has reported monitoring secret flight tests of Soviet rockets that could be used to guide nuclear weapons down from full orbit. In any event, a MOBS

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capability would simply be an extension of the tested FOBS, as well as the techniques already mastered in the numerous Soviet manned and unmanned orbital systems. The same logic would apply, of course, to the United States.[28] Therefore it must surely tax the imagination to believe that détente between the super-powers has been extended to effective restraints on the use of nuclear weapons in space.

Outer space may also become a crucial environment for missile defence systems. Both Soviet and American scientists have verified that the 'hot X-ray effect', resulting from high-yield nuclear explosions in outer space, promises to provide defence over a wide area against offensive ballistic missiles. An ABM system using X-rays in outer space could vaporize elements of enemy missile warheads and render them harmless, simply by an explosion in the general area of the approaching missiles. Since direct or even near direct hits are not required for destruction, the Soviet deployment of this type of an ABM system could go a long way to offset the American advantage in missiles with multiple warheads. If MIRV were deprived of its assured destruction capability in this manner, the Soviet Union might achieve effective parity in nuclear weapons.[29]

IT is unpleasant, but important, to examine realistically the narrow limits within which détente has been able to operate, and to acknowledge the ease with which this limited understanding might be shattered. To be sure it is comforting to engage in complacent self-deception about the depth and extent of the détente reached between the super-powers. This is especially so among Europeans who are largely condemned to the role of spectators, and whose feeling of impotence is easily rationalized in terms of reduced defence efforts. Their natural resentment against overwhelming American power also gives rise to ready criticism of American policies and a tendency to retreat towards neutralism, while expecting at the same time that the United States can ultimately be relied upon to maintain an effective deterrent against a growing Soviet strategic force. Thus emotions are frequently mixed and perceptions are easily blurred.

The hard facts would show that the missile crisis of October 1962 was a landmark of sorts, but not the kind that it is often thought to be. While it caused Moscow to back down in a nuclear confrontation with the United States, it also demonstrated that the Soviet leaders were prepared to gamble for high stakes, even from a position of nuclear

[28] Evert Clark reports both the Soviet and American nuclear space weapons, *New York Times*, 26 December 1967, 2 April 1968, 25 April 1968. See also *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge*, pp. 52–53, 86, and Institute for Strategic Services, *The Military Balance, 1968–1969* (London, 1968), p. 5.

[29] *The Soviet Military Technological Challenge*, pp. 63–67. Somewhat farther in the future, but still within present Soviet and American capabilities, is the use of outer space for an ABM system than can track offensive missiles upon launching, and then intercept and destroy them during their boost phase by means of a ballistic missile sent from outer space (*ibid.*, pp. 66–67).

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inferiority. One of the principal consequences of the Cuban showdown was the Soviet decision to remedy this condition of strategic inferiority by greatly increasing their ICBM force. With it went a continuing willingness to contemplate military risks for political gains, this time from a greatly strengthened strategic posture. One might logically object that the very concepts of inferiority or superiority in nuclear weapons are meaningless, since both the United States and the Soviet Union have already acquired an enormous overkill capability. Politics, it would seem, has been largely impervious to such logic, while each side continues to shape its respective policies from the perception it has of its strategic relationship to the other.

The most likely impact of a larger and more versatile Soviet nuclear arsenal would be to widen the range of political conflicts with the West. In the judgment of the strategic analyst, Thomas W. Wolfe, the Kremlin will be tempted 'to test the new strategic relationship, seeking such political gains as the traffic might bear. This in itself may be no more than a repetition of past Soviet performance. But operating from a more favourable correlation of forces, the Soviet leaders would probably attempt to reopen various stalemated issues and to seek fresh advances in the Third World, thus introducing new elements of turbulence into international relations.' [30] The Soviet drive for nuclear parity, therefore, will not likely enhance détente and the reasonable settlement of conflicts. 'In past Soviet probings', Senator Henry Jackson recalls, 'the strategic inferiority of Soviet power has set limits to the extent of the risks that Moscow was willing to run. It is disquieting to contemplate the risks the Kremlin might consider taking in the future if it was confident of being closer to an equality or a superiority of overall deterrent strength, and also possessed a local superiority of forces.' [31]

THE Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 illustrates the scope of risks contained in the Soviet concept of détente. From the beginning of the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities, Moscow openly aligned itself with the most adventuristic firebrands in the Arab world. The Soviet leaders were not only willing to furnish enormous quantities of very sophisticated arms, but also to give almost unqualified and uncritical political and diplomatic support to an Arab cause that was openly in favour of an armed attack. On 8 February 1967, Syrian President Al-Atassi, for example, announced over Damascus Radio that 'we are preparing ourselves for a popular war of liberation. . . . The Palestine problem will not be solved except in the heart of the occupied territory itself.' Or again on 23 February he broadcast: 'We command that a transfer be made from positions of defence to positions of attack

[30] Wolfe, *Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, p. 73. See also the testimony of Professor Philip E. Mosely, who comes to the same conclusion, *ibid.*, pp. 52–63.
[31] Address by Senator Henry M. Jackson at Chicago, 24 March 1968, p. 3 (mimeo).

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so as to be able to enter upon a battle to liberate the occupied territory.'[32] The radical leftist, pro-Soviet Baathist regime that seized power in Syria at the beginning of 1966 represented a most important political foothold for the Soviet Union in the Middle East. 'The Soviets', Professor Bernard Lewis observed, 'had invested a good deal of time, effort and money in the left-wing Baathist government and had achieved a closer relationship with it than with any other government not under Communist control'.[33]

Soviet inflammatory propaganda was also aimed at improving Nasser's image, while inciting Arab passions. Doubtless in an effort to offset the numerous pieces of evidence that had accumulated concerning the Egyptian use of poison gas in its intervention in the civil war in Yemen, Moscow Radio (in Arabic on 16 April) accused Israel of preparing to use poison gas against the Arabs, with the assistance of the West German chemical trust I.G. Farben.[34]

Events started rolling inexorably towards armed conflict with the rumour that circulated in the Arab world, reported in *Izvestia* on 17 May, about 'the concentration of large contingents of Israeli troops on the Syrian and Lebanese borders'.[35] On the following day U Thant acceded to Nasser's request to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force that had been policing the Israeli-UAR armistice line. This permitted Nasser, who had also been threatening Israel with annihilation, to draw up his forces, which were likewise massively equipped with the latest Soviet weapons, into a direct confrontation with Israel. On 19 May *Izvestia* quoted at length the Cairo paper *Al Ahram*, which again laid the blame for the deterioration of the situation at Israel's door, because of 'the concentration of Israeli armed forces on the Syrian border'.[36]

By 22 May Nasser announced that he had mined the Strait of Tiran and closed the Gulf of Aqaba. Apparently feeling that the Arabs had outmanoeuvred and successfully bottled up Israel, the Kremlin rejected a call for a meeting of the UN Security Council which had been urgently requested on the evening of 23 May by Canada and Denmark. When the Security Council did convene, Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko employed a variety of tactics up to the outbreak of hostilities which were designed to prevent serious discussion of the issues. Moscow also rebuffed all attempts to convene a meeting with the United States, Britain and France, or hold private consultations with other powers, for the purpose of trying to head off war in the Middle East.

Soviet encouragement had meanwhile been feeding the ambitions of the Arabs. Writing in the Soviet military paper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*,

[32] Quoted in 'The USSR and the Middle East War', *Jews in Eastern Europe*, November 1967, p. 18.
[33] Bernard Lewis, 'The Arab-Israeli War: The Consequences of Defeat', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968, p. 323.
[34] 'The USSR and the Middle East War', *op. cit.* p. 22.
[35] *Ibid.* p. 30.
[36] *Ibid.* p. 33.

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on 18 May, Colonel O. Ivanov remarked that 'Syria has reliable friends who will not leave her in need',[37] while an official Soviet government statement released on 23 May, casting Israel as always in the role of aggressor, warned: 'Let no one have any doubts about the fact that should anyone try to unleash aggression in the Middle East, he would be met not only by the united strength of the Arab countries, but also by the strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states.'[38]

On 25 May the State Department transmitted President Johnson's request to the UAR and Israel not to resort to force. The next day President Johnson sent an appeal to Premier Kosygin, which sought to enlist Soviet co-operation in restraining Nasser.[39] The imminence of war and its possible widespread consequences momentarily seemed to introduce a note of caution in the Soviet attitude. Early in the morning of 27 May the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo visited Nasser for the purpose of requesting that he should 'not be the first to open fire', while simultaneously the Soviet Ambassador to Israel presented Prime Minister Eshkol with a note from Kosygin that warned of 'a tremendous error if arms began talking'.[40] The effect of this brief flirtation with restraint was largely dissipated when the UAR Minister of Defence, Shams ed Din Badrin, returned from Moscow on 28 May with a message from Kosygin, promising 'that the Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any country to intervene, so that the state of affairs prevailing before 1956 may be restored'.[41] Similarly, on the very eve of war, *Pravda* (3 June) prominently called the roll of countries that would give full support to the Arab cause, with a list headed by the Soviet Union.

Thus, despite a few signs of hesitation, the general tenor of Soviet behaviour during this period did not serve to moderate Arab extremism that was bent on war. In fact what is essentially noteworthy in this chain of events is the artificial Soviet incitement to war of an already highly volatile Arab movement. The original pretext for the Arab military moves that ultimately led to war was the alleged massing of Israeli forces on the Syrian frontier. In reviewing the evidence about this charge, two facts become apparent: (1) Moscow was directly involved in instigating this report, and (2) the report itself was false. It is instructive, for example, that the Soviet Ambassador to Israel delivered a strong protest against these alleged troop movements, and yet adamantly refused the invitation of the Israeli government to investigate this accusation for himself at first hand. As Professor Lewis notes, 'the troop concentration, as is clear from reports of the UN truce observers,

[37] *Ibid.* p. 30.
[38] *Pravda*, 24 May 1967.
[39] Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics* (New York, 1968), p. 89.
[40] *Ibid.* pp. 91–92, 100, 236, 240. On the highly controversial question of what it meant not to fire the 'first shot', see *ibid.* pp. 92–93, 101–3, 132–33.
[41] *Ibid.* p. 100.

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never took place'.[42] Somewhat more colourfully, James Reston called this 'the biggest fish story since Jonah and the whale'.[43] After the war it was even revealed that the falsity of this charge was known by Nasser, who had nevertheless made use of it to justify his own military action. In the course of the trials of the senior Egyptian military officials whom Nasser sought to make scapegoats for his defeat, the by then former Defence Minister Badran reported to a military court that the UAR Chief of Staff, General Mohammed Fawzi, was sent to Syria to investigate the Soviet contention about the Israeli troop build-up. According to Egyptian radio and press reports of the trial, Badran reported that General Fawzi had found the Russian and Syrian accusations baseless and had asserted that the Russians 'must have been having hallucinations'.[44] 'The conclusion', in Professor Lewis's measured phrase, 'is inescapable that the Soviet government, for reasons of its own, either planned or connived at the launching of what became a new and dangerous crisis in Israeli-Arab relations'.[45] It may be, as he suggests, that the immediate Soviet aim was to bolster its client Syrian regime from collapsing, but the wider implications of the predominantly reckless Soviet behaviour pattern cannot be ignored. The Kremlin surely helped to precipitate a war which, according to the Arab script, would have ended with the extinction of Israel.

At the outbreak of hostilities there were, however, two unknown factors: what Israel would be able to do, and what would be the attitude of the United States. The whole world, perhaps including Israel, was surprised by the dimension and speed of the Israeli victory. The brief interval of fighting also reduced the opportunities for great-power intervention. Yet the issue did arise. Moscow and Washington made frequent use of the 'hot line' in order to sound out each other's intentions regarding their own direct participation in the Middle East conflict, which both wished to avoid. Many Arab leaders, who had come to expect direct Soviet assistance in battle, cried betrayal when it did not come. Yet Moscow understood clearly the consequences of such an act. As Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon later commented, 'the word of President Johnson in the six-day war played a historic role by warning the Soviet Union that her military intervention would cause a global confrontation'.[46] The limits of Soviet bellicosity were therefore set within the framework of a super-power stand-off, in which each side effectively countered the direct intervention of the other.

Although not generally recognized, the June war was potentially as explosive as the Cuban missile crisis. As in the case of Cuba the

[42] Lewis, 'The Arab-Israeli War', *op. cit.* p. 323.
[43] James Reston, *New York Times*, 23 June 1967.
[44] Hendrik Smith, *ibid.*, 3 March 1968. See also 'The USSR and the Middle East War', *op. cit.* p. 64.
[45] Lewis, 'The Arab-Israeli War', *op. cit.* p. 323.
[46] Remarks by Deputy Premier Yigal Allon to the Knesset, quoted in the Jerusalem dispatch of James Feron, *New York Times*, 31 October 1968.

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original Kremlin intervention was not motivated by a search for a peaceful accommodation of political differences. Indeed, in the Middle East crisis Moscow actively provoked conflict that led directly to war. In both cases, however, while the Soviet willingness to assume risks was high it was not so high that it involved the prospect of a nuclear exchange with the United States. It is within the confines of these limits of risk that the Soviet understanding of détente emerges.

Again, as after Cuba, the fright of a super-power showdown stimulated co-operative measures. Just as the aftermath of Cuba produced the partial test ban treaty, so the most positive result of the Glassboro meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin was the renewed effort to move jointly toward the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This entirely accorded with the Soviet concept of détente. Militarily, it was aimed at reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. Politically, it called for no sacrifices on the part of the Soviet Union, while the treaty's discriminatory character stirred up bitter controversy in the non-communist world, especially between the United States and some of its principal European allies.

SOVIET involvement in the June war of 1967 and its interest in a super-power détente must be viewed against the background of Soviet foreign policy during the preceding dozen years. In July 1955 Premier Bulganin met with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden and Premier Edgar Faure in Geneva, with the aim of solving the problems of German reunification and European security. The heads of government agreed upon a vaguely worded directive to their foreign ministers, who were instructed to pursue the resolution of these issues with detailed proposals. At the time the word 'détente' was not yet fashionable, but a widely-heralded 'spirit of Geneva' was said to have been born, symbolizing a relaxation of political tension among the great powers. This spirit, as it turned out, was rather short-lived, for when the foreign ministers convened in Geneva in October and November it became apparent that the Soviet and Western positions were totally irreconcilable. The stalemate that ensued faithfully reflected the East-West stand-off in Europe, a stand-off which substantially remains intact. Khrushchev's failure to dislodge the Western powers from Berlin during 1958–1961 only served to confirm the frozen nature of the European confrontation. The success of the West in holding the line in Europe must be attributed to the continued functioning of NATO, which de Gaulle's defection in 1966 failed to destroy.

It was precisely during the period marked by the 'spirit of Geneva' that the Kremlin began its campaign to outflank NATO in the south, by a policy of active penetration of the Middle East and the whole Mediterranean basin. Falling precisely between the two Geneva conferences of 1955 was the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of September 1955. As Walter Laquer recalls, it 'was regarded at the time as the great turning point in the Middle East, the end of one era and the beginning of another.

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There is no need to revise that view in retrospect; the arms deal was, indeed, the great divide.'[47] The significance of this move was not, of course, simply the introduction of communist bloc arms, but of the Soviet political influence that went with them. Nasser's violently anti-Western 'neutralism' was promptly given great impetus during the Suez débâcle of 1956, in which, again, Moscow's position was enormously enhanced. A second significant influx of Soviet arms began flowing to the Middle East following the Cairo summit conference of Arab leaders in 1964, where a specific programme for the destruction of Israel was laid out.

Meanwhile the Soviet navy began taking an active interest in the Mediterranean. In 1963 the chief Soviet naval spokesman, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, provided the theoretical justification for this move by endowing the Soviet navy with a clearly offensive role that required its operation in the oceans throughout the world.[48] Ambassador Harlan Cleveland reported that 'between 1963 and 1966 the Soviet Mediterranean forces increased tenfold', while 'Soviet operating days in the Mediterranean during the first six months of 1967 were 400 per cent greater than the comparable figure for all of 1963'. Over the same period, Soviet submarine operating days in the Mediterranean increased by 2,000 per cent.[49] Following the June war the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean became even greater. Between May and August 1967 Soviet warships, submarines and supply vessels more than doubled in number, and the former policy of sending individual warships and submarines through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean on short visits was transformed into maintaining a permanent full-scale naval presence there. The Soviet fleet made regular use of the two major Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Port Said and the Syrian port of Latakia. At the western end of the Mediterranean the premature French withdrawal from the superbly equipped naval installation at Mers-el-Kebir, situated only 260 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar, put this strategic base at the disposal of the militant government of Algeria.[50] The extent to which Algeria has, in turn, put Mers-el-Kebir at the disposal of the Soviet fleet is not entirely clear.[51]

[47] Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (New York, 1959), p. 211.

[48] Admiral Sir John Hamilton, 'The Military Importance of the Mediterranean', *NATO Letter*, July–August 1967, p. 24.

[49] Ambassador Harland Cleveland, 'The Transformation of NATO', *ibid.*, November 1967, p. 5.

[50] 'Defense of the Mediterranean and the NATO Southern Flank', Frans Goedhart, rapporteur, Document 431, Assembly, Western European Union, *Proceedings*, December 1967, vol. III, pp. 204–29.

[51] Admiral Robert L. Dennison noted in May 1968 that 'the Soviets are making Mers-el-Kebir, the great former French naval base in Algeria, a port of call (*Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1968, p. 286). On the basis of a tour of the Arab states, Drew Middleton reported that 'the Soviet Union, in a move that underlies its strengthened strategic role in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world, has arranged to post technicians in Mers-el-Kebir. . . . The establishment of this westernmost Soviet military outpost was disclosed at the highest level of the Moroccan government and confirmed by United States officials' (*New York Times*,

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Though the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla has not achieved anything approaching parity with the US sixth fleet, Moscow has made formal demands for the Americans, in effect, to leave the Mediterranean to the Russians. Even before the June war Brezhnev posed the question at the Karlovy Vary conference in April 1967: 'what are the grounds, twenty years after the end of World War II, for the US Sixth fleet to cruise the Mediterranean and to use military bases, ports, and supply bases in a number of Mediterranean countries? . . . The time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the US Sixth fleet from the Mediterranean.'[52] Ever since the June war this demand has been insistently repeated.

The Arab defeat in the June war only deepened the dependence of the radical Arab leadership upon the Soviet Union, both in order to replace their enormous loss of arms and as a source of diplomatic support wherever the Arab cause is argued.

The Soviet-Arab partnership, to be sure, is an uneasy one. Nasser, for example, has not only become totally dependent upon Soviet military equipment and spare parts but following the June war he accepted several thousand additional Soviet military instructors and advisers. Moscow doubtless has not forgotten the precedent of its experience in supplying arms to the Loyalist cause in Spain in 1936-1938, when the political price was the creation of a cadre of communist political commissars, whose influence in the Loyalist army and government was out of all proportion to their small numbers. Nasser, too, is undoubtedly aware of this, and will seek to resist the subversion of his hold on power. On the other hand, he and other Arab leaders may wish to call upon Soviet support in some future crisis. In this event Moscow would not only have its agents on the ground, but would have at its disposal Soviet naval units that represent a flexible capability. These include helicopter assault carriers and amphibious landing craft, which could be used for a military intervention at short notice.[53] Thus while Moscow has not reduced its client Arab states to satellites, it has the ability to ensure that pro-Soviet governments could emerge from future Middle East political turmoil. The story of the Soviet-Arab relationship obviously has not yet been played out.

One fact, however, is evident: A new front in the Soviet-Western confrontation has been opened up in the whole Mediterranean basin. The exception to this is the position of Gaullist France, which, having abandoned NATO, can no longer be counted diplomatically as part

16 July 1968). Henry Tanner, reporting from Algiers, said that Western diplomats in Algeria did not believe that Mers-el-Kebir was being turned over to the Soviet Union. He confirmed, however, that 'a handful of Soviet instructors serving with the Algerian Navy moved into the base with the Algerian naval units to which they were attached' (*ibid.*, 22 December 1968).

[52] Speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev before the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, Karlovy Vary, 24 April 1967, in the *Soviet View of NATO*, p. 10.

[53] *New York Times*, 25 February 1968.

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of the West. De Gaulle, acting upon his policy of 'free hands', accepted the Arab-Soviet explanation for the June war in an effort to prevent the United States from emerging in a relatively stronger global position, as a result of the defeat of the Soviet-sponsored Arab states.[54] As the Dutch parliamentarian, Frans Goedhart, pointedly remarked: 'General de Gaulle took sides with the Arabs, Tito, and Moscow in stating that Israel was the aggressor. . . . I assume that this statement was a practical application of the Gaullist political principle of "détente, entente et coopération" with the East.'[55] De Gaulle also hoped that France might fill some of the power vacuums left in this area by the departure or expulsion of the other Western powers. In respect of the Middle East, both the Soviet and Gaullist policies of détente shared expansionist aims, each implemented in its own fashion.

THE extension of Soviet power has coincided with the radical scaling down or total disappearance of a British military presence in a wide arc extending from Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean to bases around the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean to Malaysia and Singapore in South-East Asia. Severe pressure on the pound forced London to accelerate its withdrawal East of Suez, so that by the end of 1971 it only plans for garrisons in Hong Kong and in a few minor dependencies outside Europe. Among the military and political positions left exposed, some are of considerable strategic importance, such as Aden, which as part of the People's Republic of South Yemen achieved independence on 30 November 1967. Although Britain had promised limited civil and military aid for at least six months thereafter, the end of the British military presence in Aden was at hand. Aden would appear to be the natural focus for projecting Soviet naval power, so that, perhaps in league with Nasser, Moscow could then command both ends of the Red Sea and push outward to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The likelihood of the Kremlin seeking to fill these vacuums is increased by the unlikely prospect that the United States will provide security guarantees for any of these areas. Once extricated from Vietnam Washington might be expected to be wary of fresh undertakings involving far-flung troop commitments abroad.

What the Kremlin will do depends upon the intentions of the Soviet leadership as they are revealed over time. What the Kremlin can do, however, is already clear from the direction of the development of Soviet military capabilities. Beginning in the Khrushchev era and continuing at a rapid pace ever since, the Kremlin has significantly extended the reach of its conventional military power by investing in long-range airlift transport, in addition to the helicopter carriers, amphibious landing vessels and the overall expansion of the Soviet navy. The effect

[54] Marc Ullman, 'De Gaulle's Secret Diplomacy', *Interplay*, August–September 1967 pp. 38–41.

[55] Assembly, Western European Union, *Proceedings*, December 1967, vol. IV, p. 50.

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of these measures, a military expert notes, is 'to improve the maritime-air-logistic elements of power needed to project Soviet military influence into distant areas without having to invoke the threat of immediate nuclear holocaust. . . . At the very least, the Soviet leadership is providing itself with wider options for global intervention than it has hitherto possessed.' [56]

It is inherently impossible to provide an accurate reading of Soviet intentions simply by assessing their capabilities at any given moment, since there are so many variables involved. A variety of factors must always be considered, such as the personal relationship among the Soviet leaders at the summit of power within the Kremlin, their need to establish priorities between solving domestic problems and undertaking foreign adventures, their need to assert leadership within the world communist movement by supporting foreign commitments that involve risk, their judgment of the risks involved, which, in turn, rest on assumptions concerning the anticipated response of their opponents, both in the communist and non-communist worlds, their assessment of how events, once set in motion, can be prevented from getting out of control, etc. Despite these qualifications, several fundamental observations can nevetheless be made. One can be put in the form of a question: Why should the Soviet regime divert scarce and extremely costly resources to create a growing capability for global intervention if there was never any intention of making political capital out of them, should targets of opportunity arise? Another concerns the nature of the Soviet regime. A dictatorship, even one that is no longer completely totalitarian, is still relatively immune from the pressures of public opinion and can change its professed intentions overnight. And one must still take account of the long-term, fundamental commitment of the Soviet leaders to an ideology, however modified, that seeks to reshape the world in its own image and whose authoritative interpretation continues to serve as the justification for the Soviet leaders' monopoly of power. Intentions, then, are related to capabilities, although not in any self-evident manner, and the hard fact that there has been a significant increase in Soviet capabilities must be taken seriously.

All this in no way contradicts the fact that the Soviet leaders have sought détente, as they have understood détente. In the Soviet view détente is entirely compatible with encouraging or engaging in military adventures on a wide-ranging scale, so long as they remain below the nuclear threshold and do not endanger the existence of the Soviet Union. Or put another way, if détente exists in the East-West confrontation, so does the broadening of the areas of conflict between the superpowers.

[56] Wolfe, *Hearings, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, p. 71. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, 'Russia's Forces Go Mobile', *Interplay*, March 1968, pp. 28–37.

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DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS: VIEWS FROM MOSCOW

*Donald D. Barry**

IF anyone had any doubts about it, the practice of graffiti-writing exists in the Soviet Union. It may, in fact, fill a particular psychological need in a land where spontaneous forms of expression are kept to a minimum. An amusing example of this genre greeted the visitor in the men's room of Moscow University's Law Faculty in early 1968: 'On this chain Khrushchev himself tried to commit suicide (on the day after the October 1964 Plenum).'

The conclusion of the newly-arrived foreigner as to the meaning of this inscription was 'business as usual': ridiculing the fat, bumbling, shoe-pounding Nikita Sergeyevich after his fall from power, the typical current practice of the Soviet intellectual. A little reflection might have led the reader of this message to a different kind of conclusion, however, one which several more months of immersion in Soviet intellectual life confirmed to be the sounder: that this (presumably) young lawyer-to-be was reflecting not the view of the Soviet intelligentsia in general, but of his own legal profession, notoriously one of the most reactionary of the groups making up the Soviet educated strata. Many other intellectuals, to the extent that they think about Khrushchev at all, are more likely now to look fondly upon his period of rule as a relatively liberal interlude between periods of repression.

One of the characteristics of the present period, as was in part the case, on the surface at least, in the 1930s, is that the vehicle for the suppression of real or alleged political deviancy is the law itself. Time and again the newcomer, in asking about the prevailing atmosphere, hears references to the 'trials' or 'processes' (*protsessy*). No further explanation is given or needed, for it is clear that the trials in question are those of dissident intellectuals (at this particular time the trials of Ginsburg, Galanskov and others had recently taken place), a practice which is increasingly coming to characterize the political style of the present Soviet leadership.

Long-time foreign residents in Moscow testify that their contacts with even close Soviet friends have been affected by events, that only the bravest come to see them now. These foreigners, who have seen several such periods of attenuated contact with Soviet acquaintances over the years, were sure that soon enough the clamps would be loosened and old ties would be renewed. The foreigner returning to Moscow for the first time since the relatively hopeful days of 1962 could not be so confident. This feeling was only strengthened by the remark of one Russian

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friend not given to exaggeration that ' people are beginning to fear each other again '.

Perhaps because of the attempted restrictions on contacts with foreigners, interest in learning of non-Soviet versions of important developments seems to have increased. The BBC maintains its typically high reputation for reliability, and Soviet citizens appear to depend upon it more than ever. (The Voice of America seems never to have been able to establish this level of credibility.) The BBC's only real gaffe in the first months of 1968, in the view of some Muscovites, was its reference to Ginsburg, Galanskov *et al.*, as ' writers ', a title which even sympathetic listeners felt they did not deserve since, of course, the writings of these defendants were not available. BBC commentator Anatoli Maximovich Goldberg continues to be enjoyed and respected by listeners for his complete mastery of the Russian idiom and his sardonic yet restrained analyses of events. His commentary on developments in Czechoslovakia provided one of the few avenues for the Soviet citizen to obtain a non-Soviet view of the situation.

Another source of news on the Czechoslovak scene was the returning Soviet tourist. On the 40-hour train journey from Prague to Moscow last January there was ample opportunity to exchange views with a young Russian engineer returning from two weeks' holiday in Czechoslovakia. ' They just have it better than we do ', he finally blurted out, having cited the superior beer and food, the relative freedom he had in travelling around the country, and, most surprising to him, the fact that he had stayed in three different cities in the homes of Czech friends (who had attended a Soviet university with him). Foreigners living in the homes of Soviet friends is, of course, an almost unheard-of practice. It will be interesting to see the extent to which post-invasion Soviet tourism to Czechoslovakia is resumed. One is forced to wonder if, from the Soviet standpoint, the deepening of the Czechoslovak economic crisis was a fully unintended consequence of the invasion.

Soviet students, at least those at Moscow University, have long been aware that there is often far more news of interest in the foreign communist newspapers on sale in Moscow than in the Soviet press, and the droves of people who line up to buy copies of the *Morning Star*, *L'Humanité*, *Trybuna Ludu* and the others are clearly not just interested in improving their language skills. When in those critical days in May and June *Rude pravo*, the Party newspaper of fraternal Czechoslovakia, became virtually unavailable in Moscow University, the fact that a direct and distinct avenue of news about the event of the decade in the communist world had been cut off was not lost on the students. Ironically, this extremely significant withdrawal of a source of outside news was missed by the foreign press corps, which somewhat earlier had given considerable coverage to the new Soviet policy of allowing a small number of copies of *The Times* and a few other non-communist foreign newspapers to be sold to foreigners in Intourist hotels. Incidentally, a

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follow-up by the press corps on the actual availability of these papers would have been worthwhile. This foreigner tried on at least a dozen occasions to buy a copy of *The Times*, but without success.

THAT the Soviet leadership really means business in its professed intention to stem the tide of intellectual dissent is nowhere shown more clearly than in the address of M. V. Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences, to the Moscow Party conference late in March. Keldysh railed against 'isolated groups' of scholars who had written letters in defence of 'people who have carried out acts hostile to us' (in the main, the defendants in recent *protsessy*). Stating that most such letter-writers acted out of 'insufficient political maturity', Keldysh explained that the Academy of Sciences 'is disturbed and is taking measures to prevent similar occurrences' in the future. No doubt Keldysh is right when he says that these dissidents are 'rare exceptions', but he and his superiors are concerned enough that nearly one-fifth of the printed version of his speech dealt with ideological nonconformity and included the warning to dissenters that in the 'true nature of things' they 'do not determine our science' and 'the development of science will go forward in any case', with them or without them.[1]

Once, in a hotel room that was probably bugged, a young Soviet physics teacher offered to explain why it was that Keldysh was obliged to make such a strong statement. However, he pointed out that it would have to be at another time in another place. As it turned out, he apparently thought the better of his offer, as well as of continued contact with me, so the explanation was never given. But one can surmise, without inside information, that the reason for the sternness of Keldysh's warning, as well as for the manifold threats from other authoritative quarters, is genuine concern over a growing willingness to question the correctness and legality of official actions.

It may well be that the present leadership is reaping the whirlwind of the modest but nevertheless real improvement in the protection of individual rights instituted under Khrushchev. The details of the campaign to bring about a 'return to socialist legality' instituted after the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 have often been described. In those days the concept of legality (*zakonnost*) was associated almost exclusively with the protection of individual rights. In an interesting but not untypical semantical evolution, the context of *zakonnost* has shifted through the years to the point where, to the extent that it is used at all any more, it simply acts as a code word for the latest Party-inspired campaign in the legal field.[2]

BUT the campaign for *zakonnost* in its original post-Stalin conception, as short-lived as it was, apparently brought to the minds of a few

[1] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 3 April 1968.

[2] See, for instance, the varied meanings and usages of *sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost* in V. M. Chkhikvadze, ed., *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost i sposoby eye obespechenia*, Moscow, 1968.

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Soviet citizens the fact that there are at least some avenues for the individual to challenge the mobilization of the legal process of the state. As long as the authorities choose to fight battles against the most offensive of the dissidents through the judicial process, that process allows for certain counteractions by defendants and their sympathizers. Thus, many of the defendants in the most important of the recent trials have made formal pleas of not guilty, have stoutly maintained their innocence in court, and have raised questions concerning the illegality of actions of state officials in their cases. Some of these defendants have employed trained legal counsel who, instead of playing the role of minions of the state, have made some attempt at a confrontation with the accusers. And supporters of the accused have been able to make known to the world, if not to their fellow Soviet citizens, the character of these judicial proceedings and their condemnation of the whole process. These are important and basic differences from the political trials of the 1930s. Most of the time the authorities did not even bother with a sham trial. This is not to say, of course, that the recent trials have not been rigged and were not basically unfair to the defendants. Protests and pleas of defendants and their counsel in court have been ignored or summarily dismissed. Lawyers and supporters of the defendants have been hounded or otherwise harassed, and sympathizers have been largely excluded from the supposedly public trials, while the courtrooms have been packed with hostile onlookers. And, as Soviet newspapers have indicated before and during some of these trials, there could be no doubt that the 'criminals' would be convicted and punished.

What the events connected with the trials seem to show is that a small and perhaps slowly growing number of Soviet citizens appears to be willing to challenge openly certain acts of the authorities who, in turn, are attempting to increase the costs which such dissidents must pay for their actions. The only weapon of the dissidents in this uneven battle is the hope of publicizing events connected with the trials. In this, of course, the Soviet communications media are of little help, and the dissidents turn to the foreign radio and press to inform their fellow citizens and the world. Thus, the foreign communications media take on even more importance, not only providing the Soviet citizen with an alternative to domestic reporting of foreign news and giving him access to internal news which the regime deems not fit to print, but also acting as a vehicle of dissent, by which officially proscribed views can be disseminated.

Seen in this light, the trials of dissidents become a kind of 'foreign' influence on the Soviet populace, and in this respect they are not unlike developments in Czechoslovakia prior to the August invasion. Clearly one of the purposes of that invasion was to prevent contagion by example at home, and it is a sign of the times in the Soviet Union that the latest important trial was of protesters of that invasion. What are the authorities to do to prevent further contagion by example based on the acts of their own internal dissidents? One of the possibilities would be to dispense

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with even the semi-open, semi-legitimate judicial practices of the past few years and return to the secret, harsh, summary justice of Stalinist days. The concept of *zakonnost* which prevailed during parts of 1956 and 1957 would preclude such a return, but under present conditions no such certainty exists.

In this regard, what will be the role that the jurist, the trained expert in legal matters, is to play in developments to come? It seems clear that the members of the procuracy, the most political branch of the legal profession with the highest proportion of Party members, can be depended upon to continue implementing Party policy, whatever direction it takes. And in spite of all the talk about Soviet judges being 'independent and subject only to the law' (article 112 of the USSR Constitution), they can be counted as completely dependable when the line of prescribed action is made clear. The position of the defence counsel is more ambiguous, and a debate has been raging for some time over his proper role. Basically, some jurists hold that his job is 'to aid the court in clearing up all matters relating to the case', whether favourable or detrimental to the defendant, while others insist that 'the activity of the defence counsel, as distinguished from that of the procurator, is one-sided. The defence lawyer should defend and not accuse . . .'.[3] The pressure on the defence lawyer to play the former role, particularly in trials having political overtones, is strong.[4] But in any case he has traditionally been accorded a status in trials far subordinate to that of the judge or the procurator, and his significance is limited, no matter which role he chooses to play.

But perhaps the most important lawyer is one that does not appear in court at all. This is the legal scholar, who works at a university law faculty or a law institute. This group of jurists, numerically the smallest part of the legal profession, has contributed a great deal to fashioning the form and content of the new codes and statutes which have been adopted in recent years. Many of their contributions have been liberalizing in nature. On the other hand, however, they have not openly opposed the retrograde steps the regime has taken in the field of law. It is not without significance that no legal scholar is known to have been among the signers of petitions protesting against the recent trials.

N. V. Krylenko once remarked that 'a club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is more efficient, the most efficient is the court'.[5] As a high official in the People's Commissariat of Justice during much of the 1920s and 1930s, Krylenko was in a good position to appreciate the effectiveness of the court as a stifler of real or alleged political dissent. But in early 1938 Krylenko went from Commissar of Justice to enemy of the people and liquidation without benefit of trial, and if pure efficiency is the standard, it might be concluded that this way is the most convenient of all.

[3] I. Perlov, '*Zachem korit zerkala*', *Izvestia*, 14 February 1965.

[4] Boris Zolotukhin, attorney for Alexander Ginsburg in the latter's January 1968 trial, was reported to have been expelled from the CPSU, apparently for carrying on too zealous a defence.

[5] As quoted in D. Barry and H. Berman, 'The Soviet Legal Profession', *Harvard Law Review*, November 1968.

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THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Werner Klatt

'THE dilemma facing party authorities in Eastern Europe is how to make a reformist omelette without breaking too many eggs.'[1] This sentence had hardly left the printer's press when the mass media announced the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. In one short moment of history not only had too many eggs been broken, but the omelette had been thrown into the fire for good measure. Whatever else may happen, the omelette remains charred.

It may sound like a platitude to say that the world will never be the same again; but the 'August events', as the Soviet brutality is now euphemistically referred to at times, have been one of those not too frequent occasions to which this generalization applies. For a moment it seemed senseless to continue any attempt at giving an 'interim account' of reforms that were sacrificed, besides much else, by *apparatchiki* unable to recognize their own mediocrity, and even less the call of history. In the meantime attempts have been made to differentiate between rational Russian economic reformers opposed to the Soviet adventure, and frightened politicians or military hawks in the Kremlin. These distinctions show the same unreality that was characteristic of so much apparently detached analysis in the halcyon days of 'East-West détente' and 'peaceful coexistence'. When our anger and revulsion about the Soviet invasion have given way to the cool analysis of underlying causes and likely consequences, the fact will remain that a nation's cry for liberty has been choked by men who knew all along that 'economic liberalization' and political freedom are inseparable parts of one whole. To permit one without allowing the other has never been—nor will it ever be—a practical proposition.

Economists, more than others, have been guilty of trying to divide the indivisible, to treat the political setting as *ceteris paribus*, as if anything ever stayed equal in these fast-moving times. For anybody who wished to see it, it has been clear all along that sooner or later the search for economic reform was bound to come into head-on collision with the political doctrine of the one-party dictatorship; that the political men in power would be obliged to assert themselves; and that economic reformers, together with other liberalizers, would be found among the casualties. This has not been the conflict of men of different temperaments, as some like us to believe, but it has been the first round in a long battle whose outcome can only be either the reinstatement of liberty as the main plank in the lives of nations and individuals, or else their

[1] Michael Gamarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe* (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968).

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submission to the forces of darkness at noon. The concept of guided communist democracy is a myth.

In this situation the question is bound to be asked whether there can be more than a historical interest in reviewing reforms that were formulated and tried in the years before the cataclysm. The answer is in the affirmative. As the months roll by, there will be a need to draw conclusions from the failures of the past. In the course of this reappraisal economists will be well advised to check their findings against those of their political colleagues, lest the world be misled again to take the rosy picture of a part for the multicoloured spectrum of the whole. For years on end some economists have argued persistently that there is an inherent rationality in the Soviet pattern of economic planning, only to argue after the collapse of the new order in Czechoslovakia that the ageing traditional Soviet model is no longer workable and that no amount of patching-up can help it.

ECONOMISTS on either side of the ideological frontier have at times claimed that economic reforms can be instigated, executed and judged without reference to the wider political setting in which they occur; or that they are indeed the essence of political reform itself. Some have always rejected this view and have held, like Professor Brus of Poland, a man who speaks from considerable experience, that 'the possibilities of the further functioning of the . . . economy have been exhausted' and 'that the emphasis must now be transferred to the . . . political sphere'.[2] Others have deprecated such views and have attributed a supreme role to reforms in the economic sphere. 'In all our discussions it is the economists who have the last word', said the Czechoslovak authors of the 'Two Thousand Words' as recently as last June.[3] In the meantime the disastrous events of the summer will have taught those who have had their priorities wrong that in the final analysis it is invariably politics that have the last word or—to use the Chinese phrase—it is politics that take command. Political and economic developments have always been too closely interwoven to permit of an arbitrary separation.

When reassessing the history of Eastern Europe's reforms, it is worth recalling that it all started 20 years ago, when Stalin evicted Tito, then considered a mad dog in the service of Western imperialism, from his pen of communist sheep. After frantic efforts to be more orthodox than the byzantine tyrant in Moscow, Tito had to change the content and course of his policies. Yugoslavia's workers and peasants were offered a share in the country's economic affairs, and as the American taxpayer showed willingness to meet the bulk of the annual balance of payments deficit, a programme of limited reforms brought some measure of success.

Nearly a decade later, it was Mikoyan's public address and Khrushchev's 'secret speech' at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and

[2] Januscz Gorski and Witold Sierpinski, 'Marxism—Bourgeois Economics—Revisionism', *Trybuna Ludu*, 6 July 1967.
[3] Ceteka, 28 June 1968.

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Togliatti's testament that opened the political sluice-gates. They remained ajar until they were forcibly shut during that fateful night last August. In Hungary, where the floods proved too vehement, the dams of restraint burst, causing damage that has not yet been repaired fully. Much of the shoring-up that has been done ever since has been little more than patching-up. This is true of all parts of the Soviet empire. The structural weaknesses of the political fabric have proved to be beyond the repairers' ken. Limited economic reforms often had to make do where fundamental political changes were out of the question. Stringent political measures against writers and other challengers of the established order at times accompanied steps designed to liberalize the laws governing economic affairs. At other times they followed each other in a seemingly inexplicable sequence. In the end good reasons were always produced to explain the political vacillations. In the final analysis, the economic reformers became too great a menace to be tolerated any longer.

A SPATE of books has appeared of late, interpreting the economic reforms of the last two decades. Some take the broad political view. Others fail to include in their balance sheet any of the political liabilities which so easily put those responsible for the accounts into the red. In *Wirtschaftsreformen in Osteuropa*,[4] Hans-Hermann Hoehmann of the Federal Institute of East European and International Studies has presented a collection of commendably matter-of-fact papers. These range from Alfred Zauberman's review of the theoretical discussion underlying the change from volume to value as a measure of economic planning and accounting, to Professor Gregory Grossman's balance sheet of economic reforms which was first published in *Problems of Communism* at the end of 1966. A symposium of papers cannot be expected to be as uniform as the work of a single author, but Hoehmann's clear guidance to contributors and his firm editorship have secured more uniformity and less repetition than might otherwise have been achieved. Among the chapters on individual countries, Hoehmann's own contribution on the Soviet reform of 1965, Gert Leptin's chapter on East Germany's New Economic System and Wolfgang Eggers's description of the Yugoslav record are particularly satisfactory.

The pains caused by the change from *dirigisme* by administrative measures to a market order moved by the levers of the price mechanism emerge in case after case. So do the limits which economic reformers, such as Nemchinov and Liberman of Russia, Brus and Lipinski of Poland, Behrens and Benary of East Germany, or Selucky and Sik of Czechoslovakia, encounter when presenting their economic programmes to their political masters Kosygin, Gomulka, Ulbricht or Novotny. Only after Novotny's removal from office were some of the roadblocks pushed off Czechoslovakia's path towards economic rationality.

[4] Karl C. Thalheim and Hans-Hermann Hoehmann, *Wirstschaftsreformen in Osteuropa* (Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968).

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Marshal Yakubovsky's refusal to withdraw his Soviet armoured cars and the subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia served as reminders that the removal of political roadblocks is not a matter to be decided unilaterally in Prague. The political leaders in the Kremlin have, once and for all, removed any ambiguity on this subject.

Michael Gamarnikow, economic analyst of Radio Free Europe, has had the unique opportunity of selecting the material for his study on *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*[5] from the multi-language reservoir of the organization he has served for many years. His book is based on a series of articles which students of Eastern Europe will have seen during the years 1964 to 1967. Being the work of one author, the book does not show the unavoidable shortcomings of a symposium, but being 'an interim report', it suffers the inevitable fate of studies of this kind, becoming out-of-date before the printer hands the pages to the bookbinder. An epilogue, written today rather than before publication, would have to record the defeat of the 'pace-setters' by the 'feet-draggers'. Even though they are dated, Gamarnikow's observations on prices, on decentralization and on the cost of economic reform—a taboo among the subjects debated in Eastern Europe—can still be read with profit.

Eugène Zaleski's *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union*[6] is more and less ambitious than both Hoehmann and Gamarnikow. Zaleski has limited his study to the Soviet case, but he sees it as 'a tidal phenomenon'. 'The failure of administrative reform brings forth an upsurge of discussions on the need for reforming the planning system; and the hesitations and difficulties encountered in that field bring back the problem of administrative reform.' The change from authoritarian to indicative planning, using prices, money, credit and fiscal policies in preference to administrative measures is clearly seen as part of a political process. The reader is never allowed to forget the interference and intervention by the Party, limiting the powers delegated to the organs that govern the economy of the country.

> In contrast with the stable political authority represented by the Party Secretariat and Politburo, the economic authorities in general and those concerned with planning in particular are weak, divided among several agencies, and unstable. These agencies—whose average lifespan is two, three or at most four years—hardly have the time and independence needed to put together coherent plans.

Speaking of recent reforms, Zaleski calls them a device to gain time within a collective leadership that is subject to a variety of pressures. His is a readable account of a highly technical subject. It deserves a wide public.

[5] Michael Gamarnikow, *ibid.*

[6] Eugène Zaleski, *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union* 1962–1966. *An analysis of Recent Trends in Economic Organization and Management* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

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This also applies to Professor Raupach's latest book in which he analyses the theory and practice of the Soviet economic system.[7] This study has been published in the same series in which his concise, yet comprehensive *History of the Soviet Economy*[8] appeared. Unlike Zaleski, Professor Raupach is concerned with the ideological aspects and inner contradictions of the Soviet economic model rather than with its political superstructure. He wastes no time on its Marxist antecedents, since Marx was preoccupied with a critique of bourgeois economies but did not provide the tools with which to control the affairs of a communist state. Raupach approaches his task from the platform of German liberalism without being blind to the shortcomings of the market economy. He sees the principal distinction between the two systems in the nationalization of the means of production, which furthers the tendency towards capital controls and planning in physical terms and inhibits both the individual's use of capital and his risk-taking. There is much in this small volume that is worth reading, such as the analysis of the Soviet system of economic communications and of fixed prices; the attempts to reform the system with the aid of cybernetics; and the predicaments inherent in a system that operates without the signals which the market provides in non-communist societies. Raupach sees no reason to regard the use of mathematics in itself as a sign of liberalization. 'The likelihood', he says, 'that this technical device will lead to the consolidation of centrally controlled systems is just as great'. In his view, the central problem of the Soviet economy, i.e. the rational allocation of the factors of production, has not been solved and, to judge by the present state of the 'socialist' economic theory, it will not be solved in the future (regrettably, Professor Raupach uses the term 'socialist' where 'communist' would be appropriate; an English edition of his book might put this right).

IN contrast to some German authors, who see in an English or French summary a reminder of their country's decline from a position of unchallenged supremacy in the field of East European studies, Czechoslovak authors and publishers in the last few years before the Soviet invasion treated the language in which they printed as a matter of convenience rather than of national pride. As a result, a large number of books and pamphlets have recently become available to the English reader who wishes to study at first hand the special features of what was once the Czechoslovak case. Most outstanding among this crop of publications were the views of Ota Sik, the architect of the Czechoslovak reform, as contained in his book *Plan and Market under Socialism*,[9] an expansion of his earlier work on the problems of socialist commodity relations, and in his contribution on Czechoslovakia's New System to a

[7] Hans Raupach, *System der Sowjetwirtschaft. Theorie und Praxis* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1968).
[8] Hans Raupach, *Geschichte der Sowjetwirtschaft* (Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1967).
[9] Ota Sik, *Plan and Market under Socialism* (Prague, Academia Publishing House, 1967, also White Plains, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press).

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small volume on *Economic Reforms in the Socialist Countries*[10] (socialist and socialism standing, as usual, for communist and communism). Before the Soviet invasion, these works showed the extent to which economic reformers dared advance. Since the invasion these books have become a sombre reminder that under communism liberty is a matter for licence and not of right.

Ota Sik has become an émigré. Formerly director of the Institute of Economics at the Academy of Sciences, he was made a Deputy Prime Minister in the short-lived government formed in April 1968, after the fall of Novotny. Though 'refraining from polemics with other theoretical standpoints', or even 'taking up a position on them', Sik on many occasions has spoken out bluntly against political interference which, more than once, has jeopardized the success of his economic proposals. Sik has, of course, spoken as a communist who, whilst criticizing the methodological errors of the Stalin school, based his own economic concept on 'the necessity for socialist market relationships', which were to replace the 'over-simplified, mainly quantitative approach to planning'. His was the position of a convinced Marxist who, like his fellow reformers, did not question certain preconditions of communist economic rule, such as the expropriation of private property and the rejection of capitalist ways and means. What he was after was greater efficiency of the existing system and not its abolition. This was clear when he first succeeded in having his views endorsed by the Central Committee of his Party at the end of 1963. Thereafter, he refined his programme, but in all essentials he has adhered to his original concept. He was the master-mind behind the five-year plan of 1964 and of the New System of Economic Planning and Management of 1967, in which he tried to match the need for central indicative planning with the desirability of decentralized management based on business productivity and individual initiative. Early in 1968, he defended the post-Novotny government's creation of a National Economic Council, a central organ of the Council of Ministers, which had set itself the task of dismantling the bureaucratic administration at the centre. Goodwill and intelligence proved no match for the inner contradictions inherent in the communist economic system, which thrives on 'democratic centralism' and fears nothing more than the rise of genuine democratic forces.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S New System of Economic Planning and Management, like its Political Action Programme, had been the dream of progressives and reformers throughout the communist lands ever since it had become possible to think aloud without immediately falling foul of the secret police. The economic debate which had been going on for a good many years was a variant of the general political theme. The experiments which were tried were designed to move the economies away from their conventional setting towards what was rather

[10] *Economic Reforms in the Socialist Countries* (Prague, Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1967).

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imprecisely called ' market socialism '. The changes made invariably fell short of the proposals of the most liberal among the economic reformers. Their views tended sooner or later to come into conflict with those of the political Establishment which was anxious to maintain a maximum of continuity and to cause a minimum of disruption. In this order of things, the economic reforms invariably ranked as a low second. Without ignoring individual national facets, the reforms can be said to have had certain elements in common. They aimed at improved efficiency of planning, increased productivity of industrial labour and reduced waste of material and financial resources. To this end the reforms included some or all of the following objectives:

1. the replacement of obsolete bureaucratic practices of planning controls by non-bureaucratic methods;
2. the limitation of central authority to major decisions of planning and investments;
3. the delegation of central authority from state planning commissions to functional bodies, such as industrial trusts or trade associations;
4. the encouragement of plant managers to make decisions on the factory floor without reference to central authority;
5. the strengthening of incentives ranging widely from bonuses to managers and workers to funds reserved for capital investment or social amenities;
6. the reduction of success indicators to a few essential ones, measured in financial rather than physical terms and thus replacing what in East Germany has been called '*Tonnenideologie*';
7. the introduction, as a chief measure of plan fulfilment, of profitability defined in terms of the net value of sales or production;
8. the creation of direct links between manufacturing industries and retail trade organizations;
9. the elimination of subsidies on raw materials and capital goods and the displacement of public grants by bank loans;
10. the charge of a tax on capital assets and of interest on credits;
11. the alteration of prices and price ratios so as to bring them into line with current scarcities and preferences;
12. the permission to compete in foreign markets free of state intervention, though within the framework of state trading corporations.

THIS list of objectives tended to grow longer—or shorter—as experience was gathered in the implementation of the reforms. Though closely interrelated, the items listed did not all necessarily form part of each of the reforms. Apart from variations from country to country, there were also fluctuations throughout the period of experimentation. Whereas there was agreement that obsolete bureaucratic practices had to

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be abandoned, the central planners retained massive powers. They reserved the right to control long-term planning, major investment projects, the product mix, prices, price ratios and wages. They were thus unprepared to move as far or as fast as the economic reformers wished them to go. Where national economic councils were created some years ago, authority sometimes reverted to conventional functional authorities, such as ministries or commissions. Where industrial associations, combines or trusts had been formed, the heads of these organizations wielded considerable power.

The right of plant managers to make their own decisions remained fairly restricted. One of the means by which they were given a certain range of choice was the increase in funds retained to cover depreciation, to pay bonuses and to improve communal services. Equally significant was the reduction in the number of success indicators which, however, still included such all-important aspects of management as the profit rate or rate of return on capital, the value of sales, the composition of the product mix; the extent of the wages and investment funds; the volume of material and labour resources used and the contributions to and withdrawals from public and factory funds—a formidable list indeed of central controls over most essentials of industrial input and output. The success indicators thus left little room for freedom of decision by factory directors and managers.

The quality of goods, particularly in the consumer sector, was supposed to be improved as a result of direct links between manufacturing industries and retail organizations. Both horizontal and vertical links were being introduced, but results were few and far between. A tax on capital assets, sometimes called production fund tax, became a generally accepted principle, but this was not yet true of a differential rate on land and natural resources. Nor was the problem of foreign competition solved, though a number of experiments were carried out in an attempt to test the domestic cost structure in foreign markets. The bulk of foreign trade remained tied to the communist area where it proved easier to earn foreign exchange than in the world markets. The shortage of convertible exchange operated as a constant obstacle to competitive 'coexistence'. The needs of industry for fixed and working capital were being met to an increasing extent through bank credits instead of grants-in-aid from public funds. Organs of workers' control or self-management, on the Yugoslav model, were not seriously considered anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

The most knotty problem of all proved to be that of prices and price ratios. Here the reforms were least uniform and least advanced. Czechoslovakia developed the most flexible price system consisting of three tiers: fixed prices for important raw materials, machines, industrial and agricultural consumer goods; floor and ceiling prices for less essential goods; and free prices, agreed between buyer and seller, for non-essentials. A similar price system was envisaged in Hungary's New Economic Mechanism. In the Polish economic guidelines, the three-tier

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price arrangement distinguished between high prices for new products, basic prices for goods in full production, and clearance prices for obsolescent products. East Germany carried out, in three stages, a drastic change in prices and price ratios: first, in the prices of fuel and power, ferrous and non-ferrous metals and metal products; second, in the prices of half the output of the chemical industry; and finally, in those of the remainder of the basic industries as well as the products of the light and building industries. Since the suicide, in December 1965, of Erich Apel, East Germany's former chief planner and creator of the country's New Economic System, the economic reforms once again became the sole responsibility of the political leadership. Nowhere in the communist area were essential prices exposed, without official hindrance, to the market forces of supply and demand.

As Egon Neuberger has recently pointed out in an interesting study on *The Legacies of Central Planning*,[11] the more out of line prices are in centrally controlled economies, the more difficult it is to adjust them. In Neuberger's own words, 'radical changes in relative prices of inputs and outputs affect the income distribution among regions, among branches of the economy, among firms within a given branch, among workers in a given enterprise, and among different classes of consumers'. But though prices and price ratios are particularly obstinate in evading the grip of the reformer, they are by no means alone in this. Yugoslav economists consider the irrational price system, the centralized foreign exchange system, and the lack of a capital market among the most damaging legacies. As Neuberger puts it, so as to operate a decentralized market system, 'the creation of a satisfactory mechanism for the transfer of investment resources from those who do the saving to those who do the investing' is required. Yet, in most parts of Eastern Europe capital markets exist only in rudimentary forms at present. Of the many negative legacies of a troubled past, those inherited from the controllers of price relations and financial transactions are the most troublesome when structural changes of centralized economies are in the making.

Whereas there is a good deal of similarity, there is no uniformity in the attempts to modernize the economies of the area. No two reforms are alike. Moscow has not always been accepted without question as the sole spring of political thought or of economic innovation. In the early sixties the economic debate centred for some time in the Soviet Union. From there it radiated at first to the industrial parts of the communist area, but eventually even agrarian Bulgaria was infected by the general trend. Rumania remained least prone to engage in reforms on a broad scale. The crude methods of planning, government control and industrial management that were put into effect in the Soviet Union in the late twenties may have had their justification in the lack of experience of a primarily agrarian community. They proved less adequate to the task of steering a complex industrial economy towards modernization.

[11] Egon Neuberger, *The Legacies of Central Planning* (Santa Monica, California, Rand Corporation, 1968).

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The industrial parts of Eastern Europe, where the processes of manufacturing and trading had reached a high degree of division of labour before the last war, proved least suitable for Stalin's type of planning and management. When the ravages of the war had been repaired and the political controls emanating from Moscow had been relaxed, open debate started. Practical reform became possible when major economic predicaments defied the crude remedies of normative planning and administrative intervention. Whilst credit is due to the economists, they were able to make themselves heard only when, and as long as, political relaxations coincided with economic difficulties.

THE criticisms of planners and economists on the record of the past is too well known to need elaborating. It agrees closely with the comments made for many years by Western observers. There are no two views about the degree of waste, in human, material and financial terms, from which Soviet-type economies have suffered as a result of planning in physical rather than financial terms and of steering the economy by administrative measures instead of market forces. There is less agreement on the remedies. These were freely discussed throughout the area until the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At one end of the scale the revision of established principles went so far as to favour a system under which plan targets were limited to a few indicators, the most important of which was the profit of the industrial plant, whilst all else was to be left to the initiative and the free interplay of the market forces. Not unnaturally, these views were resisted, if not rejected, by the conservatives among economists and planners and by the vested interests of government officials, Party functionaries and plant managers. These men tended to see an alternative solution in an economy planned and controlled by the computer—that fig leaf which is supposed to cover the shame of centralized planning. Neither school anticipated a return to private property or capitalist enterprise. Both phrased their criticism in Marxist terms and rejected any suggestion that they were aiming at copying Western economic practices. The replacement of the planned economy by a completely competitive society was rejected out of hand. None of the planners and economists was in favour of changes that could lead to developments which might no longer react to controls emanating from the seats of political power. Most of the reforms had been directed primarily at the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, but the reformers no longer regarded the farming industry as outside their purview, though none of them suggested the abolition of the collective farms —on the Yugoslav or Polish model.

For the last 15 years, the economic system, as it operated throughout the area in Stalin's time, has been eroded. The process has been slow, and it has been hindered by political inhibitions against abandoning established ways. It has been accelerated as the needs of an increasingly complex manufacturing industry and a rising demand for consumer goods exercised growing pressures on outmoded planning practices.

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Most of the reforms were in the right direction. This applied as much to the curbing of central administrative power as to the delegation of authority to industrial trusts, trade associations and plant managers. The replacement of physical success indicators and material balances by financial measures went some way towards eliminating the worst features of economies that had been known for their waste of human and material resources, their low efficiency, low productivity and low profitability. The creation of vertical and horizontal links helped in bringing into line the interests of suppliers and consumers in product mix, quality and price. The elevation of credit institutions to a key position in financing investments and innovations furthered the efforts to eliminate wasteful projects and processes. The limited change of prices did away with some of the worst cases of misinvestment, though new disparities were bound to be caused by newly fixed price ratios. As far as they went, the reform measures may be taken as sensible. To be fully effective, however, they hardly went far enough.

Some of the reforms were of a highly technical nature, and their success could not be judged before they were given a full trial. Some weaknesses were emerging at an early date. Where the reforms were put into effect vigorously and consistently, clashes, infinitely more serious than those that had arisen in the past, occurred between the interests of central authorities and captains of industry. To those who could not anticipate the dangers ahead, the invasion of Czechoslovakia has revealed in whose favour the final decision invariably goes. The central authorities will always try to retain ample powers with which to reassert their position in case of serious difficulties. At a conference on the Soviet economic reforms held in Moscow last May, Baibakov, the Chairman of Gosplan, revealed that Russian factories had to adopt the new Soviet success indicators in addition to, rather than in place of, the old indices. He favoured the use of mathematics in planning, but he would have nothing to do with the methods applied by 'bourgeois' economists.

In line with the political leadership, the industrial bureaucracy tenaciously holds on to its old ways and opposes any change in essentials, and the inertia of the low-grade official operates as a powerful brake. More important still, the events of the recent past have fully justified the ever-present fear that the surrender of controls is bound to weaken, if not to undermine, the authority of the ruling Party. If the market forces were allowed their full play, prices freed from interference would reveal more cases of misallocation of resources than even a strong political regime might wish to admit. A rational reallocation of resources could dislodge workers from their places of employment on a substantial scale. It might also reveal a greater lack of managerial and administrative skill than can be afforded by societies set on a course of economic liberalization. As seen by communists, the reforms should ideally yield flexibility without leading to the allegedly disorderly processes of capitalist society.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia marked an important setback for the

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cause of economic reform, not only in this country, but also in the USSR and Eastern Europe in general. With the subjugation of Czechoslovakia to Soviet rule, the hopes of economic and political liberalizers were dashed. At this stage nobody can dare forecast with certainty the length of the tunnel through which the people of Eastern Europe will have to crawl before they can see the light of day again. To be sure, none of the inner contradictions of the Soviet system has been solved by military action. To make the economies of Eastern Europe at least tick again, at some stage a minimum of the reform measures that became necessary when the traditional patterns began to yield diminishing returns will have to be restored. But no ready return can be expected in the foreseeable future to the political self-expression that was tolerated in Czechoslovakia before the country was invaded. It will take some considerable time, if ever it comes to it, before the shortcomings of the present system can be overcome without opening the way to what are considered the evils of capitalism. After the summer crisis in Czechoslovakia, the communist leaders of Eastern Europe can be expected to move with caution and to accept for the time being any number of defects in the present system of planning—and even the danger of declining economic growth rates—in the interest of external political cohesion and internal political stability. Of course, both these terms have become even more relative of late than they have been in the past. As a Polish proverb puts it, pears do not grow on willow trees.

A COMMENT

Gregory Grossman

IT would be difficult to dispute Dr Klatt's conclusion that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has seriously set back the course of economic reform in that country and in Eastern Europe in general. Even before 20 August 1968 the success of the Czechoslovak economic reform was far from certain. Perhaps we do not always fully appreciate the complex conjuncture of favourable circumstances necessary for the successful transition from a Soviet-type command economy to even the relatively modest form of a socialist market economy that was projected by Dubcek's Action Programme. Nor do we always fully appreciate the extent and depth of the economic, social, and political effects and reverberations that an *economic* reform such as the Czechoslovak must set in motion, even disregarding the parallel political reform measures (if this is possible). Few countries in modern times have undergone such a far-reaching social revolution in such a short time as has been implied in the blueprint of the Czechoslovak (or Hungarian) economic reform. (Yugoslavia, of course, has; and we shall have occasion to refer to its experience below.) Historically, the nearest thing to it was the opposite process in Eastern Europe—the transition *to* the Soviet model in the late

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forties and early fifties. But that process was associated with a simultaneous tightening of political and social controls, rather than the reverse, and for this reason was in a sense ' easier '.

Among the necessary conditions for the carrying out of a far-reaching economic reform is Moscow's acquiescence. While before mid-1968 Moscow was seemingly not preventing the elaboration and adoption of far-reaching reform programmes in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, now it may attempt to impose a direct limit to the Czech advance towards economic decentralization and, especially, ' marketization '. At the same time it should be recognized that Moscow's interest in the matter is not unambiguous, for the efficiency of the Czechoslovak economy, and particularly its ability to earn convertible exchange rather than depend on Soviet assistance in this regard, are now presumably of greater concern to Moscow than before the invasion.

Another set of necessary conditions are internal political. First, the power balance within the decisive councils of the Party and the government must be favourable to the reformers (although the reformers themselves need not be of one mind). Here, the short-term effects of the invasion seem to be unclear. On one hand, as Dr Klatt stresses, the Soviet presence has already forced the removal from political life of certain pro-reform leaders, notably Ota Sik himself, and may discourage others from pressing for further economic liberalization and attendant measures. On the other hand, the general mood of the country following the invasion has presumably shifted in the direction of greater popular acceptance of economic reform. Needless to say, Moscow's stand on this issue may, therefore, be decisive. Secondly, a great unknown in regard to the execution of a reform such as the Czechoslovak is the political power and ability of the Party and government leadership to impose on the public, at least initially, a number of painful and unpalatable measures. This refers especially to the leadership's ability to say ' no ' to the many sectoral, regional, and other interests that inevitably plead for exceptional treatment in the process of implementation of the reform. It also refers to the ability of the regime to readjust wages and other incomes and to allow significant increases in retail prices, all of which may be necessary for the consistent and effective execution of the reform. In this regard Dubcek may be now in a better position than before 20 August, or in which Novotny was before him, in that Dubcek can now presumably appeal to the newly-created sense of national solidarity and refer to the state of economic emergency in taking a stronger position on these scores. Or at least he may find himself in a stronger position for a short while in the immediate wake of the invasion.

Internal political ability to put through unpalatable and painful measures is especially important in the absence of material reserves, both domestic and external, with the aid of which transitional difficulties could be eased and particular interests soothed. Even before the invasion the Czechoslovak economy was poor in such resources (not counting the

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questionable likelihood of substantial Western credits). Now it is even less well provided, and the possibility of obtaining large Western credits is, of course, even more remote—as is the possibility of large credits from the East for the purpose of lubricating the wheels of the reform. Thus, not only some of the political circumstances, but also the 'objective' economic conditions have now turned against the likelihood of a successful economic reform in Czechoslovakia in the near future.

DR Klatt's reference to Dr Zaleski's excellent monograph on *Soviet* economic reforms, which carries the story through 1966, prompts the question 'where is that reform now, and what are its prospects?'. With the benefit of another two years' hindsight Dr Zaleski's cautious and largely sceptical conclusions now look particularly apt. The Soviet reform of 1965, very modest even on paper, has turned out even more modest in reality. There is no space to document this impression here, but—at least to this writer—the overwhelming testimony of both Soviet sources and Western observers bears it out. True, the Soviet economy has done relatively well in the past two years, in comparison with its performance during the first half of the sixties. But the credit need not belong to the reform alone—for example, one could mention the relatively good crops of the last few years, especially the record crop of 1966—nor need one assume that the reform's beneficial effects will be lasting. One of its immediate effects, and this is to some extent true of any administrative shake-up of the Soviet economy, was to release some hoarded stocks and other resources, which may have had a significant beneficial effect in the short-run but in a 'once-and-for-all' way. Certainly the very important article by N. Baibakov, the Chairman of Gosplan, in *Pravda* on 1 October 1968, not only sounds a critical note in regard to the progress of the reform, but in its various programmatic aspects seems to pay little attention to the spirit of 1965, especially as concerns the autonomy of the individual enterprise. True, Mr Baibakov announces a reduction in the number of commodities to be planned centrally for the 1971–1975 quinquennium (and presumably also for the individual years in that period). But the functions to be given up by the central planning organs are not to be turned over to the enterprises or even 'associations'; rather, they are to be devolved upon the *ministries*. Since the ministries have heretofore been among the chief opponents of and obstacles to enterprise autonomy, it does not seem likely that they will eagerly share these new powers with enterprises. Instead, there is now considerable danger of the re-emergence of the hypertrophied and autarkic ministries as existed before their blanket abolition by Khrushchev in 1957 in favour of the *sovnarkhozy*. Khrushchev was right in taking a dim view of the ministries then, although his own prescription provided no cure either.

Looking ahead, what will the next Soviet economic reform be like? It is difficult to escape the impression that—barring some drastic

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measures, most of which seem to be precluded by the present reactionary political climate in the USSR—considerable disappointment with the results of the 1965 reform will set in among Soviet leaders. The above-mentioned revival of ministries of the pre-1957 type will do nothing to alleviate such disappointment. What then? Perhaps nothing for a long time as the issues are fought out within the Kremlin. Surely a major move towards economic decentralization, especially 'marketization', appears most unlikely so long as the present political climate persists. A return to Khrushchevian, small-sized *sovnarkhozy* seems equally unlikely. The one possibility that has not been tried yet, and therefore not yet discredited in practice, and which would avoid major decentralization and liberalization, is the devolution of planning and economic and administrative powers to the level of the *large economic region* (like the 20 [approximately] in recent Soviet 'regionalization' schemes). The central planning organs would then be chiefly concerned with the interconnexions between a small number of large units, a reasonably manageable task. Of course, under Soviet conditions these large units would tend to become autarkic, but because of their size (on the average each as large as Czechoslovakia), the autarky would not be as grotesque as it was with Khrushchev's mini-regions.

If this should happen, the development may be quite interesting to watch. One should bear in mind that the large regions would often have very different economic interests, that these diverse economic interests would at times overlap with national consciousness, and that, last but not least, political power, i.e. the Party, in the USSR is also territorially organized. All of which may, of course, also mean that this solution, too, will be unacceptable to the Soviet leadership.

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SOVIET PLANNING AND GRINEVETSKII—A COMMENT

Alec Nove

IN A MOST INTERESTING article,* Leon Smolinski drew our attention to the importance and originality of Grinevetskii, the engineer whose ideas on Russian economic development were noted and appreciated by Lenin and Krzhizhanovsky, and who must be accorded an important place not only in the thought-patterns underlying GOELRO but in Russian planning in general; indeed he should be regarded as a pioneer in developmental planning on a world scale. My own first encounter with his name was in a somewhat ill-fated little book by my colleague Jacob Miller,** who made much of him and indeed used the relationship between his ideas and subsequent plans as part of his presentation of the Bolsheviks as an integral part of Russian historical development. Lenin's views, his desire to mobilize bourgeois specialists for the fulfilment of his and their dreams of Russia's industrialization, finds reflection in Pogodin's play *Kremlevskie Kuranty*, and Smolinski very properly cites passages from Lenin's works to illustrate his thought on this matter. Very apt, too, is the following comment of his own: 'for their part the communists contributed to the partnership that strong, stable government ruthlessly dedicated to the cause of industrialization that Grinevetskii had been longing for', though their methods were very far removed from his. Clearly, Smolinski has written a valuable piece.

So far, so good. Two points, however, call for critical comment, one perhaps relatively minor, the other a key problem in development economics. To dispose of the minor one, it is really rather pointless to refer three times to a typical empty-propagandist nonsense about GOELRO and other plans being based on 'the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism', especially when this nonsense was published in 1952, a time when even reputable Soviet economic historians had no alternative but to produce such poppycock. *Of course,* as everyone from Lenin himself to any serious Soviet historian today would readily admit thinking about Russia's industrial development did not begin on 7 November 1917, nor did it begin in Bolshevik minds. Witte also had ideas about the priority of heavy industry, many Tsarist officials thought of the importance of rail transport as a means of lowering costs and linking important areas of the country together. Other projects too have long histories. The Volga-Don canal, if memory serves, occurred also to Peter the Great. The economic use of waterways was no secret to the Varangians or the Hanseatic League. Smolinski cites examples of the projects advanced by some Russian engineers, and he very properly

* *Survey*, no. 67, pp. 100–115.
** *Soviet Russia* (Hutcheson, 1953).

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stresses that Grinevetskii was not wholly original, that he has predecessors, though he went beyond them in a number of respects. A development plan *as such* can, of course, occur to anyone, including anti-Marxists, and especially in a country in which, for various historical reasons, the state plays a major economic role. An Egyptian research student of mine (Mr El Ghazali) presented an interesting dissertation in the course of which he surprised me (no doubt owing to my own ignorance) by discussing a most ambitious and comprehensive plan devised for Egypt by Mehemet Ali in the 1820s. Quite possibly the Japanese had some developmental ideas too in the period of the Meiji restoration. Whatever the value and limitations of these plans, Marx had nothing to do with them, naturally. To assert the contrary is almost (though not quite) as if someone claimed that ferrous metallurgy production is due to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Probably some silly fools did say this in 1952, though we all know that metallurgical techniques and the necessary inputs are much the same in capitalist countries. It is hardly worth spending a pennyworth of printers' ink to refute them. What *might* still be true is that the carrying out of plans and investments in an uncongenial environment requires 'strong stable government, ruthlessly devoted to the cause of industrialization' (Smolinsky's words) *and* with an ideological commitment such as would cause it to give priority to these over other calls on resources in a relatively poor country. All this is not for a moment to assert that there was or is no other road forward than the Leninist road. Nor can any sensible person deny that many Bolshevik policies were economically unsound and caused great waste of resources.

THE SECOND POINT OF criticism is more important. It seems to me that Smolinski contradicts himself. On the one hand, Grinevetskii is said to be 'market-orientated' throughout, and his approach is contrasted with the Soviet denial of 'price-and-market criteria'. But on the other hand his priorities are similar to the Soviets'; 'investment was to be concentrated first in a few strategic producers' goods industries' and his order of priorities 'had to be most strictly adhered to'. But surely this will not do at all. Such administratively determined priorities *do* contradict market indicators. No one, surely not Grinevetskii, would or could argue that, especially in the process of reconstruction after the war and civil war, 'fuel and power industries, metallurgy, industries supplying raw materials, railroads, would be the most profitable!? How happy would development economists be if this were so in *any* developing country! Granted that his calculations are based on an analysis of demand, the word 'demand' here includes the input-output consequences of his own plans (i.e. railways need rails, metallurgy requires iron ore, coalmines need pumps and pit-props). In *that* sense, even Stalin's plans were based on 'demand'. It is not enough to say, with Smolinski, that Russian backwardness was due to high-cost fuel, metal

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and freight transport, and that therefore his plans were based on market-and-price analysis. Of course everyone, even the Tsar, knew that (for instance) railways reduced transport costs in comparison with horse-drawn drays on muddy 'roads'. But, as a glance at Russian railway history would tell us, this did not make investment in railway construction the most *profitable* way of using money. Were it otherwise, the role of state finance and state guarantees in Russian railway-building would hardly have been so great. Costs were not high without objective reason.

In other words, Grinevetskii's analysis and developmental programme was *not* based on price-and-profit criteria, certainly not as these are understood by most Western economists. He does indeed take the future development of the market into account, he does indeed take prices much more seriously than the Bolsheviks did, especially (as Smolinski does rightly point out) *within* the priority sectors themselves, e.g. in deciding which fuel would it be cheaper to develop. However, the logic of his programme would *not* call for the adoption of the radical investment-criteria proposals of certain present-day reformers: he would surely advocate *different* rate-of-return criteria in different sectors, and might well have sympathized with Bazarov's proposal, in the twenties, to exempt certain key strategic sectors from the requirement that they 'pay'.

It would be of interest to the further discussion of the subject if Smolinski were to refine his interpretation a little. Really he cannot have it both ways, accepting both 'priorities strictly adhered to' *and* the market, without saying a great deal more about how they are to be reconciled. This problem is worrying many developmental planners, and is visibly also worrying Messrs. Kosygin, Baibakov and Co.

Nor is it clear by what means Grinevetskii could have enforced his priorities under private enterprise conditions, when he also assumed that Russia would be unable to adopt protectionist policies for political reasons.

Smolinski is, of course, perfectly right that what he calls 'initial conditions' play a vital role in determining a plan's priority and targets. This is because an economic *plan* (as distinct from pseudo-philosophical windbaggery) *must* be concerned with real resources, their scarcity or abundance, whether these be water, oil, managerial talent, timber or whatever. These are data, not of themselves ideological. Lenin saw this, but, Smolinski argues ,' Lenin's fellow-Marxist economists disagreed with him'. This would seem to need some documentation and argument. Which economists? That Lenin had no patience with 'boastful communists' is, of course, true. That some would-be planners in the war-communism period (and since) talked bunkum is also true. But what is there about Marx or Marxist economists which should predispose them to disregard 'initial conditions', or to adopt, once they thought about them at all, targets and priorities unrelated to resource

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endowment and development strategy? As one moves into the twenties, one does indeed find many Marxist schools contending. Some argued *against* the type of priorities which Grinevetskii had recommended, using market-criteria arguments in favour of giving priority to agriculture and industrial consumers' goods (Shanin, Sokolnikov, and to some extent, Bukharin). Such ideas as these resemble those of market-orientated development economists of today, not Grinevetskii's.

The task of reconciling market trends and development strategy is a great deal more complicated than Smolinski would have us believe. But we still owe him thanks for a most useful and thought-provoking article.

A REJOINDER

Leon Smolinski

NIHIL Novi me alienum esse puto, let alone when Nove speaks of Grinevetskii. It would take a book to answer some of his stimulating and incisive questions. In the meantime I am glad to have this opportunity to clarify a few points.

Grinevetskii's 1918 programme of economic development was destined for a capitalist market economy, with bourgeois democratic institutions. But its priorities and even specific investment choices are similar to the Soviet ones, although they were derived using different criteria and, obviously, were not based on Marxist theory but on a knowledgeable analysis of Russia's 'initial conditions'—its actual and prospective scarcity relationships.

Nove subscribes to my thesis that Marxism was not an important influence on early Soviet economic planning, but looks upon it as an axiom that does not have to be proved. He takes me to task for appraising G. M. Krzhizhanovsky's statement made in 1955 (not in 1952!) that—let me quote it for the fourth time—'the GOELRO Plan was built upon the granite foundations of Marxism–Leninism'. Professor Nove describes it as 'typical empty propagandist nonsense' which is 'hardly worth spending a pennyworth of printers' ink to refute'.

Should we ignore a statement by a distinguished architect of Soviet industrialization simply because we disagree with it? The mere fact that it has been used in Soviet propaganda does not necessarily make it false, and Krzhizhanovsky's background makes him rather well qualified to speak of GOELRO, of Marxism and of Leninism.[1] Nor is his claim so patently absurd as to dismiss it out of hand. I agree with Nove that it would be rather grotesque to look for Marxist influence in the Egyptian planners of the 1820s, in Peter the Great or in the Meiji planners. But

[1] He was, along with Lenin, one of the founders of 'Soyuz borby . . .', presided over the GOELRO Commission and then over Gosplan: he was at least as good a planner as Pogodin is a playwright.

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is there not at least one important difference between them and the Soviet system's directors of the 1920s? The former were not, while the latter *were*, Marxists. But is there perhaps something in Marxism which would preclude it from influencing economic plans? At the beginning of his comment Nove appears to hold this view, but towards the end he points out, quite correctly, that there is nothing in Marx or Marxism which would have this effect.

The role of Marxism in shaping Soviet economic policies is an interesting and important issue which can hardly be settled on *a priori* grounds. In some instances Marxian ideology may have been invoked (as was suggested by Alexander Gerschenkron) as a mere rationalization of policies adopted on other grounds. In others it may have played a more active role. It appears desirable to examine each important episode on its own merits and this is what I attempted to do in the case of the GOELRO Plan.

NOVE'S second point, or rather set of points, is of great interest and touches upon one of the key issues in the theory and practice of economic planning: the proper relationship between the plan's priorities and the market. Professor Nove takes issue with my description of Grinevetskii's plan as being market-oriented and of his priorities as being based on price-and-market criteria. If I understand Nove correctly, he believes that I exaggerate the difference between Grinevetskii's and the traditional Soviet approach to planning. In particular, according to Nove, Grinevetskii's analysis and his development programme are not based on price-and-profit criteria (although Nove does not offer an alternative interpretation). Consequently, Grinevetskii's recommendation that these priorities should be implemented in a market economy under private enterprise conditions is inconsistent, since 'such administrative priorities do contradict market indicators'. Nove does not make quite clear why they do, but judging from the context he may mean that market indicators would give priority to consumer goods' and not to producer goods' industries selected by Grinevetskii. Nor does Grinevetskii offer a solution how to reconcile markets and priorities.

To start with the last objection. One can hardly blame the Moscow professor for failing to settle this issue in his pioneering study if, as Nove justly reminds us in his next sentence, Messrs. Kosygin, Baibakov and Co. are still grappling with it now, 50 years and eight long-term plans later. Nor are investment priorities on the part of the planners incompatible with capitalist markets. They seem to coexist more or less successfully, e.g. in French planning, which P. Massé called 'less than imperative but more than indicative'.

In considering the remaining questions raised by Nove we might perhaps first distinguish between criteria used in formulating a plan and measures employed in carrying it out. The two do not have to coincide: a sophisticated price-and-profit analysis might conceivably

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result in the imposition of rationing.[2] Grinevetskii uses price-and-market analysis for the purpose of drawing his plan, but does not commit the planners to remain passive or to rely exclusively on market forces in its implementation. Concession grants, for one, would enable them to influence actively these forces if need be. The need for such interference appears, however, to be considerably smaller in Grinevetskii's system than in the Soviet-type economy, precisely because his priorities had not been 'administratively determined' but based on an analysis of relative costs, prices and markets. Nove's statement that these priorities necessarily contradict market indicators is more applicable to a Soviet-type economy than to Grinevetskii's plan.

Why? It appears to me that in this part of his comments Nove may not give sufficient attention to some essential differences between Grinevetskii's plan and Soviet-type development programmes. The former was to be mainly financed by foreign investors and to be implemented in a relatively open economy by profit-motivated privately owned enterprises. The latter were financed mainly by forced saving and implemented in a closed economy where, as Nove himself has shown us so well in his writings, the prevailing policy was to maximize output with a virtual disregard of cost and profit. No wonder that under these conditions, 'price relations between producer and consumer goods have no significance whatever as parameters for any decisions in a socialist economy. They neither influence the allocation of resources between investment and consumption sectors, nor do they affect investment decisions in particular industries, because those decisions are not governed by higher profitability in money terms.'[3] If Grinevetskii's approach was essentially similar to the Soviet and his 'analysis and developmental programme was *not* based on price-and-profit criteria' (Nove's italics), how would foreign capitalists be made to invest in planned loss industries? How would such industries survive in the face of foreign competition?

Just because he had fewer degrees of freedom at his disposal, Grinevetskii had to pay closer attention to investment criteria which Soviet-type planners often tend to disregard. Not so much because they are Marxists as because, on the one hand, they have a greater freedom of manoeuvre in sellers' markets financed with forced saving and, on the other hand, they lack adequate measures of relative scarcities.

AT the same time, neither Grinevetskii nor, I think, any real world development planner can be portrayed as a simple-minded, single-minded profit maximizer, that useful abstraction that haunts the diagrams of elementary price theory.

[2] Or, to use Nove's own fine example, 'the discovery that goods can be produced 30 per cent cheaper in some other country is far too often merely a prelude for the imposition of a 35 per cent import duty . . .' (A. Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, revised edition, Praeger, 1966, p. 199). Government measures which interfere with the price system may well be preceded by a cost-price analysis.

[3] Jan Lipinski, at a conference on 'Price Formation in Various Economies' organized by the International Economic Association.

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First, even in the case of an individual capitalist entrepreneur, 'long-term profit-or-loss calculations are quite imprecise and are therefore frequently buttressed by various macroeconomic considerations, such as the prospects of overall expansion of a national or regional economy, the likely fortunes of related industries . . .'.[4] National planners are bound to pay even more attention to external economies in their investment policies. In the case of Grinevetskii, if I interpret him correctly, profitability plays the role of a constraint rather than that of the maximand. Neither he nor I ever said that his priority sectors were 'the *most* profitable', although he apparently thought that they would be profitable enough to attract foreign investment and grow notwithstanding foreign competition. He says explicitly that in post-war Russia such branches of heavy industry as mining, basic metallurgy, and construction materials would be faced with more favourable demand conditions, would be in a better position to withstand foreign competition and would recover sooner than almost any consumer goods' industries other than food (*Poslevoennye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti*, 2nd ed., p. 102). He recommends that weak industries unable to hold their own should be allowed to wither away (p. 101). On similar grounds he abandons plans for the creation of some new industries to which he had given a top priority before the revolution. The general principle is that 'Russia cannot afford the luxury of investing deliberately in unprofitable ventures' (p. 95), which is rather different from the traditional Soviet approach.

An important exception to this general principle—and here Nove's point is very well taken—is investment in railroads or, to be more precise, in those new railroads which were assigned the task of opening new territories and creating new markets. Grinevetskii allows for their running at a loss 'during the first few years' of their operation and sets aside substantial subsidies for this purpose. And yet even in this case he would probably agree with Peter Wiles that large external economies do not render the price mechanism unnecessary,[5] and would dissociate himself from the Soviet planned loss industries, aged infants that have continued to receive subsidies for decades. Grinevetskii's treatment of canals also reminds me of Peter Wiles rather than—as it does Alec Nove—of Peter the Great: he held such ventures to be technologically feasible but favoured their postponement on the grounds of cost-and-market analysis.

Being a pragmatic man rather than a model builder, Grinevetskii is difficult to classify. What label should one pin on him? Unbalanced growth? Balanced growth? Growing balance? All three? A stage of unbalanced growth which gradually, through a process of cross-fertilization of markets, becomes more balanced? The labels themselves appear to be sufficiently controversial to allow for a number of combinations and

[4] G. Grossman, 'The Gold and the Sword', in H. Rosovsky, ed., *Industrialization in the Two Systems, Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron* (Wiley, 1966), p. 207.

[5] Cf. P. J. D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism* (Harvard, 1962), p. 95.

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permutations of this game. Or, one could play another fashionable game, applied in recent years to all and sundry development theorists from Adam Smith to Joseph Schumpeter, and ask how would Grinevetskii formulate his model, had he known differential equations. But then he *did* know differential equations.

The real question at stake, it appears to me, is rather how realistic was Grinevetskii's appraisal of the prospects of his priority sectors, and of his sources of finance. Would these sectors actually attract foreign concessionaires in post-war capitalist Russia? One would have to survey *ex posteriori* the elasticity of their 1918 expectations, a task from which even Mr Gallup is likely to shrink. One bit of evidence which seems to support Grinevetskii's appraisal of the situation has recently been uncovered: an application filed by an American consortium in 1917 for a concession. Its plans called for the construction of a network of large-scale metallurgical works in southern Russia and other projects including a railroad at the cost of 580 million rubles which the Americans thought would be extremely profitable. The consortium reports that 'it has found in Russia all the necessary conditions for a profitable and rational development of this business on a very large scale'.[6] Still it is by no means certain that Grinevetskii was justified in taking the supply of foreign funds virtually for granted and thus assuming away the key issue of 'the Great Industrialization Debate' of the 1920s, that of sources of finance.

Another relevant question is, as Nove justly points out, 'by what means Grinevetskii could have enforced his priorities under private enterprise conditions'. I have already considered this question from a more general viewpoint of whether there is a logical contradiction between priorities and private enterprise. But it is also possible to consider it from the viewpoint of specific historical conditions in Russia at that time. Could Grinevetskii's goals be realized by democratic means in the sociopolitical setting which he postulates? For example, would industrial workers acquiesce in low wages? Or 'was Stalin really necessary?' One wonders how far we can go in comparing the somewhat surrealist reality of the Stalinist experiment with a foregone alternative to it which has never been given the benefit of a test. One might perhaps argue that, with less need for forced saving and with democratic safeguards postulated by Grinevetskii and absent from Leninism, the need for and the likelihood of Stalinist measures were reduced. Had Stalin died in 1929 and had he left *his* industrialization recipe on his desk, one wonders how feasible it would now appear to us, known only on an *ex ante* basis and supplied with a critical commentary by, say, Premier Bukharin or President Kondratev.

TWO small points remain to be mentioned. Marxist economists who disagreed with Lenin on the GOELRO Plan were Kritsman, Larin

[6] R. Sh. Ganelin, 'Tsarism, burzhuazia i amerikansky kapital', *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 81, 1968, pp. 158 ff.

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and Milyutin, or three out of five economists-members of Gosplan. Their names were listed in my article, and their views were expressed, *inter alia*, in various issues of *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn*, from December 1920 to February 1921.

As for Alec Nove's statement that 'an economic *plan* (as distinct from pseudo-philosophical windbaggery) *must* be concerned with real resources, their scarcity or abundance', it expresses my feelings much better than I ever could. In fact, if I may, I will use it as a motto for my next article. As Nove would surely agree, it does not follow from his statement that economic plans in Soviet-type economies have been necessarily based on an adequate appraisal of relative scarcities of real resources. In this respect, Grinevetskii's plan compares favourably with, say, the Genplan, not to speak of the era when each East European economy was attempting to become a little Russia with a little Magnitogorsk of its own. Each of these countries had a very real but not a very realistic plan. It is an interesting question to what extent their inferiority to Grinevetskii's plan can be attributed to the fact that the latter was based on price-and-market analysis. He may just have been a better economist. But then, come to think of it, he was not an economist.

What better way then for two economists to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Grinevetskii's seminal study than to discuss his ideas? And one could hardly wish for a better informed and a more stimulating partner in such a discussion than Professor Nove. But should we not let Grinevetskii speak for himself? An English translation of his study is long overdue. I hope that a market-oriented university press, after a careful price-and-loss analysis, will publish Grinevetskii's book before its last existing Russian copies disintegrate completely and turn into an undecipherable *pulverem et umbram*.

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North of Ussuri

THE SOVIET PACIFIC BASTION

Violet Conolly

IN the mass of research literature on the Soviet Union now available in the West, regional studies on the whole make a very poor showing. As a result of this neglect even a vast and rich area like the Soviet Far Eastern Region has been largely ignored, except in moments of border tension with Japan before the war or with China since the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Region is, of course, remote, and source material relatively exiguous, while for years under Stalin it was completely shut off from the outside world.

The situation has, however, improved in recent years. A trickle of foreign visitors and delegations have visited selected sites in Yakutia and towns in the south like Komsomolsk and Khabarovsk and, in spite of many gaps, there is a fair volume of statistical and other documentary materials about the Region including some fascinating and illuminating travelogues on the new mining areas in the north, which were virtually unexplored until recently.[1]

The area is the focal point of many domestic and international problems of compelling interest, and as the base of the many-sided and growing Soviet ambitions in the Pacific region its significance extends far beyond the Soviet Pacific frontiers. Strategically, the Soviet Union's post-war position in the Far East has been changed dramatically by the elimination of Japan from Manchuria and by her replacement by communist China as the main source of military tension on the Amur-Ussuri frontier.

The conflict with China seems also to have given a new spurt to the lagging development of the natural resources of the Soviet Far Eastern Region. The Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 concentrated its economic directives for this Region on the extractive industries, e.g. gold, tin, diamonds, etc., but entirely failed to mention the grossly neglected infrastructure of housing, agriculture, communications and other amenities on which the success of these mining industries and the establishment of stable cadres to run them so largely depends. In the following year, however, the Party Central Committee promulgated a series of much more practical and necessary measures to ensure the 'integrated development' of the Soviet Far East (*Izvestia*, 30 July 1967). The need to improve agriculture and local food supplies and generally to raise living standards in order to attract stable labour cadres were all duly recognized. Emphasis was laid on the development of the Region's oil, gas, chemical, timber and cellulose industries with a view to drawing the Region rapidly into trade with the 'Pacific Rim'

[1] These travelogues appear from time to time in *Dalni Vostok* (Khabarovsk), the organ of the RSFSR Writers' and Khabarovsk Writers' Organization, and in *Polyarnaya Zvezda*, the organ of the Writers' Union of the Yakutsk ASSR.

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countries. Briefly, the Party was taking more down to earth steps to make the Far Eastern Region a stronger and more reliable Pacific outpost.

THE Soviet Far Eastern Region is the largest territorial unit in the Soviet Union. It now includes the Yakutsk ASSR, which alone is about six times as large as France, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands seized from Japan after the last war. In all it constitutes a land mass of some six million sq. kms. These Soviet territorial acquisitions were valuable economically and strategically. Southern Sakhalin contained well-developed paper and cellulose industries and the Kurile Islands, stretching from Kamchatka to the northern tip of the Japanese homelands, formed strategic 'boundary posts' along the Sea of Okhotsk.

This enormous area is sparsely populated. The overall density is about 1·4 per sq.km., falling as low as 0·2 per sq.km. in parts of Yakutia. In 1964 the total population was about five million, considerably less than that of Holland, although the Soviet Far East is incomparably larger, about 12 times the size of France. This population belongs predominantly to the younger age groups. It is very unevenly distributed and tends to be concentrated in the large towns of Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk and in an increasing number of new mining sites such as Mirny and Aikhal (of diamond fame) in the west and the new tin and gold settlements of Chukotka in the north-east.

Both in agriculture and industry there is an acute lack of labour. The state-assisted migration and settlement schemes, including bonuses and higher rates of pay and various amenities for workers in the Far East and north, have been so mismanaged that they have not produced the stable voluntary labour cadres which it was hoped would replace the former forced labour of *Dalstroi* (eliminated in 1957–58). Living conditions are still too primitive and the disparities between rates of pay and cost of living too great to attract the majority of migrant workers to settle permanently in the Far East (or Siberia). The result has been that for some years more people have been leaving the Far East than arriving there. The situation had become so serious and costly that in 1967 the Soviet government scrapped the previous system of organized recruitment for Siberia and the Far East and upgraded the material incentives for settlers in the more inclement areas. Thus from January 1968 they were exempted from the agricultural tax and granted 4,000 rubles credit at the place of settlement for the construction of a house and other pecuniary benefits, including free transport for a wide range of family dependants (who were not hitherto encouraged to accompany settlers) and improved pension rights. It is too early to say what effect these facilities for family migration will have on the labour situation. Some months later, however, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 15 May 1968 was complaining that labour turnover was the scourge of the construction sites and other enterprises and denounced the practice of 'annually transferring thousands and thousands of seasonal

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workers—lumberjacks and fish processors—to the north and Far East without previously having studied the conditions and opportunities for keeping them in these areas'. 'Is not this tantamount', asked the newspaper, 'to deliberately promoting turnover?' At the same time *Stroitelnaya Gazeta* of 19 May reported unfavourably on the situation in the Amur construction trust, which is largely responsible for providing housing for new agricultural migrants in this main grain producing area of the Far East. Two thousand eight hundred families were scheduled to settle in the Amur oblast in 1968, but owing to the heavy turnover of labour in the Amur construction trust 900 workers were then lacking, so these families' chances of being promptly and decently housed seemed poor.

Soviet sources provide abundant information on the unimaginative bureaucratic approach and bungling of the various organizations involved in the recruitment, settlement and supply of labour for the Far Eastern Region. The actual selection of migrant workers seems to be extremely casual. Thus the wrong types of people are too often recruited, such as those with a tendency to neurasthenia or alcoholism who are an almost certain liability in the more primitive areas with a very harsh climate, or people from the relatively mild climate of some towns in European Russia and the Ukraine who have more difficulties in adjusting to Far Eastern conditions and privations than the inhabitants of Russian villages and small towns (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 September 1968). The supply organizations seem hopelessly inefficient and dilatory in getting the necessary goods to the remoter mining and construction sites. As far as luxuries like fruit and flowers are concerned, they are often beaten to the post by enterprising speculators who understand the needs of, for example, Kolyma miners, with plenty of rubles in their pockets and nothing to buy, and seize their opportunity. It is incredible that up to the present the supply organizations have been unable to provide special clothing for the severe climatic conditions of the Region and that the construction trust has shown little or no flexibility in adapting housing plans to northern conditions. Judging from illustrations in the Soviet press, housing in Kamchatka and Magadan oblast is identical in design to the multi-storied blocks in Moscow. It is little wonder therefore that so many migrants seek the first opportunity of moving west to better domestic conditions, in spite of the high wages offered in the Region. Nevertheless, despite the 'flitters' and the acute need of labour, the overall picture is of an increase in population which between 1959 and 1965 amounted to 14·6 per cent and which showed a rise of about 80 per cent between 1939 and 1960 (according to Soviet official statistics).[2] There is a

[2] In spite of the harsh climate some of the largest population increases have been in the mining areas of the north-east where rates of pay are high. Thus in the nine years from 1959 to 1968 the population of Magadan oblast increased fivefold and that of the Chukotka-Bilibin region more than twentyfold (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 10, 1968, p. 149).

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tendency among West Europeans with no experience of the north to make a bogy of its harsh cold climate, but many Canadians and Russians, given decent living conditions and insulated housing, settle happily there and would not live elsewhere.

The ethnic composition of the sparse population of the Far East is mixed with a now preponderant Slav element. Russians and Ukrainians form the hard core of the mining and industrial communities and also of the *sovkhozy* and *kolkhozy* of the Ussuri and Amur valleys and of the Pacific fishing fleets. The dwindling remainders of the original native inhabitants—the Chukchi, Eveny, Tunguz (or Evenk) peoples now amount to about 60,000 in all—are heavily outnumbered by Russian migrants in their homelands. This is most noticeable in the extreme Far Eastern land of Chukotka, where rich mineral discoveries have recently drawn numbers of Russian technicians and workers to operate the mines. The above figures for the native population do not include the Yakuts, who are regarded as a race apart from these 'small peoples of the north', and who are numerically the largest and the most advanced of the northern tribes. They are a compact group and have the status of an autonomous republic. Their numbers remained almost stationary at about 226,053 between the 1897 and 1959 censuses, while the Slav group increased from 30,000 to 230,058 between 1926 and 1959.

These reindeer peoples of the north who suffered great hardships and losses during the arbitrary collectivization drive which took no account of their herding needs and techniques have in recent years acquired a place in the economy as suppliers of meat and transport to isolated mining communities. A much more sensible attitude is now adopted towards them by Soviet officials who have learned to recognize their traditional skills as reindeer breeders and masters of all that pertains to the tundra way of life.

The Chinese, who were formerly to be found throughout the Amur and the Primorsk areas, have all disappeared, expelled since the Second World War to Manchuria or elsewhere in China. The departure of the Chinese, who had a very bad reputation as extortionate small traders and gold smugglers, will not have been regretted locally. The Korean population has also been depleted, many having been deported in the late thirties to Uzbekistan where they are reported in the Central Asian press to be successful rice farmers. According to the 1959 census there are still some 40,000 Koreans in this Region, but no Japanese remain there.

THE 6,500-km.-long Pacific seaboard of the Soviet Far Eastern Region, so tenuously connected with the Russian centres of government and supply, and its proximity to the USA, China and Japan, make it an area of major strategic importance to the Soviet Union. The north-east frontier zone of Chukotka is separated from Alaska only by the 30-miles-wide Bering Strait, yet in spite of Moscow's anti-American hostility

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and suspicion the USA has figured less prominently in Soviet Far Eastern defence publicity than either imperialist Japan before the war or communist China at the present time. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the publication of Mao's frontier claims against the Soviet Union in July 1964, which listed the Amur lands among the territories unjustly wrested by Russia from an impotent China in the last century, both sides have reported provocations and tension on the Amur-Ussuri frontier. It is often forgotten that at this time China did agree to respect the status quo pending a renegotiation of her frontiers with the Soviet Union. But the Russians were quite intransigent. They refused to negotiate these frontiers except in regard to what various Kremlin spokesmen called 'minor rectifications'. Then in June 1968 Gromyko returned to this question and stated that China had refused to consider some Soviet proposals (which do not seem to have been published) for the joint utilization of border rivers. These Russian proposals were probably aimed at easing the precarious situation created for Soviet shipping by the Chinese regulations for controlling foreign shipping on border rivers issued in April 1966. But little or nothing is known about the effect of these regulations or how the situation has developed since 1966.

The Soviet rejoinder to China's claims in the Amur area is that China never really exercised political power or even cultural influence over the native inhabitants of the Amur and Ussuri region. Soviet historians and archeologists have been marshalled to support the view that the native art and cultures of this region reveal no trace of Chinese influence and have remained self-contained indigenous phenomena throughout the ages. This political imbroglio has suddenly given new significance to the artifacts, pots, skills, etc., of native peoples like the Nanai (Gold) or Ulch as pawns in the Sino-Soviet frontier dispute.

The noisy recriminations and abuse which fill the mass media of both sides in this conflict make it impossible to pinpoint the actual state of play between the Russians and the Chinese in the Far East. Soviet garrisons have undoubtedly been strengthened on the more vulnerable stretches of the frontier, though to what extent is not known. The Soviet frontier with Manchuria has been reinforced by the Soviet-Mongolian military pact of 1966 which officially permitted Red Army forces to be stationed in Outer Mongolia in addition to the troops already working there. At the military parade in Ulan Bator in November 1967 Russian rockets were seen for the first time and the establishment of an intermediate-range ballistic missile site east of Choibalsan, a town near the Mongolian border, was reported. But in the present unpredictable climate of Sino-Soviet relations these measures are probably an insurance against border clashes rather than an indication of Soviet militancy.

Both sides accuse the other of violating their land and air space. A recent Chinese protest (NCNA, 16 September 1968) listed some 40

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Soviet aircraft sorties into the Heilungkiang province for 'reconnaissance, harassment and provocation' between 9 and 29 August 1968 and stressed the 'increasingly concentrated, barefaced nature of these attacks'. For their part the Soviets have come out with lurid tales of Chinese provocations. The worst of these seem to be the incidents at the Pogranichny frontier station on the Ussuri line in 1967, when allegedly hundreds of howling Red Guards and villagers crossed into Soviet territory and committed all kinds of vandalism. This story appeared in Konstantin Simonov's Far Eastern report in *Pravda* (17–19 July 1967) and was also picked up locally by Hugo Portisch and described in his excellent series of articles in the *Wiener Kurier* (14–24 June 1968). Portisch was told by local officials that the Chinese side of the frontier had been evacuated to some 30–50 kms., while the Soviets, on the other hand, had encouraged selected colonization of their border zone with special benefits, rates of pay, etc., for settlers.

TURNING to Japan, it is interesting to note the ambivalent position she holds in Soviet policy, whether viewed in the context of Soviet policy towards the USA in East Asia or in the strictly local framework of the Soviet Far Eastern Region. I am only concerned here with the latter position.

Soviet-Japanese economic relations in the Far East have become increasingly close since the worsening of the situation with China. There is, nevertheless, deep resentment in Japan about Soviet delimitation of fishing zones in the northern Pacific waters where traditionally the Japanese fishermen were masters.

The relationship between the Japanese and the Soviet Far Eastern mainland is much more satisfactory and in many ways the resources of the two countries could be mutually complementary there. The Soviet invitation to the Japanese in 1961 to participate on a co-partnership basis in the economic development of Siberia and the Far East was an extraordinary move in view of the former Soviet suspicion of and hostility towards Japan, and seemed at first to open up vast prospects of economic co-operation. The series of projects for this far-ranging economic co-partnership originally included the construction of an oil pipe-line from Irkutsk to a Soviet Pacific port, Japan to supply the pipe and other equipment and to be paid in oil; joint development of the Okha (Sakhalin) natural gas as feed for the new Japanese petrochemical industry; the development of the lumber industry and the rich Udokan copper mines in the east Siberian wilderness north of Chita; and the piping of Yakut natural gas to Nakhodka and shipment to Japan. All of these projects have now been under consideration for nearly eight years. The only contract which has actually been signed (July 1968) is a plan for the development of lumber in the Amur province. According to this agreement, Japan will supply the Soviet Union with machinery and consumer goods valued at $163 million during a three-year period starting next year and the USSR will ship some eight million

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cu.m. of timber, equivalent to the imports from Japan during the next five years. The total quota of consumer goods supplied by Japan will be worth $30 million (*Asahi Evening News*, 7 November 1968). The negotiations between the Soviets and the Japanese on these projects have been marked by sharp disagreements regarding credits, capital investment levels, prices, etc. This is not very surprising considering the magnitude of most of these proposals, involving large capital investments and the creation in many cases of an indispensable infrastructure of communications, housing and other amenities. The Japanese may also have in mind the risk of a sudden Soviet change of attitude to Japanese private enterprise, problems of labour relations under communist law and other such reservations, all of which might result in heavy financial losses to firms engaged in this enterprise. Both sides seem to have taken an increasingly tougher stand as the negotiations proceeded. The Japanese are apparently weighing the pros and cons of alternative and perhaps safer investment sources for minerals in Australia, Alaska and the Canadian Yukon. But the Russians seem to be under the impression that because Japan needs to import such large quantities of iron ore, copper, oil and lumber for her booming industries she will conclude a deal with them at any price to obtain access to supplies from the Soviet Far East and Siberia. They have misjudged the situation in Japan, and it is indicative of the way the wind is blowing that no government credits are to be made available for these co-partnership schemes.

The position in regard to Japanese exports of consumer goods to the Soviet Far Eastern littoral is much more promising and this trade will no doubt continue to increase as it has in recent years. Among other groups, a consortium led by Mitsubishi has been formed to import Soviet marine products in exchange for Japanese fish processing machinery. It is significant of the enhanced status of Japan in the Far Eastern Region that a Japanese Consulate General was established in Nakhodka in 1967 (the only foreign mission in the area); a joint Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee meets regularly to iron out Far Eastern trade problems; and an Import-Export Laboratory has been set up in the Complex Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Khabarovsk to study trade with the 'Pacific Rim', in the first place with Japan.

Soviet-Japanese coastal trade on a barter basis is administered by a new office of *Dalintorg* opened for this purpose in Nakhodka in 1964 and regulated by separate protocols to the Soviet-Japanese trade agreements. Japanese businessmen frequently visit Khabarovsk and a few other towns in the Region to promote trade by exhibitions of Japanese goods, and their visits are reciprocated by Soviet trade officials.

Soviet ports and shipping are being expanded and modernized to cope with the projected trade drive with the 'Pacific Rim' countries,

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though much still remains to be done to improve loading and warehousing facilities, including the lack of refrigeration on the Maritime Coast. The Far Eastern tanker fleet has been enlarged and additional timber carriers have been built in Rumania so that the Far Eastern Steamship Company's timber-carrying fleet of 40 ships is reported to be the largest in the Soviet Union. They carry some five million cu.m. of timber annually to Pacific basin countries. There are various indications that the Soviets intend to extend these Far Eastern shipping operations into the south-east Pacific. The Singapore-Soviet Shipping Agency, a branch of the Far Eastern Steamship Company and operating on a joint Singapore Chinese-Russian basis, was organized early in 1968 for trade with South-East Asia and India. Later there were press reports that the Russians were competing with British and European shipping lines with 36 cut-price sailings a year in the Australian trade (*The Times*, 21 January 1969). A settlement has apparently been reached on this matter by which the Russians have agreed to cut their sailings to 12 a year northbound and rather fewer southbound. Plans have been approved for an icebreaker train ferry to operate throughout the year between the Soviet mainland and Sakhalin, but they do not seem to have got off the drawing board yet. The Soviet attempt in 1967 to open the Arctic North Sea Route to commercial shipping from European ports to Japan met with no response. The risks involved for foreign firms from the unpredictable ice conditions and the lack of specially ice strengthened cargo ships probably outweighed the advantages of price and time offered by the Soviet sponsors of the route.

SOVIET political strategy in the Far East and 'Pacific Rim' trade depend largely on the successful development of the Soviet Far Eastern Region. It is an area of great mineral wealth with vast reserves of Soviet gold, diamonds, tin, tungsten, mercury and mica, to which increasing importance is attached in Moscow. Other natural resources are large and valuable stocks of timber, furs (mink, ermine, seal and black, silver and Arctic fox) and the largest fisheries in the Soviet Union. Owing to the inaccessibility of many of these minerals and the extremely harsh climate of the major gold, diamond and tin areas, exploitation is beset with many problems, in the first place the retention of stable cadres of labour. Here as elsewhere in the Soviet Union a veil of secrecy surrounds statistics of production and costs of non-ferrous and precious metals. But the Far East is recognized as the chief source of Soviet gold with some 60–65 per cent to its credit. Production in the Kolyma mines (the chief gold region of the country) has increased by 86 per cent in the last five years (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 September 1968) and extraction of gold in the Magadan oblast has almost doubled since 1959 (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 10, 1968, p. 148). These results correspond to great pressure to increase gold production in the Far East since the Soviet gold reserves were depleted through payments for large purchases of foreign grain. Nevertheless, there is a continuous

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stream of complaints in Soviet sources of 'lagging enterprises' in the Far Eastern gold industry and that output might be much increased if worsening conditions and mining machinery were improved. The older gold mines in the Kolyma and Aldan group (in Yakutia) have been reinforced by a newly operated mining belt stretching from Kular in north-western Yakutia to the Chukotsk mines in the extreme north-east of the Region. This so-called 'Golden Bulge' (*Zolotaya Duga*) is also extremely rich in tin and tungsten, and until recently was no better known than 'the mountains on the moon'. The former Soviet deficiency in tin which necessitated large imports has now been cut down to a few thousand tons owing to the output from these Far Eastern deposits. The centre of the tin mining area lying between the Yana and Indigirka rivers is Batagai, which has a concentration plant and an expanding 'townlet in the taiga' where there were formerly only rough concentration camp hutments for the unfortunates who worked these Arctic mines under *Dalstroi*.

The western Yakut tundra has also proved exceptionally rich in diamond 'pipes'. The chief sites of this new diamond industry are at Mirny, Aikhal and Udachny, all well within the Arctic circle and remote from organized communications or supply centres. In spite of these difficulties a processing plant has been built at Mirny and there are ambitious plans to protect the workers in the processing plant and at home from the ferocious local frosts by special new insulation techniques. Illustrations of these new diamond towns in which the inhabitants are to live entirely under cover were published in a Soviet pamphlet for the Montreal Exhibition. But they have been dismissed as 'sensational' even by some sceptical Soviet critics.

The cost of mining gold and diamonds in the harsh and primitive conditions of the Soviet Far East must be many times higher than in a more temperate climate. When the world price of gold was pegged at $35 per ounce a Swiss expert estimated the Soviet cost price at about $80 (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 23 July 1967), and diamond mining costs would probably be equally high. The gold mining costs must be enormously increased by bad management, ludicrously inadequate mining equipment and the above-mentioned heavy labour turnover. In order to attract labour to the state mining enterprises exorbitant rates of pay are offered to metal workers, carpenters, chauffeurs, etc., far above the legal rates (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 September 1968). The *starateli* or pan-handling private gold prospectors produce their gold, apparently, more cheaply and efficiently than the state enterprises because they work longer hours, do not down tools for holidays and will take on any job that needs doing so as 'to get rich quick' from the sale of their gold finds to the state.

The Soviet technical supply organizations concerned with the gold industry seem at last to have recognized the need for specialized

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machinery for the north-eastern mines which operate in Arctic conditions (a need which has been stressed by experts for years), but the factory designed to manufacture this equipment at Cheboksary is not yet built. Meanwhile the annual loss from the lack of specialized equipment is estimated by Soviet experts at the huge figure of 400 million rubles. A lamentable picture of the present state of affairs was revealed at the second conference on the development problems of Magadan oblast last summer (*Problemy Ekonomiki*, no. 10, 1968, p. 149). 'Mass produced, standard "non-northern" equipment in a low temperature in permafrost soil cannot be efficiently used in the conditions of the north-east', declared the conference rapporteur. 'Here it should be specialized, powerful, reliable, highly-productive, transportable, easily repaired with an increased margin of safety. . . . At the present time the north-east virtually has no "northern" equipment, although it has been discussed for many years. This costs the national economy dear. For example, the basic machine in the Kolyma gold fields is the bulldozer constructed on the lines of a low-powered tractor which is specifically designed for agricultural work. According to expert opinion it has proved unsuitable for use in mining operations owing to its low power, frequent breakdowns and long stoppages. With such machines the planned fourfold increase in mining work in the north-east is hardly possible. . . . This description of bulldozers applies also in their several ways to the majority of other types of earth-moving, mining and transport machines.'

Heavy metallurgy in the Far Eastern Region lags far behind the non-ferrous industries both in the development of the raw material basis for the manufacture of iron and steel and of the processing industries. This is so despite the fact that there are large deposits of coking coal in south Yakutia and iron mines nearby at Aldan and in the Amur basin and elsewhere in the Region, while the enormous coal mines of the Lena basin have so far scarcely been tapped. The question of a Far Eastern metallurgical base has been under consideration for some years and seems at last to have been decided, at least in principle. Meanwhile the Region is chronically short of heavy metal, a large percentage of which has to be imported from western Siberia and further afield which is costly and a heavy drain on the already overloaded railways. The only local steel works is the old *Amurstal* works built during the first five-year plan in the early thirties. It had no blast furnaces originally and worked on local scrap metal and pig iron from Manchuria (probably no longer available). *Amurstal* is now being expanded to include a new continuous steel casting works and a blast furnace to make its own pig iron. It was experiencing an acute shortage of scrap metal for its open hearth furnaces early in 1968. The potentially very promising scheme for the joint operation of a Sino-Soviet Amur iron and steel industry based on iron and coal on both sides of the frontier and linked with a vast hydro-electric power project has now been in cold storage

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for some years owing to the Sino-Soviet conflict. This scheme would have made excellent economic sense and will surely be revived when Sino-Soviet relations improve.

The oil, natural gas, coal and water-power resources of the Soviet Far East are far in excess of the Region's present requirements and are for the most part awaiting exploitation. The most active oil industry is in Sakhalin, with an annual production of about two million tons. This oil is important for mainland factories and plants and about 10 per cent is exported annually to Japan. An oil pipe-line is now being constructed from Okha to Komsomolsk. There is an enormous oil reserve in Yakutia but so far no extraction plans. A start has been made with the exploitation of the Lena-Vilyui natural gas fields and an experimental pipe-line 300 km. long now carries the gas over permafrost ground to Yakutsk and Pokrovsk. If the scheme now under consideration for Japanese participation in the further development of this gas materializes, the pipe-line would be continued to a point convenient for shipping the gas to Japan. This would be a costly but apparently technically feasible operation.

THE great rivers of the Far Eastern Region—the Lena, Yana, Kolyma and the Amur—are estimated to contain at least a fifth of the total USSR hydro-power, though the power development in the Region is relatively very small. The Vilyui GES is being built at Chernishevski, a growing town in the taiga, in extremely difficult conditions. It is to supply the adjacent diamond industry sites of west Yakutia: Mirny, Aikhal and Udachny. It was opened in 1967 after many postponements.

In the north-eastern gold mines development of lode mining is being hampered by a shortage of electric power which is described by some as the 'Achilles heel' of the industry. A small nuclear power station is being built at one of these mining centres, Bilibino, to generate electricity for the Chukotsk mines, but a much more powerful station or stations is needed. All the equipment for the Bilibino station has either to be flown in or brought over the 300-km.-long winter ice road from Zeleny Mys on the Kolyma delta. In the south of the Region most of the power is supplied by small thermal stations for which there are abundant coal supplies.

The Soviet Far Eastern fisheries are a very valuable asset to the Union economy, supplying one-third of the total Soviet catch or 2·3 million tons in 1967, and some 40 per cent of Soviet canned fish including large exports of Kamchatkan crab and salmon and other fish. It is hoped to extend the export market to include Japan and South-East Asia when Soviet domestic fish consumption is satisfied. These fish supplies also contribute substantially to the poor and wholly inadequate local food supplies.

The Soviets now dominate the north Pacific waters formerly controlled by the Japanese, who also worked a string of canneries on the

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Soviet Far Eastern mainland until expelled after the First World War. An uneasy situation prevails between Japanese and Soviet fishery interests and fishermen because of the declining ceiling fixed annually for Japanese fishermen at Soviet-Japanese conferences and because of Soviet rough handling and arrests of these fishermen caught outside the fixed boundaries. It is indeed an irony of fate that the Japanese are building refrigerated ships and other sophisticated fishing equipment for their Soviet rivals in these fisheries.

Apart from the north Pacific, where Soviet fishing interests have increased enormously at the expense of the Japanese, the Soviets are now looking for a larger share of the south Pacific catch, estimated at half of the world's fish production, of which the Soviet Far Eastern fisheries' share is only eight per cent (*Pravda*, 16 February 1969). Dissatisfaction was recently expressed by the head of the chief directorate of *Dalryb* that specialized ships for pelagic fishing were not being built and that there were delays in equipping the Far Eastern fishing base ports of Nakhodka, Preobrazhenie and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka for the expansion of the fishing industry (here again lack of housing for the workers was at the root of the delays).

The Soviets have had little success in establishing a local food base in the Far East founded on more productive agriculture. Costs are high and most food grains have the lowest yields in the USSR. A large part of the Region, being in the permafrost zone, is unsuitable for arable farming, though some special strains of vegetables can now be produced even as far north as Verkhoyansk owing to the short but intensely hot summer season, yet in the better placed southern areas agriculture is at the mercy of the monsoon and flooding and is also extremely inefficiently organized. The result is that large quantities of food grains had to be imported from west Siberia and the Kazakh Virgin Lands. Now, however, following the harvest failures of 1964–65, it seems to have been decided in principle to continue the imports of grain from Australia and Canada as a more economic and satisfactory means of supplying the Far East. A stable food supply is increasingly important for the success of the 'integrated development' of the Region and its growing industrial population. The planning organs seem to be considering this problem more seriously now than formerly. For example, it has been decided to build a fertilizer plant to supply Far Eastern farms with fertilizers which have long been in short supply and which have had to be imported at great cost from Siberian or European Russian plants. *Pravda* sharply criticized the state of agriculture in the Maritime Krai and in particular the lack of 'skilled farming'. It concluded: 'The planned growth of many important branches of industry and the further strengthening of the economy of the territory are unthinkable without a commensurate development of agriculture.'

Astronomical statistics often appear in Soviet sources about the wealth of timber in the southern areas of the Far East, though

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apparently large areas have never been properly surveyed. More soberly it has been estimated at about 18 per cent of the Union stocks of standing timber but at only five per cent of Soviet timber output. After years of wasteful working efforts are now being made to put the Far Eastern timber industry on a more efficient basis and in the first place to reduce the percentage of unprocessed logs in the total production. The percentage of sawn timber produced and exported is to be greatly increased and a number of wood chemical plants are being built. The first wood chemical complex in the Soviet Far East (apart from the cellulose-paper factories taken over from the Japanese in Karafuto) is now being constructed in Amursk, a new town between Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk. The first section of the cellulose-carton plant, with an annual capacity of 75,000 tons, went into operation in 1967 and the second, with double this capacity, started in 1968. The Novomikhailovka wood chemistry combine is now being built in the Ussuri taiga with technical assistance from Poland. This combine will be equipped to produce more than 20 different items from timber waste and the first project to begin production is expected to be the rosin extraction works. The first chip-board factory in the Soviet Far East is planned for Nakhodka using imported Japanese equipment. When in full production these various projects should put this formerly stagnant industry on a new footing. Meanwhile the sophisticated paper industry inherited from the Japanese in Karafuto remains the main source of paper and cellulose produced and exported from the Soviet Far East. The exports of sawn Siberian pine and cedar to Japan and Australia could be greatly increased by more attention to the market requirements of these countries, and there is also a big potential market for timber in the largely treeless countries of the 'Pacific Rim', including India. The directives of the Twenty-third Party Congress specifically called for an all-round development of the Region's timber industry with an eye to increasing the Soviet share in this market.

One of the greatest obstacles to the development of the resources of the Soviet Far East, not least of the timber industry, is the primitive state of transport throughout many of its vast roadless spaces. The only main railway line in the entire region is the Amur spur of the old Trans-Siberian built in 1916, to which extensions were made in 1945 to Sovetskaya Gavan, Komsomolsk and Nakhodka (just in time, incidentally, to rush Red Army troops across the Tartary Strait and seize southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands from the Japanese). The announcement in 1966 that a great new line, the *Sevsib*, would be built some hundreds of miles north of the Trans-Siberian railway to link Tyumen in west Siberia with a Pacific port should eventually open up vast areas of Siberia and the Far East hitherto only accessible by air or river or even to some extent almost inaccessible for development. Little is known about the progress of this track but it was

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originally scheduled for completion in 20 years. In spite of the construction difficulties of this big rail project, there is little doubt that the Russians who are famous long-distance railway builders will eventually add this track to their triumphs.

The lack of railways and good roads (apart from the 7,000-km.-long arterial road, built by concentration camp labour and linking the Magadan and Aldan goldfields with Bolshoi Never on the Trans-Siberian railway) is largely made good by the far-flung penetration of the Region by aviation. Fares are relatively cheap and practically every inhabited hamlet has its airstrip and air services to link it with the main towns like Yakutsk and Khabarovsk, to which the trunk airlines from Moscow fly regular services and continue further east to Kamchatka and Sakhalin. In the present state of communications in the Far East, the Lena, the Amur and other local rivers are a great asset and are much used for passenger and cargo transport, especially in summer when the melting ice turns large areas transversed by 'winter ice roads' into impassable marsh and bog. A speedy solution of the road problem is hampered by the enormous cost of building roads through the taiga, estimated at 500,000 rubles for one kilometre of first class road.

THE Soviet government's attitude to the development of the natural wealth of the Far East has for years fluctuated between extremes of interest and seeming indifference to its fortunes. External pressure from China or Japan may cause a heightening of interest and activity, while competing domestic claims on limited investment resources may equally well cause a tightening of financial support for Far Eastern projects. Yet all the time very large capital investment is required to bring the resources of the Region to a stage of profitable production. The present critical situation with China may to some extent explain the fact that the original somewhat vague directives of the draft Five-Year Plan (1966), giving priority to the need 'for further increase in the extraction industries, i.e. gold, tin, wolfram, mercury, diamonds, mica', were reinforced by a decree in July 1967 containing more urgent and explicit instructions for the integrated development of the Region. This means that attention at the highest level at least is being given to developing the Region's food and light industries, chemicals, timber and transport, while there is a new emphasis on the importance of raising living standards and developing trade with the 'Pacific Rim' countries. These objectives will absorb much increased investment but there has been no announcement that additional funds will be made available to finance this impetus to development in the Far East.

Until 1963, at least, investment in the Soviet Far Eastern Region since the end of the war had been considerably below the Soviet average. Apart from the national need for valuable commodities such as gold and tin, there were grounds for the Soviet authorities to regard investment in this Region with a cautious eye. The number of enterprises

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regularly underfulfilling production plans or delaying construction dates years beyond schedule was high, productivity of labour was generally low and many plants worked at a loss which had to be covered by state subsidies. A recent article in *Sovetskaya Rossia* (19 September 1968) hinted that financial difficulties were impeding economic progress. It was not, however, clear whether these difficulties arose from local bureaucratic obstruction or the failure of the central organs to make the necessary financial provision for the economic development which is now apparently the order of the day.

In peering into the future of the Region, where admittedly the difficulties confronting the Soviet planners are formidable, the conclusion on the record is inescapable; that nothing will change here very fast until there is a completely new approach on the part of all the official administrations concerned, i.e. with labour recruitment, supply, housing, schools and other amenities for the workers. All have shown a degree of incompetence which would not be tolerated in big business developing new resources under capitalist conditions of profit and loss. Aramco, developing the oil reserves in the deserts of Southern Arabia, is a case in point. There is no labour problem there comparable to the flight of labour from the Soviet Far East. Priority is given in the first instance to the living conditions of the workers, to housing, appropriate food and clothing, piped water, etc. There is no question of workers living in the sort of hutments which are so often the initial lot of Soviet migrant workers to Far Eastern mining and construction sites.

The Soviet Far Eastern Region is now a challenge to Russian bureaucracy. The experts and especially those of the Siberian department of the Academy of Sciences clearly realize the deficiencies of the present situation and time and again have put forward proposals for a radical new approach to the development problems of the Region. The auspices are good for more concentrated attention on the area than hitherto, bringing accelerated development in its train. A major factor in the situation is the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power with ambitions in regard to Pacific trade and generally greater involvement in the economic life of the area. The Soviet Far Eastern Region has long been a sleeping partner in the 'Pacific Rim', but it may surprise the world in a few decades by its dynamic impact on its neighbours.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

COLLECTIVE LACK OF LEADERSHIP

Leonard Schapiro

THERE is, or was, a brand of toothpaste in the United States which was sold in three sizes, marked respectively 'large', 'gigantic', and 'mammoth'. A request for a small tube therefore produced an article clearly marked 'large'. Evidently the sales psychology experts had discovered that this simple expedient appealed to the customer. The experts of Agitprop concerned to sell Soviet Party history to the public apparently take the same view. There are accordingly no bad periods in the history of the CPSU—only good, excellent, and superlative. The latest recruit to the rewriting of Soviet Party history, whose subject is what is called 'collective leadership' in the Soviet Union today, faithfully follows this principle.[1] He is concerned to rebut several suspicions that may have arisen in the minds of the more critical elements among the Soviet public—that the origin of much of Stalinism is in fact to be sought in the suppression of dissent and in the centralization of control which Lenin imposed in 1921, for example; or that the horrors of Stalin's rule are attributable not so much to the personal failings of one man, as to the nature of a political system which made the emergence of such a man as a supreme and uncontrolled autocrat possible. Mr Rodionov's juggling with the facts of Soviet history is not worth very much attention. Suffice it to say that the latest effort on Party history shows no more respect for, or indeed acquaintance with, the quite well-known and documented facts than most of the previous efforts in the same direction by earlier Soviet authors.

However, Mr Rodionov's book is of interest for two reasons. He represents a novel phase in Party myth-making which is designed to restore the somewhat tarnished image which Party leaders have acquired of late—largely enhanced by the practice whereby a successor to power inevitably denigrates his immediate predecessor. The moral of Mr Rodionov's exercise in historical romancing is that 'collective leadership' is the magic talisman against any misdeeds or mistakes that an individual Party leader may happen to make. In the course of his narrative the author seems to attach a whole series of not entirely related meanings to 'collective leadership'. It can mean simply the regular summoning of the Party organs and compliance with the Party rules. It also means a code of conduct for a leader—modesty, lack of personal ambition, sensitivity to the masses and the like. The portrait is modelled on the great Lenin, safely dead and canonized. Although

[1] P. A. Rodionov, *Kollektivnost—vysshii printsip partiinogo rukovodstva* (Moscow, 1967).

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Mr Rodionov nowhere says so, one is left with the impression, no doubt not unintentional, that Brezhnev happily has all the necessary qualities, so that the present epoch properly qualifies for the brand-name of superlative. Finally 'collective leadership' also seems to mean a somewhat mystical eternal wisdom which resides in the Party as a whole (echoes of Trotsky!) and which no temporary aberrations or errors can ever extinguish.

All this has very little to do with collective leadership in its ordinary meaning of responsible participation by all Party members in decision-making. This is evidently not the Rodionov, or Brezhnev, line. As we know from Brezhnev's protégé D. Kunaev,[2] collective leadership means joint discussion no doubt, but it in no way excludes or diminishes the authority of the individual leaders in the execution of the duties entrusted to them. Others, presumably less enthusiastic in their support of Brezhnev's ambitions than Kunaev, have argued quite differently. For example, F. Petrenko, a Central Committee middle-level official, in a remarkable article published in *Pravda*,[3] very graphically described what is presumably normal procedure at a Party meeting—where, in place of a genuine discussion followed by a genuine decision, 'in fact everything is managed by one or several persons who arranged the meeting' as well as preparing the draft resolution which is successfully steered to adoption in the face of a totally apathetic audience. Petrenko and those like him evidently hanker for something in the nature of genuine social democracy which has long ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. Where organs have been so long atrophied his nostalgia may be quite unrealistic. But it is, at all events, more stimulating than the new mythology which is being built up by Rodionov and those like him.

However, Rodionov does disclose one fact of great interest of which we were not previously aware. It appears that at the Central Committee plenum which followed the fall of Khrushchev it was solemnly decided that in future and for all time the offices of First Secretary of the Party (or General Secretary as he now is) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers must not be combined in the same person. The importance attached to this principle suggests that what we may be witnessing in the Soviet polity today is not merely a temporary expedient, but a genuine attempt to solve the dilemma of the conflict between the Party and the government machines which has been the most difficult problem throughout Soviet history. One-man rule is simple and intelligible, whatever its disadvantage: two-man rule, which is what has been going on in the Soviet Union for four years, may prevent the emergence of another terrible Stalin or irritating Khrushchev (as Rodionov implies), but can it work? We will not find the answers in Rodionov, because political analysis is something of which no Soviet author has so far proved capable. We are fortunate

[2] Writing in *Partiinaya Zhizn* in October 1966.
[3] On 20 July 1967.

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in possessing a series of works by non-Soviet scholars which between them assemble and analyse all the available evidence on the fall of Khrushchev and on the subsequent political situation and its prospects.[4]

THE Soviet leaders might do worse than read and ponder these books, because the solution which they have sought to achieve is beset with many serious difficulties. In one sense it is perhaps quite possible to maintain, perhaps even for many years, the kind of equilibrium, or division of spheres, that seems to have been established between Party and government at all levels below the very top summit of Politbureau and Secretariat. Thus the economy is firmly in government hands and the Party is being strictly and no doubt at times effectively dragooned to keep its nose out of the serious business of management and planning, and to concentrate on the hot air of propaganda. There is no reason to suppose that this move is unpopular with the *apparatchiki*. True, they have lost the dominant position which Khrushchev built up for the Party apparatus. But Khrushchev took Party control (the 'return to Leninism') seriously and did not hesitate either to sack those who did not produce results, or to remodel the shape of the apparatus. His organizational ideas may have been crazy, as well as unpopular with the Party: but they were genuinely aimed at efficiency, and at reduction of the size of the apparatus. His unpopularity among the *apparatchiki* as well as the irritation of the planners no doubt contributed to his downfall. But there is no reason to suppose that the *apparatchiki* today dislike their position of privilege without responsibility, or that their self-respect is unduly perturbed by the thought that they have no real job to do in the most important sector of the life of the country. Perhaps they feel compensated by the fact that they are left to reign supreme in such areas as ideology, the anti-religious campaign or the control of literature. The return to greater severity in these spheres in the past few years may well be due to the fact that they have become the main area in which Party energies are unrestrained. Besides, the blocking of the economic reforms is a sign that the *apparatchik* is not reconciled to the idea that he should keep out of the economic sphere.

This kind of equilibrium is, no doubt, perfectly workable at the lower levels, and could well, as one author suggests,[5] go on for many years. The problem arises at the top—in the Politbureau, where policy has to be decided. At this level 'collective leadership' is completely unworkable, as indeed it would be (and sometimes is) unworkable

[4] Arrigo Levi, *Il potere in Russia. Da Stalin a Brezhnev* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2nd ed., 1967); Borys Lewytzkyj, *Die Kommunistische Partei der Sowjetunion. Porträt eines Ordens* (Stuttgart, Ernst Klett Verlag, 1967); Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Serge Romensky, *L'USSR à 50 ans. Les révisionnistes conservateurs* (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1967); Michel Tatu, *Le pouvoir en URSS. Du déclin de Khrouchtchev à la direction collective* (Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1967), published in English translation as: *Power in the Kremlin* (London, Collins, 1968).

[5] Lewytzkyj, *op. cit.*

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in the USA or in Britain. The President may cajole, persuade, listen to everyone, compromise—but in the end it is he, and he alone, who must decide. The British Prime Minister may listen to all opinions voiced in the cabinet or emanating from his experts, but in the end he alone must decide. President and Prime Minister may well decide wrongly, and pay the penalty at the next election. But the point is that 'collective leadership', at that level of government, can mean nothing more than listening to what others have to say.

The same is true in the Soviet Union—or was until October 1964, when Khrushchev paid the penalty for, among other failings, an impetuous disregard of his colleagues and cavalier treatment of the Presidium of the party (as the Politbureau was then still called). Most of our authors are agreed on that. But what none of them has been able to answer are some of the following questions which have long puzzled me. Who presides over the Politbureau—Brezhnev or Kosygin, or each member in rotation? (At least we do know that Khrushchev was permanent chairman of the Presidium.) Who has succeeded Khrushchev as Commander in Chief of the armed forces? Why was no successor appointed as head of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Affairs (which controls the security organs) for three and a half years after General Mironov was killed in an air crash at the end of 1964? Or was no one appointed because they could not all agree in the Politbureau on the appointment, for fear that it might put too much power into Brezhnev's hands if one of his supporters were appointed? Why has Andropov, the new head of the KGB, been elevated to candidate membership of the Politbureau? Is it to enable the other members to keep a close eye on police activities so as not to leave it all to the Secretaries of the Central Committee, of whom Brezhnev is the undoubted chief? Above all, if the Soviet radar screens should ever disclose an imminent nuclear attack, and there are only a few minutes' warning in which to take the fateful decision on counteraction, whom does one have to pull out of bed—Brezhnev or Kosygin? There is obviously no time for the two of them to argue it out.

We do not know the answers to these questions. I suspect that the reason why we do not know is that there is no clear answer to any of the problems which I have posed. The Soviet leadership is in an undecided phase. It knows what it does not want—either terrible Stalin who was too dangerous for everyone; or irritating Khrushchev who was a drag on real economic efficiency. To this end great care is being taken to ensure that no undue preponderance of power is accumulated in the hands of any one man, that all interests are properly consulted, and that areas of responsibility are not invaded by thrusting zealots. No doubt Shelepin appeared as such a thrusting zealot, and the Brezhnev-Kosygin duumvirate has wisely removed him to a position of total unimportance—Chairman of the Soviet TUC. But this phase in Soviet rule is a temporary expedient which cannot solve the real problem of decision-making—the need for one man ultimately to

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decide. One can see that with the memory of Stalin still alive the Soviet leaders are anxious to avoid 'charismatic' leaders for some time to come. But they will not solve their dilemma by mystical phrases about 'collective leadership' which ignore the elementary principles of politics. To put it bluntly: if you have been foolish enough to leave absolute and uncontrolled power to one man in the past, the solution for the future does not lie in indecision all round, but in the controlled and limited power of one man. The decision to invade Czechoslovakia, however, allows us to draw the inference that even an indecisive government can bring itself to the point of taking decisive action if it feels that the threat to its authority is great enough. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the need to deal with the danger of infectious 'liberal' interpretations of the nature of Party leadership spreading to other Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, must in the end have seemed to outweigh the disadvantages which such a course entailed. We do not know how that decision was taken in the Politbureau, except that Kosygin has stated that it was unanimous. It is possible, though we have no evidence to support the theory, that Brezhnev has acquired new authority, the position of *primus inter pares*, for example, as a result of the new need for decisive action. He may, conceivably, have become Commander in Chief. All that can be said is that nothing has come to light to suggest that the nature of 'collective leadership' is in any way different from what it was before 21 August 1968. But we would do well to learn the lesson that 'collective', or indecisive, leadership is nonetheless capable of decisive action in certain circumstances.

IT is a matter for surprise that this question of leadership, which seems to be of such overwhelming importance in every government, escapes the notice of so many students of Soviet politics. Soviet commentators, like Rodionov, dodge the awkward question in a cloud of platitudes. But even so careful a student as Dr Churchward, in his valuable recent study of the Soviet political system,[6] has not tackled the problem. He rightly concludes his study by pointing out that the Party Congress, its Central Committee, Politbureau and Secretariat, as well as the state organs, are becoming increasingly important. Key material decisions, he thinks, 'are still taken by a small body of leaders in which one person may have a decisive influence'. But this is merely to state, if not to beg, the main question. Though, of course, if it should prove to be the case in the future that Brezhnev has in fact acquired new authority, Dr Churchward's assumption will have been shown to be correct.

On the whole I find myself in agreement with both Monsieur Tatu and Signor Levi that the two most likely alternatives for the Soviet Union are either a return to something like Stalinism, or an evolution

[6] L. G. Churchward, *Contemporary Soviet Government* (London, Kegan Paul).

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towards something like democracy. Yet the statements of both alternatives call for considerable qualification. 'Stalinism' meant the rule of the man Joseph Stalin, and fortunately such men are rare. It also meant the rule of one man—at a particular stage of national and international development when Stalin's government by holocaust became one of the possible alternatives. It is unlikely that history will repeat itself in the form of another Stalin. But one can well imagine the return of strong one-man government in some form or another. This could be the result either of stagnation and inefficiency owing to the present defective system of decision-making, particularly in an emergency; or it could be the product of exasperation with the growing indiscipline and assertion of independence by the intellectuals, by some churchmen and perhaps even by some workers. Technocrats and soldiers would in the ordinary course sympathize with the need for order and can certainly be expected to show their traditional dislike of intellectuals. The invasion of Czechoslovakia will certainly increase repression and intolerance, and thus increase the probability of the return to Stalinism.

Yet there are certain grave objections which may render this line of evolution the less probable of the two alternatives in the long run. The first is that this 'new Stalin' would have to come from the Party, since only the Party has the necessary apparatus of arbitrary power at its disposal, and, above all, it is the Party which controls (or until recently controlled) the whole police complex. But the experience of Khrushchev and his fall have demonstrated beyond doubt that the increasingly complicated and differentiated economy of the Soviet Union simply cannot be left to the mercies of the arbitrary and relatively ignorant Party amateurs. Whatever solution for its leadership the Soviet Union may decide to adopt, it is difficult to visualize the one which would most imperil the aim which is cherished above all by those whose influence is strongest—the economic, technical, and military might of the country. The second objection to the 'new Stalin' alternative is that it is inconsistent with what Monsieur Romensky so aptly calls the 'conservative revisionism' of the present leadership—the genuine desire to jettison some of the more inhibiting dogmas without at the same time risking instability, or worse, as a result. There is a point of no return in politics as in aviation, and I think it may have been reached in the Soviet Union. There is a determination to avoid the inefficiency and muddle which years of arbitrary and chaotic rule engendered in the economy. There is an urge towards experimentation and genuine discussion, at all events in the sphere of economics and science, which has already borne modest fruit. The severe decline of tolerance in intellectual matters and a renewed wave of arbitrary illegality in the past few years are certainly lamentable signs. But the fact remains that this trend has not been allowed to impinge on the evolution of 'revisionism' in the economic sphere. One is left with the uncomfortable impression that both Party and government leaders

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are agreed that intellectual life, religion, and law are irrelevant and unimportant areas of activity, and that it is quite a good thing to give the KGB its head in such matters if the result is to keep them out of mischief in the more important spheres. If this is so, one can only hope that the Soviet leaders will learn their grave mistake before it is too late, and they are faced with a Hungarian situation. Above all, the main argument against a new Stalin is that every Party and government leader since 5 March 1953 has been fully alive to the danger. Whatever mistakes they may have committed, they have at all events proved quite capable of nipping the ambitions of their Berias and Shelepins in the bud. There is no real reason to suppose that they will not continue to watch each other like hawks, and join for the kill (as they did in October 1964) even at the very slightest sign of danger.

What of the other alternative—the evolution towards some form of democratic government? No one would quarrel with Monsieur Tatu's view that at best the progress towards this solution will be very long, very slow and very laborious. But it has some arguments in its favour as the more likely alternative of the two. It is notable that Yugoslavia, having thrown off Soviet domination in 1949, embarked on the slow path towards revisionism years before the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia made an attempt to celebrate its emancipation from Soviet tutelage as the result of the collapse of international communism by a similar revision of the fundamentals of communist rule. Of course the parallel cannot be pushed too far, since the Soviet form of communist rule was alien to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and is indigenous to the Soviet Union which still suffers from the heritage of Lenin's mistakes. Even so, the Yugoslav and the short-lived Czech experience is a pointer to the way in which a system of one-party communist rule may evolve if once the inhibitions are removed. For some time to come, of course, the trauma of the Czech experience is bound to have the effect of strengthening those Soviet institutions quite considerably. Only an incurable optimist could foresee any prospect of changes in the democratic direction in the Soviet Union in the near, or even middle, future.

There are in my view two factors which could in time help to shift the inhibitions even in the Soviet Union. The first factor is the real need for ultimate one-man decision coupled with the very understandable fear of the reappearance of a new Stalin. The only practical way to solve this dilemma which has yet been devised by man is to entrust one man with this ultimate power, but to make sure both that this power is limited by law, and that it is exercised in such circumstances that it can be withdrawn if the holder of it proves unworthy or incapable.

The other factor which could, in the long run, operate against the present still largely arbitrary system in favour of legal order is the need for efficiency. However reluctant Marxists may be to recognize

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it (though Marx himself did), a sound legal order is much more conducive to economic development than any arbitrary system of government. Free dissent, within properly defined and protected limits, alone ensures the kind of uninhibited discussion on which sound technical policy can be based. Predictability and regularity are essential in a modern technical and industrial state if it is to operate to the full extent of its capacity. Contracts must be observed, political considerations must be kept within strict limits, individuals must be able to do their work in circumstances which guarantee their security as long as they fulfil their obligations to the enterprise. As compared with Stalin's era, there has been enormous improvement already in these respects. Characteristically, while in the past few years legality has sadly declined in other areas, it has remained unaffected, or has even improved, in the technical and economic spheres. But since legality is indivisible (whatever the present rulers of Soviet Russia may think) it will be necessary to extend its operation to all aspects of life without exception before there can be any certainty that it will operate reliably in the area where it is so essential to the technocrats and the planners.

Perhaps this view is over-optimistic. Russian history is full of lost opportunities and of confident and totally mistaken predictions. I express no more confidence than do the authors whose books I have much enjoyed and benefited from. But I am sufficiently influenced by Marxism to believe that a society which is growing to maturity in the technical and economic spheres must one day also prove capable of reaching its political maturity.

INFERNO A LA RUSSE

Victor S. Frank

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN'S reputation as a major Russian writer rests on a relatively slender body of writing: three major novels, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Cancer Ward* and now *The First Circle.* The last-named novel has just become available in English translated by Michael Guybon * (presumably a pseudonym). In addition there are four long short stories (*povesti*) and a batch of 'sketches and mini-stories'. There is no doubt, however, that he *is* a major novelist of the post-Stalin era—perhaps to be classed together with such men as Pasternak and Sinyavsky.

His main achievement is organizational: he evidently set himself the gigantic task of portraying the whole of the Stalin era: his personal (very personal!) experience of that era is immense, his knowledge, as far as the wider social scene is concerned, is equally impressive. Yet he has managed to describe the labour camps by limiting his vista to one day

* Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The First Circle* (Collins & Harvill Press, 1968).

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in the life of one rather unremarkable prisoner in one particular camp. *Ivan Denisovich* was his first novel. Despite the undoubted merits of the two later novels, it still remains an unsurpassed marvel of artistic economy. Both the *Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle* are more diffuse than *Ivan Denisovich.* Even so, his latest novel is another miracle of compression, if only in terms of the time of action: all the events in the vast novel (581 pages in the English translation) take place within three days towards the very end of 1949. Inside these 72 hours there move at least 70 characters ranging from Stalin to the janitor Spiridon, one of the most poignant subjects in Solzhenitsyn's portrait gallery. It is a measure of Solzhenitsyn's outstanding organizational capacity that this rather overpowering gathering of characters does not confuse the reader: as one progresses from one chapter to another, the characters gradually acquire distinct individuality and become easily recognizable.

The subject matter of *The First Circle* lies in between the camp as described in *Ivan Denisovich* and the hospital life as described in the *Cancer Ward.* All three novels depict group life at its lowest—a group life, that is, entered against the will of the individuals comprising it. *The First Circle*—the title is derived from Dante's *Inferno* in which the first circle was reserved for pre-Christian sages—is superficially less harrowing, less apocalyptic than the milieus described in the two other novels. 'The first circle' is one of those curious establishments in Stalin's Russia which were set up by the security organs to obtain cheap skilled labour on the design and research levels for tasks of overriding importance to the state. Living conditions in these 'special prisons' were naturally far superior to those in the camps or, in fact, to those among unprivileged civilians. Food and shelter were adequate, books were freely available, no physical labour was expected of the prisoners. Yet prisoners they remained, and the constant threat hanging over them was the possible expulsion from the privileged status of 'special prisoners' to that of a common camp slave—for any disciplinary offence or unsuccessful work.

The book has not been published in the USSR and, as things stand now, is unlikely to be published in the foreseeable future. Although the action takes place 20 years ago, any percipient reader—and Soviet editors and censors are nobody's fools—will realize that, in effect, the novel castigates not only the evils of the Stalin era, but certain standing features of Soviet society. A malicious mind may even read into the novel the notion that the whole of Russia *now*, what with her cosmonauts, blast furnaces and ICBMs, is a vast special prison, where highly skilled designers and engineers do their jobs under constant supervision of security officials. Be that as it may, Solzhenitsyn's indictment of Stalin's system has obviously been too much for the powers-that-be in the Soviet literary establishment.

There are unforgettable vignettes in the novel—cartoons, as it were, of Stalin himself, of Abakumov, the head of the MGB under Beria, of dozens of lesser MGB characters, even of a liberal visiting American

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lady (Mrs Roosevelt?), who is shown around a prison. The all-pervading stench is that of fear, a fear which affects everyone from Stalin downwards, but which diminishes as it descends the power structure, until at the very bottom, the habitat of those who have *nothing more to lose*, fear disappears and gives way to hatred and contempt.

It is truly an inferno *à la Russe*.

MARTOV AND LENIN

Jonathan Frankel

MARTOV can be seen as the father of Menshevism and one might therefore expect his biography to deal primarily with the Mensheviks. In fact, though, the central theme of Israel Getzler's biography* turns out to be Martov's attitude to Lenin and Leninism. What an ambiguous and complex relationship this was. Working together, they helped found the St Petersburg Union of Struggle in 1895 and *Iskra* in 1900. And with the other editors of *Iskra*, they subjected the RSDLP to the 'state of seige' in the years 1900–3, hounding mercilessly 'Economists', Revisionists and Bundists. Then followed the split of 1903 when Martov, we are told, came to dislike and even despise Lenin.

But while Lenin was ready throughout to 'mark off' his own faction and excommunicate the Mensheviks, Martov was never ready to force a final break with the Bolsheviks. At the Second Congress, even though the dispute with Lenin was already beyond repair, he did nothing to prevent the walk-out of the 'Economists' and Bundists who would have provided him with a secure majority. He preferred to do without them and remain in a minority. (Getzler's description of the immediate origins of this schism is surely the most exhaustive so far.) In April 1905 Lenin called his purely Bolshevik Party Congress, thus finalizing the schism. But Martov was ready to let bygones be bygones and welcomed the Reunification Congress of 1906. Again, in the years 1908–11 he was prepared to join Lenin in sharp condemnation of those Menshevik leaders in Russia accused of 'liquidationism', even though now was the time when the full story of the Bolshevik 'expropriationist' policy was coming into the open. Predictably, Lenin again split the Party at the first moment he considered it expedient—in January 1912. During the war, Martov joined Lenin in the Zimmerwald movement and against the right-wing Mensheviks. On his return to Russia in May 1917, he once more found himself together with Lenin in bitterly criticizing the great majority of Mensheviks who defended the socialist participation in the Lvov coalition. And in July 1917, he passionately attacked the Kerenski-Tseretelli government for 'persecuting' the

* Israel Getzler, *Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat* (Cambridge University Press, 1967).

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Bolshevik leaders. When most Mensheviks walked out at the beginning of the Second Congress of Soviets, he and the other Internationalists stayed on for a few more futile and humiliating hours. Even after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, he eagerly participated in the Bolshevik-run Soviet Central Executive Committee and pressed for the expulsion from their Party of all Mensheviks who took up arms against Lenin's regime. While the *Cheka* was building up the Red Terror which swept away many an old comrade, Martov and the Menshevik Central Committee described Lenin's revolution as 'historically necessary' and called on all Party members to support the Red Army. In 1922, now in the West, Martov welcomed and participated in the conference held in Berlin between representatives of the Vienna, the Second and the Third Internationals to discuss ways and means to co-operate more closely. This pattern of schism (engineered by Lenin and denounced by Martov) to be followed by reunification or reconciliation (inspired by Lenin and welcomed by Martov) only came to an end with Martov's final illness and death in April 1923. (The two men who had fought their way through so many political debates first as allies then as opponents died within a year of each other.)

Few men knew Lenin's attitudes and methods so well. Few Russian social democrats hated them more. And yet Martov would not break away from Lenin once and for all as did such Mensheviks as Potresov, Liber and Tseretelli. But if he would not excommunicate the Bolsheviks he was equally unwilling to join them or justify them. While Plekhanov oscillated sharply, as Getzler aptly puts it, between his old anti-terrorism (and hence anti-Bolshevism) and his deep-rooted Jacobinism (and hence pro-Bolshevism), Martov steered throughout a middle course. When Mensheviks, SRs, Bundists and ex-'Economists'—Trotsky, Riazanov, Larin, Rafes, Martynov, even Maisky—joined the Bolshevik camp, Martov fought successfully to retain the full independence of the now skeletal Menshevik Party. From 1903 to 1923 he denounced Leninism vehemently and consistently.

THUS, Martov can be classified neither as an archetypal fellow-traveller nor as an early 'cold warrior'. He was against Leninism but equally against most anti-Leninists. Would-be allies from the reformist right were shunned even though sincere co-operation from the Leninist left never materialized. As Israel Getzler clearly shows, such a posture guaranteed maximal political impotence. This, in fact, is the central question which runs through this devoted, thoroughly researched and holding work. From crisis to crisis we follow Martov walking the tight-rope between Leninism and right-wing Menshevism. And at each point we are led to ask, why did he persist? How are we to explain Martov's politics?

The relationship between Martov and Lenin could, perhaps, be partially explained in psycho-analytical terms, as a love-hate relationship

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which enraged Martov but held him captive nonetheless. But Getzler has written a political biography and has deliberately avoided the quagmires of psychological history. Although the book might have benefited from more material about Martov's personality and private life, Getzler is almost certainly right in his assumption that Martov's political attitudes can best be explained in political terms. And this he sets out to do in his final—highly thoughtful and thought-provoking—chapter, 'The Hamlet of Democratic Socialism'.

Here he weighs a number of possible explanations for Martov's refusal to cut his last ties with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. First, he was a prisoner of his own anti-'Economist' past. Martov had fought the battle with too much passion to admit later that his position had been erroneous. But if his stand of 1900–3 had been essentially correct, then so presumably were *What is to Be Done?* and other Leninist classics which had been issued with the blessing of Martov and the other *Iskra* editors. This fact inhibited a total repudiation of Bolshevism.

Then there was the weakness which the Mensheviks, in general, and Martov, in particular, displayed when it came to the day-to-day problems of Party organization. The Menshevik leadership was made up almost entirely of intellectuals pure and simple, good analysts, poor 'bosses'. To the extent that the Menshevik faction in Russia threw up organizers, *praktiki*, Martov tended to regard them with suspicion as potential 'Economists', liquidators and trade unionists. The Stalins, Krasikovs, and Baumans naturally gravitated to Lenin who (until 1922, at least) valued their ruthless thuggery and was prepared to use this quality to the full. Conscious of Lenin's greater effectiveness, Martov was reluctant to take the initiative in forcing a final break, reluctant to enter into open, direct competition. This was no doubt a factor in 1904, 1906, in 1910 and, most important, in 1917 when Martov might perhaps—as Getzler suggests—have established his own Menshevik 'Internationalist' party competing independently against both the Liber-Dan-Tseretelli form of Menshevism and against Lenin's Bolshevism. Martov preferred to fight from within the Menshevik Party, in effect helping Lenin to discredit its leaders.

Getzler argues persuasively, however, that the truly decisive factor was Martov's total commitment to the classical doctrines of Russian Marxism as he understood them. He felt an equal obligation to socialism and democracy, an equal reverence for the ideal of the future and for the socio-economic realities of the present. He did not believe that Russia was ready for socialism—hence his opposition in 1917 to Lenin and Trotsky—but he could not regard socialism as a dream to be forever postponed. He upheld the basic liberal freedoms but clung tenaciously to the concept of proletarian dictatorship. Lenin, to him, represented the primitive forces still at work within the semi-urbanized Russian proletariat. But however barbaric, he

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remained—argued Martov—a leader of the working class and in 1917 even of the proletarian masses. What, then, could be more logical than to criticize him, but not to abandon him, not to take up arms against him? As he wrote just before his death, he and Lenin stood 'on one and the same class basis' (p. 222).

MARTOV'S politics can thus be seen—although Israel Getzler does not actually say this—as the most damning proof of the absurdity of trying to apply the German social democratic model to Russia. In Russia, after all, the basic choices for the left-wing radical were simple enough—agrarian reform organized from above or revolutionary eruption from below? A parliamentary democracy, a socialist dictatorship or anarchism? An urban or agrarian orientation? And in 1917—continuation of the alliance, a separate war or a separate peace? Marxism, as applied by Martov although not by Lenin, only tended to confuse such basic issues. The result was a life of political futility.

What, then, it may be asked, is the point of devoting a full-scale biography to Martov? The answer which emerges clearly enough from Israel Getzler's book is that Martov, for all his political ineffectuality, was at the same time a man of keen intelligence, passionate commitment and integrity—a man in short who earned his right to serious attention. His analysis of particular political situations—as distinct from tactics—was usually realistic, often expressed with great force. Of the February revolution he wrote: 'Either the revolution will kill the war, or the war will kill the revolution' (p. 147). In July 1917 he wrote: 'The creative forces of the Russian bourgeoisie are completely exhausted and its role in the revolution played out' (p. 157). Writing in 1922 he concluded: 'The war has not proved a prologue to the world revolution. All realize this now. This means only that the war is the prologue to *new* wars' (p. 214).

Martov really came into his own, though, as a polemicist. It was in debate that his anger and passion burst asunder the physical handicaps of generally poor health and a fatal throat disease. His finest hour came in the period from 1918–20 when, in the intermittent periods of Menshevik 'legality', he used his position as a member of the Central Executive Committee to attack without compunction the censorship, the terror and the sheer mindless brutality unleashed by the new regime. As the Red Terror got under way, he gave Lenin, Trotsky and Lunacharsky no respite, holding them directly responsible for the 'hostage' system and mass shootings: 'Because somewhere in a dark reactionary corner assassination plans are being hatched, should thousands and thousands who have no part in these plans . . . ask themselves for weeks and months on end whether this is not their last night?' (p. 178). Or again, 'The power of the local executive committees [in the villages] has been reduced to the one right conceded them by the *Chekas*, that of a voice in the shooting of their own members!' (p. 203).

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Describing this dramatic period, Israel Getzler has produced a masterly portrait made the more lifelike by his effective use of Martov's unpublished letters sent to friends abroad and now in the Boris Nicolaevsky archives. He has revealed to us a man who—because of his Marxist orthodoxy and hostility to Kantianism—regarded the individual conscience as of little or no significance and yet could not rest in the face of the cruelty and arrogance of the new regime. What deprived him of all peace was the thought that elementary justice and liberty were being trampled into the dust daily in the name not of Tsarism or liberalism but of socialism. He could not remain silent: 'Tall, scraggy and irascible, a ragged scarf wound around his sinewy neck, he would jump up frequently to interrupt the speaker and shout words of indignation, in a hoarse, breaking voice. An instigator of many a stormy incident, he would not calm down until he had been deprived of the right to speak or had been excluded from a few sessions [of the VTsIK].' So recalled Paustovsky. Futile Martov was, but not easily ignored or easily forgotten. (The Lenin of 1923, already paralysed, apparently used to 'point at Martov's books on his shelves and demanded that a driver take him to Martov'.)

The late Isaac Deutscher in naming his monumental biography chose the much-abused word, 'prophet', to describe Trotsky. Israel Getzler has preferred to call Martov in his title simply 'a Russian Social Democrat'. But if a prophet is the man who emerges from the wilderness to denounce the court—regardless of who is king—then the word better describes the power-shy but vociferous Martov than his power-hungry comrade who, on 25 October 1917, banished him 'to the dustbin of history'.

SOVIET SCHOLARSHIP

Maxim Mikulak

THE past half century has witnessed an erratic course of development of Soviet scholarship. It is increasingly recognized inside and outside the USSR that the twenties represent a unique decade of Soviet Marxist creativity and intellectual exploration. This trend came to an abrupt end during the thirties when Soviet intellectuals experienced social and political regimentation and had to relate their professional activities to socialist construction. In the immediate post-war period Soviet scholarship reached a low point because it was made subservient to the ideological demands of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Nonetheless, some signs appeared—even before the death of Stalin—that Soviet intellectuals were attempting to break away from the ideological strait-jacket closely associated with A. A. Zhdanov and were attempting to air serious problems that were

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smouldering beneath the façade of Stalinist monolithism. *Wissenschaft in kommunistischen Ländern** is primarily concerned with the restoration of genuine scholarship in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the time of Stalinist dogmatism to the more-or-less liberal period of recent times. This work, consisting of 12 essays by distinguished German scholars in the fields of Marxist philosophy, cybernetics, economics, sociology, literature, pedagogy, jurisprudence, and history, is actually an outgrowth of a series of lectures presented during the winter term of 1966–67 at the Eberhard-Karls University in Tübingen.

IT is clear from the essays in *Wissenschaft in kommunistischen Ländern* that diversity of interests and directions exists in communist scholarship; consequently, there is no uniform pattern of evolvement. Despite the thaw and Khrushchev's denunciation of the cult of personality, the scholars from the USSR and the German Democratic Republic continue to be dominated by the Stalinist legacy. However, the scholars from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are becoming influenced more by indigenous forces as well as by exposure to Western currents of socialist thought. In many cases Soviet savants are endeavouring to pick up the strands of intellectual development of the twenties, whereas some of the outstanding Eastern bloc scholars are often reaching out into the unexplored, especially in the area of Marxist philosophy.

Iring Fetscher notes in his 'Zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie-Diskussion im Ostblock' that much disenchantment prevails among the younger communist philosophers who resent the imposition upon their philosophical studies of sterile and stereotyped conclusions derived from orthodox historical materialism. In the USSR the young Marxists are trying to recapture the philosophical spirit of inquiry and academic standards that were current under the leadership of the Menshevik philosopher A. M. Deborin. By expressing interest in the philosophy of science, Soviet Marxist philosophers hope to duplicate the Soviet scientists' achievement of obtaining autonomy from dogmatic encumbrances. While Soviet philosophers concentrate on the philosophy of science, it is the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Yugoslavs who are formulating a viable, open and humanistic Marxism as opposed to the Marxism contrived by the Party cadre and bureaucrats who are obsessed with economic planning and efficient productivity instead of the problems of humanism, freedom and alienation. Fetscher believes that two trends are beginning to dominate contemporary critical Marxism. The first is the philosophy of praxis, which stresses the concrete activities of human beings in a real society and the inseparability of theory and practice. The prominent figures in this modern school of Marxism are Karl Kosek, a young Czech philosopher, and the Yugoslav professor of philosophy, Gajo Petrovic. The second trend deals with

* Dietrich Geyer, ed., *Wissenschaft in kommunistischen Ländern* (Tübingen, Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1967), 310 pp.

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Marxism as a positive social science committed to a socialist moral philosophy. The Polish professor of philosophy, Leszek Kolakowski, and the Yugoslav logician, Mihailo Markovic, have furthered this trend of Marxism. It should be noted that the shift of emphasis from the traditional social and economic interpretation of Marxism to that of a humanistic Marxism is essentially a non-Russian phenomenon.

Illustrations of how new areas of study gain respectability are provided in Helmut Dahm's 'Kybernetik als Problem kommunistischer Philosophie' and Peter Ludz's 'Neuere Entwicklungstendenzen in der Soziologie des Ostblocks'. It is difficult to believe that cybernetics, which now enjoys a prestigious position among the Soviet natural and social sciences and has wide application in the USSR, received in the early fifties a hostile reception from some Soviet ideologists and scientists. Only after lengthy discussions, encompassing the right to existence of cybernetics, its uniqueness, its philosophical limitations, and the nature of information, did Soviet philosophers and scientists complete an acceptable dialectical materialist form of cybernetics that supposedly differed from the West. In the instance of sociology its acceptance in the communist world as a legitimate area of investigation rested not so much on an accommodation to but as an emancipation from Marxism-Leninism. Until the mid-fifties sociology was identified with historical materialism. In 1955 and 1956 the term 'Marxist sociology' began to appear with regularity in the USSR. By 1957, under the inspiration of Florian Znaniecki, the Poles began to refer to 'empirical sociology'. After 1961 most of the Eastern bloc nations encouraged empirical sociology as a means of ascertaining realistically the achievements and weaknesses of their societies with respect to Marxist theory, and empirical sociology became an important ingredient for the philosophy of praxis.

THE essays on economics, literature, pedagogy, jurisprudence and history are valuable for revealing the extent to which these traditional areas have overcome the ideological restrictions of Stalinist Russia. Erik Boettcher, in his 'Niedergang und Wiedergeburt ökonomischen Denkens in der zentralen Planung des Ostblocks', calls attention to the fact that 1947 marked a time of crisis in the history of Soviet economic planning and involved the problems of value, cost of production and prices. Voznesensky, who was chairman of Gosplan from December 1947 to January 1949, advocated the use of a pricing system in Soviet planning that reflects the actual costs of producer goods, and consequently he supported the profit system for measuring economic efficiency. Stalin, however, took the position that the Soviet economic law of value be based on the worth of labour rather than on the real costs of production. Boettcher suggests that Voznesensky was executed because of his persistent opposition to Stalin's economic policies. But the issues raised by Voznesensky are now being examined in the USSR,

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particularly after it became plain that Gosplan simply could not keep pace with the expanding complexity of the Soviet economy. After Stalin's death the Soviet economy and that of her client states began experiencing a crisis of permanent readjustment. Boettcher is convinced that communist economists are compelled to turn more and more to the market mechanisms of the West, decentralization, and computerization as methods of spurring the economy; the heyday of rigorous central planning has passed in the USSR.

The two essays on literature, Peter Brang's 'Die Literaturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion' and Hans Meyer's 'Die Literatur der DDR und ihre Widersprüche', focus on the problem of formulating a Marxist approach to literature. Brang observes that once cultural activities were treated as an aspect of ideology, Soviet writers had to accept a monistic outlook and method—that of socialist realism—and the result was the banishment of several brilliant and individualistic schools of literary criticism that originated in the twenties. In post-Stalinist Russia attempts have been made to introduce a sociological framework for literary criticism reminiscent of Belinsky's approach of over a century ago. In his piece, Meyer adequately shows that East German literature is a form of cultural politics whereby the writers are expected to stress the class struggle, the building of socialism, and display ideological hatred for the West in general and West Germany in particular.

Oskar Anweiler's 'Entwicklungstendenzen der pädagogischen Forschung in der Sowjetunion', Klaus Westen's 'Probleme der sowjetischen Rechtswissenschaft', and Dietrich Geyer's 'Gegenwartsfragen der sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft' relate the historical background, institutions, and the recent trends of research in pedagogy, jurisprudence and history. Despite the experimental programmes in the use of cybernetics and programmed instructions and the increasing use of mathematical methods of research, Anweiler states that Soviet pedagogy is still wedded to Anton Makarenko's educational philosophy of the thirties, emphasizing collectivism in school and children's organizations; the USSR can hardly be viewed as being in the forefront of educational theory and practice. According to Westen, Soviet legalists are still wrestling with the embarrassing problem of the existence of the Soviet state, law, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, all of which clearly should have withered away with the proclamation of socialism in the USSR. The tasks of the Soviet experts in jurisprudence are to evolve legal codes that reflect the non-oppressive nature of socialist law, operate within the philosophical edifice of historical materialism, and (Westen could have mentioned) do not impinge on the Party's power which is by and large extra-legal. Geyer, after discussing the principal institutions and periodicals of Soviet historians, points out that history in the USSR must strike a balance between good scholarship and the ideological demands of the Party. Closely scrutinized by Party organizations are historical works of the Soviet period which are often patriotic tracts.

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Some of the finest scholarly writing produced by Soviet historians deal with the history of science and technology; there is uncommon co-operation between Soviet historians and scientists.

Thomas Nipperdey's 'Die Reformation als Problem der marxistischen Geschichtswissenschaft' merits special consideration because it is an in-depth study of Soviet and German historiography on the Reformation. In the communist world the high point of Marxist scholarship on the Reformation is Engels's *The Peasant War in Germany*, which interprets the Reformation as a by-product of the struggle between emerging capitalism and decaying feudalism. Soviet and German Marxist historians view the Reformation as the first and decisive act of the bourgeois revolution, marking a distinctive break with feudalism. Nipperdey argues that a bourgeois class hardly existed in sixteenth-century Germany and that the bourgeois revolution gained momentum in seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France, well after the Reformation. Nipperdey accuses, and correctly so, the Marxist historians of neglecting the social, political, psychological and religious factors. This essay demonstrates the difficulty Marxist historians have in coping with religious history that does not neatly fit into the schema of Marxist historical materialism.

Wissenschaft in kommunistischen Ländern, considering that it is a product of a university seminar for students, is a welcome addition to the literature concerned not only with the trends and problems of research in the European communist nations, but also with some of the factors that give communist scholarship its unique characteristics.

MARXISM, LIBERALISM AND THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

James D. Young

DURING the past decade a perverted form of Marxism has penetrated the consciousness of economic historians, sociologists and economists in Europe and America as well as in the Third World. This preoccupation with the type of problem raised by Karl Marx in the nineteenth century has been reflected in one of the influential books of the post-war era, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* by W. W. Rostow. Since Rostow's book first appeared in 1960 an increasing number of scholars entrenched in the universities of Western Europe and America have devoted a good deal of attention to the genesis, social structure and ideological underpinnings of industrial capitalism. In contrast to Karl Marx, who declared that capitalism had come into the world 'dripping with blood from head to foot', a new school of scholars led by T. S. Ashton, W. H. Hutt, N. G.

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Smelser and E. E. Lampton have presented a sophisticated defence of early British capitalism. Thus Ashton has written: 'The notion that the coming of factories meant a "depersonalisation" of relations in industry is the reverse of the truth.'

Side by side with the revision of the historical studies undertaken by the pessimists—for example, Marx, Engels, the Hammonds and the Webbs—concerning the conditions of the British working people during the Industrial Revolution, a critique of the arguments of Max Weber and R. H. Tawney has gained widespread currency in the academic world. The role of ideological motivation in the rise of liberal capitalism among entrepreneurs—and particularly the role of religion and the protestant ethic—are in partial disrepute.[1] Nevertheless, a rehabilitation of the role traditionally allotted to ideological motivation in the advent of liberal capitalism among the proletariat—and, perhaps more importantly, in initiating the pattern of socialization and in underpinning the new forms of social control—has been attempted by sociologists and historians such as Eric Fromm, E. P. Thompson and Sidney Pollard.

In *The Decay of Capitalist Civilisation* Sidney and Beatrice Webb insisted that the initial success of liberal capitalism had rested on its ability 'to apply the whip of starvation'. Notwithstanding the Webbs' original insights into the methods of social control evolved by British capitalists during the Industrial Revolution, the training of the proletariat was, in fact, a very complex process in which 'the whip of starvation' played a relatively minor role. The socialization of former domestic workers, Irish immigrants and Scottish Highlanders, or the transformation of the peasantry and pre-industrial labour force into a factory proletariat was achieved (in the colourful phrase of Sidney Pollard) through 'an assault on working class morals'.

By the early 1960s the socialization of the pre-industrial labour force by means of ideological indoctrination was mapped out by sociologists as an essential feature of the early phases of industrialization. British and American scholars recognized that the creation of 'a new work-discipline' had led entrepreneurs, whether they were right-wing authoritarians like Josiah Wedgwood or left-wing humanitarians like Robert Owen, to hack out a new character-structure for the emerging proletariat suitable to an industrial environment and compatible with a hierarchical social structure. Moreover, the perfection of clock time or the instruments for measuring 'socially necessary labour time' produced, in the opinion of some students of industrialization, a regularization of the new work rhythms of industrial civilization.

Therefore sociologists and historians have seen work-discipline as an inevitable and automatic feature of industrial capitalism at a certain stage of evolution. This approach has enabled communist and left-wing scholars to see in the Irish immigrants a sub-strata of the British proletariat who were 'docile' and 'willing' to accept starvation wages.

[1] S. B. Clough and C. W. Cole, *Economic History of Europe* (Boston, 1952), p. 153.

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In opposition to those scholars who have seen the socio-economic behaviour of the Irish in Britain during the Industrial Revolution as a feature of industrialization, many communist and authoritarian socialist scholars have traced the strike-breaking activities of the Irish immigrants back to inherent racial or character defects. This fitted in well with the theoretical position of those communist academics who lauded the Luddites (Eric J. Hobsbawn, for example, described 'machine-breaking as a form of collective bargaining'), and simultaneously characterized working-class opposition to industrialization in communist countries as 'sabotage' and 'crimes against the state'.

In Britain during the Industrial Revolution the training and work-discipline of the indigenous labour force required 'steady methodical application, inner motivation of sobriety, forethought, and punctilious observation of contracts'. Those who were culturally alienated from the evolving industrial society—for example, the Irish and the Scottish Highlanders—were also essential as a supplementary labour force. Thus E. P. Thompson has argued that in England 'the heavy manual occupations at the base of industrial society required a spendthrift expense of sheer physical energy—an alternation of intensive labour and boisterous relaxation which belongs to pre-industrial labour rhythms, and for which the English artisan or weaver was unsuited both by reason of his weakened physique and his Puritan temperament'.[2] This argument is capped by the assertion that 'the worker had to be turned into his own slave-driver'.

This argument is cogently presented, and truly ingenious in its conception of how the process of industrialization was accomplished in Britain. There are, however, a few uncomfortable facts which have been overlooked in this view of the forces creating an industrial proletariat. A recent study of an important agency for inculcating the new moral values of industrialism into working people has called into question the extent to which a section of the Scottish proletariat was exposed to capitalist ideology.[3] What is needed to back up Thompson's argument is a statistical analysis of the number of working people who attended church or who were exposed in other institutions to the moral values of the emergent industrial society. Another important factor which has been ignored is the way the trade unions not only opted for capitalist values, but also operated sanctions against their own members who were in danger of practising the customs and traditions of the pre-industrial labour force. This happened in some cases in the eighteenth century before the new ideology of industrial capitalism had been firmly established. The building trade unions in the eighteenth century, for example, 'excluded anyone "defiling themselves with unclean women—committing adultery—being guilty of any lewd, obnoxious or disloyal practices

[2] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), p. 433.
[3] A. Alan Maclaren, 'Presbyterianism and the working class in a mid-nineteenth century city', *Scottish Historical Review*, XLVI, 1967, pp. 115–39.

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whereby he may be liable to public censure from Church or state . . .". Nor would it admit any "drunkard, swearer, or sabbath breaker".' From a sociological standpoint these rules were further complicated by the fact that they combined 'economy with Puritanism'.[4]

A further significant point is that the trade unions among the agricultural workers often encouraged secret oaths and the values of pre-industrial society. The existence of a multi-dimensional bourgeois culture is as plausible an explanation for differing labour rhythms in a society undergoing industrialization as the divergent elements in the labour force created by the transitional stage of the new industrial society. In the case of the building trade unions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the new rules and sanctions—and the working-class values underlying them—hinted at a community or plurality of interests which are the antithesis of a monolithic, totalitarian trade union movement. However, it is only during the past few years that scholars have questioned the traditional Marxist assumption that the culture of British capitalism and industrial man are inseparable.

WHAT then is the exact relationship between industrialism and capitalism? As this question has been hotly debated in academic circles by American and European liberals, a group of scholars led by Clark Kerr has evolved the theory of convergence. All modern capitalist and communist societies are, according to this theory, becoming alike. The theory of convergence is, in fact, based, in the words of Walter Laqueur, 'on the assumption that industrialisation and urbanisation create a civilisation common to all modern societies, not only similar forms of production but also political institutions that are alike'.[5] A number of liberal scholars have questioned the convergence theory; and Raymond Aron has drawn attention to 'the different types of industrial society' in the contemporary world.

Among the overwhelming majority of Marxists the consensus of opinion is that industrialism and capitalism in Western Europe are inseparable. A few Marxists, whose antecedents are rooted in the pre-war Trotskyist Fourth International, adhere to the theory that capitalism and industrialism are also inseparable in the so-called 'socialist third of the world'.[6] A variant of the convergence theory is seen in Bertram D. Wolfe's claim that 'many of the features which Marx identified with "capitalism" were actually features of modern industry under any ism'.[7] In the contemporary 'socialist' countries undergoing the process of industrialization the 'features which Marx identified with capitalism'—the division of labour, the exploitation of labour and wage differentials—are both visible and identifiable. But

[4] Raymond Postgate, *The Builders' History* (London, 1923), p. 18.
[5] Walter Laqueur, *The Fate of the Revolution* (London, 1967), p. 186.
[6] Tony Cliff, *Stalinist Russia: A Marxist Analysis* (London, 1955), pp. 222–52.
[7] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (London, 1967), p. 346.

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are these features characteristics of industrialism or capitalism? This problem is wrapped up in metaphysics and semantic difficulties, and there is no easy or definitive answer to it.

Nonetheless, a neo-Marxist has argued that 'one way of reading the working-class movement during the Industrial Revolution is as a movement of resistance to the annunciation of economic man'.[8] In an earlier study this same historian recognized that the process of industrialization inevitably produces successive stages and evolutionary cultural and economic patterns. Thus he wrote: 'It is notorious that in the early stages of industrialisation, the growing towns attract uprooted and migrant labour of all types; this is still the experience of Africa and Asia today.'[9] Here he is employing God's most precious gift to the historian: hindsight; and he seems to imply that everything is inevitable after it has happened more than once. At least Marx has a different methodological approach, and, when he says that 'history does nothing', he is trying to break out of the limits of his own determinist philosophy. Contemporary Marxists and neo-Marxists are only now beginning to face the question of the validity and effectiveness of making a moral critique of an inevitable historical process.

V. G. Kiernan, a neo-Marxist, who has gone much further in his 'critical criticism' of traditional Marxist concepts than his co-thinkers such as Ralph Miliband and E. P. Thompson, now recognizes that 'for Marxism today the study of ethics, not in the abstract but in the setting of history, cannot be treated as a mere annexe to be built on to it, but must become an integral part of it'.[10] This recognition of the problem of the dichotomous relationship between Marxist ethics and contemporary Marxist historiography and sociology has not yet led Kiernan to confront the logical contradictions within Marxist philosophy itself. Nevertheless, he is, I think, worrying over his own intellectual assumptions when he questions whether it really is possible to criticize morally an inevitable process in any adequate way. He has tried to resolve this problem by arguing thus: 'Marx took ethics for granted, assuming that all men not blinded by prejudice or self-interest must think alike about social morality. What he thought must be gathered from what he condemned as wrong, child labour in factories for example.'[11] Few other Marxists would agree with his judgment; and, though Kiernan's novel explanation is not entirely convincing, it has the merit of raising the problem of ethics in relation to general socialist activity. This is particularly relevant to socialist attitudes in relation to the problems of industrialization. Kiernan has, however, evaded as much as he has 'explained', since even neo-Marxists accept the thesis of inevitable

[8] E. P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English', *Socialist Register 1965* (London, 1965), p. 356.
[9] E. P. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 421.
[10] Victor G. Kiernan, 'Notes on Marxism in 1968', *Socialist Register 1968* (London, 1968), p. 206.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

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'stages of economic growth'. How can Marxists argue that the extermination of the Scottish Highlanders was necessary for the growth of British capitalism, and yet morally criticize the historical actors who brought this about?

In 1963 E. P. Thompson justified his study of *The Making of the English Working Class* by undermining 'the lessons of history': '. . . the greater part of the world today is still undergoing problems of industrialisation, and of the formation of democratic institutions, analogous in many ways to our own experience during the Industrial Revolution. Causes which were lost in England might, in Asia or Africa, yet be won.' A central theme of this book is the role of 'inevitability' in history. Against the almost demonic impersonal power of 'inevitability' he offers the counterpoise of 'human agency', that is, the choice and options open to individuals in the making of history. In Britain during the Industrial Revolution, he argues, 'it still is not possible to speak of "totalitarian" or "Asiatic" despotism'. Meanwhile the experience in contemporary countries undergoing industrialization has not encouraged those neo-Marxists, who in the mid-1950s and early 1960s had hoped to see a reconciliation of democratic institutions and industrialization in the Third World. This socio-economic reality has prompted Herbert Marcuse to argue that industrialization in the contemporary world dictates totalitarianism. Here the arguments of most right-wing and left-wing sociologists and historians about the social character of industrialization in the contemporary world have tended to coalesce.

INDUSTRIALIZATION in Britain during the period between 1750 and 1860 was not 'despotic' or 'totalitarian' any more than it arose from democratic consensus. This fundamental fact was decisive in allowing working-class values, class-consciousness and institutions to emerge and crystallize in opposition to the cultural dominance of the ruling élite. In Russia, however, the first surge towards industrialization came between 1870 and 1918. A great deal of technical and managerial skill was provided by the Germans; the British provided most of the capital equipment; and the French provided most of the capital invested in coal, iron and textiles. By 1918 Russia was still very backward when compared to West European countries. The country was not just backward quantitively, but also in terms of economic efficiency. Output per worker remained very low, and so did wages.

Russian industrialization emerged in the context of autocratic feudalism, and the nascent working classes were subjected to intense exploitation. Housing conditions were bad, hours of work were long, industrial accidents were frequent, and strikes were often put down by force.[12] In *Russia in Revolution 1890–1918* Lionel Kochan has argued

[12] G. V. Rimlinger, 'Autocracy and the early Russian Factory System', *Journal of Economic History*, XX, 1960, pp. 72–79.

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that 'no antithesis exists between industrialisation and an authoritarian political system. On the contrary, industrialisation supplies its own, improved methods of social control.' [13] Contemporary opinion was not so sure about the effectiveness of the new methods of social control. Indeed one writer was of the opinion that in this period 'the half-peasant character of our factory proletariat gives it a peculiar, rebellious trait'. A major problem confronting the Russian entrepreneur at this time was the link between the factory and village, which enabled many peasant-workers to resist the temptation to commit themselves fully to factory life. This probably slowed down the process of industrialization and the formation of a permanent working class.

An important consequence of the factory-village link was the absence of a fully developed sense of class-consciousness among the industrial proletariat, since the proletariat were, in sociological jargon, only semi-committed to industrialism. 'The half-peasant character of the factory proletariat' delayed the formation of the labour movement, which by the time it arrived on the Russian scene in the early twentieth century lacked experience in working-class democracy and self-activity. As late as 1904 the early factory workers were essentially peasants who yearned for life on the soil. As Theodore H. Von Laue has written: 'Behind this worker stood the foreman ready to fine him for *dremlenie*, for daydreaming and the shoddy work it caused. The peasant-worker's exertions in the factory were shorn of their spiritual wholeness. The connexion between his inner motivation and his outward motions had been served, the harmony broken.' [14] Under Tsarism the Russian proletariat had been deprived of the type of conditions which had made it possible for the British 'working class to make itself as much as it was made'. At that time the Russian class structure was fluid; and some newspapers had pressed the bureaucracy into granting limited protection to the factory workers. The next stage of industrialization witnessed the creation of a proletariat 'committed' (i.e. in the sense of being thrown into a prison) to industrial society.

Whether Russian socio-economic experience can be mapped out as a scientifically recognizable stage of economic growth between 1860 and 1917 à la Rostow, a distinct pattern of industrialization was nonetheless discernible. As Rostow puts it: 'With 1861, and the freeing of the serfs, the process of creating the pre-conditions for take-off accelerates: both technically—in the build-up of social overhead capital and the bases for modern industry—and in terms of the ideas, attitudes, and aspirations of various groups of Russians. Then, by 1890 or so, the Russian take-off begins.' On the other hand Raymond Aron has convincingly pointed out that it is a myth to suppose 'capitalism necessarily evolves into socialism (Soviet style)'.[15] The crux of the problem has

[13] Lionel Kochan, *Russia in Revolution 1890–1918* (London, 1967), p. 52.
[14] Theodore H. Von Laue, 'Russian Peasants in the Factory 1892–1904', *Journal of Economic History*, XXI, 1961, p. 80.
[15] Raymond Aron, *18 Lectures on Industrial Society* (London, 1967), p. 5.

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been outlined by Alexander Gerschenkron in a discussion of the socio-economic prerequisites of modern industrialization: '. . . the Soviet case is a very peculiar one, and for many reasons pre-revolutionary Russia seems to provide a much more "normal" case for a discussion of specific patterns of substitution in the process of industrialization.'[16]

Within this context the Russian working class was evolving as 'a social and cultural formation' rather than as a 'thing'. Moreover, if the evolving Russian working class was not able to 'make itself' in a democratic environment, it still had some autonomy. Indeed, Leon Trotsky described 'the political strike' of the workers in the early years of the twentieth century as 'the battering ram which the awakening nation directs against the walls of absolutism'. For Trotsky 'the political strike' employed by the Russian workers, 'so rare in Western Europe', was a new and fundamental form of struggle.[17] On the other hand Gerschenkron has compared the Russian labour movement at this time to the German labour movement during the heyday of Bebel and Liebknecht. As Gerschenkron puts the argument:

> Similarly, the economic position of labour was clearly improving. In the resurgence of the strike movement economic problems seemed to predominate. It is true, of course, that in the specific conditions of the period any wage conflict tended to assume a political character because of the ready interventions of the police and military forces on behalf of management. But this did not mean that the climate of opinion and emotion within the labour movement was becoming more revolutionary; as is shown by the history of European countries (such as Austria or Belgium), sharp political struggles marked the period of the formation of labour movements that in actual fact, though not always in the language used, were committed to reform. There is little doubt that the Russian labour movement of those years was slowly turning towards revisionist and trade-unionist lines.[18]

Whether we agree with Trotsky or Gerschenkron—and the evidence supports the latter—a striking feature of the Russian labour movement was the absence of major indigenous working-class leaders.

The absence of proletarian revolutions in Europe in the 1920s, envisaged by the leaders of the Third International, compelled the Bolshevik theoreticians to revise traditional Marxist concepts. Marx had assumed 'the primitive accumulation of capital' to be a basic pre-requisite for a society undergoing industrialization; and he had further assumed that socialism could only be built on the foundations of an industrial society. So, in order to rescue Lenin's 'operational Marxism' from Marx's inhibiting concepts concerning the preconditions for socialism, Trotsky and Preobrazhensky advanced the theory of 'the primitive socialist accumulation of capital' and rapid industrialization.

[16] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York, 1965), p. 49.
[17] Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1959), p. 32.
[18] Alexander Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

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By the early 1920s the creation of an authoritarian form of work-discipline and the eradication of absenteeism, bad time-keeping and disobedience in factories and mines had been initiated by the Communist Party. The trade unions had also been robbed of their real function as associations for the protection and improvement of working-class wages and working conditions. The transition to totalitarian rule was facilitated by the Russian tradition of autocratic feudalism and authoritarian rule under Lenin. In 1930 Kh. Rakovsky, a dissident Bolshevik, declared: 'A ruling class other than the proletariat is crystallizing before our eyes.' Moreover, the Stalinist bureaucracy indoctrinated the workers with the sort of 'bourgeois' values which were common to the early stages of industrialization in Britain. As well as introducing new forms of social control by means of what the Webbs, in another context, characterized as 'applying the whip of starvation' to discipline the working class, the ruling bureaucracy also used the bait of incentives in the form of piece-work rates. Stalinist theoreticians tried to justify wage differentials and piece-work rates as 'socialist emulation'. But Marx had been scathing in his criticism of piece-work, and there were no texts in his writings to vindicate piece-work in any conceivable circumstances. As Marx wrote: 'Piece-work therefore lay the foundations of the modern "domestic labour", as well as of a hierarchically organized system of exploitation and oppression.' [19]

The dichotomy between Marx's views on piece-work and piece-wages and Stalinist practice created a 'false consciousness' in the bureaucrats who had to cope with the tensions and contradictions of this unforeseen situation. The fact that the Stalinists succeeded in imposing a total 'harmony' between the worker's 'inner motivation and his outward motions' was the central feature of Russian industrialization under a totalitarian dictatorship. In this situation the Russian working class had no opportunity to 'make itself', and, whether or not Dwight MacDonald's conjecture of the inseparable relationship between totalitarianism and 'mass man' had a foundation in reality, the Russian workers had no autonomous class culture of their own. A plural culture is anathema in a totalitarian society. The relationship between the character-structure of the Russian working class and the social structure during the Stalinist phase of industrialization has not been studied in depth, yet Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills justified it thus:

> The key importance, in fact, of the rise of the Soviet Union to great international stature lies in this simple fact: for the first time in the intricate history of the industrial revolution men can now see that this industrialization does not require capitalism as an institutional framework, that it can be accomplished without depending upon private initiative, and that *when it is carried out by state bureaucrats*, industrialization can even be a more *rapid and orderly process*

[19] Karl Marx, *Capital* (London, 1949), p. 564.

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> than when carried out by private capitalists running private firms for private profits.[20]

A considerable number of democratic socialists in the advanced industrial societies took it for granted in the 1950s and early 1960s that the industrialization of backward countries could only be achieved by the decree of dictatorial élites. C. Wright Mills, who came out of a 'Wobby' family in Texas, was no exception, and he thereby abrogated the philosophy of democratic socialism.

In the Stalinist era the key factor in creating 'an inner motivation' in the Russian working class had been the social character of totalitarianism. The Stalinist bureaucracy exorcised 'the motivational conflicts' of the workers, the broken harmony of their inner motivations and their outward motions, by means of psychological terrorism. This terrorism had partially depended on a still evolving 'Marxist' ideology, of the legitimatization of a 'false consciousness' in traditional Marxist terms, compatible with the needs of rapid industrialization. Under Stalin industrialization was accelerated by a powerful national afflatus, an impulse to make up for lost opportunities in Tsarist times, and by the bureaucracy's objective economic compulsions—for example, by the need to 'attract uprooted and migrant labour of all types' into the factories, mines and collective farms, and by the crucial need to catch up with other industrial nations.

The process by which the socialization of the Russian working class was accomplished in the Stalin era has been inevitably wrapped in obscurity. Marxists are generally more interested in masses than in individuals; and only a handful of Marxists have made a serious study of the role of human agency in the historical process. Leon Trotsky was, for example, compelled to invent a fictitious character, 'a collective Markin', who embodied all the virtues of the 'proletarian' (*sic* !) makers of the Bolshevik revolution. Between the period when Russia embarked upon rapid industrialization and her emergence as a major industrial power the bureaucracy had succeeded in 'making' a modern proletariat. Neither Marxist nor liberal scholars have so far displayed much interest in how this was accomplished, and there are few signs of them being willing to do so in the future. If the intellectuals opt for rapid industrialization, and justify this course of action by futurist arguments, the methods by which the pre-industrial labour force is moulded in the crucible of societies undergoing industrialization will seem to be an irrelevance.

And yet the character of the socialization of pre-industrial labour will determine whether democratic or totalitarian forms of government emerge during the process of industrialization in the developing world. Under Stalin industrialization was 'purchased at a catastrophic cost to

[20] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (London, 1965), pp. 475–76. My emphasis.

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human consciousness'. In the metamorphosis of Russian industrialization the potential 'Luddites' were transformed into Stakhanovites. By contrast industrialization in Britain was accompanied by 'sharp and, in the main, open social struggle. From this process of social struggle rather than as an automatic corollary of industrialization, the great democratic triumphs which we associate with the nineteenth century were won. They came not simply because England was being industrialized; they came because the industrialization was accompanied by a rich social history in which a vast growth of human awareness took place.'[21]

The socialization of the Russian working class was imposed in obscurity by applying 'the whip of starvation', by means of terrorism, and by initiating the whole range of social controls available to a totalitarian state. As industrialization was accomplished under a totalitarian dictatorship, the Russians were not able to produce a class-conscious working class, an 'aristocracy of labour' or an independent labour movement. In contrast to the British working class, the Russian working 'class' has not had to search for norms, and this has created its own problems. In a perceptive paragraph Alexander Gerschenkron has explained the consequences:

> It can be argued that viewing the Soviet economy as 'socialist' does little to advance our understanding of that economy. Rather, it is the fact that the policy of rapid industrialization has been inaugurated and maintained by a totalitarian dictatorship and that the mechanics of dictatorial power have come to dominate the economic processes; this has created curious incongruities and *actually prevented*, or at least delayed, the *mental adjustment* of the population to the *normalcy of a fully industrialized society*.[22]

THESE problems are of contemporary (as well as of historical) relevance. They are shaping contemporary socialist attitudes about the irrelevance—or need for—independent trade unions and democratic institutions in countries undergoing industrialization. It is interesting, too, in this context to note that the attitudes of those Marxists who have written on the problems of industrialization (for example, Eric J. Hobsbawn in his introduction to Marx's *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*) are not significantly different from those of Western liberals like W. W. Rostow who have offered their own prescriptions. As the communist bureaucracies emerged in the emergent countries in the post-war years, the ruling élites were increasingly forced to work out a refined 'Marxist' theory to justify and legitimize exploitation under communist industrialization. Ota Sik, a Czechoslovakian Marxist, has recently argued that:

> At the socialist stage of development labour is still relatively

[21] Lewis Coser and Irving Howe, 'Authoritarians of the "Left"', *Voices of Dissent* (New York, 1958), p. 96.
[22] Alexander Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, p. 2. My emphasis.

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> *onerous* (long hours) and intensive. There is a relative *lack of variety, work is monotonous,* and, for most people, offers little *creative scope.* There is still a fairly rigid division of labour, binding the majority to one occupation for life. Consequently, as a general rule people expend their labour for others, primarily because labour is the condition for acquiring from others the use values needed for themselves.[23]

Here a communist economist has captured the appeal and the ethos of contemporary communist propaganda in the emergent countries. Naturally, such propaganda has a strong emotional appeal for the technocrats, administrators and civil servants in those countries; and it has had little impact on the indigenous proletariat. Against the value-system on which the exploitation of the working class rests in those countries where the communists hold sway or are struggling for supremacy, Marx's criticism of industrialization still has some relevance.

In recent years Eric J. Hobsbawn has argued that from 1873 onwards 'the development of the Russian revolutionary movement led Marx and Engels to place their hopes for a European revolution in Russia. No misinterpretation of Marx is more grotesque than the one which suggests that he expected a revolution exclusively from the advanced countries of the West.' Dr Hobsbawn has distorted the argument about Marx's expectations—and consequences—of a socialist revolution in an underdeveloped country, yet he has unwittingly given support to the socialist critics of Stalinism by admitting that Marx's preoccupation with Russian history in the last decade of his life sprang from his hatred of the inherent inhumanity of industrialization. He has also conceded that Marx's changing attitudes were conditioned by 'his growing hatred of and contempt for capitalist society. . . . It seems probable that Marx, who had earlier welcomed the impact of Western capitalism as an inhuman but historically progressive force on stagnant pre-capitalist economies, found himself increasingly appalled by this inhumanity.'[24] This evidence has weakened the arguments of such 'Marxists' as Leon Trotsky, Bruno Rizzi, C. Wright Mills and Isaac Deutscher, who claimed that Stalinist industrialization represented a progressive historical force. Dr Hobsbawn's evidence has given no solace to those 'Marxists' who sought vindication for the exploitation of working people in the writings of Marx. But when Hobsbawn judges the impact of exploitative industrialism on working people in Britain and Russia, he inevitably reveals his moral schizophrenia. Therefore the exploitation of the British working class was inhuman and reprehensible; and the exploitation of the Russian working class was, accordingly, historically necessary and

[23] Ota Sik, 'Socialist Market Relations and Planning', *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth: Essays Presented To Maurice Dobb*, ed., C. H. Feinstein (London, 1967), p. 139. Emphasis in original. My critical remarks on Ota Sik's writings do not detract from my unconditional support for the revisionists in Czechoslovakia.

[24] Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. With an Introduction by Eric J. Hobsbawn* (London, 1964), p. 50.

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progressive. However, the contradictory evidence in Marx's writings has served to strengthen the confusion amongst socialists in the West about the socialist attitude towards industrialization in the developing world. Moreover, Marx himself was never really sure whether all revolts were progressive or useless by impeding more advanced regimes; and those who have followed him are often caught up in this duality, this contradiction.

In the West the majority of socialists, whether they belong to the authoritarian or the libertarian left, assume that industrialization in the developing world will be both authoritarian and progressive. Thus the options are closed; the purpose of struggling against preordained 'fate' is questioned; and the juggernaut of modernization beckons the pre-industrial labour force forward to new forms of social control. In contrast to E. P. Thompson's early optimism about 'winning causes' in Asia or Africa 'which were lost in England', he has now opted for a less optimistic perspective. In a recent article he sounds a note of fatalism: 'Without time-discipline we could not have the insistent energies of industrial man . . . whether this discipline comes in the form of Methodism, or of Stalinism, or of nationalism, it will come in the developing world.'[25] If there were crucial differences between British and Russian industrialization, then what is important for the developing world is whether the new work-discipline comes in a Methodist *or* a Stalinist form. This is what will determine the outcome—whether Asia and Africa will throw up Luddites or Stakhanovites, democratic labour movements or state controlled labour movements, a totalitarian reality or a democratic utopia. In opposition to the interpreters of inexorable contemporary 'reality' in the developing world, the message of Leszek Kolakowski, the Polish philosopher, is still valid and relevant:

> The only protest of the utopian against social reality is that it is morally wrong; his only instrument for influencing the course of social reality is to tell people how the world should look to fulfil those criteria of absolute good and evil. . . .
>
> Between obedience to the world of reality and obedience to the moral imperative, an abyss gapes on whose brink the great historical tragedies have been played: the tragedies of conspiratorial insurrections predesigned to disaster and the opposite kind of tragedies, of collaboration with crime as a result of the belief in its inevitability. On both these brinks, the moral history of the revolutionary movement of recent years has also been staged.

[25] E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism', *Past and Present*, no. 38, 1967. On the general problems of historical determinism versus human agency in relation to the role of the labour movement in industrial societies see my review article, 'A Survey of Some Recent Literature on the Labour Movement', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 39, no. 2, 1968, pp. 205–15.

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WHITHER AFRICA?

Dennis Austin

> Anyone can run to excesses,
> It is easy to shoot past the mark,
> It is hard to stand firm in the middle.

CONTRARY to his belief, and to the claims made in the foreword of the book,* Mr Andreski (who is Professor of Sociology at the University of Reading) belongs to a familiar tradition of earlier commentators on African affairs. A common thread of concern runs through the opinions—and what they say is usually observation cast in the form of argument—of writers and politicians as disparate as René Dumont, Dr Verwoerd, Frantz Fanon, Mrs Elspeth Huxley, Laurence Van der Post, Ivan Potekhin, Sunday journalists in this country, political science writers in the United States, and Mr Andreski in this companion volume to his earlier account of Latin America. They are the moralizers: eager to describe the sins of the African states; wagging their heads over the follies and greed of the African leaders; concluding either with sorrow or satisfaction (or with an unpleasant combination of both) that affairs are in a bad way in the newly independent states. Very often the motive behind such comment has been plain, as by Verwoerd and his kind who were quick to list the sins of the African-ruled states in order to justify their own brand of wickedness. Moralizers in the tradition of left-wing comment, of whom Frantz Fanon is certainly the most ardent, have been moved to castigate the newly independent regimes out of a lingering hope that they will evoke some revolutionary cleansing force of a peasant revolt against the corruption of the first generation of African leaders. It is not easy to see why Mr Andreski should want to belong to either camp, and I think that he would disclaim allies who came forward from either the right or the left. Nonetheless, he pursues his intelligent, melancholy way through the pages of his book, hardly allowing any lightening of the sky—hippopotamus-glum—which clouds his African scene. There are (to be sure) conclusions, but they are not very different from the generalized comment of the preceding chapters, except when they take the form of advice to would-be patrons: then they are unhelpfully jejune as, for example, in the closing sentences:

> But if we have to decide which of [the African governments] to applaud or help, or at least not to condemn, we should choose those which are preparing the ground for progress by maintaining order without recourse to draconian methods, curtailing corruption, limiting the expansionist and parastitic tendencies of the bureaucracy and the army, fostering indigenous small businessmen, spreading birth control, practical education and respect for work.

* Stanislav Andreski, *The African Predicament* (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), 237 pp.

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The general stance adopted in this short book of more than 16 chapters is implicit in the title 'African Predicament', and made explicit in the text. The language, alas, is often stilted, the run of sentences ungainly, the choice of words occasionally ridiculous. Nkrumah, for example, is said to have 'spoiled his own work by harping about Pan Africanism—a chimera with which he was distracting the Ghanaians from attending to their own affairs'. Other African societies are described as having been 'pervaded by predacity' whereby 'no one has other choice than to skin or be skinned'. Many of the observations set down by Mr Andreski seem to me to be either (1) so general as to give a falsely simple interpretation of very complicated matters; or (2) stated so baldly, without supporting evidence, as to have very little objective value; or (3) to be insipid, of the 'it might be like this' if it is not 'like that' variety. As, for example, in his comments on:

> 1. *Biafra*: 'Biafra would no doubt have been allowed to secede if the oil wells did not lie within its boundaries. But coveting the revenue, the Moslem generals, with the blessing of the Lagos government, have launched their troops upon a cruel war of conquest which has already claimed more victims than the British Imperialism had throughout the entire period of its activity in Africa' (p. 77).
> *or polygamy*: 'Nevertheless monogamy was one of the chief factors which made European political structures remarkably stable in comparison with Asia, and which made the internal politics of European states relatively free from violence' (p. 162).
> 2. *The police*: 'Everywhere people fear the police and their exactions, of which the most common form is imposition of fines for fictitious offences, the fines naturally going into the pockets of the policemen. The police are regarded by the ordinary people as extortioners or even uniformed bandits' (p. 93).
> *or the Civil Service*: 'Unless he receives a substantial bribe from a non-kinsman an average African official will give all the appointments which he controls to his kinsmen . . . (p. 100).
> 3. *National Unity*: 'It is not certain, however, that further development will lead to the emergence of nations as defined by the present frontiers; for it may happen that the spread of education in combination with growing dissatisfaction may lead to an emergence and crystallisation of nationalisms along dividing lines more congruent with the ethnic boundaries, and to an eventual re-drawing of the political map. This may, but need not, happen because political integration can exert enormous cultural influence and eventually induce ethnic amalgamation and homogeneity. . . . So it is not impossible that, notwithstanding their arbitrary origins, the present frontiers will circumscribe the future nations' (p. 74).

I hope that I shall not be misunderstood, however, if I say also that I detect a coyness about statements purporting to describe African attitudes to sex which certainly does not reflect on the African predicament. In Europe, says Mr Andreski, 'by the time the champion climbers reach the top [of the social ladder] the habit of working

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hard has become to them second nature, while their desire for fun and their ability to enjoy carnal pleasures will in most cases no longer be strong enough to distract them continuously from their duties'. That is not true (we are told) of many African societies where 'the lucky ones never had the time to learn the habits of hard work and responsibility; and they have reached positions of power and wealth in a flighty frame of mind and still full of desire for amusements and carnal pleasures, which quite a number of them satisfy even during the working hours' (p. 154).

WHAT is the general drift of argument in the book? That the newly independent black African states are in a moral, social, economic, and political 'predicament'. Most of the governments are venal (or 'kleptocratic'). The new towns are 'urban jungles'; their leaders indulge in 'television without sanitation'. Society at large has suffered a 'moral deterioration'; its members (of whom there are too many for the resources available) are afflicted by many ills—neo-colonialism, polygamy, African socialism, 'circulating élites', and 'shibboleths about education'. Hard luck indeed!

The difficulty about questioning these assertions is not that many of them are very likely true, but that they can be balanced only by a contrary set of assertions—that, for example, the time span with which such comments are concerned is too short still to justify dogmatism, that Africa and Latin America may be more unlike than like each other, or that there is a remarkable search still for ways of returning to parliamentary rule and the ballot box even among the military who have replaced many of the party leaders. I have no wish to justify these contrary observations, although the simple fact may be worth noting, which Mr Andreski does make very explicit, that if we looked at the African or Asian countries in terms of their capacity to survive as *states*, rather than in terms of their ability to become *nations*, a more cheerful view might be possible even of the prospect, with which Mr Andreski is concerned, of there being an end to the 'poverty, oppression and strife' within these newly-independent countries.

For my part, however, I would welcome an end to the kind of moralizing of which Mr Andreski's book is a comparatively well-informed, intelligent and competent example. Much more useful would be intensive studies of particular problems which face the African governments at national and local levels, studies in which economists, political scientists, social anthropologists, and sociologists would all play their part. In ancient Egypt, I am told, those who hoped to influence the gods paraded a mummy through the house with such comforting inscriptions as: 'Celebrate the happy day.' They probably had about as much effect in their own time as the present parading of books on Africa whose general message does not amount to much more than 'Bemoan the unhappy African'. Could we not have a moratorium,

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in the name of moderation and modesty, on such writings? Then authors who were tempted still to write generalizations—even true ones—about the African continent, could be warned (a) that they are unlikely to do better than Mr Andreski has done; and (b) that, if they persist, they are in danger of being given the advice said (no doubt apocryphally) to have been tendered by the Chinese philosopher Kung to his disciples:

> And Kung raised his cane against Yuan Jang,
> Yuan Jang being his elder,
> For Yuan Jang sat by the roadside, pretending to be receiving wisdom
> And Kung said
> 'You old fool, come out of it,
> Get up and do something useful.'

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Quarterly Notes

THE AMPHITHEATRE OF THE ABSURD

A Letter to China

ON 1 FEBRUARY 1969 'THE TIMES' published the following letter in its correspondence column:

> Sir,
>
> It was with astonishment bordering upon incredulity that I read the following paragraph from today's *Times*:
>
> > The New China New Agency reported that after they had seen Mao Tse-tung 'the revolutionary fighters were beside themselves with joy. They sang time and time again: "Chairman Mao, you are the resplendent sun and we are like sunflowers blossoming happily under your sunshine. You are the bright dipper, and we are stars rallying closely round you" '—Agence France Presse.
>
> Are the Chinese quite right in the head?
>
> Yours faithfully
> Valerie Gladwell.

I salute Mrs Valerie Gladwell. Her letter, like the exclamation of the child from the Andersen fairy tale, again shows that innocence often goes hand in hand with common sense.

Mrs Gladwell is obviously shocked by the style of Chinese publications. If she had been reading them continuously her reaction would have been more blasé because there is, of course, nothing extraordinary about the item she quotes. Anyone who follows the Chinese press encounters a thousand such passages, many of them even more fatuous. Take, for example, the story reported in the *Peking Review* (27 December 1968). It describes a certain Yu Chun, 'Chairman Mao's Good Cadre Who Is Always Full of Revolutionary Vigour'. In 1961 Yu Chun fell ill and his ailment was diagnosed as cancer:

> After being taken to hospital, he never for a moment gave any thought to his personal affairs. What he did think about was state and world affairs. . . . Determinedly, Yu Chun said: 'I will study Chairman Mao's works as long as my heart beats. I will be one with the people to my last breath. As long as my body can still move, I will advance in the direction Chairman Mao has pointed out!' In hospital Yu Chun made a big effort to sit up in bed, propped up against the head board, to read Chairman Mao's works. When he became dizzy, he shut his eyes and repeated passages to himself. If the pain got worse, he recited aloud. When the nurses advised him to rest, he replied: 'I can't put Chairman Mao's works down once I pick them up.' . . . Yu Chun seized every minute to propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought despite the constant pain. His ward was always in the lead in the study of Chairman Mao's works, and the Party branch to which he belonged in the

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> hospital was always the most active in political and ideological work. . . . Shortly afterwards, the hospital did an extensive excision of his cancer, cutting off more than two feet of his intestines. The operation was successful. . . . With indomitable revolutionary spirit, Yu Chun increased his physical exercise so as to be able to leave the hospital earlier to serve the people. . . . In fighting cancer, Yu Chun has always attached more importance to the creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works than to life itself. It is the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung which gave him the overwhelming courage and strength to triumph over cancer and death. Two months later, a buoyant-spirited Yu Chun arrived at a new fighting post: the rear section of a P.L.A. artillery unit at the Fukien front.

Or take the following story reported by Cheng Chow Radio. On 19 December as winter approached, the workers of the Shuching motor vehicle repair works decided to implement Mao's current economy campaign and postponed heating the works for 12 days:

> When the weather suddenly turned freezing cold, the workers rubbed their hands together and recalled the Red Army crossing the Snow Mountains. Then an evil wind blew up. Someone babbled: 'Let's buy some scented glycerine to prevent our hands and faces from cracking.'

This suggestion was condemned as the 'poison of "economism"'.

But the lot of the American people is also not enviable. Recently *Jen-min Jih-pao* published an informative article under the title, 'Why do the American people go hungry?':

> Means of production under the capitalist system are in the hands of the capitalists, who engage in production for maximum profits and not to satisfy the needs of the working people. They would rather let the food rot in warehouses than allow the working people to have enough to eat. The capitalists invariably keep the masses unemployed and short of food so as to ensure a source of cheap labour power. They use the 'whip of hunger' to drive the working people into creating more surplus value for them. Therefore, the more capitalist production develops, the more acute polarization of society becomes and the more huge wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small number of exploiters, while the working people who create this wealth become more impoverished daily. This is the absolute law which governs capitalist society. Under the rule of a handful of multi-millionaires, millions upon millions of the toiling masses are struggling on the hunger-line and lead a most miserable life in the United States, which calls itself the most 'affluent'.

This obviously shows a deep Marxist-Maoist grasp of life in contemporary capitalist countries. This grasp is no less startling in its perception of the facts of life in China, as Mrs Evelyn Gibson pointed out in a letter to *The Times* (4 February 1969) which followed Mrs Gladwell's:

> My favourite quotation from the New China News Agency has always been: 'The peasants are enthusiastically paying their taxes.'

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The Merrill Elite Press Pyramid

FOLLOWING ONE OF THE IMMORTAL thoughts of Mao ('Newspapers must not be run behind closed doors. They must face the masses and must have the correct general orientation and at the same time be fresh and lively'), the *Peking Review* recently carried out a survey among its subscribers which included the following questions:

1) What do you think of our articles and reports on the creative study and application of Mao Tse-tung's thought?
2) What do you think of the documents, articles and reports about China's great cultural revolution published in the *Peking Review?*

I have not obliged the editors of the *Peking Review* by replying to their questions. I have instead sent them Mrs Valerie Gladwell's letter.

But it is not only in Peking that there is an interest in high-quality journals. Recently *Time* magazine (10 January 1969) reviewed *The Elite Press*, by John C. Merrill, Professor of Journalism at the University of Missouri. Included among the top 10 journals in the 'Merrill Elite Press Pyramid' are *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Pravda*. The former 'resorts at times to exaggeration, half-truths and outright falsification', but *Pravda* gets full marks. It is, according to Mr Merrill, 'without a doubt the calmest, most businesslike and most influential newspaper in the Soviet Union and perhaps in the world', its articles 'should serve as good examples to daily journals everywhere'.

Can it be that our learned professor really does not know what he is talking about?

It is actually reading the international press, not reading about it, that provides a proper comparative perspective. As one who has been doing this systematically for many years I am constantly struck by the deficiencies in political vision of readers who have had no opportunity of following anything but their own national press. That is not to say that the reader of *The Times* (or any other Western quality journal) is not infinitely better informed than the reader of *Jen-min Jih-pao*, or even of *Pravda*, only that even the best coverage of the communist press in the West cannot really convey its character, flavour, or impact on its readers.

Illustration is an inadequate substitute, but one can quote innumerable stories to indicate the problem involved. Take, for example, the coverage in the Soviet and East European press of Jan Palach's suicide. At first it was passed over in silence. After two days Warsaw Radio reported that 'the Czechoslovak authorities are investigating the circumstances of the suicide'. TASS first referred to it only after five days had elapsed, saying that it was 'an anti-socialist provocation'. This was echoed by the East German *Neues Deutschland* which, six days after the event, explained that Jan Palach had been driven to his death by secret organizations manipulated from abroad. It mentioned West Germany's intelligence agency and added:

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> It will also be recalled that a few days before, a pamphlet by the ideologist of the counter-revolutionary 'Club of Engaged Non-Party Members', Ivan Svitak, had been posted at the Philosophical Faculty of Prague's Charles University. Svitak is currently in the USA and is active at the institute of the infamous anti-communist Brzezinski.

The Polish *Zycie Warszawy* (24 January 1969) gave a 'sociological' explanation. In an article entitled 'Emotions and Depressions', it quoted statistics on suicides in different countries and concluded that they were caused by psychological disturbances:

> The motives of the youthful suicides are very complex. However, as even partial evidence suggests, it is a fact that those who are particularly inclined to such actions are persons who deserve medical attention and truly sympathetic help from society.

The Hungarian *Nepszabadsag* (25 January 1969) published an article by Ferenc Varnai who said:

> The suicide of Jan Palach is the product of a hysterical mood bred by rightist and counter-revolutionary forces, whose purpose is to prevent the restoration of order and the political consolidation of a country with a socialist regime. . . . What hatred, what callousness, what cold calculation are needed to drive young men—half children—to self-destruction, when it is well known by the enemy that the chosen victim is merely a puppet in their schemes designed to stir up passion.

Finally, *Pravda* (30 January 1969), in an article, 'Provocateurs and Their Victims', authoritatively explained that

> Jan Palach's death was in fact political murder, his action was forced on him by elements who are constantly trying to inflame the turbulent situation in the country.

Pravda complained that it is not only the Western press that 'inflates in every way the case of Jan Palach', but also that

> some Czechoslovak journals, instead of helping to explain precisely and conclusively the circumstances of these tragic events, try to sow doubt, to delude Czechoslovak society, and to create artificially an uneasy atmosphere, a feeling of uncertainty, apprehension, and fear. At the same time the Czechoslovak press reported some more 'attempted suicides'. Some organs of Western propaganda hastened to promote these people almost into the ranks of political fighters. However, from the information given in the Czechoslovak press it is clear that such attempts were made by criminals who were trying to escape from punishment for all kinds of misdeeds.

Is this an example of 'businesslike' reporting by a newspaper belonging to the 'Merrill Elite Press Pyramid'? Surely, someone here is not quite right in the head? In Prague, Soviet assertions made in the same article that Palach had been reassured that the fuel he was to use would cause only a 'cold flame' or 'luminescence' have been greeted with the contempt they deserve. Interviewed by the Slovak Youth

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Federation daily, *Smena* (29 January 1969), Dr Miroslav Kusy, Professor at Komensky University in Bratislava and the then head of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party (later dismissed by Husak), said in reply to a question about Jan Palach's act:

> In spite of its tragic nature, this act has its logical aspect. It is an extreme expression of passive resistance, with which our people have defended themselves ever since the August events.

As the Slovak writer Dominik Tatarka wrote earlier, before Jan Palach's self-immolation, in *Reporter* (8 January 1969), the fortnightly organ of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists:

> In the last few months people in this country have appeared in a new light, especially the young people. Have you noticed that there are moments when the fear for one's life simply disappears? . . . When fundamental human and social values are in jeopardy the fear for one's own life disappears. What is life good for when they take away from us what is more valuable than life? . . . To be human is not a calculated purpose; man cannot be used as building material for the construction of history. He does not want to be a brick in the hands of the superpowers simply because they are more powerful. However hard the reality may be, man will never accept it for ever.'

However, the Soviet version of Palach's death has been accepted by a small group of Czechoslovak Stalinists, supporting the Soviet occupation. At their meeting in Cechie Hall in Prague-Liben, a leaflet entitled 'The truth about Jan Palach's death' was circulated. It repeated the Soviet assertions: 'The burning of Jan Palach was the act of extreme rightist and anti-socialist forces. Jan Palach intended to soak himself with a special liquid causing a so-called "cold flame". Somebody substituted petrol for this liquid. That is how it all happened.'

The minutes from this meeting of the Czechoslovak Quislings were published (before the new censorship clampdown) in the *Reporter* (27 February 1969). The transcript was prepared at the meeting itself, despite strong precautions taken by the organizers to prevent any unsympathetic observers from attending it. Such excellent reporting was not without risks even before Dubcek's fall. Would not *Reporter*, rather than *Pravda*, deserve to have been included in the Merrill Elite Press Pyramid?

Double Standards

WHILE THE CZECHOSLOVAK students set themselves on fire to regain democracy, the militant students in the West are hell-bent on destroying it. They are very concerned about its absence in Greece or in Spain, but in Great Britain and in Germany they are for 'an extra-parliamentary opposition'. A contributor to the book edited by Tariq Ali [1] wrote in somewhat purple prose:

[1] Tariq Ali, *New Revolutionaries* (London, Peter Owen), p. 56.

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> Further progress along the path of socialism means throwing aside the rotting corpse of social democracy, upon which the vultures of Fabianism, careerism and orthodox communism are still sustaining themselves. These three with their necrophiliac passion for a dead social democracy are themselves to be thrown on the rubbish-heap as the last of the 'reformists'.

While New Leftists expressed their condemnation of the Soviet invasion, they were strangely reluctant to make much fuss about it, although there is no doubt whatever about the strong pro-Czechoslovak sympathy among all students. The New Left activists were divided about it doctrinally.[2] The gamut of interpretation ran from 'deploring the right-wing tendency of the Czechoslovak leaders before the invasion', through condemnation of their 'ultra-revisionism', to the acceptance of the Soviet (and Cuban) thesis about the 'restoration of capitalism' in Czechoslovakia which was halted by the occupation. They were not involved in it emotionally. They would demonstrate about Vietnam or Rhodesia at the drop of a hat, and the self-immolation of a Buddhist monk would send them into the streets in a frenzy, but a similar act by a Czech student failed to produce similar reactions. One has only to compare the violence of the New Left protest about the monk with the perfunctory character of their protest about the student (for example, the sparse participation in an all-party five-minute silent vigil in Oxford), to see that Czechoslovakia was more of an embarrassment than a stimulus to genuine indignation among them. This is not surprising. The contrast between the attitudes of Eastern and Western students was admirably summarized in a letter from a Czech student quoted in *Dissent* (January/February 1969):

> Western socialism, especially in its radical form, took me completely by surprise. It seemed so completely unreal, something from a different planet or a different era. You have completely dissociated theory and practice. The men I met are all properly repelled by the realities of authoritarian rule, but they keep on preaching the same weary Utopian ideologies that can lead to nothing else. They live in a romantic dream-world in which their dear radical rhetoric is perfectly consistent with their apparently sincere faith in freedom and justice. But do they really think they could apply their radical

[2] In the *New Left Review* (January–February 1969) Hans Jürgen Krahl, a leading member of the German SDS, wrote in the Neanderthal style of the latter-day neo-Marxists:

> The ideology of the Prague reforms failed to achieve any awareness of the contradiction between the material base of a nationalized ownership of the means of production and a liberal superstructure. It was in the Hegelian sense badly and anachronistically idealistic, in so far as it sought to combine two mutually incompatible historical monuments—the new rational principle with the mature substance of the old ethic. The post-Stalinist reforms in Czechoslovakia represented an ahistorical transference of the historically new, still undeveloped and étatistically distorted principle of the socialist mode of production onto the old and withered substance of bourgeois social relations. . . . The fossilized liberalism of a long-vanished phase of bourgeois society characterized by competitive capitalism was resurrected in an attempt to institutionalize constitutional liberties

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Utopia in a real world and still respect their libertarian commitments? Do they really think their Utopias could be benign if their revolutions were not comic-opera coups on indulgent campuses but real ventures in the exercise of power?

I met a few hard-headed colleagues, but most of the men who clamoured for attention were three-semester intellectuals, pampered children of your permissive, affluent society, throwing tantrums because Father gave them only education, security and freedom—but not Utopia. They bitterly resent society because it does not treat them as the fulcrum of the universe: though from what they told me about themselves it seemed that their families did treat them that way. I can't take them seriously. They seem to have no idea of the cost or the value of the privileges they receive abundantly and *gratis*. They dismiss them as 'bourgeois'—in Czechoslovakia we are struggling for just a fraction of what they dismiss. I suppose their histrionics do have some individual cathartic value, like the old duelling fraternities, but socially they seem infinitely irrelevant. Can you imagine one of them in Czechoslovakia?

What surprises me most is not that they take themselves seriously—students always do, and we are no exception—but that their elders take them seriously. In the West it seems possible to grow quite old without having to grow up—you have so much slack, so much room, so much padding between yourselves and reality. You can afford a great deal: we can't. For instance, can you imagine reading Sartre's *Les communistes et la paix* here in 1952? That was just at the time of the Slansky trials. Or reading Marcuse on repressive tolerance, in Prague at the time of the Writers' Union Congress? It was not until I started visiting the West that I began to understand that a Sartre or a Marcuse can simply afford a great deal of illusion. You all live in a different era—you still believe in Utopia. You simply haven't faced up to the fact that you can't build a Utopia without terror, and that before long, terror is all that's left. You have little stomach for terror—after 20 years, we have even less. But you like your radical illusions too well. We've had our fill of Utopia.

One can see why the Western New Left militant students are somewhat less than enthusiastic about their East European colleagues and about Czechoslovakia in particular. They only paid lip service to provide themselves with a moral alibi or to acquire wider political respectability. It is in any case manifestly wrong to assert, as did the *Sunday Times* (2 February 1969), that Czechoslovakia is one of the issues which provide common ground among militant students. On the contrary, it created dissension among them. One manifestation of this was the boycott of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal meeting on Czechoslovakia in Stockholm by many of its erstwhile supporters who had endorsed it enthusiastically when it dealt with Vietnam. For them Czechoslovakia under Dubcek was sliding towards counter-revolution, for Tariq Ali Czechoslovakia is one of the symptoms of the world

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revolutionary upswing. Both those positions make Mrs Gladwell's question seem very relevant.

The Dialectics of Slander

THIS QUESTION CERTAINLY applies to quite a lot of 'revolutionary' acts of the 'militant students'. The LSE leaflet calling for 'creative vandalism' is just one example of the 'ideas' which are blurring the distinction between civilized and non-civilized behaviour. Recently I had a chance to see the same phenomenon displayed in more striking form at various US university campuses. At the University of Illinois 'creative vandalism' was applied to its library where thousands of index cards—some not duplicated elsewhere—were taken from the library's card catalogue, mutilated and destroyed. At all universities, whether at Berkeley, Queen's College or Chicago, those charged with the maintenance of discipline receive a stereotyped label: 'Fascist Pig'. Here, for example, is a description of the disciplinary hearing involving a third-year law student, Gustin L. Reichbach, before an academic panel at Columbia University (*New York Times*, 18 December 1968):

> When Mr [Mark] Rudd, former chairman of the campus Students for a Democratic Society chapter, was called to testify, he turned the lectern around so that his back was to the five-member panel. Ronald Shiftan, the student chairman, asked him to turn around the right way. Mr Rudd replied: 'I'm here to testify at the request of Gus. What more do you want from me—to face you pigs?'

The newspaper of Columbia's Students for a Democratic Society, *The Hard Core* (20 December 1968), referred in an article on the case to 'the crimes of Columbia' and made an ironical comparison between a pledge to academic freedom and the nazi salute ('Heil Hitler'). In connexion with the (recently ended) strike at the campus of San Francisco State College, it sarcastically asked: 'Was there occupational therapy at Auschwitz?'

At San Francisco City College the Black Students' Union and the Third World Liberation Front demanded the establishment of a Black Studies Department which would grant a B.A. in Black Studies, and the immediate admission of 500 'Third World Students', without regard to their possible lack of educational qualifications for entrance into the University. The previous President of the College, Robert Smith, has been called a 'pig' by the demonstrators. The acting President, Dr S. I. Hayakawa, has been regularly greeted by them as a 'blood-sucking fascist', but this routine greeting was varied by one girl student who called him 'Eichmann'. During my stay in California the local press described the incident. Dr Hayakawa, who is of Japanese descent and a famous semantics expert with an impeccable record of intellectual liberalism, told her that she was 'an idiot'. Whereupon the indignant girl announced that *she* would sue *him* for slander; not the other way round. I wonder what Mrs Gladwell would have said about *that*?

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'Down With Us'

IT IS IRONICAL THAT WHILE on the West Coast Dr Hayakawa was dubbed 'Eichmann', on the East Coast the phenomenon of Negro anti-semitism flared up. It manifested itself during the recent New York teachers' strike. In a situation where the professional rights of the predominantly Jewish teachers clashed with the attempt of the local Negro and Puerto Rican community at Ocean Hill-Brownsville to exercise control over the schools in their districts, an element of specifically anti-Jewish racial animosity was injected into the conflict, and not just anti-white, but anti-semitic sentiments were expressed. This has been described by the Jewish New York monthly, *Commentary* (January 1969) as

> symbolic anti-Semitism which Jews instinctively find more chilling. Negroes trying to reassure Jewish audiences repeatedly and unwittingly make the very point they are trying to refute. 'This is not anti-Semitism', they say. 'The hostility is toward the whites. When they say "Jew", they mean "white".' But that is an exact and acute description of political anti-Semitism: 'The enemy' becomes the Jew, 'the man' becomes the Jew, the villain is not so much the actual Jewish merchant on the corner as the corporate Jew who stands symbolically for generic evil.

One incident has particularly angered the American Jewish community. It involved the reading of a poem—written by a 15-year-old Negro schoolgirl—by a prominent member of the African-American Teachers' Association, Leslie Campbell. One stanza of the poem runs:

> *Hey, Jew boy, with that yarmulke on your head,*
> *You pale-faced Jew boy—I wish you were dead;*
> *I can see you, Jew boy—no, you can't hide,*
> *I got a scoop on you—yeh, you gonna die.*

No one called Mr Campbell an 'Eichmann'. But whatever the rights and wrongs on the two sides in the New York teachers' strike it is interesting to see how some prominent Jewish 'progressives' reacted to the anti-semitic episodes which took place during the dispute.

Two such Jewish 'progressive' pundits wrote about it and neither of them was very concerned about the manifestations of anti-semitism. I. F. Stone, the author and publisher of that classical example of muddledom, *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, wrote: 'It will not hurt us Jews to swallow a few insults from overwrought blacks', and added that 'the danger lies in white racism, not black'. Evidently some racisms are more progressive than others.

Andrew Kopkind, pillar of the *New York Review of Books*, described the incident with Mr Campbell in an article in the *New Statesman* (7 February 1969) thus:

> The mass-circulated newspapers never deviate from support of Israel, but one small radio station which appeals to the hip/radical underground chanced to let a black schoolteacher read an anti-semitic poem (dedicated to the head of the teachers' union) and hell broke loose. The station—one of the few in the country which is

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> supported by listener-donations and has no commercial advertising—may lose its licence for the indiscretion.

As was pointed out by an outraged reader in the subsequent issue of the *New Statesman*, Mr. Kopkind was rather discreet about the content of what he called 'the indiscretion'. He also used in his report an amazing (for a Jew!) argument in defence of black anti-semitism:

> Jewish employers treat Negroes neither better nor worse than non-Jewish employers do. If the Jews' hearts are in the right place, the Negroes can't see the anatomical difference.

In the early thirties there was an anecdote about some Berlin Jews who were so impressed by the anti-semitic arguments used by Goebbels at a public meeting that they joyously exclaimed: '*Weg mit uns!*' ('Down with us!').

In France, during recent demonstrations at Nanterre, some (Arab?) students were shouting 'down with the Jews' (*Jewish Chronicle*, 7 March 1969). At the Sorbonne law faculty a number of Jewish students, who wanted to show how 'progressive' they were, demonstrated their support of the Arab terrorist organization, *El Fatah*, by manning its stand.

In a conversation with some New Left Jewish students in France who argued that it is necessary to disregard anti-semitism in the Arab 'liberation movements', a French-Jewish writer, Albert Memmi, replied (*L'Arche*, reprinted in *Mainstream*, December 1968):

> If a revolution of the Left today can take place only at the expense of the Jewish community, you may regard this as legitimate if you wish, but I, for my part, do not think so; I am not an historical masochist. I see no reason why the Jews should be offered up in a sacrificial Holocaust for the sake of a forward march of History.

Are the Jewish 'progressives' quite right in the head?

Explosives in a Nursery

A BRITISH SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST, David Martin, in an article in the *Spectator* (31 January 1969), described the student unrest at the London School of Economics as a 'Day Nursery of Revolution', an activity based on infantile regression:

> The main activity of the Nursery of Revolution was drama. In the darkest corner of the Nursery is to be found an Old Theatre, so called because the same childish scenes are re-enacted there year after year. There the children use their imagination and play at revolution. They never tire of these endless scenes and enormously prefer them to contact with the outside world.

Mr Martin concluded:

> A mixture of student aestheticism and theatricality is a much greater nuisance than it is a danger. The social relationships of the nursery may be boring or infuriating but hardly a challenge to

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> the adult world. The older style of revolutionary disciplined himself and was cruelly anal in his irrevocable march towards a new society . . . anarchism and vitalism are excellent attitudes for social parasites but are not serious political philosophies. It is the Puritans who make revolutions, even in England. One need not worry too much about long-haired Cavaliers decked out in the trimmings of Carnaby Street.

It is true that Great Britain offers the militant 'new revolutionaries' fewer opportunities than other countries, but experience everywhere indicates that the boys in the Nursery are hefty fellows quite capable of smashing toys, and other things too. Whether they can 'destroy society', as they proclaim they will, depends on the society in question; they can destroy universities. In Berlin they have already almost succeeded in doing so. In Frankfurt and Heidelberg, in Toulouse and Paris, in Perugia and Rome, in New York and San Francisco, the children are out of the Nursery and a mini-terror against both the academic staff and fellow students is already developing. The 'guerrilla on the campus' is not concerned with university reform but with using the university as a springboard for wider revolutionary action. 'Idealistic' demands serve as levers for such actions. Disruption of university life is followed by elaboration of coercive methods, storm-troop tactics against academic authorities—by similar pressures on fellow students. Whatever sympathy one may have for student grievances, which in many countries are often legitimate enough, it cannot be extended to this tendency to substitute the force of argument by the argument of force.

In his testimony before the Congressional sub-committee, Dr Hayakawa said, referring to SDS activists, that 'in their system there is no more room for debate than at a Nazi rally in the days of Adolf Hitler' (*International Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1969). A militant student at the London School of Economics put it somewhat differently: 'We have an ideology and our opponents don't—so they are very frightened to take us on in the debate' (*The Guardian*, 27 January 1969). One thing can, beyond doubt, be caused by the activities of the militant students, even if they do not succeed in destroying the university: a steady deterioration of intellectual life in the colleges, and a marked lowering of educational standards. This is a danger not much talked about in Britain, but it is a complaint which is more and more frequently heard on US campuses.

The Black Studies which are being demanded by militant Negro students all over the United States are likely, in view of the circumstances in which they are being set up, to fall short, in many cases, of university standards. Anyway, the militant Negro students are thirsty not for knowledge of African history, but for Black mythology; demands that are met are soon followed by other demands, as is the case with white militants.

A rather comic illustration of this is what happened at the Jewish-sponsored Brandeis University in Boston. The Negro students there

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also demanded the introduction of Black Studies. When their demands were accepted they found another issue to keep up their militant spirit of protest and to continue the 'confrontation'. They came up with a request that the Brandeis students' canteen and its *Kosher* kitchen should start serving some traditional Negro pork dishes; the absence of such dishes from the menu, they said, was evidence of racial discrimination. At Rutgers University, the Negro students demanded 'college credit' for 'black life experience' (*New York Times*, 27 February 1969). At Cornell University, they used guns to make their demands acceptable. At the University of Connecticut, 'the Movement was going to use voodoo; by sticking a pin in their university it would kill the war in Vietnam' (*The New York Times Magazine*, 23 February 1969). At Merritt College in Oakland, California, black students tried to bar a white student from a philosophy course, saying: 'It does us no good to discuss any sort of black cultural philosophy with this white man in the room.' At Berkeley, new 'university' courses include one called 'Social Welfare 298', the theme of which is 'that all Americans are racist because they all make decisions on the basis of racial or ethnic values'. *Newsweek* magazine (10 February 1969) interviewed some black militants: their attitude to learning is well illustrated by what they had to say about the study of law and mathematics. J. Otis Cochran, a first-year law student at Yale, said that he 'came to the conclusion that belief or support for the law is not the only relevant reason for coming to law school. In fact, you should learn the law in order to discover how the prosecutors of the system use it, and then you can use it to uphold or to undo the system'. Nathan Hare, a 34-year-old Ph.D. and the head of the Black Studies Department at the San Francisco State College, expressed some opinions about mathematics which bear a close resemblance to the ideas which were developed in the thirties in the Soviet Union, except that it is now a case of 'black' mathematics, and not of 'proletarian' mathematics. Mr Hare wrote: 'I can visualize, for instance, a reading problem in "black" mathematics that would not be saturated with middle-class referents such as stocks and bonds. Rather, the teacher might ask in order to whet the ghetto child's appetite for maths: "If you loot one store and burn two, how many do you have left?."' It is interesting that while some white academics sheepishly accept this kind of perversion of university values, some Negro scholars find enough courage to stand up against it. Martin Kilson, Jr, a Harvard Assistant Professor of Government, wrote: 'Blissfully unaware that their bigoted and paranoid outlook makes shambles of scholarship and learning, the black critics of Social Science 5 seek to reduce the course to a platform for black nationalist propaganda.'

At Harvard University, long before the outbreak of the campus disorder in April, a course in Social Relations, specifically aimed at the 'radicalization' of the students, was taught by SDS adherents. The

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militant students at Wisconsin State University demanded the abolition of grades and of the lecture system, and an equal vote with the faculty members in departmental policy; on top of this they have proposed a 'teaching contract' in which the students and teachers would decide at the beginning of each term what material the course would cover, and the procedures for the evaluation 'of *both* teacher and students'.[3]

The militants complain that grading is 'a process so destructive as to create long waiting lists for university psychiatrists',[4] that 'teachers still dominate the classroom', and proclaim that 'the problem is to *get the power to take control of the institution* so that we can use it as we want'.[5]

Such views and demands are, of course, by now standard expressions everywhere of what is so often described as 'small militant minorities who are in no way representative of the majority of students' (which is true but not always relevant). Whether it is in the United States, Germany, France, Italy or Great Britain, militant students have been formulating demands in the perspective of the Leninist question, 'Who—whom?'.

In Great Britain it has, for instance, been stated in the International Socialism pamphlet, *Education, Capitalism, and the Student Revolt* (October 1968), that 'the central question of control over higher education is raised' and that 'the most important area in which the system should be contested is over the content of courses themselves and the related issue of control of appointments'. In the United States the militants go further. Jerry Rubin, the clownish Yippie 'new revolutionary', one of the organizers of the march on the Pentagon in 1967 and of the demonstrations at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention, has recently argued in the columns of the sophisticated 'progressive' literary journal, the *New York Review of Books* (13 February 1969), that it is necessary to organize 'an offensive against the courts':

> To challenge the courts is to attack American society at its roots. In campus rebellions, the most revolutionary demand, the demand that can never be granted by the administration, is the demand for amnesty. Attacking the society's mechanism for punishing her citizens is attacking the society's very basis for control and repression.

At Columbia, a fire-bomb was recently thrown into the Low Library. It was extinguished before doing damage, but the library of New York University was burnt down. At Stanford University the office of the President was set on fire by an incendiary bomb and a valuable collection of rare prints ruined. In San Francisco a Molotov cocktail tossed into the home of a professor almost took the lives of a family of five.

[3] *Critical Teaching*, Essays by the Education Committee of the Teaching Assistants' Association (Madison, 1968). Also: *Critique and Program of the History Students Association* (Madison, September 1968).

[4] It 'wittily' adds: 'Students of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your grades.'

[5] *Connections*, 11 December 1968–15 January 1969, Madison. Italics in the original.

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In Germany Molotov cocktails have also become popular. In Berlin police have discovered them in the offices of the Revolutionary Students' Organization. *Der Spiegel* (10 February 1968) has given many examples of their use by militants. The student paper of Kiel University, *Skize* (*Sketch*), in its February issue called upon the students 'to organize collectively' in order to overcome the fear of acting individually, so that they can engage in practical revolutionary activities, such as stealing books and food, setting fire to department stores and churches, and throwing Molotov cocktails into police stations and government buildings. It added: 'We must do this to destroy capitalism.'

In Britain, things are still not so explosive, but, as a contributor to a Penguin Special, *Student Power*, put it, 'for the student generation of the 1960s, it suddenly became clear that violence could have a liberating purpose'. Tariq Ali (who sounds almost urbane in comparison with Jerry Rubin) used a drawing of a Molotov cocktail as the frontispiece of his book, *New Revolutionaries*. His last words in the book are: 'WE mean business.' Before his 'revolutionary' trip to Pakistan, Tariq Ali dismissed the significance of the diagram [6] at a party organized by the publisher to launch the book, saying that 'it did not mean that there would suddenly be a lot of little men running around tossing incendiaries' (*Daily Telegraph*, 5 February 1969).

Suddenly or not, the little men are already tossing them in other countries. At San Francisco State College a student lost three fingers when a home-made time-bomb exploded when he attempted to put it in the Creative Arts Building on the college campus (*International Herald Tribune*, 7 March 1968). 'Creative vandalism' joins with 'creative arts'. . . .

A modern version of Anderson's tale, 'The Little Match Girl', would seem to be 'The Boy with a Molotov Cocktail in a Day Nursery of Revolution'. Mock Molotov cocktails decorated the offices of Peter Owen, the publisher, at his party for the *New Revolutionaries*. It is difficult to decide who exactly is not quite right in the head here.

The Promised Land

Goethe said in *Faust* that '*Im Anfang war die Tat*' ('In the Beginning was the Deed'). Yet it is through the power of words that myths are perpetuated or reinvented. 'Progressive' myths are constantly refurbished through sentimentality, sophistry or ignorance, but beyond this, whether in the case of the elderly 'progressive' survivors of the thirties or of the young romantic nihilists of the New Left, there is a longing for the Promised Land.

The location of this Promised Land changes. In the thirties it was the Soviet Union; today it is still Cuba, but the Cuban 'experiment'

[6] It was originally published in the *New York Review of Books* together with an article by Andrew Kopkind extolling revolutionary violence.

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may also lose its power of attraction, as did the quaintly called 'Soviet experiment'.

The Havana daily, *El Mundo* (8 July 1968), published a table showing the disparity between the planned sugar production targets and the actual achievement (in million tons):

	Target	Actual Harvest
1965	6	6
1966	6·5	6
1967	7·5	5·5
1968	8	5·2
1969	(9)	?
1970	10	?

Despite the disappointing results of the 1960s, Castro again announced in a speech on 2 January 1969 his confidence that Cuba would produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. He claimed that 1969 output would be more than 5·5 million tons (probably an overestimate), but admitted in effect that this would mean a drastic drop from the old target of 9 million tons for 1969. At the same time he announced the introduction of sugar rationing to reduce Cuba's present consumption to about a third.

This announcement in Castro's tenth anniversary speech is a crowning irony in a country which, whatever its previous political misfortunes, had before 1959 the highest per capita income in Latin America. Now virtually everything the Cubans need for everyday life is rationed.

Castro's initial attempt at industrialization—he originally condemned Cuba's dependence on sugar as a 'hateful result of capitalist exploitation'—was abortive. It was admitted to be a costly error and abandoned after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1963; since then Cuba has again concentrated on sugar production.

At about the same time Khrushchev, who had proclaimed not long before that the Soviet Union was already building communism, the higher stage of socialism, was importing Canadian wheat to make up for a poor Soviet harvest. The current Soviet joke at the time was to ask when Cuba would reach the higher stage of socialism and begin to build full communism. The answer was: 'When it begins to import sugar.' Rationing is only a half-way house, but jokes may be more realistic than programmes in a communist country.

At the same time as the Economic Development myth was being contradicted by events, Castro moved closer to standard communist practice elsewhere on the issue of freedom of artistic expression. Until recently he had been somewhat exceptional in this respect, allowing the Cuban artists and writers considerable room for experiment, satisfying their 'avant-garde' longings and permitting greater contact with the cultural scene abroad than is the case in other communist countries. The publications of *Casa de las Americas* stand in contrast to the intellectual communist publications in states run by the Party, both in

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terms of sophistication and of the margin of liberality. They resemble Soviet publications of the twenties more than contemporary ones. Needless to say, they also had a greater appeal abroad.

However, a new cold wind on cultural matters has recently been blowing in Cuba. In October 1968 the National Meeting of Young Writers in Cienfuegos issued a very orthodox type of declaration on the 'historic responsibilities' of Cuban intellectuals. There were also other manifestations of a conflict between the authorities and the Cuban artists and writers. The authorities rejected two of the six works which won prizes at the annual competition organized by the National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists because they stood 'outside the ideological content of the Cuban revolution'. The two prize-winners—the poet Herberto Padilla and the playwright Anton Arrufat—had become targets of the official criticism which, as in other communist countries, is directed against nonconformist intellectuals.

When Castro came to power in January 1959, having overthrown the corrupt Batista regime, he promised to build a new Cuba with civil and political liberties. After 10 years of the 'Cuban experiment' his promises have long ago been abandoned and the usual post-revolutionary cycle has led to austerity and 'revolutionary vigilance'. Not only political, but even sartorial dissent has been made impossible, Latin temperament and *joie de vivre* have been put into the straitjacket of puritan radicalism. Thousands are imprisoned for political crimes, half-a-million Cubans have left the country, while several hundred thousand more wait for a chance to do so. It is unlikely that 1969, proclaimed by Castro as 'The Year of Decisive Effort', will see the creation of a New Man (the emergence of which is the hackneyed purpose of all revolutionary regimes). He will fail to emerge in Cuba, just as he failed to emerge in Russia or in China. Instead of a New Man, Cubans will probably have to be satisfied with new austerity, new vigilance, and old propaganda.

Is all this going to dampen the sympathy of the 'progressive' intellectuals to Castro's Cuba? The economic plight of the Cuban people and the tightening of cultural controls may perhaps affect some, as did Castro's support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This event led to a rewriting of two lines of a poem written by one of the young Bourbons of the New Left, Adrian Mitchell, who declared in *Peace News* (31 January 1969) that this 'shook' him. He added, however, that it did not shake his 'general faith in the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban people, or Castro for that matter . . .'.

We have been through this before (though it was not *Castro-enteritis* then), haven't we, Mrs. Gladwell?

Where Have All the Toilet Rolls Gone?

THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST countries is like an iceberg, with only the lesser part visible to Western observers. They have described the

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role of *Blat* (graft) and of the *Tolkach* (fixer) in the Soviet economy, but it is difficult for them to realize how widespread is the phenomenon of private enterprise in 'socialist' societies. Recently, toilet paper disappeared from all the shops in Poland. The Warsaw *Ekspres Wieczorny* (24 January 1969) attributed this lack of toilet rolls to thievery. 'Who is stealing them and where?' the newspaper asked; 'In the factory, at the distributors, or during transportation? We don't know.' The Directorial Board for Cultural Articles, which deals with such matters, confirmed that theft 'occurs constantly'. Not long ago the so-called 'meat affair', which led to the dismissal of the Warsaw District Party Secretary, was exposed, because one fine day carbon paper disappeared from the Warsaw shops, and this led the investigators to the trail of the speculators who were stealing meat from state stores and, after injecting the remaining carcasses with water in order to increase their weight, were using carbon paper to preserve the colour of the meat. Also not long ago a Polish newspaper triumphantly announced that 'the problem of lemons has been solved'. This would presumably render obsolete a story circulating in Warsaw about a husband who discovered his wife in bed with a lover and exclaimed indignantly: 'Mary, down there in the street there is a very short queue for lemons, and you have nothing better to do than . . .'.

There is also an apparently authentic story about a collision in Warsaw between a tram and a taxi which led to the discovery that the driver and the ticket collector had been operating the tram on their own for two years. Vodka is sold on private account in many state-run bars. Etc., etc.

Thefts from state enterprises are so widespread that Polish sociologists conducted several surveys on the subject (when they were still allowed to do so). They came to the conclusion that, for the population at large, the stigma of thievery attaches to the individual when he steals private property, but not when he steals state property. The subject of stealing in general was recently referred to by Michael Radgowski, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka* (1 February 1969):

> A certain lady ran into her former cleaning woman in the street, who was wearing a scarf stolen from the lady in question. The lady energetically removed the scarf and expressed in a few bitter and moralizing words her opinion of the pilferer. At that moment a young man joined in the conversation and made this telling remark: 'What are you beefing about, lady? We all steal. Unless somebody ain't working.' Well, there is no doubt that a phrase such as 'everybody steals' reflects an ideology perhaps even more poisonous than the theory of convergence which Professor Jerzy Wiatr formulated with such precision in an earlier issue of *Polityka*. The idea that the capitalist and the socialist systems will gradually grow to resemble each other does not bother—or so it would seem—the minds of the general public, while the belief

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> that 'everybody steals' is being expressed in gloomy tones in almost every social group. If only just thieves would say that! But thieves generally say little, they just steal. These words are thus being said by *kibitzers of thievery*, by its social theoreticians: these are fellows who try to excuse every act of pilfering as a product of alleged higher necessity. . . . In Poland the most widespread motive for theft is the fact that something is just lying about. It might be a bag of cement lying on the ground, a piece of equipment not properly registered, anything which seems to have no owner and is a temptation to a fellow deprived of moral guidance. Here we have this thief of common property and behind him we have the ideologist who will justify and pardon him. 'Everybody steals' means, in fact, that everybody must steal, because wages are low, family allowances are low and one must somehow make ends meet. The idea of this spontaneous redistribution provides a hypocritical mask for common thievery. I have never met a thief—or, to be more precise, I have never heard of a thief—who would fix a limit on thievery for himself, some two thousand zloty a month, let us say, needed to supplement his low pay, and who would give this additional income to his thrifty wife to save it up for a TV set. This would be an example of moral discipline of a very high order.

Indeed it would. But it is understandable that it does not exist. A Polish economist once said that 'the only permanent characteristics of a socialist economy are temporary difficulties'.

Faustian Deviltry

ONE OF THE CONTRIBUTORS to the Tariq Ali volume is Fritz Teufel, leader of the West German *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund*, who, as the editor informs us, 'has been built up by the right-wing German press as a "bogy-man" because of his libertarian attitude towards sex and morality'. In the text published in the book Teufel describes his ideological development (he refers to himself as 'T'):

> T. began to read the leaflets issued by the Left (SHB, SDS, Argument Club). T. began to take an interest in the political discussions at the university without, however, at that time becoming active himself. T. decided to fill a gap in his education and therefore took part in a SDS working party concerned with Marxism and the history of the working-class movement. This turned out to have been the *decisive* gap in his education. For six months T. read with hardly an interruption: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Lukacs, Korsch, Reich, Marcuse, etc. Like lightning, theoretical knowledge struck into his innocent, fallow soil. T. began to understand things which, previously, he had only vaguely divined: for instance, that in a bourgeois society, property and freedom are identical. . . .

Teufel does not mention Proudhon among the sources of his 'theoretical' enlightenment, but clearly he also came to the conclusion that 'property is theft'; personally, he implemented the reverse principle:

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> T. has a previous conviction for what the comedian Nestroy calls an experiment in achieving greater equality in the possession of wealth—the judiciary calls it larceny. T. did what, in a rationally organized society, probably anybody would be entitled to do, even on the present-day level of development of productive forces: he took what he needed without paying for it. This happened in January 1967. It concerned half a pound of butter, two pairs of socks and a box of shoe-spray. T. freely admits it would have been better if he had expropriated the means of production of the newspaper publisher Springer.

Herr Teufel does not seem to know about similar phenomena in the 'socialist countries' (referred to above). But the 'new revolutionaries' are interested not only in practice. The Berlin student leader, Ekkehart Krippendorff, proudly declared (*Sunday Telegraph*, 9 February 1969) that the German New Left was more seriously concerned with 'theory' than its counterparts in other countries. In the search for *tiefere Bedeutung*, the West Berlin militant students are looking for sources of theoretical enlightenment. They even announced in their paper *FU-Spiegel* that if the academic authorities 'continue to deny us the chair of Marxism-Leninism, we will address ourselves to the comrades of the Humboldt University in East Berlin'.

The Italian communist *l'Unità* (8 February 1969) commented that although this demand had been rejected by the academic authorities at the Free University of Berlin, 'the students continue to fight an action which unites the cultural interests of the University with a strong political inspiration'.

How these 'cultural interests' and 'strong political inspiration' are combined in East Germany has been illustrated once again in the affair of the new production of *Faust*, first performed at the Deutsches Theater, East Berlin, on 3 October 1968. It was even praised by a critic of the leading Party daily, *Neues Deutschland*; West German critics found the production 'original', 'imaginative', 'full of insight' into Goethe's drama. But the SED leadership ordered changes in the production to bring it into closer accord 'with the demands of our times'.

These demands were authoritatively stated by Ulbricht in his speech of March 1962, when he said that the vision of the dying Faust—'a free people on free soil'—is being realized in East Germany:

> Two hundred years after Goethe laid down his pen for the last time, the workers and peasants, craftsmen, clerks, scientists and technicians—all workers of the German Democratic Republic—have begun to write a third part of *Faust* with their struggle for peace and socialism. . . .

Yet apparently the experience of the 'workers of the German Democratic Republic', at least those who attended the performance of *Faust*, has sharpened their ears for passages in the play which could be seized upon to mock official propaganda. Loud laughter and applause greeted Mephisto's lines:

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Es ist so schwer, den falschen Weg zu meiden
Mit Worten lässt sich trefflich streiten,
Mit Worten ein System bereiten. . . .
(It is so hard to avoid the wrong path,
It is possible to fight admirably with words,
To build a whole system with words. . . .)

The militant students of the Free University in Berlin can watch the performance behind the Wall, and yet they are so anxious for Marxist enlightenment that they are ready to accept it even from over there; are they quite right in the head? One can understand Faust listening to Mephisto, but how much attention should be paid to a little Teufel?

Left, Right, and Wrong

THE PRESENT LUNATIC WAVE is not confined to the militant students. Infantile regression (or is it senile progression?) also affects intellectuals who used to know better. There is a proper masochistic orgy going on among the breast-beating 'liberals' of the United States. To describe the American intellectual scene at present requires considerable stylistic self-restraint. It is enough to say that nothing like this has happened since the great wave of self-flagellation swept through Europe in the Middle Ages. Anyway, it would be difficult for me to describe it: some of my best friends are New York 'liberals'. . . . I know they used to be quite right in the head, but what mind-blowing times are these!

When the Stalinoid intellectuals in the thirties wanted to justify the Soviet purges and concentration camps, they invariably used the argument: 'You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs.' They fervently believed in the marvellous omelette which would finally emerge after all the egg-breaking. The argument was about the relation of means to ends. They were wrong about the means, and they were ignorant of the real Soviet scene, but at least they were talking about a tangible omelette.

On my visit to the United States I came across a new twist to this old argument. In the course of a discussion, some New Left students were told that the number of Stalin's victims exceeded 20 million. One of them answered: 'Oh, well, sometimes it may be necessary to liquidate people, if it is necessary for the cause!' The point here is that the same student was very critical of the Soviet Union and quite 'anti-Stalinist'. The argument about breaking eggs has been retained, but without the belief in the old omelette. Soviet society 'stinks', according to this particular student, but although this earlier vision of a utopian society has gone sadly astray at such high human cost, he is hardly trying to comprehend the reasons for this, and is again ready to sacrifice untold millions 'for the sake of the cause'. This time it is the cause which tends to be even more separated from 'empirical history'. The geographic Messianism of the 'progressives'

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in the thirties has been replaced by a more abstract belief in an historically disembodied omelette. Not a few of the new romantic nihilists display today attitudes which not so long ago led to the road to Auschwitz and Vorkuta.

In New York even some elderly intellectuals who fought the immoral means/moral ends argument in the thirties ended by embracing it in the late sixties. The eggs were broken so long ago, and where is that omelette?

Faced with this problem the young militants of the New Left display ignorance and/or a refusal to learn. The elderly 'progressives' are beginning to idealize irrationalism.

Recently, in the course of a discussion in New York (which had the provocative title, 'The End of the Rationalist Tradition?') Norman Mailer asserted that 'mood is more important than rationality' and Leslie Fiedler hailed 'the power of positive unthinking' and 'the new irrationality'. He reversed Freud's well-known dictum: 'Where Id was, Ego shall be', saying that 'Where Ego has so unsatisfactorily displaced Id, Id shall flourish once again'.

The 'idealism' of the young, so often invoked, is very frequently quite specious; the proverbial 'wisdom' of the old is also in short supply. The old French proverb has been turned upside down: '*Si la jeunesse pouvait, si la vieillesse savait. . . .*' If the young militants *could* they would indeed destroy society, the wave of violence at various universities has reached quite frightening proportions. If the older academics *knew* that through their spinelessness they may contribute to and witness the destruction of the universities, they might face more boldly their responsibility for preserving both the standards and the institutions of learning.

The united front of the young and old 'progressives' in the *New York Review of Books* seems to embrace the whole spectrum from the highly literate Mary McCarthy to the illiterate Jerry Rubin. Miss McCarthy wrote recently (30 January 1969) that Orwell 'was not unique in tearing the mask off Stalinism' (Mary did it too), and that 'his relentless pursuit of Stalinists in his own milieu occasionally seems to be a mere product of personal dislike'. (In the course of a long critique of Orwell's 'down and out' years she recalled a youthful misadventure of her own, one occasion when she was heart-broken and suicidal and—she does not spare us the details—was dressed in an evening gown of 'yellow chiffon with a silver belt and a bunch of cherries at the waist': all this actually in the pages of the chic new *Vogue* of the modish New Left, the *New York Review of Books*.)[7]

[7] Miss McCarthy's relentless eye for uncanny detail lights up her whole brilliant career. Hers is a penetrating eye: cosmological, scatological. Its achievements range from the elated love scenes of the Pullman car virgin (in her first book, *The Company She Keeps*) to the happy description of the toilet facilities offered to her in North Vietnam (in her latest book, *Hanoi*). Toilet paper (the 'cultural article' that is vanishing in Poland) keeps slipping into Miss McCarthy's narrative on North Vietnam:

> Each time I went to the outlying toilet, the young woman interpreter went with

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Jerry Rubin declared in the next issue that 'smoking pot is a political act'. He is worried, however, that the Movement is in a bad way. He wrote: 'In 1965 we were the conquerors of the world. No one could stop us.' In 1969 some of this formidable energy has been sapped and arrests and trials have 'demoralized the spirit':

> This has happened slowly—not the way many paranoids expected, the knock on the door, and concentration camps for thousands of us. Chase that shit out of your head. That's not the American Way. The American Way is to pick one off here, one there, and try to scare the others into inaction. . . . they have picked off the [Black] Panther Leadership and driven it into jail and exile without our burning the fucking country down in retaliation.

This seems to be a not uninteresting style for a literary journal which aspires to new heights of cosmopolitan sophistication. I am looking forward to Miss McCarthy's review of a future book by Jerry Rubin entitled 'The Pot That Failed'.

A la Recherche du Temps Perdu . . .

MARY MCCARTHY IS NOT THE ONLY prominent woman writer with a Catholic education and a radical posture. That other former *jeune fille rangée*, Simone de Beauvoir, has also been reflecting recently on the political lessons which the past has for the present (unlike Mary McCarthy she has a pro-Stalinist past). Her reflections took the form of a comment on the behaviour of the wife of one of the few survivors of the Slansky trial of 1951, Artur London (whose book, *L'Aveu*, has recently been published in Paris by Gallimard). In an interview broadcast by Radio Luxembourg, an excerpt of which appeared in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (10 February 1969), Simone de Beauvoir expressed her admiration for this pathetic victim of the Moscow Trial in Prague, whose husband, a life-long communist, confessed to all the crimes with which he was charged but had not committed. A fanatical communist, Lise London accepted the charge that her husband, an ex-prisoner of Mathausen, was a Gestapo agent. For Simone de Beauvoir, Lise London's blind faith in the Party over and above her personal relationship to her husband is a heroic posture which deserves not pity, but admiration:

> When she heard him confessing she thought: 'He has never said anything to the Gestapo, he has never had any weakness in his

> me as far as the door, bearing my helmet, some sheets of torn toilet paper she had brought from Hanoi, and at night, the trusty flashlight. She waited outside till I was through and then softly led me back.

Or:

> Other luxuries I found at the Thong Nhat Hotel were sheets of toilet paper laid out in a fan pattern. . . .

Say it with flowers, but not always:

> When we stopped en route, young Mrs Chi of the Peace Committee whispered: 'Would you like to make water or shit?'

An anthology of such highlights of Miss McCarthy's stylistic precision about the whole human experience—from defloration to defaecation—might well be entitled 'A Vassar Pilgrim's Progress'.

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> character, he is an honest and sincere man, if he confesses it means that it is true!' It was a little like a religious temptation. She thought: 'It is my love for him which prevents me from believing him guilty, but I must be a good communist and overcome what comes from my love for him. Therefore he is guilty.'

This imaginary farrago of inconsistencies is, for Mlle de Beauvoir, deeply moving. She considers that the letter in which Lise London renounced her husband 'was perhaps a little more than was necessary', but the fact that she later on came to believe in his innocence was 'also very moving'. In fact the sequence was exactly the same as in her own case, except that Mlle de Beauvoir believed in the historical guilt of the accused in the Moscow-type Trials on the basis of the 'dialectical reason' of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Brecht ('The more innocent they are—the more they deserve to die'); they condemned the accused for being against History itself. This logic still affects her, although Mlle de Beauvoir says that she has 'never had such unconditional political beliefs' as Lise London. She expresses no remorse for upholding at the time the type of perversion of justice of which Artur and Lise London were first supporters and then victims. She does not make the slightest effort to question her own past attitude. Like Sartre, she takes the position that she was right even when she was wrong. She seems to think that she has an individual right to do what the Party, evidently no longer an instrument of History for her, claims as its own unique privilege.

The French Left Bank intellectuals were, of course, never quite right in the head. But now even Sartre, who was so full of admiration for the militant French students, has been mocked by them. At a recent meeting in Paris some of them ironically shouted at him, 'Thank you, Daddy!' and 'Go to bed!' (*Corriere della Sera*, 12 February 1969). *L'existence précéde l'essence.*

The Lunatic and the Lunar

IN FRANCE THE EX-FELLOW-TRAVELLERS seem content to look at their chequered past with equanimity. In the Soviet Union Bukharin is again being denounced while Stalin's name is taking on a new lustre. As for the USA, the legacy of the Moscow Trials can be seen as not irrelevant. At one of the West Coast universities I took part in a seminar which had as its theme Robert Conquest's book, *The Great Terror*. During the discussion the question was asked, why did it take 30 years for the public in the West generally to recognize as fact the evidence presented in this book on the purges, fake trials and false confessions, although a lot of the information given in it was accessible and had been known all along. There was no agreement on the answers to this question, but many participants in the seminar tended to look at it as a question which is no longer relevant today.

Ironically, a couple of days later the country was plunged into a discussion about the Pueblo affair. No one seems to have pointed out

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that it was the problem of the Moscow Trials all over again, only this time, writ large in the framework of international relations. The American marines were forced to confess to having been within North Korean territorial waters, despite evidence to the contrary. However, this time it was not only the accused in the hands of their persecutors who confessed to the faked crimes. This time the United States itself accepted the guilt in a Moscow Trial type of ceremony at which the prosecutor and the accused played roles in a prearranged scenario. On this occasion it involved an admission by the representative of the United States of what he knew was not the case, his promise 'not to do it again', and—a repudiation in advance of these 'confessions' as due solely to the desire to have the Pueblo crew released.

It is difficult to imagine anything so surrealistic, and yet on the face of it both sides were 'quite right in the head'. Still, some questions remained. Having submitted to North Korean blackmail and having satisfied them with a confession of guilt, however perfunctorily expressed, the American authorities promptly instituted an inquiry into the conduct of the members of the Pueblo crew who made public 'confessions' while in captivity. The question of the military code of conduct has been raised. What seems to have escaped the attention of the public is the incongruity of a situation in which individuals (who were facing torture) could be expected not to confess, if the state itself had eventually agreed to do so. The new incident in Korea is a reminder that the question remains relevant.

Paradoxically, on the very same day as the radio was giving details of the circumstances of the release of the Pueblo crew, another item in the news was the lunar flight of Apollo 8. The newscaster reading these two items was probably unaware of the irony of this juxtaposition of the two American dramas, one of political humiliation and the other of technological triumph.

This contrast manifests itself at present on the American scene in general: throbbing energy coexisting with self-doubt, reaching for the sky with the loss of political and moral guidelines. Computers and behavioural sciences cannot fill the gap. But there are some who are trying to do so. Reading the *San Francisco Examiner* (21 December 1968) I came upon a description of the East Bay Debutantes Ball which cheered me up considerably. It pointed out that the

> generation gap seems to be narrowing. There appears to be a keep-in-touch movement afoot. Dean Julian Bartlett of Grace Cathedral and his attractive wife, Marge, while not rocking, were dancing quickly. The Rev. Mr Bartlett was attired in Episcopalian garb, but his long waistcoat combined with his clerical collar did project a groovy With-it Nehru effect.

So perhaps all is not lost. If the generation gap is not filled by adolescents growing up, it is at least reduced by adults behaving like adolescents. Gay in heart? Perhaps. But right in the head? I salute you, Mrs Gladwell.

L. L.

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DOCUMENTS: SOVIET UNION

SOLZHENITSYN: IS HE NICE?

The Solzhenitsyn affair continues. His two books, Cancer Ward *and* The First Circle, *were not published in the Soviet Union but were generally acclaimed by literary critics and the public in the West when they appeared. To their credit the Soviet authorities have (so far) been intelligent enough not to make a repetition of the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair, although their efforts to discredit the greatest living Russian writer and their policy of maintaining the ban on his works goes on.*

It was with some surprise that we recently received a letter from Mr Victor Louis in Moscow, accompanying a manuscript on Solzhenitsyn, submitted for publication in Survey. *We decided to publish it as a document of our times in the conviction that whatever the intention behind it, the writings of Solzhenitsyn are the best answer to his critics and that his books have already acquired their place in the history of twentieth-century literature.*

The text of the letter is as follows:

Dear Mr Labedz,

Here is the story of my recent visit to Mr Solzhenitsyn. It was too heavy for my own paper, the Evening News, *and I have sent copies to a number of other magazines.*

Perhaps it should be shortened, omitting the second paragraph and the begining of the third. I don't want to sound anti-Solzhenitsyn. I admire him as a writer but was disappointed to discover that I disliked him as a person.

If you cannot use the story, I should be grateful if you could return it to me.

Yours faithfully,
Victor Louis.

Soon after the letter arrived, the Washington Post (16 *March* 1969) *published the text of the manuscript which Mr Louis sent us. Nevertheless, we decided to print it too: the American published text is shorter than the one we received. The other text was accompanied by a note written by the* Washington Post *correspondent in Moscow, Anatole Shub, saying that Louis 'has vigorously denied all charges that he had any part in the Solzhenitsyn campaign. Although Solzhenitsyn resolutely declines to see both Western and Soviet journalists, Louis managed to visit the novelist last month, mainly, he says, to clear up the controversy over his own role.' Shub added, however, that Louis's article 'should by no means be considered an interview authorized by Solzhenitsyn'. Considering the implications of the innuendos contained in it, there can hardly be any doubt about this.*

What is in doubt is the purpose of this whole charade and the many curious activities concerning an artist whose writings will remain the pride of Russian literature. We have referred to these in previous issues

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of Survey (*Nos.* 64, 67, 68, 69) *and we think it only fair to our readers to provide them with some background on the author of the article. Because it is somewhat longer than usual we cannot put this in the 'Our Contributors' column.*

Mr Victor Louis was the first to report to the West the ousting of Khrushchev and, more recently (in November 1968), *he was, as he said over a drink in Phnompenh, the 'first Soviet citizen in* 19 *years' to have visited Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's bastion on Formosa, obviously in order to re-establish contacts with the Kuomintang Chinese* (Washington Post, 17 *February* 1969). *It was he who reported that Gerald Brooke is to be re-tried* (Evening News, 22 *April* 1969). *In between these achievements, unusual even for a Soviet journalist, Mr Louis published various interesting articles in the Western press such as, for instance, 'Svetlana—by her children'* (Evening News, 20 *July* 1967), *which threw an unsympathetic light on Svetlana Alliluyeva in the same way as the article printed here does on Solzhenitsyn. Louis's other journalistic assignments and accomplishments are described in the three articles, excerpts of which we reproduce below, the first of which was written by Vero Roberti.*

Corriere della Sera (8 August 1967)

We now know the 'messenger' who brought to London on behalf of the special services of Soviet propaganda the two typed copies of the memoirs of Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, which were published in Russian last Friday.

This 'special messenger' is a Soviet journalist, correspondent in Moscow of a London evening newspaper. His name is Victor. His full name and surname have no importance. The Italian police has already noted them in its black book because last year the Italian authorities refused to give Victor an entry visa to our country. . . . He wished to come to Italy to accompany the 'mad' writer Valery Tarsis who had been expelled from the USSR, but had to content himself with following him to London and acting as his interpreter at a press conference. Victor was able to come to London because he is married to an Englishwoman, who was known in Moscow when she was a governess in the service of the British Naval Attaché.

All the foreign correspondents who have been or are still in Moscow know Victor. He is about forty years old and is intelligent and charming. His flat in Moscow is comfortable, large and modern. There are very few Soviet citizens who can boast of having a flat like Victor's in a block of flats for foreigners on the Leninski Prospekt. As correspondent of an English newspaper Victor can take advantage of all the facilities available to his foreign colleagues. His privileged position is envied by all his Soviet friends who are subjected to the handicap of sharing flats and of looking only from a distance at the show windows of the 'dollar shops', at the bottles of real Scotch whisky and real

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French cognac and at the mountains of American cigarettes. Victor can legally lay his hands on these god-sent goods because he is paid in sterling which he exchanges into 'coupons' with which to buy at the 'dollar stores'. He was also able to buy modern furniture in Finland and, taking advantage of the customs exemption, he enriched his apartment with an ultra-modern radiogram and a couple of loud-speakers. Personally, I ordered for him in Italy ceramic tiles for his dacha near Peredelkino. It was an extravagance, but he had discovered in the works of Gorky the tiles of Vietri.

Victor has a degree in law and is an expert on the Soviet legal code from which he has derived many advantages. He has been an interpreter, first at the Brazilian Embassy and then for an American correspondent. After his marriage, which he insisted on having celebrated according to the Orthodox rite, he became correspondent of a London evening newspaper which he provided with the most sensational exclusive news of recent years.

After his special assignment with the 'mad' Valery Tarsis, Victor came to London again, this time in connexion with the memoirs of Svetlana Alliluyeva. It was he who had carried the clandestine copies of the Svetlana memoirs and together with them an album of photographs of the Stalin family. I saw these photographs about a fortnight ago, when I met Victor in Fleet Street. The first photographs in the album were published today exclusively by the *Daily Express*. They show Stalin sprawling on a divan in his dacha of Zubalovo in 1932; Svetlana and two other women in Soviet bathing kit, i.e. short pants and bras with the gallant Mikoyan offering them two bottles; Svetlana as a child in 1933 in the arms of Beria whom she has now dubbed the Rasputin of her father, and Nina, Beria's third wife, on a Crimean beach in 1938.

I asked Victor whether he knew anything about the Svetlana memoirs and he answered: 'I have nothing whatever to do with that thing, but I am sure that they will be published in London before they are published in the United States.'

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New York Times (12 August 1967)

Currently touring Western Europe selling the Stalin pictures and Alliluyeva text, Mr Louis describes himself as a journalist—the Moscow correspondent of the London *Evening News*.

He speaks proudly of his 'scoops', saying: 'I was the first to report the news of Khrushchev's fall in 1964, eight hours ahead of the rest.'

Educated at Moscow University's foreign-language centre, Mr Louis speaks five languages, including fluent English. He is a good mixer, a pleasant host and a patron of the arts and seems to live very much

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like a well-to-do Western businessman. His contacts reach from the Kremlin to New York's garment district.

Western intelligence services have long suspected Mr Louis as an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

United States intelligence men surmise that Mr Louis's efforts to sell the unauthorized version of Mrs Alliluyeva's book are intended to spoil sales of the authorized version and to discredit the author.

Mr Louis denies that he has anything to do with Soviet intelligence.

'Why don't people believe me?' he asked an American correspondent in Hamburg several days ago. 'Why should I be the scapegoat? Everyone expects that I should be a Soviet agent. Why can't they believe I am a professional journalist?'

His antecedents are cloaked in uncertainty. Mr Louis has sometimes said that his great-grandfather was French—accounting for his French name—and that he has many relatives in France, but he has given other versions of his background.

Western diplomats remember meeting Mr Louis just after World War II when he was serving as a messenger for the New Zealand Embassy in Moscow and later for the Brazilian Embassy. Two or three years after the war Mr Louis disappeared from Moscow. He has since told friends that he was arrested because of his many contacts with Westerners, and was charged with blackmarket dealings and treason.

He is believed to have spent nearly a decade in various Soviet labour camps, including the notorious one at Karaganda.

Mr Louis stands about 5 feet 11 inches and has light brown hair and blue eyes. He generally wears gold-rimmed glasses, a wristwatch with a gold band and well-tailored suits. He smokes fairly heavily, preferring Camels to Soviet brands.

He travels freely outside the Soviet Union, and has been seen in the Far East and the United States as well as in Western Europe.

He even arranged, on 17 October 1966, to spend a half hour with Vice-President Humphrey, at the latter's office. The meeting was set up by *Parade*, a magazine section for Sunday newspapers, for which Mr Louis had provided photographs of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in retirement.

He also made arrangements that led to a National Broadcasting Company documentary broadcast 11 July on Mr Khrushchev's life since his fall. Mr Louis has denied that he personally filmed and interviewed Mr Khrushchev.

His deals began to attract attention here as early as 1956.

Foreign correspondents who were in Moscow in 1959 remember Mr Louis as a purveyor of art works by young Soviet avant garde painters of whom the Soviet regime disapproved.

Western visitors recall that he used to take them to his home, turn up the radio to foil electronic eavesdroppers, and produce a portfolio of paintings. Sometimes he arranged meetings between Westerners and

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the painters themselves. These meetings sometimes led to arrests and charges of illegal dealings with foreigners.

In 1958, Mr Louis married Jennifer Stratham, a young Englishwoman who had been the governess for the children of the British Naval attaché in Moscow. Mr and Mrs Louis now have two children of their own, and Mrs Louis frequently travels with her husband.

In May 1959, Mr Louis aroused Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Loewe when he attempted to pirate their hit musical 'My Fair Lady'.

Mr Louis wrote to them asking for a complete orchestral score, saying he had translated the libretto into Russian and intended to produce the musical in Kiev and Sverdlovsk. He mentioned that Mr Lerner and Mr Loewe would receive no royalties because the Soviet Union was not a member of the Universal Copyright Convention.

The Lerner-Loewe team refused, and requested assistance from Soviet officials here in preventing the piracy. As a matter of fact, the State Department in Washington soon thereafter arranged for an American production of 'My Fair Lady' to tour the Soviet Union.

When the noted Soviet writer Valery Yakovlevich Tarsis was granted permission to leave Russia in February 1966, Mr Louis was initially at his side as a public-relations man and interpreter. Later he was heard to say that Mr Tarsis was psychotic and a third-rate writer.

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Newsweek (21 August 1967)

When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, who broke the story to the Western world? Victor Louis. When rebellious Russian writer Valery Tarsis was flown out of Moscow last year, who escorted him to London? Victor Louis. And when a pirated manuscript of Svetlana Alliluyeva's memoirs appeared in England and West Germany last month, who was holding on to it? Victor Louis. But who is Victor Louis? 'It's not fair for the West to call me a Kremlin agent', he complained last week in Hamburg, where he had just negotiated the sale of the Svetlana story to the magazine *Der Stern* (circulation: 2·1 million). 'Whenever I go outside Russia, someone is suspicious that I am an agent. That makes me sick.'

There is also a good deal of suspicion about Louis when he stays in Moscow. Officially, he is a Soviet citizen and a correspondent for the London *Evening News*. But he knows too much, lives too lavishly and travels too freely to be simply that. He keeps a seven-room apartment in Moscow and a three-storey dacha with a small swimming pool in the suburbs. But his own count he has toured 50 countries—'at my own expense' he says—and when he visited Washington last fall he was wined and dined by the State Department and had a friendly chat with Vice President Humphrey.

Louis was born in Moscow 39 years ago. While a student at the

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University of Moscow during the Stalin era, he began working for Western embassies. But in 1947 he was accused of being—of all things—a Western agent and was sentenced to 25 years in labour camps. The sentence was cut short in 1956. When he returned to Moscow he worked for the Western press.

But in time it became clear that in addition to enjoying valuable contacts with both the Western press and the Soviet Government, Louis was also mining the gap in between. He soon became known as a 'door opener'. When Jess Gorkin, editor of *Parade* magazine, decided he'd like to do a story on Khrushchev's life after the fall, he approached Louis, who cleared the idea with the government. Louis's other specialty, some acquaintances argue, is subtly to undercut anti-Soviet information in the West. When Tarsis, who had denounced the Soviet system as 'police Fascism', was brought to the West with Louis's help, it looked at first like a victory for free speech. But was it? 'We outsmarted you that time', a Soviet diplomat in Washington remarked recently. 'When Tarsis was making anti-Soviet pronouncements in Moscow, you listened to him like an oracle. Now you have him in the West and nobody gives a damn what he says.'

The same sources think Louis was on a similar mission when he arrived in London with a copy of Svetlana's manuscript, snapshots from the Stalin family album, and six Louis by-liners about 'Uncle Joe' and his family. Some argued he hoped to take the edge off the Svetlana memoirs—scheduled to be published just a month before the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

Louis insists he was simply an honest journalist trying to set the Stalin story straight. He wrote two stories for the *Evening News* and in one of them quoted Svetlana's son, Joseph, 21, as calling her defection a 'betrayal'. He also sold photographs and interviews to the *Daily Express*, which ran them last week.

Whatever else he accomplished, Louis certainly managed to shake up international publishing circles. *Der Stern's* competitor, *Der Spiegel*, which had already bought the European serial rights from Harper & Row, was granted a court injunction to stop *Der Stern* from publishing the story. But last week *Der Stern* went ahead anyhow and ran the first of three or four instalments—keyed largely to photos and a précis of the manuscript. German authorities left *Der Stern* alone for the time being, but the offending issue was banned in Switzerland on the ground that it was published without Svetlana's approval. And *The New York Times* and *Life* magazine announced they would move up their serialization publishing dates from October to September. And how does all the excitement—and notoriety—sit with Victor Louis? 'I'm beginning', he says, 'to get disappointed with people.'

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No editorial changes have been made in Mr Louis's article published below.

SOLZHENITSYN

Victor Louis

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN is probably the most controversial writer Russia has ever known. He said that he would not give any interviews, either to Russian or to foreign journalists, but I took advantage of the fact that my name had been brought into this story and went to talk to him. I found him at his home in the country.

As usual with Russian writers there has been a tendency to compare him with Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. When I mentioned this to him he modestly replied that such comparisons could only be made after his death. A little less modest however is the way he signs his letters simply with one name—Solzhenitsyn—without preceding it with 'A. I.' or 'Alexander'. This has also been the habit of many great men in the past, and this master of words, with his understanding of nuances, is obviously not doing it by accident. Of course it is hard for any human being to resist when people around them persuade them that they are geniuses. Perhaps he is.

So far, however, Solzhenitsyn is not a Tolstoy, but he appears to be becoming one gradually, although only in mini form. 'I am a country man, a villager. I live and breathe real air', he exclaims. He looks very well on it, and has started growing a beard but it is nothing compared with Tolstoy's. His estate compares poorly too. He has bought a small, wooden dacha, about 80 km. (48 miles) south-west of Moscow and has made it his summer retreat where he lives with his wife and a few selected friends.

There are two downstairs rooms and his study is in the upstairs room which has a small balcony. The roof is covered with corrugated asbestos, painted pink. There is a built-on garage for his green Moskvich car, trestles for sawing firewood, a wide bench which he made himself and a small wooden toilet. The porch is all covered with Russian vine.

A small stream runs beside the house and a beautiful view opens on to forest and field with, nearby, an abandoned church like those he has described so sympathetically in his short stories.

In this country his manuscripts are as tempting as forbidden fruit anywhere. They are copied out again and again in geometrical progression. People who would normally never bother to read a 'medical' novel read night and day when they are lent a manuscript for 48 hours, hurrying to finish it in time and pass it on to somebody else. Solzhenitsyn knows this very well.

He knows a lot more too. Like any Soviet citizen who has spent time in a labour camp, he is his own lawyer and knows the value of

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having an alibi. If he writes letters, he knows that they will eventually find their way into the Western newspapers, but he addresses them to members of the the Writers' Union so that someone out of the hundreds of writer-members will send the letter to its destination. From a legal point of view no one can accuse Solzhenitsyn of anything. If, like Tolstoy, he disagrees with the regime, he will not say so openly. He uses his hard-learned knowledge of the law so that no one can blame him. It is hard to accuse him of sending his novels abroad but he is not at all surprised that they get there. 'This is quite natural', he says. 'As long as "*sam-izdat*" ("publish-it-yourself") exists in Russia and as long as the manuscript has commercial value in the West, the leakage will go on without interruption.' He continued on this subject. 'I know of surprising leakages of manuscripts. Evgenia Ginsburg's, for instance. Somebody sold her manuscript and I am absolutely sure that she never sent it.'

His next step was to protest about the publication of his manuscript abroad. This he did with admirable indignation, proclaiming that he would prosecute the publishers. I do not know whether he did it in the sincere belief that as soon as his protest reached the publisher who had bought one of these smuggled manuscripts, he would immediately call a halt to the printing, or whether he did it in naïvete or as a calculated protest; he must know that Pasternak also protested in vain and on the other hand it is the natural desire of any writer to be published.

Anyway Solzhenitsyn could not be accused like Sinyavsky or Daniel of sending his manuscript abroad, at least no one can prove that he did so. He made his public protest and at the same time suggested quite logically that 'works of our authors should be published in their motherland'.

When the Russian émigré Grani Publishing House, which has already printed his selected works, and claimed a copyright for some of them, learned about Solzhenitsyn's 'protest against publication', they understandably continued their plans to publish and in addition sent a 'provocative cable' saying that Victor Louis had sent another copy of *Cancer Ward* to the West and so they had decided to print it immediately. Solzhenitsyn himself called this cable provocative, and agrees that there would have been no sense in sending another copy. And after all, if I am to be blamed for sending one copy, who was it who sent the others? Why are they not sharing the blame?

When I went to see Solzhenitsyn, he refused to admit that he had accused me of anything, because he had no evidence. 'My letter to the Writers' Union only contained questions based on the cable from Grani', he explained. 'I haven't got anything against you personally. Why don't you ask Grani about it?'

SOLZHENITSYN can probably boast more admirers, friends and enemies than any other writer in the Soviet Union. After my own

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name was involved in the story of the supposed smuggling of his manuscript, I spoke to a number of people about him. Many are surprised that *Cancer Ward* has not been published. After all, no book which could be labelled anti-Soviet would be accepted by *Novy Mir* and prepared for publication. Some people suggested the fairly logical explanation that Solzhenitsyn became enormously popular after his first and only sizeable novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, appeared. The main attraction of this novel was that it told of things which are not easily found in print. There is hardly a single family in Russia which has not lost a relative or a close friend in the war nor had one taken off to jail in Stalin's time. Solzhenitsyn's book started an avalanche of hundreds of other manuscripts written by those who had suffered and wished to tell their stories to the public. But most of them were not masterpieces, just sad accounts of facts so well known by word of mouth. The horrors of Beria's concentration camps are, of course, no credit to the state, and everyone would prefer to forget the unforgettable. 'After all', one writer pointed out to me, 'in Western Germany nobody encourages novels about the horrors of nazi concentration camps, nor in the States about murdering national leaders'. These things too are a national shame and people would like to close up the dark pages of history. So why in the Soviet Union, where printing is in state hands, should this type of literature be stimulated, printed, distributed? Why should magazines put salt on open wounds? But the time Solzhenitsyn spent in camp and in exile shocked him so deeply that he became one-track-minded and can hardly keep off this subject in his work. Probably this is one of the reasons why for the time being his works do not appear in Russian magazines.

Other people have had different comments to make. Some said that because he is a gifted writer, they hope he will give them something of definite literary value, something without a double political meaning. Another writer said that he had the impression that Solzhenitsyn is trying to say that the Russian peasants have been happy only twice after the revolution, first in the time of NEP (Lenin's New Economic Policy, introduced in the 1920s) and then under the German occupation. This is an example of an extreme attitude towards the writer.

The émigré publishing house in Frankfurt does good business, reselling manuscripts to Western publishers, as they did with Evgenia Ginsburg's book. But apart from the profit they collect, they put the writers in rather an embarrassing position. In Solzhenitsyn's case they advertised his works with such sentences as 'The construction of communist society does not worry Solzhenitsyn. He tells of the life of ordinary Soviet people and his stories, even though published in *Novy Mir* magazine, are as different from Soviet propaganda clichés as Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago*.' Or again, 'communists could not be brought up on his stories. Soviet power and the Party are not named in his stories, but they are present there as evil foes of life and humanity.'

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Solzhenitsyn, who is a member of the Writers' Union, is put in an awkward position by this sort of publicity, and the émigrés must appreciate this. However, Solzhenitsyn has never himself sent a protest about this sort of thing. When such things are shown him, he simply refuses to look so as to avoid giving a personal reaction. From a legal point of view, if he refuses to read or listen to statements of that kind, no one can accuse him, either of agreeing with them or of refusing to react to them. He disagrees with the Writers' Union on many counts, but he doesn't want to return his membership card because it gives him considerable advantages and to belong to the Writers' Union is the dream of many writers.

The Writers' Union would not like to expel him because he is a popular author apart from the fact that he was accepted under unusual circumstances, after no more than one of his novels had been published.

Solzhenitsyn is indignant with *Literaturnaya Gazeta* after the paper attacked him last summer. 'Why from 21 April until 26 June did not they publish my protest and my ban to publish *Cancer Ward* in the West?' he frowns. 'The paper took three months preparing a lampoon to answer my letter about the ban. So I announced that I would make no more public statements. I would not write anything at all. I have finished writing. Publicly. That's all. I have learned my lesson.'

The writer believes that if his letter had been published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* immediately he sent it, the West would not have violated his ban, but the existence of his letter was well known to the publishers concerned, and no one paid any attention to it. 'I am a man who is quite without rights', he complains, 'who cannot answer the two or three hundred calumnies about me'. He goes on, 'I am gagged. I am bound hand and foot and I have been suffering for three years.' Russians love a martyr and Solzhenitsyn relishes the role. 'I am such an unhappy man that I wrote in my letter to the Writers' Congress absolutely openly that I am ready to accept death and indeed I am ready to accept it, even now. Let the first bayonet come and pierce me. I am ready to meet death at any moment. I am already in the earth up to my neck.'

But nobody approaches with a bayonet, and Solzhenitsyn, understanding the vulnerability of his situation, says more realistically, 'Someone of course would like to imprison me'. It seems that no one is planning to imprison him at the present moment, but the chances of *Cancer Ward* or *The First Circle* being freely printed here are almost nil.

Now Solzhenitsyn spends most of his time writing and only ventures out shopping from time to time. 'I am fulfilling my ambition as a writer', he says philosophically, 'and I am not interested in private life'.

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STALIN:

A PLEA FOR A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

We reproduce below the complete text of the letter which Peter Yakir, the Soviet historian (the son of the famous General Yon Yakir, shot in 1937 as one of the accused in the Tukhachevsky trial), sent to Kommunist, *the theoretical organ of the CPSU, on 2 March 1969 after this journal had praised Stalin's military talents.*

To the Editor of *Kommunist*. Copy: to the CC CPSU

From citizen Peter Ionovich Yakir,
living at: Zh-280, Avtozavodskaya
ul. No. 5, kv.75

In the second and third numbers of your journal for 1969 there appeared two items: a review by E. Boltin, a Doctor of Historical Sciences, entitled 'Stirring Pages from the Annals of the Great Patriotic War', and the article, 'For a Leninist Party Spirit in the Interpretation of the History of the CPSU', signed by V. Golikov, S. Murashov, I. Chkhikvishvili, N. Shatagin and S. Shaumyan.

A careful reading of these articles leaves no doubt in the mind that their main aim is to whitewash and extol Stalin. For all the authors' pretence at impartiality, it is not difficult to detect their main idea: to give a high, general appreciation of I. V. Stalin.

Thus, with the authority of the central organ of the CPSU (under the existing authoritarian approach to complex questions of public life) the pro-Stalinist campaign, which has now been going on for several years, has reached its high point. At the same time, in various newspapers and now in the pages of your journal, special stress in the evaluation of Stalin is placed on the secondary questions of his personal qualities as a state leader. Our thinking fellow citizens have in recent years become critical, for example, about the diplomatic, military and economic achievements of Ivan the Terrible or Nicholas I: they do not compensate in the moral consciousness of our contemporaries for the fact that the former was a sadist, guilty of perpetrating mass repressions, and that the execution of the five Decembrists was always on the conscience of the latter. That an exception to the general rule is made for Stalin is the more surprising, for even quite recently in the pages of your journal numerous examples of scandalous mismanagement, voluntarism and Stalin's arbitrary approach to economics, politics, science and the arts were cited. People of the old and middle generation remember the legacy left by Stalin on 5 March 1953: a catastrophic situation in agriculture, a branch which had been handed

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over to the Lysenko-Olshanski group, bread queues in the provinces, an acute housing shortage, lack of co-ordination in the system of wages and prices, an aggressive foreign policy leading to the very brink of war, a dictatorial rule without precedent (carrying reprisals against all those with different ideas) in the arts, dozens of people deported, and hundreds of thousands of people of all ages, from children to the very old, if by some miracle they succeeded in surviving at all, perishing in the camps, etc. Is it necessary to recall the last months of Stalin's life: the medieval campaign of anti-semitism connected with the so-called 'Doctors' Plot'; the flagrant lies at the Nineteenth Congress; the sudden abandonment—as soon as the tyrannical oppression ended—of all his fundamental ideas on linguistics or on the economy of socialism. I do not even mention the spiritual legacy of Stalin: of the terrible atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation, the consequences of which, it seems, have not been overcome to this day.

And now your journal enthusiastically recommends works imbued with a servile attitude to the memory of the 'Boss' and his grim antics (we remember the tasteless luxury of the 'Komsomol' metro station and of the 'Leningrad' Hotel—and all the various facts which were made known a few months after Stalin's death, at the September 1953 Plenum); his attitude to specialists (a vivid example of this is the 'discussion', if one can call it that, between our semi-literate leader and supporters of the views of the great linguist N. Ya. Marr); the destruction of genetics; scorn for 'anti-scientific' cybernetics or for the theory of relativity; research into the history of feudal Russia, and so on. As if taking the cue from those years, your journal writes: 'The historians have at their disposal leaders of the CPSU and of the Soviet state: . . . of Stalin . . .' (no. 3, p. 71).

There is a definite point in all this: to define the limits of 'the cult of personality' and to separate Stalin from his deeds. It so happens that the responsibility for the mass repressions is placed on those who carried them out: Ezhov, Beria and Abakumov. This is ostensibly attractive, but it is a deliberately misleading operation. Never in the history of our country was there a cult of Ezhov's personality, there was only a cult of Stalin's personality, and with Ezhov's departure the repressions still continued. Stalin bears the responsibility as the initiator and organizer of all crimes committed by the state in the quarter of a century of his rule.

At the same time, your authors attack those who, according to them, 'concentrate all (?) their attention on mistakes and shortcomings' (no. 3, p. 70) and who, 'instead of giving a real Party critique of the mistakes and shortcomings of the cult of personality, cast slurs on the heroic history of our state . . .' (*ibid.*, p. 73).

It is not difficult to guess what is behind this call for a 'real critique'. Indeed, the authors themselves set the limits of this 'critique': 'The Party's point of view . . . is set out in the well-known resolutions of the CC CPSU of 30 June 1956—"On Overcoming the

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Cult of Personality and its Consequences"' (*ibid.*). There is no mention here, of course, that after this came the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, and also several meetings and plenums which amplified in their documents and decisions the resolutions of 1956. I remember how the voices of people who are at the present time members and candidate members of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU resounded from the platform at the Congress and the plenums. They all without exception severely criticized Stalin and his creatures—Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. To substantiate this point I will quote some examples:

Podgorny, N. V.: The participants of the meetings and conferences consider it intolerable that the body of Stalin, who has done so much harm to our Party, country and to the Soviet people, should be beside our leader and teacher, the great Lenin, the banner of all victories of socialism. (*XXII sezda KPSS. Stenograficheski otchet,* vol. 3, p. 122).

Shelepin, A. N.: Letters and statements of prisoners tell of a number of cynical decisions taken by Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov, which during interrogation resulted in cruelty to the people and to leading comrades (*ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 403).

Demichev, P. N.: Muscovites witnessed the destruction of the Leningrad *aktiv* by Stalin and Malenkov with a heavy heart. Many innocent, important Party and Soviet economic workers of the Moscow organizations were also liquidated (*ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 116).

Suslov, M. A.: Molotov and Stalin sanctioned capital punishment also for the officials' wives in the so-called 'list No. 4 of wives of enemies of the people', which contained the names of V. A. Dybenko-Sedyakina, E. S. Kossior, A. I. Chubar, E. E. Eikhe-Rubtsova and others. . . . During the cult of Stalin's personality . . . physical repression reigned against those Party officials whom Stalin suspected of disagreeing with his views. . . . Chinese leaders speak and write about the mass repressions during the cult of personality as if it were a matter of small twists. . . . They have defended Stalin's mistakes and distortions (Report to the plenum of the CC CPSU of 14 February 1964, *Pravda,* 3 April 1964).

It must be stated with regret that on this question, the Chinese leaders have found people of like mind in the pages of *Kommunist.*

Even the type of assertions made by E. Boltin in his review (which stated that 'I. V. Stalin, with all the complexities and contradictions in his character, remains an eminent military leader') was not long ago contradicted by a different kind of evidence: 'One of the reasons why the Red Army was forced to endure extremely difficult conditions was the great blunder made by I. V. Stalin in underestimating the real threat of war' (*Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza,* Moscow 1961, vol. 2, p. 48).

A particularly critical situation was faced by a group of the army on the south-western front, which in September 1941 was surrounded in the region of Kiev. This situation required the immediate dispatch

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of troops from the front to the east, so as to save men and equipment and subsequently to use these troops to attack the enemy. However, despite the repeated requests to Stalin personally from the south-western front command, he firmly forbade the withdrawal of troops from the front, thus signing the death warrant of these troops (see I. Kh. Bagramyan, *Gorod-voin na Dnepre*, Moscow 1956, pp. 143–51).

On three occasions between 17 and 28 May 1942 Stalin refused requests from the south-western front to mount an attack on Kharkov. This resulted in the south-western front being completely surrounded. The operation ended in the total defeat of our forces, who suffered great losses in both men and equipment (see *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voina Sovetskogo Soyuza, Kratkaya istoriya*, p. 162).

It is not a question of Stalin preparing military operations on a globe or on a map. Any statesman can make mistakes and miscalculations. Stalin has been criticized not for his lack of wisdom in state affairs, but for his pathological inhumanity and his criminl violations of social norms and of the laws of the country.

It would be possible to write thousands of pages on Stalin's crimes. Our aim is more modest: using the RSFSR criminal code, published in Moscow in 1956 (the mildest in our history), we will try to prove that your journal defended a criminal who deserved four sentences of death and a total of 68 years in prison with the strictest deprivation of freedom. This if he were to be judged for the crimes committed only once, but as these crimes were committed constantly, the punishment should be increased by hundreds and thousands of times.

We read in the resolutions of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU:

(2) It is considered unsuitable for the sarcophagus containing I. V. Stalin's tomb to remain in the mausoleum, as Stalin's serious infringements of Lenin's instructions: *abuse of his authority, mass repressions against honest Soviet men, and other acts during the cult of personality* (my emphasis—P. Yakir), make it impossible for the tomb to remain in the V. I. Lenin mausoleum (*XXII sezd KPSS Stenograficheski otchet*, Moscow 1962, vol. 3, p. 122).

This resolution was adopted unanimously by the Congress at the suggestion of the Leningrad and Moscow delegations and the delegations of the Communist Parties of the Ukraine and Georgia, who in their turn submitted it at the request of the workers of the towns and the republics.

This decision has never been changed.

The Soviet penal code contains articles under which the actions mentioned in the decision of the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are punishable.

(1) Abuse of power—in the global sense (article 170—imprisonment for up to eight years), as well as the exceeding of authority or of powers (article 171—imprisonment for up to 10 years).

(2) In the course of the mass repressions people were illegally

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deprived of their liberty, which is punishable under the terms of articles 126 and 17 by a sentence of up to three years of imprisonment (article 17 of the penal code of the RSFSR—'co-participation'). It is stated in the article: 'Those who take part in crimes, apart from the perpetrators, are deemed to be organizers, instigators and accomplices.'

Since in this case, as in many others, the exact role played by Stalin in a particular misdeed is unknown, we may refer to article 17 of the penal code of the RSFSR, since Stalin's role as an organizer is obvious.

This is confirmed by the documents of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU: 'Both the repressions of 1935–37 and the post-war repressions of 1949–50 were carried out either on the direct orders of Stalin or with his knowledge and approval' (*XXII sezd KPSS Stenograficheski otchet*, Moscow 1962, vol. 3, p. 114).

(3) It is known that it was at Stalin's suggestion in 1937 that the decision was made to use physical methods to influence judicial enquiries, the result of which was physical violence, deprivation of sleep for up to seven days and other tortures which the author of these words (who was arrested in 1937 at the age of 14 as a member of a family considered to be 'enemies of the people') witnessed personally. These actions are punishable under articles 113 and 17 by a sentence of imprisonment of up to three years.

(4) A large number of senior officials committed suicide, some through unwillingness to take part in the crimes which were being committed, as letters written before their deaths testify; they include S. Ordzhonikidze, I. Kossior, F. Furor, Pogrebinski, head of the NKVD of the Gorki region, and founder of our rehabilitation communes, Litvin, head of the Leningrad NKVD, Kozelski, head of one of the departments of the Ukraine NKVD, Norin, head of the special service of the NKVD in Georgia, and many others. Many of those who were being persecuted committed suicide out of protest or fear of torture: Ya. Gamarnik, M. Tomski, P. Lyubchenko and his wife, V. Lominadze, A. Chervyakov, Rabichev, Adamovich, Lakoba, Firin, and several others. Some who could not withstand the torture killed themselves in prison: N. Goloded, I. Garkavy, Nosalevski, Lapin and others. All this comes within the range of article 107 (instigation to suicide), and carries a punishment of up to five years' imprisonment.

(5) The mass repressions were accompanied by slanders and insults directed at the victims, their friends and relations. This took place in the press, on the radio, at meetings and conferences. Actions of this sort come under article 130 ('slander'—up to five years' imprisonment) and article 131 ('insult'—corrective labour for up to one year).

(6) For having failed to denounce and for having protected his accomplices (Ezhov, Frinovski, Yagoda, Beria, Ulrish Vyshinski and thousands of others) Stalin is answerable under articles 88-1 and 88-2 and subject to a sentence of three to five years' imprisonment.

(7) Many victims of the repression were shot or simply killed, or died from injuries sustained during interrogation. Among these were

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such eminent Party personalities as Chubar, Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Eikhe, Voznesenski, Kuznetsov, 110 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union out of the 139 who had been elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress, and hundreds of thousands of other innocent men.

(7a) On Stalin's orders, representatives of all oppositions were arrested and in the majority of cases killed; many of them have not yet been rehabilitated, although the accusations hurled at them were complete fabrications. No one in the Zinovev and Pyatakov trials has been rehabilitated; 17 out of the 22 accused in the Bukharin trial have been rehabilitated; and many of those accused in the trial which took place at the beginning of the thirties have not been rehabilitated.

(7b) Stalin did not shrink from the annihilation of foreign communists who had taken refuge in our country to escape from the persecutions of the fascist, semi-fascist and monarchist dictatorships: the Germans H. Remmele, Schubert, Heinz Neumann, Werner Kirsch; the Hungarians Bela Kun, Mesan, Gidas, Gabor Farkas and others; the Bulgarians Stamonyakov, Tanev and others; the Poles Domba, Lesczinski, Pruchniak and others; the Estonians Kh. Pegelman and others, the Persians Sultan-zade and others; the Yugoslavs, V. Copic, D. Serdic and others; the Swiss, F. Platten (who had shielded Lenin with his own body at the time of the first assassination attempt) and others. This list could be much longer, but I think it is quite enough to include this item in the accusation.

(7c) With Stalin's knowledge, many senior members of our information service were liquidated: Berzin, Boki, Artuzov, Trelisser, Uritski, Borovich, Spiegelglass, Xenofontov, Peters, Latsis, Kedrov and others. This seriously weakened our information service during the pre-war period. Given that we do not have documentation of the crimes personally committed by Stalin, we are obliged to accuse him under article 17, and more precisely under article 102–17 ('premeditated murder in aggravating circumstances', punishable by a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment or death) and article 66–17 ('terrorist act–murder of a public figure or statesman or of a representative of power . . . with the aim of undermining or weakening Soviet power', punishable by a sentence of up to 15 years' imprisonment or the death penalty).

(8) Stalin was the head of state when, during and after the Great Patriotic War, a series of peoples of our country (the Tartars of Crimea, the Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Koreans, Greeks, Turks, Volga Germans and others) were the victims of forced and illegal deportation from the lands of their birth.

These crimes come within the scope of article 74 ('violation of the equality of nations and races', punishable by a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment).

(9) Jointly with the mass repressions, the majority of the managerial, scientific and technical cadres of all branches of our economy and agriculture were liquidated or imprisoned, which had a considerable

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effect on the economy of our country. Thus, for example, in 1938 10 per cent less iron ore was mined than in 1937, although an increase had been planned. The rapid turnover of qualified staff slowed down production: in 1940, for example, out of 153 overseers in the metallurgical industry, 75 had held their jobs for less than a year (*Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1964, no. 11, pp. 73–74).

The greatest constructors and inventors in the field of military technology were physically liquidated: G. Langemak (creator of what has since been called the '*Katyusha*'), Kurchevski (creator of the best non-recoiling gun), V. Bekauri (founder of the system of radio control of explosions), V. Zaslavski (tank builder), Smirnov (head of the work on radar), I. Kleimenov (head of the scientific institute for research into reactors), M. Leitenzon (founder of the society for interplanetary journeys at the Zhukovski academy), etc., or imprisoned: A. Tupolev, S. Korolev, A. Berg, V. Glushko, B. Vannikov (people's commissar for armaments) and many others. Some great scholars were annihilated: N. Vavilov, I. Krichevski, Dogadkin, Tulaikov, Gerasimovich, Polag. . . .

The actions which have been enumerated can be qualified according to article 69 ('sabotage'—'action or inaction tending to undermine industry, transport, agriculture . . .') and are punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years.

(10) There were some cases of desecration of graves (which is punishable under article 22 by up to three years' imprisonment). The urn containing the ashes of S. S. Kamenev was removed from the wall of the Kremlin, the urn containing the ashes of I. A. Gamarnik was taken away, the grave of M. Tomski was destroyed, the monument on the grave of I. Yakir was overturned, etc.

(11) As we know from the confidential letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the Twentieth Party Congress, and also from the recently published novel by Chakovski, Stalin had hidden himself away somewhere on the day war broke out; for several hours none of the leaders of the state could find the commander in chief. The episode in question is covered by article 247 ('desertion'), which carries the death penalty in wartime.

(12) In 1939 a broad, deep, well-equipped line had been built up of fortified regions (the 'URY'—*ukreplennye raiony*). After the annexation of the Baltic republics, western Belorussia and the western Ukraine, of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, the frontier was moved forward by from 100 to 600 kilometres. It was decided to fortify this new frontier. But without waiting for work to begin on the construction of new 'URYs', and in spite of the protests of General B. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff, all the former 'URYs' were dismantled on Stalin's orders, which gave the fascist invaders unhindered passage through our territory. That seems to us criminal negligence, bordering on treason. As for the annihilation of 80 per cent of the senior and commanding officers, which decapitated the army, this constitutes direct treason (article 64—death penalty).

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Furthermore, in spring 1941 the military leaders who had fought in Spain were arrested, and in October were shot without trial: Smushkevich, twice a hero of the Soviet Union, to whom on 26 February this year a monument was erected in his native country, P. Rychagov, Stern, Chernykh, Ptukhin, Gusev, Proskurov, Pumpur, Arzhenukhin, all heroes of the Soviet Union, and others.

The partisan bases in our country were liquidated; armoured columns were broken up; certain kinds of automatic armaments which were indispensable for the army were not put into production; and there were many other measures.

The millions of victims of the first period of the Great Patriotic War were the result of a whole series of crimes committed by Stalin.

(13) Apart from everything which has been said above, medieval bestialities were committed in our country, not without Stalin's knowledge but on his orders, bestialities which do not fall directly under the penal code of the RSFSR, but which are crimes against humanity.

During interrogations, the violence employed led those under arrest to lose their reason and people who were of sound mind were locked up in psychiatric hospitals.

(14) The wives of leading personalities who had been killed were arrested and often shot (the wives of Tukhachevski, Uborevich, Postyshev, Kossior, Eikhe, Gamarnik, Kork, Chubar, Chelekhes, Agranov, Dybenko, Vareikis and others were shot). Approaching the borders of total insanity, Stalin had the wives of his disciples, Kalinin, Molotov and Poskrebyshev arrested.

(15) Young children of personalities who had been victims of the repression were arrested and kept in camps and prisons. Among these were the children of Postychev, Kossior, Lyubchenko, Medved, Kamenev, Garkavy, Bauman, Kadatski, Tomski, Sosnovski, Popov and others. The eldest son of Postyshev, Valentin, and the sons of Evdokimov and Lakoba were shot.

(16) In some camps, hundreds of internees were shot without trial (the *garaninshchina* at Kolyma).

(17) Almost all Mensheviks, left SRs, anarchists, Bundists and *Borotbisty*, who had on the whole left political life, were physically liquidated in the thirties and at the beginning of the forties (among them M. Spiridonova).

(18) This author, who spent a term in the MVD Sevurallag (1941–42) can personally testify that the majority of political prisoners asked to be sent to the front and that the reply to these requests was to condemn them to starvation, which apart from other considerations severely weakened our front.

(19) On Stalin's orders our government refused to have anything to do with the International Red Cross organization for the aid of prisoners of war, since under our system capture equalled treason. This deprived prisoners of material aid and of some control on the conditions of their detention, which contributed to the loss of a great number

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of innocent men (the majority were captured when wounded, unarmed and unconscious).

It was not our intention to present all the accusations against Stalin which he deserves: but the ten-thousandth part of his crimes, as exposed in this declaration, already constitute a body of offences within the terms of articles 64, 68–17, 69, 74, 88–1, 88–2, 108–17, 107, 113–17, 126–17, 130, 131, 170, 171, 229, 230, 247 of the penal code of the RSFSR. If we examine article 38 of the penal code ('extenuating circumstances') we do not find any reason to lessen Stalin's sentence.

On the basis of article 39 of the penal code ('aggravating circumstances'):

(1) Crimes committed by a person who has already committed another crime.
(4) Crime involving serious consequences.
(5) Crime committed against a minor, old person or defenceless person.
(7) Crime committed with extreme cruelty and insult to the victim.

We do not doubt the necessity of referring to article 39 of the penal code in connexion with the accused I. V. Stalin.

It is equally necessary to refer to the terms of article 36 in connexion with Stalin ('deprivation of military and other rank, and of decorations and medals and honorary titles') for this measure is anticipated in the event of conviction of serious crimes.

On what basis will the authors of the articles which I have mentioned and the editors of the review rehabilitate the greatest criminal our country has ever known in its recent history?

I suggest to the authors of the articles in question that they refute the facts that I have enumerated here; refute them in the only way accepted in the society of decent men, that is by publishing my declaration and replying to it. Otherwise, it will only remain for me to conclude that the authors agree with the facts given in my declaration and with the conclusions that are drawn from them. This means that, without waiting for the reply to this declaration, I will consider myself entitled to invite my colleagues taking part in this discussion to address themselves collectively to the *prokuratura* of the Soviet Union with the aim of opening a penal enquiry against Stalin (Dzhugashvili) I. V., accused of the crimes enumerated above. I am sure that a posthumous conviction is possible and legal, just as posthumous rehabilitations are possible and legal.

Moscow, 2 March 1969 P. I. Yakir

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